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FOREWORD
   I began this research with the purport to analyse the idea of the nation elaborated by 
Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915), an Indian intellectual and prominent leader of the 
Indian National Congress from 1901 until his premature death. However, the final outcome 
of my work turned out to be rather different from what I had expected. 
It will be seen that Gokhale’s conceptualisation of the nation has been dealt with mainly in 
the last section of this study, though there are references in earlier sections, when ideas of 
the other leaders of the Indian nationalist movement are taken into consideration. As a 
matter of fact, several important issues, without which the analysis of Gokhale’s ideology 
would have been incomplete, if not incomprehensible, have taken up more space than I 
thought: I hope my decision to pay more attention to the context will help the reader 
understand the complexity of the historical period in question. In particular, I made special 
reference to the influence of European ideas on Indian intellectuals and how these were 
able to blend the old and the new in a creative process of synthesis. Indian liberalism, the 
theorisation of modernity, and the conceptualisation of the nation in the modern meaning 
of the term were all by-products of this process. This challenges the argument that the 
making of modern India was the result of the mechanical application of ‘Western’ values 
and models. It also disputes the logical consequence of this argument, id est, that Indians 
had no historical agency, but were only passively appropriating what the British rulers 
over-imposed. Moreover, I have taken into account some aspects of the political thought of 
the most relevant leaders of the Indian anti-colonial movement, inside and outside the 
Indian National Congress, in order to reconstruct the intellectual debate in which Gokhale 
was involved. What appears is that, since the beginning, Indian nationalism was never 
homogenous. It will be seen that the anti-colonial movement was made up with several 
voices, often diverging, which advocated different concepts of freedom and were more or 
less in favour of, if not against, a just social order for the nation in the making. Thus, I 
suggest that it might be better to speak of an anti-colonial movement, since this term helps 
deconstructing the impression, created ex post by the Indian nationalist historiography, of 
nationalism as a monolithic and uniform phenomenon, whereas it was internally much 
diversified; in certain cases, it opposed Indians - Muslims, Dalits, women and the 
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economically underprivileged - more than the British rulers. In studying this movement, the 
context of Maharashtra, namely the region from where Gokhale hailed, has been taken 
into consideration in order to explain how certain questions were transferred from the 
political regional stage to the national one: also the contradiction between cultural and 
political nationalism that characterised the Maharashtrian political discourse from 1870s 
reached the all-Indian political fore, as the context between Bal Gangadhar Tilak and 
Gokhale shows. 
   Let us now turn our attention to Gokhale in order to briefly introduce what I have 
attempted to investigate in the course of this work. Gokhale is a pivotal figure in the 
political history of India, because he was one of the first intellectuals and politicians to 
frame a modern and secular concept of the nation and to use the platform of the Indian 
National Congress to familiarise Indians with that same concept. Gokhale elaborated a 
liberal and political nationalist ideology, in which the existence of the modern state was the 
precondition for the building of the nation. The nation, in fact, was defined by the 
enjoyment of political and civic rights. So, thanks to the policies of the British Raj, India - a 
geographical and cultural unity - had also become a political unity and all Indians had been 
unified under the same polity. In Gokhale’s political discourse, Indians, being subjects of 
the British Crown, were entitled to citizenship rights: that is why Gokhale did not want India 
to get rid of the British connection; rather, he aspired to the status of dominion for the 
British colony. For this reason, he asked for increasing Indian participation in the colonial 
administration, since he regarded self-government as an essential precondition to steadily 
instil into the Indian people a sense of common good and belonging to the same nation. In 
this sense, the continuance of the British Raj, although progressively Indianised, would 
contribute to keep together the nation, while religion, caste and community divisions would 
become irrelevant under the wider national consciousness. By and large, Gokhale’s 
nationalism advocated the amelioration of India’s economic and social structure and 
admitted the possibility of using the colonial agency to create a juster society. Freedom for 
the nation was not exclusively freedom from the foreigner, but from any kind of injustice, 
regardless of the fact that it was an Indian or a British to perpetrate it. The nation was to be 
built in the future and the common progress that lay ahead was one of its binding factors.
  Since his nationalism was universalist and never anti-British, Gokhale was often belittled 
and called a collaborator of the British rulers by his contemporaries, Tilak in primis. In the 
same way, Indian historiography, especially the nationalist one, has judged Gokhale’s and 
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Tilak’s respective thoughts and actions more from the perspective of the coloniser-
colonised opposition, rather than taking into consideration the nation they were 
envisioning. Tilak, then, emerges as the most uncompromising and heroic champion of the 
freedom struggle of the time, even though caste and gender disabilities were the mainstay 
of his nationalism. So, my work wants to be a contribution - although far from being 
exhaustive - to the comprehension of Gokhale’s idea of the nation, beyond the 
contradiction between colonised and coloniser. I hope that the analysis of the Gokhalean 
conceptualisation of the nation will help to bring the deserved attention to the central role 
attributed by the Congress leader to internal freedom and equality. 
   Unfortunately, due to the paucity of time, I could not deal with the relationship between 
Gokhale and Gandhi. Notwithstanding the fact that Gandhi regarded Gokhale as his 
political guru, I believe that what the two had in common is much less than what is 
generally understood. In fact, a preliminary investigation into the matter has convinced me 
that differences, rather than similarities, stand out between Gokhale and Gandhi. The most 
evident shared aspect is the emphasis both gave to moral and ethics in handling political 
situations, namely the so-called spiritualisation of politics, the priority of the means over 
the end. Moreover, if Gandhi upheld Gokhale’s secularism and, like the latter, maintained 
that all Indians were members of the nation irrespective of their creed, the Mahatma took 
an ambivalent stand as far as the institution of caste was concerned. By adopting (Hindu) 
religious symbols and by mobilising the masses around religious questions, like, for 
instance, the Khilafat movement, Gandhi left behind Gokhale’s teachings and contributed 
to insert religious elements in Indian politics. However, I hope that, in the near future, I will 
have a chance to look into the elements of continuity and change between these two 
pivotal figures of Indian history. 
  Let me just conclude with a few words on the sources I have used to carry out this 
research. I spent the most part of my field-work period in New Delhi, where I could consult 
a great deal of material, both unpublished and published primary sources, but also 
secondary sources to which I could not have been able to have access in Italy. The most 
important sources for the analysis of the idea of the nation have certainly been Gokhale’s 
Private Papers and the collection of the Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. 
Gokhale’s Papers, kept in the National Archives of India, is a valuable collection, from 
which I could see Gokhale’s vision outside the public official discourse; the perception that 
Gokhale had of the other leaders of the Congress and of the anti-colonial movement; his 
concerns about painful and complex issues such as the Hindu-Muslim question or the 
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terrible conditions of Indian indentured labourers in South Africa. Nevertheless, it is the 
Speeches and Writings that were of particular relevance, because it is in the public 
discourse that a certain concept of the nation is circulated and given authoritative voice. 
Besides these two fundamental groups of sources, I have used numerous private papers 
and newspapers of the time to see how Gokhale’s nationalism was received in the public 
sphere and which were the reactions to it. Since I do not know Marathi, the primary 
sources I have used are exclusively in English. However, majority of the documents 
among Gokhale’s papers are in English. In fact, during the period in question, the elite had 
already adopted the English language as lingua franca.
 
   This work could not have been possible without the encouragement and guidance of 
Prof. Michelguglielmo Torri. I have immensely benefited from his unprecedented 
knowledge of Indian history, his countless advices, his invaluable insights, his patience 
and time. For all this, I first and foremost would like to thank him. I would also like to 
extend my gratitude to the Università Statale degli Studi di Milano for awarding me a three-
year scholarship and giving me the opportunity to pursue my research. A special 
acknowledgement goes to the Department of Historical Studies of the Università Statale 
degli Studi di Milano, in particular to Prof. Silvia Maria Pizzetti and Dr. Massimiliano Vaghi, 
who provided me with constructive feedback and unconditional help. My sincere thanks go 
also to all my colleagues who have always expressed interest in my topic and been willing 
to discuss and exchange ideas on it. I am also indebted to Dr. Parimala V. Rao, Zakir 
Hussain Centre for Educational Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), for 
teaching me to look at history from a new, fascinating perspective. I would also like to 
thank the Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, with which I have 
been affiliated for one year, from July 2013 to June 2014. The wonderful assistance I 
received from the staff of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (New Delhi), the 
National Archives of India (New Delhi), the University of Pune Library (Pune), the Gokhale 
Institute of Politics and Economics Library (Pune), the British Library (London) deserves 
special mention. Dulcis in fundo, I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to my husband 
Davide for all his wonderful and genuine support; to my sister Laura and to the rest of my 
family; and to all my friends, old and new, and all equally beloved. They have all 
contributed their bit in the outcome of this work. In particular, my true gratefulness goes to 
Chandan Tiwary for being a devoted companion in my intellectual peregrinations and to 
Denise Ripamonti for bearing with me in the hectic period of the writing of this dissertation 
and for willingly helping me whenever I asked. My thanks go also to Agnese Riva, 
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Alessandra Zappatini, Aparajita and Arijita Mukhopadhyay, Carlos Santos Armendariz, 
Danila Berloffa, Diego Maiorano, Eleonora Paganini, Elisa Bettiati, Erica Sereno, Fahrang 
Haddad, Francesca Schraffl, Giacomo Mastrorosa, Giorgio Bianchi, Giulia Maria Marcolli, 
Kiran Bhushi, Kishalay Bhattacharjee, Martine Chemana, Mihir Srivastava, Sara Galvagni, 
Serena Gianoglio, Sibilla Robutti, Sid Karunaratne, Silvia Malnati, Thierry Di Costanzo, 
and all those who I might have accidentally forgotten: thank you all so much for being 
there. 
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INTRODUCTION
Why a Research on Gokhale?
  The 15 February 2015 marked the centenary of the death of Gopal Krishna Gokhale. As it 
is said, commemoration is generally a good moment to reinterpret history. Yet, my interest 
in this eminent political figure is not really biographical. As a matter of fact, I have decided 
to do a research on him in order to try to fill a historiographical void in terms of history of 
political thought. For, as a young scholar approaching the history of the anti-colonial 
movement, I realised that a great deal of attention was paid to nationalism, whereas the 
theory of nation has been left aside, if not, at least in part, for what concerns the 
juggernauts of the period following Gokhale, namely Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi. 
  The significance of the formulation of the idea of the nation is not to be minimised since it 
was the response that Indian nationalists put forward vis-a-vis the colonial discourse, 
according to which India was not a nation, but only a subcontinent and, as such, 
characterised by multiplex and insurmountable differences. Nonetheless, Indian 
nationalism was not a ‘derivative discourse’, since, in many respects, it adopted European 
ideas in a selective manner to challenge the British subjugation and to decolonize the 
Indian mind. Ideas produced in Europe, inserted in the colonial context and appropriated 
by the Indian thinkers, acquired different meaning, autonomy, and power once they got in 
touch with indigenous ideas.
  On this backdrop, it is fascinating to see how Gokhale, among others, having internalised 
certain new concepts thanks to the Western system of education introduced in India by the 
colonial state, re-used them in order to create some conditions for freedom and democracy 
in the future of his country. Liberalism played a pivotal role in the elaboration of the 
thinking of Gokhale, who, like many other Indian nationalists, subscribed to it, albeit 
keeping a discerning and critical attitude.
  Taken into consideration this scenario of intellectual exchange, I began to understand 
how India, since the nineteenth century, had become part of an international, though small, 
public sphere , within which ideas could easily circulate and move in different directions 1
 C.A. Bayly, “Rammohun Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism in India, 1800-1830” in 1
Modern Intellectual History, 4 (1) 2007, 25-41, here 28. This public sphere consisted for instance of 
public meetings, press, political movements, newly created institutions.
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and not only, as certain historiography holds, from the 'centre' to the 'periphery'. As a 
matter of fact, investigating the history of political thought and ideas can help to 
deconstruct certain misleading schematisations that, since too long, have been trying to 
draw boundaries between ‘West’ and ‘East’, identifying the former with a rational, scientific 
and modern approach to the world, and the latter with an other-worldly, irrational and static 
mentality. Such schemata depict the contact of India with the ‘modern West’ as the factor 
which set into motion a process of modernisation, perceiving it either as a positive factor, 
indispensable for the history and the development - both political and social - of the 
subcontinent, or as a disruptive force which spoiled the real essence of Indian civilisation. 
On the contrary, there are hues and gradations that cannot be ignored, otherwise we run 
the risk to miss the significance of the process of synthesis to which the coming in touch of 
different civilisations usually contributes. 
  Any similar dichotomising approach leaves open the question of what ‘West’ and ‘East’ 
are. These are not unified by a common culture/civilisation. For instance between e.g. 
Indian and Chinese civilisations the differences are as profound, and maybe more, than 
the ones setting apart e.g. Indian and European civilisations . Another dangerous 2
consequence of those interpretative models that consider Western and Eastern countries 
as watertight compartments is that certain concepts and values are rejected as ‘imperial 
categories’, regardless of the fact that they were achievements for all humankind, just 
because they were originated in that part of the world from where imperialism started. 
These are, broadly speaking, the premises on which I started to work at my research.
  At this point, I will try to explain to which elements the historiographical inattention for 
political thought is ascribable. To better clarify this, it is necessary to briefly - and so with 
some unavoidable generalisations - describe the characteristics of Indian historiography, 
with particular attention to the post-independence one. It is possible to identify several 
currents, some of which are more or less interwoven.  
  With the establishment of the British rule in India, history became a contested realm. As a 
matter of fact, the writing of history represented for the colonial officials an important 
instrument through which they could justify their domination in India. The initial admiration 
and respect that British scholars (who were often also administrators of the East India 
 A good starting point on this problem is William H. McNeill’s classical work, The Rise of the West. 2
A History of the Human Community, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963.
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Company and, afterwards, of the Raj) had for the past and rich culture of India  was 3
gradually substituted by a contempt for it: the more the British power increased, the more 
the disdain for Indian history grew. So, according to the European conception of history, - 
whether the unfolding of history was considered as the realisation of the utilitarian 
principle, or as a progressive movement from the imperfect to the perfect, or as a class 
struggle that would lead to the victory of the proletariat - India was uncivilised, ahistorical 
and backward. India, in a word, was Europe's past . Yet, it could fit with the promise of 4
universal progress and be redeemed thanks to the contact with Europe and by emulating 
the latter: substantially, history provided the exculpation of Western dominance over the 
subcontinent and historians were instrumental in producing a discourse of cultural 
superiority and control .5
  As a consequence of the portrait made by the British of their society, Indians reacted 
writing their own history . Thus, the nineteenth century saw a considerable flourishing of 6
historical works, both regional and national, written especially in the vernacular languages, 
but also in English . On the one hand, these histories retained certain cliches of colonial 7
historiography, while, on the other hand, they started rejecting some of its distorting 
aspects. Therefore, even before the formation of an anti-colonial political scene, history 
became a battlefield, where Indians could regain the historical agency denied by the 
British. Through history, the colonised conceived his own identity and pitted it against the 
 For example, Mountstuart Elphinstone and William Jones compared the ancient culture of India to 3
that of Greece and Rome. Elphinstone was the Governor of Bombay from 1819 to 1827, while 
William Jones was a Judge in the Supreme Court of Calcutta, where he founded the Asiatic 
Society.
 Therefore, according to Henry Maine, Professor at Oxford and Cambridge in the second half of 4
19th century, Europe could find its entire past history there (Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the 
Raj, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, 66.
 Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 11.5
 It is beyond the scope of this work to dwell on the British argument that Indians had no historical 6
sense. Suffice to say here that the historical method adopted by the Indians adapted gradually to 
the scientific, Rankean method which had developed in Europe since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. See for example the first chapter of Vinay Lal, The History of History. Politics 
and Scholarship in Modern India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2003, 27-78.
 For instance, the Bangalar Itihas (History of Bengal, 1848) by Ishwar Chandra Bidyasagar and 7
the Bharatbarsher Itihas (History of India, 1859) by Kedar Nath Datta appeared in this period 
(Georg G. Iggers, Q. Edward Wang, Supriya Mukherjee (edited by), A Global History of Modern 
Historiography, Pearson Education Limited, Edinburgh 2008, 103). Note must be taken of the fact 
that the work of Nath Datta was the first history of India written by an Indian. 
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foreign one, while starting to theorise new forms of permanence and change . So, for 8
example, Dayananda Saraswati, founder of the Arya Samaj, Rammohun Roy and Swami 
Vivekananda, although not historians but social reformers, understood very well the 
importance of the historical discourse as an instrument to romanticise the original Indian 
essence, which seemed threatened by absorption into a universalized Europe” . 9
Therefore, they started to produce a counter-history and held that in ancient Hinduism 
reason and technology played already a pivotal role. What needed to be done was to try to 
resuscitate that pure, old Hinduism which had been corrupted in the course of history by 
wrong practices and by fallacious interpretations of the scriptures . Significantly enough, 10
the authentic past of India was Hindu and the advent of Islam was one of the elements 
which caused its deterioration. 
  Substantially, besides being the bedrock of collective self-understanding, history became 
‘a guide for positive change’, namely the way to progress. That is why many social 
reformers were much attracted to it. So, since the 1870s, along with a revivalist 
interpretation of history, a new strand of historical thinking emerged, one that secularised 
the cause of reform and started questioning the possibility of Indian progress under certain 
conditions of the British rule. The most important exponents of this trend were Dadabhai 
Naoroji, Mahadev Govind Ranade, Romesh Chunder Dutt who, although loyal to the 
Empire, started criticising the British domination taking into account historical data, relying 
on British blue books and using parameters similar to the Marxist ones to inform their 
analyses. Furthermore, they disputed the concept of an ancient Hindu Golden Age and 
portrayed the Muslim dynasties and the other regional kingdoms as benevolent and 
inherently part of the history of India .11
  With the achievement of freedom from the British Raj, which represented a major turning 
point in the history of the subcontinent, and, more generally, with the end of the Second 
World War, historical thinking underwent quite understandably a crucial change. On the 
 Michael Gottlob (edited by), Historical Thinking in South Asia. A Handbook of Sources from 8
Colonial Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, Delhi 2003, 2. As Gottlob shows, the 
influence which Western historical thinking wielded on India is still visible in the way Indian history 
is periodised as, accordingly, Ancient, Medieval, Modern with a stress on the dichotomy between 
tradition and modernity or as pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial, again keeping into account an 
external perspective. Historians like Romesh Chunder Majumdar retained the classical 
periodisation, started by James Mill in his History of British India (1817), in a Hindu, a Muslim and a 
British era, where alien invasions and cultural influences are the major historical breaks. 
 P. Heehs, “Shades of Orientalism: Paradoxes and Problems in Indian Historiography”, in History 9
and Theory, vol. 42, 2 (May 2003), 169-195, here 195.
 Iggers, Wang, Mukherjee, A Global History, 101-102. 10
 Iggers, Wang, Mukherjee, A Global History, 108-109.11
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one hand, the rewriting of the history of India (and Asia) originated from the exigence of 
understanding the present, the new global order, which had so rapidly changed. On the 
other hand, the rethinking of history and the reappropriation of a collective memory 
assumed the form of a grandiose mission for Indians: the target was promoting the 
national project and refuting two hundred years of Eurocentric, Orientalist historiography 
which had depicted the encounter of India with the ‘West’ as the key factor which set in 
motion the engine of change and modernisation in the immutable, timeless and static 
subcontinent. Thus, history, being a powerful means to consolidate power, started to be 
encouraged by the new Indian nation-state and gained a great deal of momentum. After 
1947, liberated from foreign rule, "the formerly passive objects of Orientalism had turned 
into active subjects who could reflect autonomously on their historical perspective"  and 12
longed to do away with the distorted colonial interpretation of their past. The time had 
come to “judge our judges”, as the poet, Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore had said.
Nevertheless, since history is never the mere narration of facts, this field kept being, not 
surprisingly, a battleground where "ideas of post-colonial agency moved in divergent 
directions" . Ergo, even though Indians could become masters of their historiography, this 13
did not mean a less controversial interpretation of the past. In fact, past, being always 
interwoven with the forging of identity, was susceptible to different and diverging readings 
according to the kind of identity that one wanted to legitimise and according to how the 
present was to be explained. This fact, together with the understandable urge to retrieve 
the centrality on the stage of history produced sometimes outcomes which were no less 
misleading than the old colonial historiography. 
  It was mainly the patronage of Jawaharlal Nehru, himself thinker and valuable historian, 
to promote the study of history and, through it, to endorse the idea of the nation which he 
had elaborated. The first Prime Minister of independent India (1947-62) saw his country as 
a ‘cultural palimpsest’, formed over the centuries by the stratification of different 
civilisations, among which also the European modernising influence had to be included . 14
The greatness and richness of India were attributable precisely to its mixture of indigenous 
 Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 64.12
 Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 67.13
 The contrast with the anti-modernist and ahistorical Gandhian outlook is rather strong. See 14
ahead.
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and foreign elements, its inclusivity and diversity . Nehru’s definition of India was a 15
powerful instrument that “envisaged a knitting together of India’s many communities into a 
political fabric in which all could have a sense of civic citizenship” .16
  By and large, the new Asiacentric historiography endorsed a reversal of the previous 
interpretations of history. So, for example, the European penetration into Asia which had 
been depicted by the British as a golden age leading towards progress appeared to 
Indians as a period of decadence and crisis, whereas the nationalist movement and the 
decline of the empire was now described as an age of dynamic transformation and 
redemption. This new historiography, mainly nationalist or Marxist, but often inspired by 
both trends, had the merit not only to dispute the one-sidedness of the colonial version of 
history, but also to broaden the historical panorama thanks to the attention given to 
aspects of social and economic history which had been ignored beforehand. It 
acknowledged and utilised the scientific method for the historical research, by giving 
priority to facts and by separating clearly history and fiction, and often adopted a Marxist 
perspective, without being doctrinally and dogmatically circumscribed into the Marxist 
ideology. Thus, especially in the work of the most eminent historians, it contributed to 
explain the awakening of modern India and to identify the most important turning points in 
the evolution of Indian society .17
  Yet, this historiography definitely presented objective limits. For instance, it considered 
the Rebellion of 1857 as the first Indian war of independence or attributed the English 
Industrial Revolution to the conquest and spoliation of Bengal. However, its most important 
characteristic is that it perceived the Indian nationalist movement as a monolithic bloc, as a 
stream which flowed in one direction, without irregularities or deviations. The struggle for 
independence was represented as the apex of the history of India, its historical vendetta 
 On the Nehruvian synthesis, see Iggers, Wang, Mukherjee, A Global History, 237-38. The most 15
important works by Jawaharlal Nehru are The Discovery of India, Oxford University Press, Delhi 
1995 (first published 1946), in which the first Prime Minister defines his idea of nation, and 
Glimpses of World History, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1989 (first published 1934), which 
confutes the Euro-centric interpretation of world history.
 Iggers, Wang, Mukherjee, A Global History, 238.16
 Giorgio Borsa, La nascita del mondo moderno in Asia Orientale. La penetrazione Europea e la 17
crisi delle società tradizionali in India, Cina e Giappone, Rizzoli, Milano 1977, 7-9. The two main 
state-sponsored projects of Indian historiography were the reconstruction of the freedom struggle 
(this expression was considered preferable to independence movement as it conferred more 
significance to Indian agency. It was suggested by the educationist, journalist and education 
adviser Tara Chand. See Iggers, Wang, Mukherjee, A Global History, 239) and the collection of the 
works of the most influential figures of this period, such as Gandhi, Patel, Nehru and Ambedkar, 
something which favoured the collection and preservation of a huge amount of primary sources. 
See also the enlightening contribution by Giorgio Borsa, “L’India moderna nelle storiografie 
britannica e nazionalista indiana”, in Nuova Rivista Storica, 50, 3-4 (1996), 328-366. 
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and, therefore, something sacrosanct, whose justness was indefeasible . For this reason, 18
attempts to analyse it in a more objective and honest mould were perceived as attempts to 
justify imperialism and again as a demonstration of the assertiveness and persistence of 
the colonial vision of the world. Another major consequence of this approach was that 
Nehru and Gandhi  - and the latter in particular - were perceived as the champions of the 19
freedom struggle and as those who were able to gather around the Indian National 
Congress the whole nation, thanks to their capacity to instil into it new force and dignity 
and to lead it towards victory against the overbearing ‘West’; they were the protagonists of 
the process of rehabilitation of India and they somehow dwarfed most of those 
intellectuals, politicians, ideologues and thinkers who had come before and who had 
equally greatly contributed to the awakening of the nation and to create an anti-colonial 
discourse.
  The hegemonic ‘Nehruvian' historiography, along with its inclusive definition of the nation, 
underwent the most virulent attacks by the 'primordialist' historians. According to the latter, 
the Indian nation had always existed, but its evolution had been interrupted by the several 
invasion of which the subcontinent had been victim all over the centuries. In order to revive 
this primordial nation, it was necessary to rediscover it in the past. In such vision, the past 
was the Indian authentic tradition which could be found in India before the advent of the 
See for example Bipan Chandra, 'Nationalist Historians' Interpretations of the Indian Nationalist 18
Movement', in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya and Romila Thapar, (edited by), Situating Indian History: 
For Sarvepalli  Gopal, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1986, 194-238. The recently deceased 
historian maintains that since 1880s there were only three historiographical schools in India: 
imperialistic, nationalist and marxist. He considers the nationalist historiography as a somewhat 
homogenous bloc, despite providing the reader with the caveat that there are several differences 
between author and author. The biggest weakness of these historians, according to Chandra, was 
that they did not take into account the fact that colonialism had a distinct impact on the several 
sections of Indian society. Yet, he as well, by defining the nationalist movement as a a movement 
of the people and for the people, conceives it in a similar way, minimising the internal divergences: 
"Whatever the extent of the actual disillusionment or participation in the actual movement by 
different social classes or strata or groups at any particular stage, the movement represented the 
interests of the Indian people as a whole vis-a-vis colonialism" (idem, 218).
 Of late, Nehru has been object of several scathing critiques within the academic world, both in 19
India and abroad. His concept of modernisation and secularism in particular have been attacked 
for having been borrowed from the West and imported into India and the expression “Nehruvian 
socialism” has acquired a very negative connotation. Otherwise, Gandhi is still kept in the 
pantheon of the freedom fighters and is looked at as the most relevant Indian ideologue, since he 
was against western modernity and drew inspiration from the Indian tradition to formulate his idea 
of nation. This is true especially in respect to the academic establishment. Other sections of the 
society, such as dalit or independent scholars, have criticised Gandhi, especially for his 
conservative social outlook. Interestingly enough, when Gandhi is attacked as a casteist by non-
brahmans, that it socially and politically accepted, as it is perceived as a non threatening, biased 
viewpoint. When it is people like Arundhati Roy, coming from the upper castes, who do that, then it 
is a betrayal, something to condemn.   
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Muslims . Therefore, this view retrieved the nineteenth-century conceptualisation of “a 20
distant Golden Age which was both indigenous and in accord with modern values” . It was 21
a clever solution of the contradiction between preserving tradition and appropriating 
modernity; in fact, those elements useful for the modernisation of society had already been 
inherent, at least in nuce, in Indian society but their diffusion had been hindered by the 
Muslim conquest . So, everything having its origin in Europe and imported into India 22
through colonialism had to be condemned; not even democracy and progress were 
spared, since their ‘genuine’ versions had always been intrinsically part of Indian 
civilisation. It was the task of the historian to provide evidence of it from the tradition . By 23
and large, this perception of history was a by-product of that same Orientalism which it 
wanted to combat, as it accepted the assumption of India as utterly different from the 
‘West’ and not eligible to historical change, since what was useful for the future was 
already existing in the past . There was no need for cultural negotiation, being ‘East’ and 24
‘West’ watertight compartments, whose natures could not communicate. Also historical 
thinking was alien to India, which had other means to understand its Self and claimed its 
own subjective way to appreciate history, for example through mythology. The European 
 Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 33-44.20
 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s, 21
Hurst & CO, New Delhi and London 1996 (first published 1993), 11.
 Such for instance was the interpretation of Radha Kumodh Mookerji (The Fundamental Unity of 22
India, Longmans, London 1914; Nationalism in Hindu Culture, Theosophical Publishing House, 
London 1921) and Kashi Prasad Jayaswal (History of India 150 AD to 350 AD, Low Price 
Publications, New Delhi 1990, first published 1933).
 The historian had "to investigate and unfold the values which age after age have inspired the 23
inhabitants of a country to develop their collective will and to express it through the manifold 
activities of their life" (quoted in Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 67 from K.M. Munshi, 'Introduction', in 
History and Culture of the Indian People, I, Bombay 1951, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 8). Munshi, a 
Gujarati literary figure and scholar who wrote several novels in which he exalted the glory of Hindu 
India and its decline with the advent of the Muslims, was the founder of the educational institution 
and publishing house Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, which is still today dedicated to the promotion of 
Indian, but more specifically Hindu civilisation. He got the financial support of the powerful 
industrial tycoon G.D. Birla for the writing of the multi-volume History and Culture of the Indian 
People, whose editor was Romesh Chander Majumdar, a renowned Bengali historian. The 
ambitious project wanted to replace the biased History of British Indian (1817) by James Mill, but it 
proved to be no less distorted in certain interpretations.
 Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 43. Interestingly enough, the classic British periodatisation of Indian 24
history in the three macroperiods (Hindu, Muslim and British) was not rejected. All the more, the 
Muslim era was looked at as a dark age. K.N. Panikkar has clearly stressed the fact that "the 
resurrection and reinterpretation of the past was not inherently retrogressive, it was only a means 
for self-strengthening and not a basis for a vision of the future". Yet, even if it represented a way "to 
reassert the cultural identity of the colonised" and was only "cultural defence", the result was the 
same as that produced by an intentional cultural revivalism (K.N. Panikkar, "The Intellectual History 
of Colonial India: Some Historiographical and  Conceptual Questions", in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya 
and Romila Thapar, Situating Indian History, 403-433 (here 432, 428, 433).
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pretence of a universal scientific approach to history was just another form of dominance 
and was to be rejected . A quote by Gandhi, who certainly cannot be fitted with the group 25
of those nationalists promoting an exclusive Hindu polity, but who with them shared some 
commonalities of thinking at least in his perception of history and in the language he used, 
is quite interesting to make this concept clearer:
"I have no desire to engage the reader's attention upon my speculations on 
the value of history considered as an aid to the evolution of our race. I 
believe in the saying that a nation is happy that has no  history. It is my pet 
theory that our Hindu ancestors solved the question for us by ignoring history 
as it is understood today and by building on slight events their philosophical 
structure. Such is the Mahabharata" .26
The most direct consequence of this argument  was that if the Hindu essence was what 27
India needed in order to retrieve its lost identity, then everything which had contributed to 
contaminate and weaken it had to be eliminated as incompatible with the revivalist project. 
So, with the demise of the British rule, the Other became the Muslims, a fortiori after the 
'vivisection of the Motherland', that is to say the terrible trauma of the Partition. Not 
surprisingly, this historiography sponsored a strongly biased reconstruction of the past and 
provided the theoretical justification for Hindu nationalism. It was especially Vinayak 
 Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 66.25
 Iggers, Wang, Mukherjee, A Global History, 228, quoted from M.K. Gandhi, 'My Jail Experiences 26
- XI, in Young India (11 September 1924), in Collected Works, CD ROM. According to Gandhi, 
history was never a guide to action, since it was corrupt at the source (See Lal, The History of 
History, 60-67). Yet, it is important to note, as Balakrishna Govind Gokhale [ see 'Gandhi and 
History, History and Theory 11 (1972), 214-25] has shown, that the idea of progress was not 
absent for Gandhi's thought. It was connected with the concept of soul force, which implied 
improvement for man through the making of a new juster history.
 The roots of this perspective lie in the theorisation against British colonialism and modernisation 27
done in the previous century by Vivekananda, Bankim Chandra Chatterji, Aurobindo Ghose, 
Dayananda Saraswati, Bal Gandadhar Tilak, ect., even though, in this revisitation - especially in 
Savarkar’s view - it was more extreme and chauvinist.
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Damodar Savarkar in his Hindutva (‘Hinduness’, 1923)  who paved the way for this 28
interpretation, emphasising the irreconcilability between Hindus and Muslims. In fact, 
Savarkar, a national hero for the Hindu right and the ideological forerunner of Hindu 
political fundamentalism, theorised that Hinduism and Hinduness were two different 
concepts; the former was a religion, deriving from the latter, which was actually an ethnic 
identity. Thus, in his elaboration of Indian identity, Savarkar merged geography, racial 
connection and common religious practices: by marginalising other religions, the Hindu 
nation became the only legitimate Indian nation. Sikhs were included in the Hindu realm, 
because their religion had developed in India, where their main shrines were located, 
whereas Muslims and Christians had “divided loyalties” , because, although part of the 29
India population, their holy lands lay outside India. In this polarising vision of history, Nehru 
and those who, like him, had fought for a multicultural and inclusive nation had betrayed 
the Hindu cause and contributed to contaminate the pureness of Hindu India . 30
  Another historiographical trend opposed to the nationalist-Marxist and to the Hindutva 
ones was the ‘orthodox’ Marxist school which, generally, considered the national 
movement and the Congress as bourgeois phenomena. Often stuck in mechanical and 
narrowly ideological application of the Marxist theory, it focused mainly on the working and 
peasant classes which were left out of the national narrative and did not benefit at all from 
the independence, which, in this view, was a mere change of the vertex of the society. The 
penetration of the capitalistic mode of production was possible thanks to colonial 
domination, which, for this reason, was a seminal factor for the introduction of 
modernisation and of the communist ideology and for the political awareness and class 
consciousness of the masses. Hence, the main figures of the independence movement 
 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva. Who is a Hindu?, Bharti Sahitya Sadan, New Delhi 1989 28
(first published 1923). As noticed by Jaffrelot, Savarkar established an equation between Hindutva 
and ‘Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan’, so that religion, culture, language and a sacred territory are put 
together in order to create the perfect ethnic nationalism [Christophe Jaffrelot (edited by), Hindu 
Nationalism. A reader, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2007, 15]. This work is 
generally considered by Hindu nationalists as one of the most authoritative books and is useful to 
understand their theorisation. Savarkar basically pushed forward the religious homogenisation 
theorised by Tilak and others and in order to do this he understood that it was necessary to 
democratise the Hindu community by including also Dalits within it. In this, he was definitely 
unorthodox and even rebellious, so much that he was attacked by several Brahmans for his 
positions (G.P. Deshpande, The World of Ideas in Modern Marathi, Phule, Vinoba, Savarkar, Tulika 
Books, Delhi 2009, 23-24).
 Iggers, Wang, Mukherjee, A Global History, 231.29
 It is noteworthy that it was a supporter of Hindutva and former member of the Hindu militant 30
youth organisation Rashtra Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Association, RSS) that 
assassinated Gandhi. No matter how much Gandhi was against modernisation and the West, his 
position towards the Muslims was too soft to be accepted by the Hindu right. 
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were members of the elite, they did not represent the voice of the masses and their action 
was not such as to change the course of history in favour of the people . The 31
historiography promoted by Nehru and embracing the Nehru consensus, was, in this 
outlook, an ideological means used by the Indian bourgeoisie against the colonial historical 
discourse and, therefore, no less specious. Even its interest in social history was 
exclusively motivated by the will to include the masses of peasants and workers into the 
freedom movement, "but obviously it was a false image of nationhood", aimed at confusing 
the masses and insert them in the hegemonic culture of the middle classes .32
  Definitely more influential than the previous one was the so-called Cambridge school, 
formed in the 1970s at the University of Cambridge. Its main assumption was that the real 
intent of the leaders of the national movement was to replace their British masters. This 
perspective was undoubtedly ideologically biased as it tried to underestimate the ideas 
and ideology of the Congress and, more generally, of the struggle for independence. It 
stressed the self-interest of the ‘westernised middle class’, disparaging their personal 
integrity and giving importance to the connections between the local interests and the 
political organisations at the national level, Indian National Congress in primis. If, on the 
one hand, such interpretation underlined for the first time the division of the political scene 
in the local, provincial and all-India level, on the other hand it left no space to the role of 
ideology, therefore reducing the independence movement to the capacity of mobilisation of 
the powerful Indian notables. Ideology was only a smoke screen, functional to the 
attainment of power, namely the sole and ultimate purpose of the Indian leaders, flattened 
into a big, homogeneous bloc. There existed no autonomous Indian politics, but only a 
reaction to the British administrative decisions, since all 'stimulating forces' were Western. 
Ideas and the entire intellectual history had no role in creating an ideological basis for a 
modern society, or at least for a society alternative to that promoted by the colonial order. 
 On Marxist historiography in India Ashok Rudra, Non-Eurocentric Marxism and Indian Society, 31
People's Book Society, Calcutta 1988. See, among the works of Indian Marxist historians, 
Mahabendra Nath Roy, Selected Works of M.N. Roy, ed. Sibnarayan Ray, Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi 1987; Shripad Amrit Dange, India: From Primitive Communism to Slavery. A Marxist 
Study of Ancient History in Outline, People's Publishing House, New Delhi 1949 and Selected 
Writings, Long Vangmaya Griha, Bombay 1974. For the works of Rajani Palme Dutt, another 
Marxist historian, consult http://www.marxists.org/archive/dutt/index.htm (visited 1st October 2014). 
Considerable exception to this dogmatic historiography which deserve mention are the works of 
Bipan Chandra, Sumit Sarkar, Irfan Habib and D.D. Kosambi, who, although defining themselves 
Marxist historians, are not easily identifiable with a specific school. According to Bipan Chandra, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Sarvepalli Gopal and A.R. Desai were Marxist historians (Chandra, "Nationalist 
Historians' Interpretation of the Indian National Movement", 195).
 Gottlob, Historical Thinking, 50-55. Quote idem, 55 from Dange, India: From Primitive 32
Communism to Slavery, 12.
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In essence, rebellion was the outcome of the failure to achieve an adequate position in the 
government . No wonder that this historiography was accused of being neoimperialist by 33
many intellectuals, not only from India .   34
  One of the reactions to this historiography, but more generally to elitist-nationalist 
historical strands, was the creation in 1982 of the 'Subaltern Studies' school . It originated 35
mainly out of the critique of the nation as expression of the upper castes and the upper 
strata of society and represented the bitter disillusionment provoked by the repression of 
the 'Emergency' period . The dream of the nation endorsed by Jawaharlal Nehru had 36
failed and it was now time to give voice to the fragments of that betrayed nation and to 
assert the priority of local, narrow identities over national ones. Subaltern studies seemed 
to imply that writing history in India and on India was nothing but a demonstration of "the 
collusion of imperialist and nationalist forces, just as they were singularly lacking in any 
theoretical impulse" . The former just minimised or completely dismissed the significance 37
of any form of resistance among Indians, whereas the latter depicted Indian nationalism as 
a magnificent enterprise in which the agency of the subalterns was denied by the 
indigenous elite. Therefore, it was only the elite who had retrieved the centre of the 
historical stage to the detriment of the underdogs of society. On the one hand, this 
historiography encouraged the study of social history and claimed that there existed no 
fixed notion of modernity, because such an assumption meant the relegation of Other 
modernities into the realm of Europe's past; on the other hand, it aroused doubts - even 
 See the sharp critique of Cambridge school historiography elaborated by Tapan Raychaudhuri, 33
"Indian Nationalism as Animal Politics" in Historical Journal 22 (1979), 747-63.
 The main exponents of this historiographical outlook were John Gallagher, David Washbrook, 34
Christopher A. Bayly, Francis Robinson, Christopher Baker, B.R. Tomlinsons, Anil Seal and Gordon 
Johnson. Not all of them have kept on adhering to the criteria of the school, which was however 
quite heterogeneous since its onset. For an accurate reconstruction of the Cambridge school's 
interpretation see Michelguglielmo Torri, Regime coloniale, intellettuali e notabili in India. Politica e 
società dell'era del nazionalismo, Franco Angeli, Milano 1996, 19-61. Among the works of the 
Cambridge school historians see Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and 
Collaboration in the Late Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1968; 
Gordon Johnson, Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism: Bombay and the Indian National 
Congress 1880-1915, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1973; D.A. Washbrook, The 
Emergence of Provincial Politics. The Madras Presidency, 1870-1920, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1976; B. R. Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, 1914-1947: The 
economics of decolonization in India, Macmillan, London 1979.
 In this year the review Subaltern Studies. Writings on South Asian History and Society (Oxford 35
University Press) was founded and edited by Ranajit Guha. It was a collection of essays mainly by 
South Asian scholars. For an overview on the works of this historiographical trend see https://
dl.dropboxusercontent.com/spa/zohkohb0i282t94/Area%20Studies/public/subaltern/ssmap.htm 
(visited on 3rd October, 2014).
 Lal, The History of History, 19.36
 Lal, The History of History, 192.37
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among some the very founding members of the schools - about whether an academic elite 
could make the subaltern speak. Moreover, was not the concept of a subaltern community 
as much totalising and misleading as a Eurocentric interpretation of Indian past? Did it 
make sense to reject in toto nationalism for being something originated in the ‘West’ and 
even more to draw a clear-cut dividing line between ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ ?38
  It is not very surprising that in such historiographical scenario, the history of political 
thought has been almost completely ignored . As a matter of fact, for nationalist, left-39
leaning, secular historiography the focus had to be mainly on the freedom struggle, since 
intellectual history was concerned only with eminent personalities and this could give the 
misconceiving impression of a resistance movement led from above which had no 
contribution from the grassroots level of society. Ideas were important only when they 
could be proof of the Indianness of the national movement and this explains the over-
emphasis on Gandhi and his anti-modernity Weltanschauung . Moreover, a great deal of 40
attention was given to those nationalists, like Tilak, who combined a certain satisfaction 
with orthodox Hindu mores  (although this is not easily admitted by certain Indian 41
historians) with a bold, defying attitude towards the British Raj. Again, this was aimed at 
stressing the power of Indian resistance and at claiming that independence was achieved 
after a tough struggle and was not a gracious concession conferred by the British. The fact 
that for revivalist historiography everything somehow connected with the corrupt ‘West’ - 
 For a brief introduction and critique to the Subaltern Studies see Lal, The History of History, 38
186-230. Some reviews of the works of the school are Sumit Sarkar, "Orientalism Revisited: 
Saidian Frameworks in the Writing of Modern Indian History", Oxford Literary Review 16, n. 1-2 
(1994), 205-24; Ramachandra Guha, "Subaltern and Bhadralok Studies" in Economic and Political 
Weekly 30 (19 August 1995), 2056-2058; Rosalind C. Morris, Can the Subaltern Speak? 
Reflections on the History of an Idea, Columbia University Press, New York 2010. Later, some 
'subaltern' scholars have been infiltrated by postmodernist ideas and maintained the impossibility 
of a subjective historical inquiry, being history a creation of the mind of the individual. See, among 
others, Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism" in 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 30, n. 14 (8 April 1995), 751-759.
 See also the reflections by C.A. Bayly, "Liberalism at Large:  Mazzini and Nineteenth-century 39
Indian Thought”, in C.A. Bayly, Eugenio F. Biagini (edited by), Giuseppe Mazzini and the 
Globalisation of Democratic Nationalism (1830-1920), Oxford University Press for the British 
Academy, Oxford 2008, 355-374, here 356.
 It is worth mentioning at this point that Indian historians in the 1950s and 1960s were influenced 40
by the historical interpretation of the eminent historian and diplomat K.M. Panikkar, who justly 
maintained that Hinduism, purified from its elements of irrationality and fanaticism, had become a 
fundamental element in the elaboration of the programme of nationalism. This historical standpoint 
was undoubtedly functional to reiterate that nationalism had mostly Indian sources. Yet, at the 
same time, it tended to neglect the opposite development, that is to say the restoration of 
traditional and conservative Hinduism. See Torri, Regime coloniale, intellettuali e notabili in India, 
54-55.
 See apropos of Tilak's conservative social vision Parimala V. Rao, Foundations of Tilak's 41
Nationalism. Discrimination, Education and Hindutva, Orient BlackSwan, New Delhi 2010. 
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and intellectual history and history of political thought are difficultly circumscribable in well 
defined geographical areas - was hardly worthy of any consideration and that for Marxists 
most ideas were nothing but a facade for material interests is quite self-explanatory. As 
seen above, there was no space for intellectual history also in the Cambridge school 
interpretation , while in the Subaltern studies perspective, given its stress on the elements 42
of continuity between British Raj and independent India, it was not really important, as 
political ideas had not proved to be something useful, since anyway, they had failed to 
mould a new, better, less elite-oriented society. At the most, the attention paid by the 
scholars of the subalterns to novels and to the unheard popular voice rather than to politics 
made them interested in the ideas of the people; yet, cultural and social history were 
disconnected from political history.
  What I have mentioned above is a fortiori valid if liberalism is taken into account. And this 
is quite understandable. In fact, liberalism was the core ideology which justified 
imperialism, it implied the mission civilisatrice of the coloniser over the colonised and it 
confined the attainment of freedom only to members of advanced societies, from which 
India, among others, was excluded. Therefore, as C.A. Bayly has illustrated in a recent 
work, Indian liberals attained several derogatory labels in the course of history. Generally, 
they were considered mendicants by the radical supporters of the swadeshi movement, 
self-seeking members of the bourgeoisie by the Marxist historians, office-seeking 
collaborators by the Cambridge schools and elitists using and circulating imperialistic 
categories by certain post-colonial studies . 43
  In the first place, such flattening approaches do not leave space to important questions, 
namely why Indians ideologues and thinkers felt at ease with liberal ideas and why they 
used them to confront foreign domination. As a matter of fact, it ignores the fact that 
liberalism was, to Indians, "a conjunctural phenomenon, rather than simply a lineage or 
influence diffused from Europe to Asia, from metropole to colony. It reflected attempts by 
people - not all of them elite - to grapple with the consequences of globalisation, the 
intrusion of colonial state and the collapse of embodied authority of popes, mandarins, or 
Brahmins which had all happened within a generation" . Liberal ideas gave Indians not 44
only the opportunity to understand the new society in the making, but also the tools to 
 The Marxist outlook of the Cambridge historians - that is the significance conferred to the 42
connection between structure and superstructure - was asserted by David Washbrook. Torri, 
Regime coloniale, intellettuali e notabili in India, 28-29.
 C.A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties. Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire, 43
Cambridge University Press, Delhi 2012, 343.
 C.A. Bayly, "Liberalism at Large”, 355.44
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transform their society the way they wanted it to be, now that, thanks to the penetration of 
Western education, the links with clan, caste, tribe, region were starting loosening and 
intellectuals had begun speaking of nation and its building. This did not imply by any 
means that what was there before the advent of the British had to be invariably wiped out, 
because Indian intellectuals were all quite aware of the fact that 'Western' ideas could be 
installed on the Indian ones. The clear-cut division between a putative ‘East’ opposed to a 
putative ‘West’ - by-product of the Eurocentric history of the world which developed since 
the European fifteenth-century conquests with the main purpose to understand the 
differences between the white man and the other and to maintain that the former was 
better than the latter - is not conducive to understand, if at all, intellectual history, since it is 
not possible to draw boundaries between ideas. And this is arguable with greater reason 
for Europe and Asia, which had been interconnected over the course of history, through 
different flows of influence, both in the material and in the intellectual realm. India was 
never sealed off from the rest of the world and ideas could move freely over boundaries. 
The trade which had unified the Indian Ocean since the first century AD and the invasions, 
after the Aryan migration, of Hellenic Greeks, Arabs, Persians, Afghans, Mongols, Mughal 
and Europeans had a strong cultural impact on the subcontinent . So, both Eurocentric 45
and Asiacentric approaches - the one holding that there are specific factors in European 
civilisation that made it superior and the other rejecting certain values because of their 
geographical origin - are equally misleading and do not help explain why certain 
phenomena originated in a particular area of the world and became significant in other 
areas.
  Secondly, if it is true that liberalism had several undeniable limits, such as the fear of the 
majoritarianism of the masses and hence its exclusionary worldview, it is simplistic to think 
of it as big homogeneous bloc. In fact, there were considerable differences between 
authors, which Indians themselves did not ignore. There was liberalism, but then there 
were individual liberals, as much as there was colonialism and colonial individual 
administrators.
  Ultimately, the dismissal of liberalism as something intellectually naive or socially 
dangerous does not take into account that ideas change according to the context in which 
 For example, as shown by Robert Marks, the Indian Ocean was the single most important 45
crossroad of trade between 650 and 1750 [Robert B. Marks, The origins of the Modern World. A 
Global and Ecological Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-first Century, Second Edition, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007 (first published 1989), 52.
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they are applied and to whom decides to apply them and for which purport . Considering 46
liberal Indians like clumsy emulators of the British and denying them the capability to adopt 
certain ideas and values in a specific context in order to change it contributes to the 
imperialistic version of liberalism which perceived history as a line in which the ‘West’ was 
followed by the rest . On the contrary, admitting that there existed a selective 47
appropriation and re-elaboration of ideas and values acknowledges the significance of 
intellectual exchange in the decolonisation of the mind. 
  Thus, the recent efforts made by certain historiography  to pay new attention to 48
intellectual history, political thought and especially liberalism represent a groundbreaking 
task which is going to bring useful historical interpretations outside "the narratives of the 
nation and empire that have constrained scholarship" . In point of fact, "Indian liberalism 49
was both wider in scope, and more specific in its remedies, than what is commonly called 
nationalism" .50
  Having considered this framework, Gokhale, whom has been so far frowned at as a soft-
spoken, conservative friend of the British rulers and to whom Tilak and Gandhi have been 
easily preferred, acquires considerable importance. In the last decades, Gokhale's thinking 
was seldom subjected to an in-depth analysis and was underestimated as something 
which did not deserve particular attention, given its presumed lack of originality. Apart from 
few good historical researches, Gokhale has indeed nearly disappeared from the 
academic panorama and has fallen almost utterly in oblivion. 
  Notwithstanding this general tendency, I believe that Gokhale is a valuable representative 
of Indian liberalism and, as such, worth studying attentively. For, Gokhale embraced a 
version of liberal thinking purged from capitalistic and imperialistic attitudes; free market 
was condemned as an ideological means to force the underdog countries to remain in a 
position of disadvantage; it was a false argument, according to him, that deep social and 
moral change were the bedrock for political representation, because it was thanks to the 
latter that the former could be achieved, as freedom always required power. These 
 India became an experimental field. See for example this question from the British perspective in 46
Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought, 
University of Chicago Press, London 1999. The author's point is that ideas which were supposed 
to have an universal reach were transformed when they got in contact with the unfamiliar, that is to 
say Indian reality (idem, 8). See also Bayly, Recovering Liberties, passim. 
 See Niall Ferguson, Civilization: the West and the Rest, Penguin, New York 201147
 See, besides the works already mentioned by Mehta and Bayly, the special issue of Modern 48
Intellectual History 4, 1 (2007), and Andrew Stephen Sartori, Liberalism in Empire. An Alternative 
History. California University Press, Berkeley 2014.
 Shruti Kapila, in Preface of Modern Intellectual History 4, 1 (2007), 4.49
 Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 1.50
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elements and many others which I will try to describe in the course of this work are some 
of the foundations of Gokhale's outlook and I think that they are quite telling of the specific 
mould attained by liberal thought in a context of political subjugation. By and large, 
liberalism became Indian when it was implanted in peculiarities belonging to a social-
cultural reality completely different from the one in which it was originated and evolved. 
Therefore, from being the ideology which justified British rule in India, liberalism was 
mutated into an instrument of dissent and resilience against that same rule and, 
significantly enough, against those variants of nationalism that, in the name of social order 
and cultural authenticity, did not recognise any liberty to the single individuals, much less 
to women, economically unprivileged and untouchables. In this sense, far from being a 
conservative system of thinking, liberalism became a radical tool in the hands of a 
subjected people, trying to defy at the same time the colonial and the pre-modern feudal 
order.
  Then, revisiting Gokhale’s nationalism is seminal not only in order to reconsider him as 
an influential exponent of liberalism, but also to better appreciate the very nature of the 
anti-colonial movement, which, since the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, 
was by no means unidirectional and uniform. On the contrary, to follow the argument made 
above, there was nationalism and there were nationalist leaders. And not all of them had 
the same concept of freedom, as for some it meant independence from foreign rule in 
order to recreate the pre-colonial social feudal order, namely a caste-oriented and 
conservative society, whereas for others freedom was the liberation from the British yoke 
so that a modern nation-state founded on democratic principles could be pursued. The 
Congress party itself was only one expression of the multifaceted nature of the anti-
colonial movement .51
Having tried to delineate the reasons why the history of political thought has kindled so 
less interest and why it should instead be a subject of investigation, as it is actually 
becoming, it is now time to examine some of the most relevant historiographical works on 
Gokhale and see how he was generally perceived. 
 Parimala V. Rao, (edited by), New Perspective on the History of Indian Education, Orient 51
Blackswan, New Delhi 2014, 36. The editor very interestingly shows how the history of education is 
an important field in order to deconstruct the schematisation coloniser/colonised and caste/class. 
The attitude held by the leaders towards the issue of education, since it is a fundamental social lift, 
is useful to understand what kind of society they aimed to and, therefore, whether they defended 
their class and caste interests or they wanted a collective social progress (See idem, Introduction 
and, by the same editor, "Compulsory Education and the Political Leadership in Colonial India", 
151-175).
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It has been said above that Gokhale, together with other leaders labelled as Moderates, 
was for a long time considered a gullible politician, manipulated by the British and 
incapable of conferring the national movement a large-scale impact. This view was 
encouraged by the fact that the Moderates, for a series of conjunctural factors, saw their 
power tarnished by the Extremist politics and were afterwards totally shadowed by the 
advent of Gandhi. Therefore, the so-called Extremists, by virtue of their powerful position 
in the Congress before it was taken by Gandhi, were considered worthy of more 
consideration, since they had been able to raise their voice against the British and to 
undermine the gutless Moderate establishment. 
As a reaction to such attitude, some friends and disciples of Gokhale, in particular 
members of the Servants of India Society, authored several books on him out of devotion 
and admiration. Most of these works, not surprisingly, are characterised by an apologetic 
and defensive posture, but have the merit to have encouraged the collection of documents 
by Gokhale, such as his speeches and writings, in addition to reproducing - although 
sometimes in a biased or altered way - some personal aspects of Gokhale's life, which 
cannot otherwise be grasped by working only with archival material. Therefore they have 
paved the way for future researches . Among this works, the short book by Gandhi is 52
certainly worth mentioning, all the more because the Mahatma considered Gokhale his 
political guru . In Gandhi's opinion, Gokhale's religion was a civic religion, which implied 53
pureness of means towards the ends, courage, patience, humility, sense of justice, 
straightforwardness and perseverance in the common interest of the nation. Gandhi 
respected Tilak, since he could captivate the imagination of his people, but he felt closer in 
spirit to Gokhale, despite several differences in their outlook . For instance, in terms of 54
social customs, Gandhi did not share his guru's stand about widows' marriage, even 
though he agreed that the condition of women had to uplifted. They differed utterly in their 
estimate of Western civilisation and democracy and in the usefulness of industrialisation, 
 Unfortunately, not being a Marathi-speaker, I can mention only English-written books. Among 52
these works see, for example, Vaman Govind Kale, Gokhale and Economic Reforms, Arya 
Bhushan Press, Poona 1916; T.K. Shahani, Gopal Krishna Gokhale: A Historical Biography, R.K. 
Mody, Bombay 1929 John Somerwell Hoyland, Gopal Krishna Gokhale: His Life and Speeches, 
YMCA Publishing House, Calcutta 1933; T.N. Jagadisan (edited by), My Master Gokhale: A 
Selection from the Speeches and Writings of Rt. Hon'ble V.S, Srinivasa Sastri, Model Publications, 
Madras 1946; P. Konanda Rao, Gokhale and Sastri, Prasaranga, Mysore 1961.
 Mohandas Kharamchand Gandhi, Gokhale, My Political Guru, Navajivan Publishing House, 53
Ahmedabad 1955.
 Nonetheless, as it has been noted by several scholars, if on the one hand Gandhi retained 54
Gokhale's vision about the spiritualisation of politics and about the primacy of means over ends, on 
the other hand, he adopted Tilak's methods in order to mobilise people. The utilisation of a 
religious language to speak to the people is an example.
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being Gandhi against them and Gokhale a sponsor of them. Moreover, the public display 
of religion was something Gokhale did not agree with, because it roused the passion of the 
‘ignorant’ masses, whereas it was exactly what made Gandhi so popular among the 
people. By and large, Gandhi considered Gokhale his master, because he had taught him 
and Indians that political life, but also life in general, had to be spiritualised and to become 
a self-negating mission. In this respect, Gokhale was, in Gandhi’s view, a real sanyasin. 
Therefore, Gandhi accepted the theoretical frame in which, according to Gokhale, political 
life had to be inserted, but rejected some core ideas of which Gokhale's thinking consisted, 
namely democracy and liberalism.
  D.B. Mathur  depicts Gokhale as a conciliator, who tried to surmount the breaches 55
between Indians and British, Hindus and Muslims, within the Congress, as well as within 
Hinduism. He was the champion of fair play and respect towards the opponents. The 
author maintains that the labels 'Extremist' and 'Moderate' are not adequate to explain the 
different strands present in the two formations. Nevertheless, this work lacks any 
explanation about the reasons why Tilak and his faction could mobilise people in 
Maharashtra more easily than Gokhale did. 
  An important work by Stanley Wolpert appeared in 1961 with the title Tilak and Gokhale. 
Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India . The author takes into account the 56
simultaneous political careers of the two Pune leaders and creates a scheme in which they 
occupy antithetical positions. In fact, even if both their outlooks were a reaction to the 
colonial ideology, the outcome was quite opposite. So, Tilak was socially conservative and 
perceived ‘East’ and ‘West’ as utterly incompatible. Therefore, it was preferably to him to 
keep a reactionary social outlook, rather than accept the modernisation - whatever it was - 
coming from Occident. Substantially, according to Wolpert, Tilak's strong traditionalism 
was tactical as it represented a polemic contraposition to the British Raj and was then a 
form of nationalism. India had no need to import methods and tactics from outside 
because through the revival of Hinduism, namely the richest heritage of the Indian 
civilisation, the society could achieve swarajya, that is to say Hindu rule, and be redeemed 
from the colonial curse. On the contrary, Gokhale, fervent admirer of European philosophy 
and political thought, from which he drew a great deal of inspiration, had a relativistic 
approach to political and social issues; he blamed the backwardness of Indian society on 
 D.B. Mathur, Gokhale, a Political Biography: A study of his Services and Political Ideas, 55
Manaktala, Bombay 1966.
 Stanley A. Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale. Revolution and Reform in the making of Modern India, 56
Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1989 (first published 1961).
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Hindu orthodoxy and on the mistaken overlapping of religious belief and social practice. 
The attainment of self-government was crucial for the progress of the nation, but not 
enough to liberate it from its social evils. The solution consisted in the spread of education 
and in the introduction of radical social reforms in order to uplift the masses. By and large, 
Wolpert properly underlines the divergent views held by Tilak and Gokhale in terms of 
social questions, comparing their conflicting opinion about progress and evolution. Yet, the 
weakness of this interpretation is that Gokhale is portrayed as champion of modernity, 
while Tilak as the representative of tradition. The corollary of such schematisation is that 
Gokhale's thinking is the result of the progress and rationality achieved by the Indians 
thanks to the contact with the British, whereas Tilak is weighed down by the Oriental 
irrationality. The outcome is a dichotomising simplification of the two politicians. Moreover, 
the author applies this schematisation also to their political vision, underestimating the fact 
that, especially after the death of Gokhale, Tilak founded the Indian Home Rule League 
and supported the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms with the purport of exploiting British rule 
through constitutional methods and in order to obtain self-government and the dominion 
status within the empire . 57
  Another seminal work, which is a reference book for anybody interested in Gokhale is 
B.P. Nanda's Gokhale. The Indian Moderates and the British Raj, first appeared in 1977, 
but recently republished in an omnibus edition : this is by far the best and most complete 58
biography on Gokhale. The author does not take an hagiographical or sympathetic stand, 
but makes a reliable and judicious reconstruction of the Maharastrian leader's life and of 
the relations between the Congress and the British Raj. Nanda maintained that it was 
somehow thanks to Tilak that Gokhale could become a politician at the all-India level, 
since he was deprived by the rival of an effective political base in Poona. According to the 
 Another remarkable work on Tilak, which emphasises the significance of the utilisation of myth 57
as a means to politicisation where mass mobilisation is difficult, is Richard Cashman, The Myth of 
the Lokamanya, University of California Press, Berkeley 1975. The author writes "“To the majority 
of western scholars Gokhale exemplifies the values of the academe, liberalism, scholarly integrity 
and detachment from the rancour of professional politics. Tilak is disdained for his obvious relish 
for political infighting and is blamed for later Poona manifestations of regional chauvinism and 
Hindu revivalism” (idem, 4). Yet, according to Cashman, Tilak understood the very nature of power 
and the demands of leadership (5), he was modern and liberal, but had to cope with a traditional 
society (217-221). For a compendium about the interpretations of Tilak thinking and political action 
see Biswamoy Pati (edited by), Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Popular Readings. Primus Books, Delhi 
2011.
 B.R. Nanda, Three Statesmen. Gokhale, Gandhi and Nehru, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 58
2004. Along with Gokhale. The Indian Moderates and the British Raj, it includes also Mahatma 
Gandhi. A biography (first published 1958) and Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman (first 
published 1995).
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author, the difficulties which the founders of the Indian National Congress had to face were 
not totally appreciated by the following generation, who tended to denigrate the Moderates 
as mendicants and representatives of their own class interests. Nonetheless, their work 
was crucial. In fact, they paved the way for their successors, because "the evolution of an 
Indian nationality was not so simple or inevitable a phenomenon as it may seem today. But 
for the skill and tenacity of a few able and outstanding men, Indians and Britons, it might 
have been delayed, if not halted altogether" . That view was somehow justifiable in the 59
1920s, as the new leaders wanted to overcome the previous methods and discourses - 
deemed to be the main cause of the Congress failure, whereas actually they were the only 
viable ones in the period of zenith of British domination - in order to give a new intensity 
and a larger political base to the nationalist movement. Yet, such interpretation of the 
Moderates persisted for long, so much that, even today Tilak is certainly better 
remembered than Gokhale in the collective imagination. In substance, Nanda gives back 
to Gokhale his rightful place among the leaders of India, significantly situating him at the 
same level of Gandhi and Nehru
  Although not a book specifically on Gokhale, Parimala Rao's Foundations of Tilak's 
Nationalism  is worth mentioning, since it pays a great deal of attention to the internal 60
contradictions within Indian society and how they reflected into the national movement. 
Rao compared Tilak's ideology with that of other liberal thinkers and politicians from the 
same region, including of course Gokhale. The overall picture is that social reforms had 
from the very beginning a divisive effect on the anti-colonial movement. With their 
emphasis on the individual uplifting, in fact, social reformers implied the nullification of 
certain particularistic high-caste privileges, namely landlord and moneylender interests, 
and the end (or at least the reduction) of the paternalistic and patriarchal characteristics of 
the social structure, which the members of the so-called Extremist faction, which Rao calls 
Nationalists using the term preferred by Tilak to define his own group, wanted to 
safeguard. In other words, Nationalists represented the landed elite of Maharashtra and 
they were equally against Reformers, or Moderates, and colonial rule, being both a threat 
to their dominant social status. Rao's book is groundbreaking, since it describes in a very 
accurate way how Tilak wanted to reinforce social and economic discrimination in the 
name of nationalism. Moreover, it deconstructs the misconception - dating back to the 
colonial period and retained by certain historiography - that Brahmans, especially 
chitpavan Brahmans, that is to say the caste to which most leaders of the region belonged, 
 Nanda, Gokhale, 480.59
 Parimala V. Rao, Foundations of Tilak's Nationalism.60
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Gokhale and Tilak included, constituted a homogenous, monolithic group. In addition to 
this, Rao shows that both Reformers and Nationalists equally appealed to the 
Government, but their demands were clashing, since they wanted opposite social orders; 
Naoroji, Ranade, Agarkar and Gokhale were in favour of social change which could bring 
about a juster society, whereas Tilak and his following wanted the restoration of the status 
quo, before the coming of the British. As a consequence, the interpretation of Gokhale as 
British Raj supporter and elitist and of Tilak as nationalist mass leader is finally refuted.
  All things considered, it is now time to revisit Gokhale in the light of the most recent 
studies and beyond his political leadership, failures and successes, but looking into the 
questions that characterised his thinking. It will be therefore the purport of this work to try 
to investigate his idea of the nation, his concept of liberalism and his elaborations of a 
more equitable social order. This is not meant to be a retreat to elite history - something 
which anyway cannot be easily dismissed, considered the pivotal role played by elites in 
the making of history - but a new, maybe small, tesserae in the still partly unexplored 
mosaic of Indian intellectual history and history of political thought.
The significance of Gokhale in Today’s India
  However, before starting, a question comes spontaneous to the scholar of history. As a 
matter of fact, as the eminent Italian historian Benedetto Croce maintained, history is 
always contemporary history , that it to say that the interest kindled by the past originates 61
from the need to illuminate and understand the present in which we are living. It is exactly 
this urge to explain the contemporaneity and its roots that differentiates the engagé 
historian and the erudite historian. So, if it is quite indisputable that Gokhale was an 
important politician and that his 'humane, secular, liberal nationalism' contributed to shape 
the aftermath India, it is necessary to appreciate why he was forgotten and, above all, why 
it would be constructive to bring him back to memory in today’s India. This question is even 
more crucial in the turn that India has taken of late, with the reawakening of an alarming 
religious nationalism and with the crisis of secularism. It is quite difficult to give an 
exhaustive explanation of what happened and this introduction is not meant to be such. 
Yet, it will be conducive to try to delineate shortly the developments which made possible a 
change of direction in terms of secularism and inclusivity and to identify the breaking 
points which contributed to produce deep changes in Indian society. 
 Benedetto Croce, La storia come pensiero e come azione, Bari, Laterza, 1938, p. 5.61
 29
After independence, India became a democratic, secular country. Nevertheless, this was 
not an inevitable or granted development. On the contrary, without the commitment of 
Jawaharlal Nehru and other leaders both in the Congress and outside it, India could have 
turned into the Hindu counterpart of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In fact, as we have 
seen, both religious nationalism - otherwise called communalism  - and secular 62
nationalism were inherent in the anti-colonial movement since its beginning. Both these 
versions of nationalism were equally a byproduct of modernisation and the outcome of the 
process of the forging of Indian identity; both utilised elements of modernity and tradition to 
respond to the colonial critique of India's being a non-nation. Religious nationalists 
considered the nation as the community of all the coreligionists, or, in its extreme version, 
religion was transformed in ethnic identity, while to secular nationalists equality towards 
different religious communities and multiculturalism were the foundation of the nation. 
  The British officials of the Indian colonial Government were well aware of the fact that the 
administrative unity which for the first time had embraced the whole subcontinent had 
spurred a sense of national belonging in India and, in the name of this, Indians had started 
contesting the British rule, at least in certain aspects. Therefore, for the sake of the 
continuance of their hold over India, the British did not hesitate to play an active role in 
creating religious and religious-caste identities in the subcontinent. In fact, thanks to the 
methodological instruments of new social sciences such as anthropology and sociology, 
scholars at the service of the British Raj "demonstrated" that communities based on 
religion and caste had political functions which dated long back and these deep divisions 
were permanent and irreparable, so much so that any legitimacy to the national claims of 
the Indians could be denied, as they were Hindu, Muslims, Parsis, Brahmans, etc. rather 
than Indians belonging to the same nation . Furthermore, for instance, census operations 63
were carried out taking into account the belonging of the individuals to a specific religious 
 This means the transformation of the Hindu and Muslim communities in political categories. In 62
Gyanendra Pandey's opinion the term 'communalism' is a legacy of Orientalism, since in the 
colonial ideology it was employed to indicate a form of politics imbibed with religion which was 
different from the secular state politics promoted by the British. See Gyanendra Pandey, 
Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1990, 8-9. 
According to Shabnum Tejani, Communalism was never defined in a clear-cut way and it was often 
used by the majority in a rather arbitrary way as everything which was asked or said by the 
minority vis-a-vis what was asked and said by the majority (Shabnum Tejani, Indian Secularism. A 
social and Intellectual History 1880-1950, Permanent Black, New Delhi 2007, 260).
 Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e nazionalismo musulmano in India nell'era coloniale”, in Mario 63
Mannini (a cura di), Dietro la bandiera. Emancipazioni coloniali, identità nazionali, nazionalismi 
nell'età contemporanea, Pacini editore, Ospedaletto (Pisa) 1996, 139-99, here 163-64.
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community and to a specific caste (ranked in a hierarchical order) . It is quite easy to 64
appreciate that the legitimation by the state of such divisions not only made them more 
rigid, but also encouraged them to become socio-political formations which could interact 
with the government . As a consequence, religious communities started having their own 65
leaders, in order to better convey their grievances to the colonial officials and to obtain 
advantages, indeed reenforcing the argument that the belonging to a certain religious 
community meant having different economic, social and political interests . 66
  These communities had of course existed before the colonial rule but had never been 
politically organised as separate groups and so had never had the function of political 
forms of aggregations. Before the nineteenth century, more than horizontal organisations 
like class and caste, the most important connections within Indian society - but this is true 
also for Europe - were of a vertical kind. In fact, the vertex and the basis of society were 
connected top-down through patron-client relations which created links of solidarity that cut 
across religious and caste groups. In short, only the upper stratum of society, regardless of 
their religious belonging, shared the power. Moreover, until late eighteenth century, 
identities were extremely parochial and were generally limited to kin and village and also 
caste identity had a very local dimension . 67
  On the other hand, liberalism with its stress on the individual, and secularism with the 
emphasis on the private dimension of religion, penetrated into India thanks to Western 
 The first all-India census was carried out in 1871, after being tested in some provinces of the 64
Raj. It aimed at collecting data for the whole of India in terms of age, caste, religion, occupation, 
education and infirmities. Religion represented a fundamental category and “in the minds of the 
census officials was not merely a basic category but a factor which cut across nearly all of human 
existence. This pervasive character of religion did not disappear from later census reports, but 
increased” Moreover, “the census reports provided a new conceptualisation of religion as a 
community, an aggregate of individuals united by a formal definition and given characteristics 
based on qualified data. Religions became communities mapped, counted, and above all 
compared with other religious communities” (Kenneth W. Jones, “Religious Identity and the Indian 
Census” in N. Gerald Barrier, The Census in British India. New Perspectives, Manohar, Delhi 1981, 
73-101, here 80-81, 84). On the shaping of communities see also Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 
132-148.
 In the interpretation of others, this division had existed since the Eighteenth century in a form not 65
very different from that of the Nineteenth century. See for example Christopher A. Bayly, "A pre-
history of Communalism? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860", Modern Asian Studies, 19, 2 
(1985), 177-203. Nonetheless, the extent of such rivalry was never at the All-India level
  Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 19.66
 Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e nazionalismo musulmano", 165. There are important works which 67
confute the colonial discourse of the antiquity of such communities. Among others, see Satish 
Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court 1707-1740, People's Publishing House, New 
Delhi 1959; M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, Asia Publishing House, Bombay 
1968; Robert C. Hallissey, The Rajput Rebellion Against Aurangzeb, University of Missouri Press, 
Columbia 1977; Michelguglielmo Torri, "The Hindu Bankers of Surat and their business world in the 
second half of the 18th century", in Modern Asian Studies, 25, 2 (1991), 367-401. 
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education. If these ideologies were instruments for the colonial rule to legitimise the 
permanence of British domination, namely they were imperial categories in the Indian 
context, they became soon functional for certain Indian nationalists to contest that same 
colonial order. Therefore, the foundation of the Indian National Congress represented in 
the eyes of its creators the epitomisation of the project of a nation in fieri which was 
predicated on the progress of society and on the application of those very principles of 
liberalism. So, the Congress turned into a powerful tool, a constructive platform which 
could help overcome the innumerable socio-religious divisions extant in Indian society. 
Then, being Indians meant playing down the objective elements of divisions, such as race, 
religion, language, culture, while stressing the subjective will to be part of the nation in the 
making . In this framework, secularism was perceived as a way to reduce the risk of strife 68
between communities; it did not deny freedom of religion to the single individual and in the 
private sphere, but it rejected to confer any value to sect and caste belonging .69
  Nevertheless, there were certain limits which prevented the masses from being included 
in the early nationalist liberal discourse. In fact, even if not particularly rich or not rich at all, 
the Congressmen were a group of privileged people compared with the average Indian; in 
most cases they belonged to the higher castes , whose culture emphasised society as an 70
organic whole. These cultural factors, along with the internalisation of the fear of the 
masses inherent in the liberal ideology, made the intellectuals of the Indian National 
Congress generally reluctant about the advisability of mobilising the lower strata of society. 
Therefore, they deemed more convenient for the sake of the unity of the anti-colonial 
movement to provide the ‘ignorant’, illiterate masses with means of self-elevation, such as 
for instance education and patronising social reforms . Of course, this social project of 71
gradual change was feasible only in the long-term and in the meanwhile the masses 
remained marginalised. Thus, either liberalism or secularism could wield hardly any 
influence on them.
  This situation created impatience among certain political leaders, who saw the 
‘hinduisation’ of the concept of nation as an easy way out of it. As a matter of fact, Hindu 
 Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e nazionalismo musulmano”, 160-62.68
 This is not to say that the liberal leaders of the nationalist movement were not themselves 69
influenced by religion. They certainly were, as they were part of families in which religion was still 
an important element in everyday life, but they hoped that religion could be relegated in the realm 
of the personal, whereas in the political sphere all Indians would become only citizens of the state, 
regardlessly of their creed or caste.
 Romila Thapar, ‘Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient history and the modern-search for a 70
Hindu identity’, Modern Asian Studies, 23 (2), 1989, 209-231, here 229.
 Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e nazionalismo musulmano”, 168.71
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associations like the Hindu Mahasabha  and the Arya Samaj , which had gained 72 73
momentum thanks to the Renaissance of Hinduism in the course of the nineteenth century, 
started becoming strongly aggressive and promoted campaigns such as the cow 
protection movement, which proved crucial to mobilise the people against the British but, 
unfortunately, also and especially, against the Indian Muslims . Not surprisingly, not only 74
was Hindu nationalism perceived as an alarming threat by the Muslim minority, - who felt 
already jeopardised by the fact of being educationally and socially backward in comparison 
with their Hindu compatriots - but also the Congress started being increasingly regarded 
as the party in the service of the Hindu majority . In fact, the Arya Samaj and especially 75
the Hindu Mahasabha had close links with the Congress and constituted its traditional 
section. It follows that Hindu nationalism represented a serious challenge from within for 
the supporters of a secular and inclusive idea of nation, who often had to come to terms 
with the representatives of a culturally defined nation. 
 For an insight about the Hindu Mahasabha in the pre-independence period see part I of 72
Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 11-79.
 On the Arya Samaj and the thought of its founder see J.T.F. Jordens, Dayananda Saraswati: His 73
Life and Ideas, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1978. The Arya Samaj had some doctrinal 
similarities with Sikhism, for example in its iconoclasm and in its posture against the superiority of 
Brahman priests and this can maybe explain its diffusion mainly in Punjab. Yet, significantly 
enough, it retained the protection of the cow, a brahmanical ritual, as its warhorse (Van Der Veer, 
Religious Nationalism, 91-92).
 In fact, for Muslims, the sacrifice of a cow during the festival of Bakr-Id is a significant ritual in 74
Islamic religion which commemorates Abraham’s offer to Ishmael. The sacrifice of the cow became 
a strong symbolic issue: on one side the Hindus who wanted to protect the gau mata, on the other 
side the Muslims which did not give up their right to carry out their celebrations. Furthermore, the 
associations above-mentioned adopted also forms of proselytism, which had never been inherent 
in Hindu tradition until then, but they were justified by the argument that it was just to convert 
Muslims, since for the great majority of them, Hinduism was the religion of their ancestors.
 This does not mean that the Muslims left the Congress en masse after the formation of the All-75
India Muslim League (1906). Furthermore, there were several moments in which the Congress and 
the League worked in concert in order to find a solution which could safeguard the Muslims in the 
would-be independent India. Yet, given the narrow-mindedness and violent posture of the Hindu 
nationalists and the shortsightedness of the most influential Congress leaders, from the late 1930s 
onwards, the leader of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, transformed his discourse of 
protection of the Muslim rights within a unitary India in a demand for an independent state for his 
coreligionists, in order to avoid their annihilation. Therefore, the emergence of Indo-Muslim 
nationalism was a reaction to the aggressiveness of Hindu nationalism, rather than to colonial 
power. Despite its vital importance for the future of the subcontinent, I am not encompassing here 
this question. Suffice it to say that the Muslim community was very heterogeneous and it was the 
depiction that certain Hindu leaders made of Islam as the cause of Indian decadence that 
contributed to its consolidation as a national group. The British, in tune with their divide-and-rule 
strategy, took advantage of the malcontent of the Muslims to stoke them against the Indian 
National Congress and supported very actively the formation of the All-India Muslim League. See, 
among many others, Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930, 
Manohar Publications, Delhi 1991; Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e nazionalismo musulmano”; 
Ayesha Jalal, The sole spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Partition, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985.
 33
The bifurcation of the national movement in two variants, that is to say, on the one hand a 
secular and inclusive one vis-a-vis on the other hand a religious and exclusive one, 
represented since the 1880s a rift within Indian society which would perpetuate itself. It is 
not difficult to appreciate why in a country like India, characterised by an extremely high 
level of illiteracy and deeply infused with religious sentiments, the religious version of 
nationalism could obtain a great deal of success. People could understand better the 
language of religion than that of secularism, with which only the more educated people 
were familiar . Therefore, religion and myth constituted easier means towards 76
politicisation and mass mobilisation, as the examples of Tilak and Gandhi demonstrate. In 
short, Hindu nationalists had the advantage to operate in a socio-cultural context in which 
religion could easily be accepted as a strong element of identity. By injecting religion into 
politics, they contributed to hinder the process of secularisation which had just falteringly 
started in the urban areas, where people were more exposed to a public sphere within 
which the new ideas of liberalism and secularism had started to circulate. 
  Hinduism, by virtue of its social relevance, could wield a certain political influence on the 
state even after independence, although the Indian Constitution incorporated the principles 
of freedom of worship, which had to be private and personal, and left no space for 
religious, sect and caste identities . The concept of Indian secularism, as it was included 77
in the Constitution, had its foundation in the equal respect for all religions and not, unlike 
the Ataturk or Soviet version of it, an equal hostility to any form of religion . 78
  The political project of secularism at the state level, which was supposed, in concert with 
modernisation, to favour the secularisation process at the cultural level  - and at the same 
time to be strengthened by it, inducing a virtuous circle - was carried on by Jawaharlal 
Nehru . Although Partition created favourable conditions for the expansion of Hindu 79
 See Kaviraj, "Languages of Secularity" in EPW, Revisiting Secularisation, 93-94.76
 The reservation policy in favour of Dalits advocated by Ambedkar was supposed to be temporary 77
and not aimed at perpetuating the existence of caste. According to Ambedkar, minorities should not 
perpetuate themselves as much as majorities should not discriminate minorities. The aim of the 
reservation policy was to facilitate the merging of the two in the future (Tejani, Indian Secularism, 
260).
 Rajeev Bhargava, "Reimagining Secularism. Respect, Domination and Principled Distance" in 78
EPW, Revisiting Secularisation, 79-92, here 87-91. 
 Nehru personally was not attracted at all to religion. In his view religion was ““closely associated 79
with superstitious practices and dogmatic beliefs and behind it lay a method of approach to life’s 
problems which was not certainly that of science. There was an element of magic about it and 
uncritical credulousness, a reliance on the supernatural” (Nehru, The Discovery of India, 26). 
Therefore, India had to reduce its attachment to religion and confide more and more in scientific 
method and reason.
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nationalism, Nehru by the 1950s, was able to impose secularism as the ‘legitimate norm’  80
in Indian political system and to make it an ‘index of legitimacy’  in the political scenario. 81
He showed admirable promptness in limiting the sphere of action of Hindu nationalists by 
crashing those groups who wanted to mobilise people over sensitive issues such as  the 
Ramjanmabhoomi  or the protection of the Hindus in East Pakistan. Nehru was adamant 82
in resisting not only the forces of Hindutva, but also those traditionalists within the 
Congress who often advocated the Hindu cause and pushed for a more condescending 
posture towards the majoritarian religion .83
  Notwithstanding Nehru’s efforts, as Peter Van Der Veer argues, the Congress somehow 
detached from the commitment to secularism in order to conform to the Gandhian legacy 
and to the Hindu discursive tradition. In fact, the Congress political discourse was:
"not secular but it imagines a common ethnic culture of India in terms of 
religious pluralism. In this moderate view the different communities that 
populate the nation have to be represented in the state. This implies that the 
legal system has to acknowledge pluralism in personal law and that the 
educational system has to pay attention to a plurality of languages and 
religions. When conflict arises between groups with different ethnic and/or 
religious identities – that is, between subnationalities – the state is seen to 
represent a superior common interest and to stand above the conflicting 
parties, so that it is able to arbitrate. At the same time, the state must 
promote the idea of religious tolerance in a pluralist society, which it can only 
do by emphasising the commonality of spiritual pursuits. Thus the state is not 
secular. Rather it promotes a specific view of “religion” as an universal 
characteristic of Indian ethnicity. The different religions are only refractions of 
 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 106.80
 P.C. Upadhyaya, ‘The politics of indian secularism’, MAS, 26 (4), 1992, 815-853, here 851.81
 Namely the birthplace of Ram, the god-hero of the epic poem of Ramayana. According to the 82
baffling interpretation of Hindu nationalists, it was located in Ayodhya and marked by a temple 
which had been destroyed and replaced by the Babri Masjid, or Mosque of Babur, built in the 
sixteenth century by a general of Babur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty. Yet, this issue is based 
on local belief, since there is not archeological evidence of the existence of the commemorating 
Hindu temple. However, significantly enough, the British paid heed to this story, to the extent that 
they created a separate space outside the m mosque for the Hindus, so that they could worship 
the place (Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 2). 
 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 112.83
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one great Indian spirituality, which the state provides equally for in its 
education system” .84
  In the Gandhian spirit, those who were different, namely inferior according to the Hindu 
orthodox realm, such as the Muslims and the Dalits, had to be uplifted and purified. 
Nonetheless, in order to achieve elevation they had to respect certain Hindu practices, like 
in primis the protection of the cow. As a matter of fact, the preservation of the Hindu sacred 
animal was a form of moral superiority which ensured the inclusion of, and reconciliation 
with, others. According to Gandhi, Hinduism, given its unique spirit of tolerance - and this 
was significantly in line with the Orientalist interpretation of Hinduism as a "universal 
religion" - could embrace other religions, provided that they adapted to it. His idiom 
therefore remained Hindu despite his talking of tolerance and pluralism .85
  This is not to deny that the ideology of the Congress was intended to create a 
multicultural and peaceful society. No doubt it was. Nonetheless, especially in the 
Gandhian version of it, its framework was that of Hinduism  and this left an ideological 86
space within the party for those who held less progressive outlooks and who constituted a 
‘brake on the development of secularism’ . Moreover, in several occasions, Nehru took 87
advantage of the moral ascendancy that he had achieved in virtue of his close relationship 
with Gandhi and presented himself as the Mahatma’s successor. On the one hand, this 
conferred him the ‘charismatic legitimacy’ necessary to deal with certain issues which 
involved direct confrontation with the influential traditionalist section of the Congress. On 
the other hand, by invoking Gandhi’s heritage, Nehru employed ‘the latter’s sometimes 
less than democratic methods’  and his Hindu-advertising religious language. Therefore, 88
even if secularism emerged as the pillar of the state and had the upper hand for more than 
 Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 23. Italic is  mine. 84
 Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 94-99. "Gandhi aligned himself with a long tradition of 85
Hindu expansion that operates through hierarchical incorporation and assimilation but has, in the 
end, little to do with a pluralist acceptance of the equality of different tradition" (idem, 95-96). 
Moreover, the author maintains that the emphasis on religious tolerance was a derivation of the 
Western discourse of modern nation-states, since the emphasis on tolerance legitimised the 
marginalisation of religious institutions in Europe and allowed the end of religious wars.  This idea 
was then applied to Hindus and Muslims in the Empire. The Muslims, being the old enemies of 
Christianity were stigmatised as fanatic and bigoted and it was thanks to their intolerance that they 
could overwhelm the mild Hindus (idem, 66-67).
 On the Gandhian ideology and concept of nation see Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e 86
nazionalismo musulmano”, 173-76.
 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 112.87
 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 98.88
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three decades, there were elements within and outside the Congress that made it 
vulnerable. 
  With regards to the Hindutvawadis, id est the supporters of the Hindutva ideology, their 
contention was that secularism was not the solution for India. Since India was a Hindu 
country, it was the duty of the state to encourage Hinduism, which had been the way of life 
of Indian people for millennia and not simply a religion. The attack against secularism was 
enforced by the argument that it was the dream of a small, undemocratic westernised elite 
completely out of touch with the masses, whereas the truth was that the nation was deeply 
infused with religious feelings. 
  However, the forces of Hindutva could not promote in the open the Hindu cause, since 
that would have been counterproductive in the secular framework of the government, 
beside being against the Constitution. Therefore, the main Hindu party, namely the 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh  struggled to consolidate the Hindu vote at the all-India political 89
level avoiding to appeal to its ethno-religious identity, but without much success. The effort 
proved useless not only for the ‘untouchability’ of the communal politics in the context of 
the Nehruvian consensus, but also because of the internal divisions of the Hindu 
community and due to the influence limited to the north of the country of both the party and 
its military arm, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, National Volunteer Association) 
a strongly militant right-wing Hindu organisation. After Nehru’s death, the Jana Sangh 
nullified its distinctiveness from the Congress by adopting Indira Gandhi’s same nationalist 
and populistic themes and could not achieve its purpose to gather the votes of the Hindus 
under the same flag . So, in stead of the Jana Sangh, it was the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 90
(VHP, World Hindu Council), a cultural organisation created in 1960s by the RSS which 
had the task to create a Hindu electorate, something which it could pursue more openly 
being outside the political scene . The VHP, aimed at the protection of Hindu values and 91
spirituality in India and abroad , very dynamically organised sensitising campaigns over 92
Hindu issues, such as cow protection, which were supported even by traditionalists within 
the fold of the Congress, who after the demise of Nehru, felt free to express their views. 
 The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was founded in 1951 by Syama Prasad Mookerjee, a Bengali leader 89
connected with the Hindu Mahasabha. Mookerjee, after serving as Minister of Industry and Supply 
in Nehru's Government in the aftermath of independence, decided to oppose the Prime Minister 
consensus project and to promote the protection of the Hindu identity of India. Its aim was the 
foundation of a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu state) in order to counterweigh Islamic Pakistan. Today the 
BJP still draws a great deal of its ideological mooring from Mookerjee.
 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 252.90
 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 193.91
 Walter K. Andersen, Shridhar D. Damle. The brotherhood in saffron: the Rashtriya 92
Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivalism. Westview Press, Boulder, London 1987, 133.
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  The hoped-for mobilisation of Hindus at the national level could be achieved only in 
1980s. By then, certain factors conducive to the emergence of Hindu nationalism had 
aroused and, however unfortunate it might seem, it was the Congress of Indira Gandhi 
which was partly responsible for it. As a matter of fact, although believing at least in 
principle in secularism and democracy, in the early 1980s the Congress underwent a shift 
from Nehruvian neutrality to the promotion of the Hindu cause. Indira Gandhi started 
adopting a lexicon of political Hinduism and displaying her religiosity in public in order to 
gain political advantage by accommodating certain political organisations. Moreover, 
during the electoral campaigns, Gandhi showed openly a biased attitude against non-
Hindu minorities, increasingly depicted as a serious threat against the Hindu community. 
Therefore, the identification of Sikh extremism with the internal enemy of the national 
integrity, along with certain initiatives which could be easily interpreted as anti-Muslim  93
created a sense of fear which overlapped, at least partially, with that of the Hindu 
nationalists, so much that several RSS volunteers preferred to vote for Indira Gandhi, than 
for the for the successor of the Jana Sangh, that is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Indian 
People’s Party) . The BJP, in fact, had initially decided to keep the same moderate tones 94
of the Jana Sangh. Nonetheless, it adopted the ideology of the Sangh Parivar  towards 95
 These initiatives was for example the removal from office of Farooq Abdullah in Jammu and 93
Kashmir; the non-condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union; the reference 
to the Gulf money as the main cause behind the en masse conversions of Dalits to Islam in 1981 in 
Tamil Nadu; the identification of Pakistan as the foreign enemy (see Diego Maiorano, Autumn of 
the Matriarch. Indira Gandhi’s Final Term in Office, London and New York: Hurst&Co./Oxford 
University Press, 2014, 118, 131).
 In addition, the credibility of the Congress as a secular party was tarnished by certain initiatives 94
by some of its sections which Indira Gandhi did not bother to crush, not to mention the posture held 
by the party with regard of the anti-Sikh riots which followed the assassination of the Prime Minister 
by her Sikh bodyguards. For the communalisation of politics under Indira Gandhi see Jaffrelot, The 
Hindu Nationalist Movement, 329-333 and Maiorano, Autumn of the Matriarch, 130-135.
 The family of the Sangh, namely the family of the RSS, which grouped the pro-Hindutva political 95
and cultural associations.
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the creation of a Hindu state when the Congress started exploiting communalisation for its 
political advantage and abandoning its commitment towards secularism . 96
  In the meanwhile, at the cultural level, the VHP had grown considerably and its network 
was no more constrained in the north but was spread all over the country . Moreover, the 97
pro-Hindutva bodies grouped changed their tactic and recognised that questioning 
secularism as such was counterproductive, whereas pointing at the Congress as a 
pseudo-secular party pursuing a set of unjust policies was more effective . So, thanks to 98
this tactical turn, the Hindus became the victims of discrimination by the Congress, which, 
behind the smoke screen of secularism, in reality favoured the Muslims, although these 
were a minority whose loyalty towards India was dubious . Therefore, Hindu nationalists 99
systematically carried out a demonisation of the Indian Muslims by popularising a 
 Note must be taken that, in the same years, even in the intellectual realm a certain scepticism 96
towards secularism started to emerge, in the West and in India. The two most influential voices in 
the anti-modernist attacks on secularism were those of T.N. Madan and Ashis Nandy (Sen, 
“Secualrism and its Discontents”, in Secularism and its Critics on the ‘Anti-modernist Critique’, 
454-485, here 477-81). Madan maintained that the secular project was never completely carried 
out, since it was the dream of a modernist minority, which wanted to impose it on the religious 
majority. Therefore, its very foundation was undemocratic and intolerant [T.N. Madan, “Secularism 
in its Place”, Journal of Asian Studies 46.4 (1987), 747-759]. Nandy, on the other hand, held that 
secularism is the by-product of modernisation and progress, blamed for the spread of violence and 
folly at the global level. So secularism is to be condemned as much as modernity, a fortiori given 
that traditional ways of life have their internal principles of tolerance [Ashis Nandy, "The politics of 
secularism and the recovery of religious tolerance." in Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 13.2 
(1988): 177-194]. Even if it was not the intention of these two intellectuals to support the arguments 
of the Hindu right - they actually wanted to start a debate on the need of further investigations 
about the meaning of secularism in religious contexts -  they somehow contributed to reinforce the 
conviction that secularism was out of place in India. This posture against secularism is ascribable 
to certain academic inclinations, very common today (and not only in India), which define and 
condemn as Eurocentric whatever idea was born in Europe, regardlessly of the results achieved in 
terms of improvement of societies. In name of the deconstruction of the colonial ideological 
system, these assertions, more or less intentionally, contribute to what Hobsbawm called the 
“reversal of the project of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, namely the establishment of a 
universal system of such rules and standards of moral behaviour embodied in the institutions of 
states dedicated to the rational progress of humanity” [Eric Hobsbawm, On History, Abacus, 
London 1998 (first published 1997), 335. Italic in the text]. 
 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 200.97
 For this change of position by the forces of Hindutva, see Sudipta Kaviraj, "Languages of 98
Secularity" in the special issue of Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), Revisiting Secularisation, 
December 14, 2013, vol. XVLIII, N 50, 93-102, here 96-97.
 See Amartya Sen, “Secularism and its Discontents”, in Rajeev Bhargava (edited by), Secularism 99
and its Critics, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1998, 454-485, for what he calls ‘Favouritism 
Critique’ see 464-467. By and large, the argument of the forces of Hindutva was that being Hindus 
a majority, they were qualified to have more rights granted, regardless of the fact that "majorities 
relevant to democratic decisional processes are deliberative, and not identity majorities" and 
democracy would be the negation of itself without the safeguard of minorities (Kaviraj, "Languages 
of Secularity", 96).
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politicised version of history  which minimised and devalued the contribution of Muslim 100
rulers in Indian past and increasingly poisoned the mind of the Hindu people by depicting 
their Muslim fellows as conspiring for the annihilation of the ‘Hindu race’ . 101
  Strong signs that things were changing for the worse soon appeared when from the early 
1980s onwards inter-communal riots started breaking out in several places. In the 1990s, 
vitriolic national campaigns started being organised in order to mobilise the ‘patriotic 
Indians’. Among other sensational techniques, yatras, namely processions inspired by 
Hindu pilgrimages to holy places in all the country, were utilised to create a sense of 
solidarity and national (Hindu) integration. 
  The most spectacular and effective amidst the Hindutva campaigns was the revival of the 
Ramjanmabhoomi movement. Aiming at the demolition of the Babri Masjid , it 102
contributed, thanks to its powerful language and to its effective means of mobilisation, to 
make the idea of the discriminated Hindus very popular. The tactic proved so successful 
that the ancient mosque was demolished in 1992. This single issue was functional to give 
the Hindutva movement widespread support and to politically organise and consolidate the 
‘national pride’ of many Hindus. It was a painful event in the history of contemporary India; 
it created deep social wounds in Indian society and represented a dangerous culmination 
in the marginalisation of the Muslim community, a process which had started much before 
and to which, as seen above, also the Congress had contributed . The destruction of the 103
Babri Masjid, generally depicted by the Hindu enthusiasts as the vendetta for the shame of 
 The painstaking attempt of secular, professional historians to confront the revisitation of Indian 100
history by political groups moved by political agendas and to emphasise the scientific nature of the 
historical discipline remained confined to the mostly English-speaking academia and intelligentsia. 
Therefore, they proved less successful that the putative pro-Hindutva historians in reaching the 
popular common sense. Among others, Romila Thapar fought this communalist interpretation of 
Indian history through her seminal works on ancient India (see by Romila Thapar, Early India: From 
Origins to AD 1300, Penguin, New Delhi 2002; Cultural Pasts: Essays in Early Indian History, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2003; Somanatha: The Many Voices of History, Verso, London, 
New York 2005). There was a general effort encouraged both by the official discourse and by 
independent scholars to argue against it (See for instance Romila Thapar, Harbans Mukhia and 
Bipan Chandra, Communalism and the Writing of Indian History, People's Publishing House, Delhi 
1969). 
 Other tactics very conducive to sensitise people were utilised in the process of saffronisation of 101
culture and education. They included, among others, the telecasting of the Ramayana serial before 
the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the introduction of several thousand of RSS-run schools. All 
this considered, the bewildered and dismayed reactions of certain intellectuals and journalists who 
depict the ascent of Modi as a bolt out of the blue are, to say the least, very naive.
 For an account of the sequence of events at Ayodhya see Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 102
2-12).
 Moreover, note must be taken that some of the most reputed and dear icons of the Hindu 103
nationalists, such as Malaviya or Villabhbhai Patel, were very powerful members of the Congress, 
of which they constituted the right-wing.
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hundreds of years of slavery under the Muslims, was followed by a strongly polarised and 
tense climate, which resulted in inter-communal riots in several parts of the country. The 
atmosphere of Islamophobia kept on escalating in the following years, boosted also by the 
general posture against the Muslims at the global level. The BJP and its affiliated 
organisations very cleverly rode the wave of the moment and did not hesitate to stoke the 
rage of the Hindus against their Indian Muslim fellows. 
  Significantly enough, it was in the BJP-ruled Gujarat that anti-Muslim violence flared up 
on a large scale in February 2002. In the town of Godhra, the death in a train fire of more 
than fifty Hindu devotees and religious workers coming back from a religious pilgrimage in 
Ayodhya  triggered the mass killings of Muslims, accused of being the culprits of the 104
burning. From Godhra, riots spread to other centres, included the state capital 
Ahmedabad, and to rural areas and went on until mid-June 2002, a period during which 
 For the reconstruction of the train burning see Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Clash Within: 104
Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s Future, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 
2007, 17-18.
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more than 2000 Muslims died and thousands more were injured . The crimes committed 105
in those months were of the most heinously cruel nature; not even children were spared 
from being mutilated and burnt alive by the Hindu mobs. It was a violence of a unique 
extent, intensity and savagery . Along with killings of people, also Islamic buildings, such 106
as tombs and mosques were destroyed during the riots.
  Human rights organisations, sections of the media, opposition parties and the community 
of academics agree that the riots could take place because members of the government of 
Gujarat and the state police turned a blind eye to what was happening. Some even say 
that the massacre had been carefully planned and coordinated, since it was a clear 
attempt to carry out an ethnic cleansing to the detriment of the Muslim minority of the 
 Eamon Murphy, “‘We have no orders to save you’. State terrorism, politics and communal 105
violence in the Indian state of Gujarat, 2002”, in Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott 
Poynting (edited by), Contemporary State Terrorism, Theory and Practice, Routledge, New York 
2010, 86-103, here 86; Christopher Jaffrelot, Communal Riots in Gujarat. The State at Risk?, 
Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, Working Papers n. 16 (July 2003), 16 
(http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/4127/1/hpsacp17.pdf, retrieved 28 October 2014). 
Leaflets circulated during the weeks of the riots are quite telling of the intentions of the Hindus to 
annihilate their Muslim compatriots: “We do not want to leave a single Muslim alive in Gujarat. [...] 
Annihilate Muslims from Bharat [...] when there were kings, the Muslim kings forced Hindu brethren 
to convert and then committed atrocities against them. And this will continue to happen till Muslims 
are not exterminated [...]. Now the Hindus of the villages should join the Hindus of the cities and 
complete the work of annihilation of Muslims” (in idem, 16). Gang rapes were ordinary practice and 
were encouraged by the diffusion of appalling poems promoting the dishonour of the Muslim 
women, escape goats of their lusty, over-reproductive husbands: 
“The people of Baroda and Ahmedabad have gone berserk 
Narendra Modi you have fucked the mother of miyas [derogatory term for Muslims]
The volcano which was inactive for years has erupted
It has burnt the arse of miyas and made them dance nude
We have untied the penises which were tied till now 
Without castor oil in the arse we have made them cry
Those who call religious war, violence, are all fuckers 
We have widened the tight vaginas of the `bibis'
[term referring to married Muslim women]
Now even the adivasis have realised what Hinduism is 
They have shot their arrow in the arse of mullahs
Wake up Hindus there are still miyas left alive around you
Learn from Panwad village [a village in Panchmahals district that was the scene of serious rioting] 
where their mother was fucked
She was fucked standing while she kept shouting 
She enjoyed the uncircumcised penis
With a Hindu government the Hindu have to power to annihilate miyas
Kick them in the arse to drive them out of not only villages and cities 
but also the country” (Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 114).
 Murphy, “‘We have no orders to save you’”, 87.106
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state . The Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi was accused of being condescending 107
towards to rioters and of condoning violence . The responsibility of Modi for the Gujarat 108
massacre was debated until 2013, when he finally got a clean chit, which enabled him to 
contest and win the general election, assuring the BJP an outright majority in the Lok 
Sabha for the first time since 1984 . Nevertheless, the sentence of the Supreme Court, 109
motivated with the lack of evidence against Modi, has not appeased the voices of those 
who consider the present Prime Minister guilty, at least politically, for the riots and perceive 
him as a danger for the stability of India. Unfortunately, it seems that those voices were 
properly hushed-up by the media, which almost unanimously supported Modi in the 
electoral campaign . 110
 Nussbaum, The Clash Within,  50–51; Murphy writes that the mobs, armed with sword, 107
explosives and several weapons, had also at their disposal “computer printouts obtained from 
government officials, listing the addresses of the homes of the Muslims and their businesses (…). 
Many attacks were made close to police stations and in view of the police but no attempts were 
made to stop the violence. Frantic calls by terrified men, women and children were answered by 
the police: ‘We have no orders to save you’. In some case the police fired on Muslims who 
attempted to defend themselves” (Murphy, “‘We have no orders to save you”’, 90).
 According to a report by Tarun Tejpal, former director of the Indian magazine Tehelka, Narendra 108
Modi gave Hindu militants three days to do whatever they wanted to take revenge against the 
M u s l i m s ( S e e h t t p : / / w w w . d e m o c r a c y n o w . o r g / 2 0 0 7 / 1 2 / 5 /
explosive_report_by_Indian_magazine_exposes (retrieved 28 October 2014, in Murphy, “‘We have 
no order to save you’”, 90).
 He then resigned from the office of Chief Minister of Gujarat, which he held since 2001.109
 The media kept stressing the high level of corruption and nepotism within the Congress (two 110
characteristics which could be equally attributable to the BJP), without making any mention of the 
inclusive social and economic policies (such as the MGNREGA and the food security schemes) 
carried out by the Congress during the years it was in power. Even if it is too early to judge the 
performance of the BJP at the national level (but signals of an inversion of tendency in terms of 
economic inclusion can be already perceived), the performance of the BJP in Gujarat is not an 
example of inclusive growth. On the contrary, the model of development promoted by Modi in the 
western Indian state, which he ruled for 13 years since 2001, was absolutely pro-corporate and in 
favour of the big capitalism, a reason why he got the enthusiastic support of the new vibrant 
‘middle class’. On the “Gujarat model” see the recent book by Indira Hirway, Amita Shah, 
Ghanshyam Shah (edited by), Growth or Development. Which Way is Gujarat Going?, Oxford 
University Press, Delhi 2014. That Modi’s reputation had remained virtually untarnished had been 
already demonstrated by the success in December 2002 in the state elections of Gujarat, which 
confirmed Modi as Chief Minister. The anti-Muslim discourse had proved the winning move in order 
to consolidate the BJP power and to gain the support of the low and high caste Hindus and 
adivasis. Again the argument was the discrimination of Hindus, which had been deprived for 
decades of resources in name of the affirmative action pursued by the Congress in favour of the 
Muslims. It is interesting that both Dalits and adivasis  had been for a long time victims of the same 
arguments made by the BJP, until they were also included in their discourse, having their vote 
become useful for the consolidation of the Hindu nationalist party.
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  That Modi could be elected Prime Minister is very telling of the easiness with which the 
plight of the Indian Muslims was forgotten . The incredible ‘ascent to respectability’ of 111
Modi was possible not only in virtue of his seeking a new identity in the form of economic 
development so as to leave behind the 2002 carnage, but also thanks to “quasi-
Westernised Indians in the corporate-owned media and mysteriously well-funded think-
tanks, magazines and websites” , something which, needless to say, contributed to 112
reduce dramatically the secular voices and dissents in the media. This clearly means that 
Modi is not, as one might think, supported only by overheated, fanatical RSS volunteers, 
fascinated by his powerful language gleaning from Hindu symbolism. It is also and above 
all the up-and-coming middle class and the crorepatis, greatly benefited by the policies of 
liberalisation and globalisation, who enthusiastically believe in Modi and contributed mostly 
to his coming-of-age. In fact, Modi’s vision very profitably has combined the chauvinist 
idea of a West-rejecting Hindu India with the promise to extend to the rest of the country 
the pro-big-business Gujarat model of development. By doing so Modi has unified under 
the same flag the Hindutvawadis and those well-off sections of Indian society impatient 
towards the pro-poor policies carried out by the Congress (and often also sympathisers 
with the Hindu cause). This synergism has proved successful so far.
  An in-depth analysis of the reasons which made possible Modi’s ascent to power lies 
outside the scope of my research. Nonetheless, it will be useful to draw some conclusions, 
before getting to the heart of this work. It is quite astonishing to compare the future of the 
nation as it was imagined by the Indian secular nationalists in the second half of the 
nineteenth century with what India has actually become with the rally of Hindu nationalism 
more than hundred years afterwards. This is not to say that the secular idea of nation had 
more possibilities to be translated into reality, nor that the emergence of a Hindu India was 
inevitable. In fact, as even the most naive student knows, history is not a predictive 
science and there are not fixed rules which regulate its course. What is important to the 
historian of colonial India is to understand that the elaboration of a certain idea of the 
nation is intrinsic in the politics of the building of identity and that myth and invention are 
 Not only in India, but at the international level. For example, the US lifted Modi’s nine years visa 111
ban immediately after he won the general election. What is more, Modi and Obama coauthored an 
article in the Washington Post where they delineated the future partnership of US and India (http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/narendra-modi-and-barack-obama-a-us-india-partnership-for-
the-21st-century/2014/09/29/dac66812-4824-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html, accessed on 
28 October 2014).
 Pankaj Mishra, Modi’s Idea of India, New York Times, 24 October 2014 (http://112
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/opinion/pankaj-mishra-nirandra-modis-idea-of-india.html?_r=0 , 
retrieved 28 October 2014).
 44
always essential to this process, since ‘getting history wrong is an essential part of being a 
nation’ . It follows that no idea of nation is more legitimate than another, since all are 113
expression of a specific political agenda. Howbeit, it is the duty of the engagé intellectual 
and of the citizen of the world to judge the results that such extremely powerful ideologies 
have on the real world in terms of peace, inclusiveness, social and economic justice, 
namely desirable values and goals from which every people should be benefited. 
Therefore, an idea of the nation like the one formulated by the moderate Congress 
leadership which emphasises the commonalities of the members of the nation and which 
aims at creating citizens beyond their religion or caste belonging is certainly more 
conducive to the common good than a ‘cultural’ idea of the nation, which stresses 
differences and divisions and assumes a classification of citizens in superior and inferior 
ones . 114
  Ergo, I argue that reflecting on the nation imagined by Gokhale is very meaningful even 
in today’s India. It is true that amidst the Congress leaders contemporary of Gokhale, 
several embraced his same vision. However, my choice to focus specifically on Gokhale 
as the subject of my research is explainable by the fact that he in particular gave priority to 
the overall improvement of society as imperative for the would-be nation. As a matter of 
fact, in Gokhale’s outlook, thanks to the impact of education and of liberalising ideas a 
modern, secular socio-political context would be created and within it the social relevance 
of creed and race would dissolve in a new political identification. That Gokhale’s project 
was not simply idealistic but well-grounded in India’s reality and needs is proved by the 
fact that Gokhale advocated the Muslim cause. Indeed, he appreciated, unlike most of the 
Congressmen who followed him, that in order to set the process of common advancement 
in motion it was necessary to allay the fears of the weakest sections of the society by 
accommodating certain requests put forward by them. 
 Hobsbawm, On History, 9. The quote is by Ernst Renan, quoted in idem, 35.113
 Michelguglielmo Torri, “The Idea of Nation in Late Colonial India", paper read at the 18th 114
International Congress of Historical Sciences, 27 August - 3 September 1995, Montreal, 5-6.
 45
  It is quite a significant indicator of the emphasis laid by Gokhale on inclusiveness that he 
was kept in high esteem by Ambedkar  and Jinnah, leaders respectively of the Dalit 115
community and of the Muslims. And despite the fact that Gandhi looked up to Gokhale as 
his political guru, it was not the Mahatma, embodiment of the ancient tradition of India, to 
take up the forward-looking message of his master. Interestingly enough, the spirit of 
Gokhale resonated in the words of Jinnah during his first speech to the Constituent 
Assembly of Pakistan in August 1947:
“If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what 
community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his 
colour, caste or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, 
and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. We should begin to work in that 
spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the 
Hindu community and the Muslim community – because even as regards Muslims you have 
Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis, and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, 
Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis, and so on – will vanish. We should keep that in front 
of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and 
Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith 
of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State” .116
So, it is hardly surprising that eleven years before the Quaid-i-Azam had concluded an 
address at the Dayal Singh College in Lahore by saying “Give me more Gokhales!” . But, 117
unfortunately for the underdogs of India, it seems that there was none left in the ranks of 
the Congress.
 Ambedkar wrote to the editor of the Bombay Chronicle in March 1916 that “[i]n a country like 115
India so badly situated socially, economically and politically, the paramount need of the hour is for 
honest leaders to take upon themselves the enormous task of regeneration, such leaders were 
found in the persons of the late Messrs, Gokhale and P.M. Mehta, both of whom were entitled to 
everlasting gratitude for the zeal and sacrifice with which they represented our cause” (quoted in 
Surendra Ajnat (edited by), Letters of Ambedkar, Bheem Patrika Publications, Jalandhar 1993, 19). 
On the contrary, the thinking of Ambedkar and Gandhi were strongly conflicting in terms of social 
reform (See Christophe Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution. The Rise of the Lower Castes in North 
India, Hurst &CO, Delhi and London 2003, 19-25).
 Zafar Anjuman, Iqbal. The Life of a Poet, Philosopher and Politician, Random House Hardback 116
2014, 57.
 A.G. Noorani, Jinnah and Tilak. Comrades in the Freedom Struggle, Oxford University Press, 117
Karachi 2010, 96 from Waheed Ahmad (edited by), Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: The 
Nation’s voice. Speeches and Statements. March 1935 – March 1940, Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 
Karachi 1992. Vol. I, 30.
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THE EMERGENCE OF INDIAN NATIONALISM
Introduction
   
  The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the emergence of Indian nationalism, with 
special reference to the intellectual history of the leading figures of the nationalist 
movement. 
  The fundamental development of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent was mainly the 
outcome of two different phenomena. On the one hand it was the by-product of the 
consolidation of the colonial state. On the other hand, it originated from the elaboration of 
the idea of the nation in the modern meaning of the term by Indian intellectuals. 
  In the course of the chapter, then, I will try to explain the role played by the colonial state. 
This exerted a centralising action by administratively and economically unifying India for 
the first time in the course of history, creating a common political platform. Nevertheless, at 
the same time, the colonial state categorised its subjects according to criteria of race, 
religion, and caste in order to crystallise divisions that could guarantee the permanence of 
the Empire and stall the formation of the Indian nation. Therefore, unifying and dividing 
forces were at play and interacted with the definitions that Indian intellectuals and 
ideologues were starting giving to their nation vis-à-vis the British coloniser.
  Further, the ideological effort of Indian intellectuals will be dealt with. The powerful 
influence of a modern system of education, predicated on rational thinking, will be taken 
into account: it will be show how the encounter between ideas coming from Europe (and 
North America) and indigenous ideas created a vibrant cultural atmosphere. The familiarity 
that the educated Indians acquired with concepts such as freedom, representative 
government, territorial unity, and nationality kindled a new interest in the political situation 
of India. The status of colonised was compared with the achievements of the British 
people in their history: the striking contrast made them realise that they needed to ask their 
dominators for more liberties as prescribed by the values and principles of British 
liberalism and constitutionalism. Then, Indians started claiming political rights on the basis 
of the conviction that, Indians, being members of the British Empire, were entitled to the 
same political rights enjoyed by the other (white) subjects of the Empire. When this was 
denied and motivated by historical, cultural, and, above all, racial reasons, Indians 
developed a modern idea of the nation. In other words, being declined the possibility to 
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become citizens within the space of the Empire, Indians started demanding their national 
rights.
  Then, it will be shown that the idea of the nation, conceptualised by the so-called 
moderate leaders of the Congress and to which Gopal Krishna Gokhale gave substance, 
considered all the inhabitants of the Indian territory, geographically and administratively 
united, as one nation. The innumerable divisions of India would be overcome by the 
participation of the would-be Indian citizens to the common project of improvement and 
elevation of Indian society. This inclusive definition of the nation was then predicated on 
the subjective consciousness to belong to the nation as a political entity. Inspired by the 
political liberal nationalism à la Giuseppe Mazzini, it stressed the elements of unity and 
emphasised the building of a common future. 
  Yet, this liberal idea of the nation was since the beginning challenged by the one 
formulated by the extremist leadership of the Indian national movement, Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak in primis,. This was informed by the naturalistic, cultural nationalism that was 
becoming dominant in Europe. Thus, the Indian nation was defined on the basis of 
Hinduness. Looking back to a glorious Hindu past and envisioning the Indian nation has an 
entity that had always existed in history, this conceptualisation aimed at the popularisation 
of the nationalist movement. Nonetheless, the mobilisation of the masses around the 
Hindu flag meant to brand all non-Hindus as the Other. Not surprisingly, the exploitation of 
religion for political ends had the negative effect to lead to a rift between Hindus and 
Muslims. 
 So, these different ideas of the nation had different effects on Indian society, something 
which shows that not all responses to colonialism were conducive to create a fairer social 
order. On the contrary, advocating freedom from the colonisers did not necessarily mean 
to promote union or, in the long run, peace and democracy. 
India: Subcontinent or Nation?
  “The feeling of degradation, from being governed by foreigners, is a feeling altogether 
European. I believe it has little or no existence in any part of Asia”. This is what James Mill, 
the famous author of The History of British India (1817), maintained in 1831. In a period 
when nationalism was moulding Europe and its politics, Mill denied its force and 
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importance for the Indian subcontinent . This is no surprise, for, as I have tried to show in 118
the previous chapter, the Indian people were seen as characterised by an overwhelming 
passivity. In the opinion of Mill, what mattered to Indians was the material advantages 
obtainable from this or that rule. And certainly, for the well-known thinker, the British 
domination was much better than any other previous regime, so that there was no reason 
for Indians to be dissatisfied with it.
  Significantly enough, Mill’s History became one of the most influential historiographical 
works on India for the whole colonial period, despite the fact that several British and Indian 
scholars had pinpointed the scientific defects of its arguments . Its clout was a clear sign 119
of the transformation of the cultural atmosphere. Mill was taking active part in defending 
the legitimacy of the conquest of India and his views were in tune with the change of 
Western attitude towards Asia. 
  In fact, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the previous global order was 
reorganised in favour of few Western nations , which could take advantage of their 120
political, military and economic superiority to model a new world system where they 
occupied the top of the hierarchy and had the upper hand on the rest of the world. This 
positive conjuncture for the Western powers was brought about by the Industrial 
Revolution and the American and French Revolutions which contributed to a radical 
transformation of the economy and the political scenario. And since an unjust and 
unbalanced global order cannot be predicated only on force and violence, this change was 
accompanied by an ideological evolution aimed at justifying it . So, the respect and 121
admiration that Enlightenment intellectuals had shown for some Asian civilisations had 
now become out of place and were being wiped out by despise, contempt and, from the 
 Lynn Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and India, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1994, quoted, 118
23. Mill was an administrator for the East India Company. In the 1830s he was Examiner of 
Correspondence and was responsible for overseeing the dispatches to India in all departments of 
the trading company. Like many other influential scholars of India, he never visited the Asian 
country and knew it only through official despatches and orientalist literature.
 See David Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance, University of California Press, 119
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, 236-41. The History was adopted as a textbook at Haileybury 
College, where the administrators of the EIC were trained.
 These nations were initially England, Russia and France and in the second half of the 120
nineteenth century the United States, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Japan.
 For an explanation of this change of global order and for a critique of the Eurocentric paradigm 121
see the sixth chapter of Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, Vistaar 
Publications, New Delhi 1998, 258-320. The dominance of the Western nations on the rest of the 
world was only possible thanks to its contingency with other developments at the global level. It 
was not inevitable and much less was it determined by ‘exceptional, let alone superior, ethnic, 
rational, organisational, or spirit-of-capitalist advantages' (Ivi, 283).
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second half of the same century onwards, even racism . Orientalism, in its new variant, 122
became an intellectual instrument of legitimisation. 
The argument on the lacking of national feelings made by James Mill was the same 
advanced few decades later by John Seeley and by other scholars and administrators of 
the British Raj. Indians could have no sentiments of patriotism, or if they had - the British 
conceded - it was limited to the regional area they belonged to. For India was a 
subcontinent, as big as Europe, with a population of 250 millions of inhabitants and, what 
is more, divided in terms of race, religion, language and culture. In brief, those elements 
considered to be fundamental for the definition of the idea of nation in Europe during the 
nineteenth century were missing in India.
Nevertheless, in spite of the British convictions and in virtue of the conditions imposed by 
their domination, a national consciousness started arousing amongst a small section of the 
Indian population. The emergence of nationalism was a complex and long process, not an 
event, and it was set in motion by several factors. It can be considered a consequence and 
a reaction to the British Raj. In fact, nationalism was a consequence of the unifying effect 
of the modern and efficient state that the British had created in order to respond to their 
imperial needs and at the same time it was a reaction to the oppressive nature of that very 
state and to the racism that increasingly characterised the British-Indian relationships. 
  As Christopher Bayly observed, forms of patriotism  by all means similar to the 123
European ones had already existed in India and this is demonstrated by the existence of 
 James Mill was strongly influenced by the values of Scottish Enlightenment and believed in 122
social progress and in the power of education. Mill refuted the myth of a golden age of ancient 
Hinduism that had become so popular among Orientalists. Their view, according to Mill, was 
preposterous because it was based on few ancient books, whereas to measure the level of 
civilisation of a certain society it was necessary to take into account its laws, customs and 
institutions. Through the analysis of these elements, Mill concluded that India was a rude society. 
Since he maintained that progress developed on a linear progress in the course of history, it was 
impossible that India’s past had been characterised by civilised manners and advanced 
institutions. Therefore, British could not rule India according to its corrupted local principles. On the 
contrary, they had to import into India the values of Enlightenment, because India could improve 
through the assimilation of Western culture (See Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and India, 11-14). The 
capability of improvement started being denied with the increasing racist posture that the British 
held towards Indians. At that point, the latter’s inferiority, due to the unchangeable category of race, 
was not amendable even in virtue of westernisation. 
 These are what Hobsbawm (Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. 123
Programme, Myth and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, 46-79) and Bayly 
(C.A. Bayly, Origins of Nationality. Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern 
India, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1998, 98-132) call respectively proto-nationalism and old 
patriotism, even though the latter term does not imply teleology and is maybe preferable. According 
to Bayly, old patriotisms are the navels of nationalism. 
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ancient words and by political discourses concerning good government . Every human 124
collectivity has a sense of place, a subjective sense of connection and belonging to its 
native environment with its physical features, its political institutions, its social constructs 
and cultural traditions. Between 1400 and 1800 the process of state-building - which for 
example in Mysore under Tipu Sultan had reached high levels of modernisation - and a 
dynamic commercial expansion had been accompanied by the creation of a wider sense of 
community and by the sharing of common institutions, culture and history at least at the 
regional level .125
  The Indian national movement that emerged around the 1870s and 1880s undoubtedly 
presented a certain continuity with traditional social patterns, memories, sentiments and 
doctrines which had been informed in the pre-colonial period. Yet, it also appropriated itself 
of ideological elements coming from Europe and North America. Movements like the 
Enlightenment, the French Revolution and Republicanism, the American Revolution, and 
the British liberal tradition had been universally important and their influence was felt also 
in colonial India. Their ideas and beliefs spread in the space of the Empire and were 
fostered by the diffusion of a modern system of education in the subcontinent. Here, they 
represented powerful intellectual and cultural instruments of innovation when they came in 
contact with Indian thought and culture. In fact, by emphasising individualism and rational 
thinking they questioned the traditional lines of authority and religious institutions. As a 
consequence the links with clan, caste, tribe, region were broken and intellectuals started 
speaking of nation and its building, overcoming the past elaborations of a common identity.
  Therefore, elements of change and permanence coexisted and their relationship and 
interaction shaped the contradictory nature of the anti-colonial movement. What was really 
new was the fact that the Indian nationalist leaders started talking of (and thus shaping) an 
all-India national consciousness, whose existence in the pre-colonial times can hardly be 
proved. It is true that terms like the Arabic al-Hind, the Greek India and Persian Hindostan 
had already appeared in the past, but they had no precise geographical connotation . 126
And even when those terms defined India as a polity carved out between the Indian Ocean 
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 1-2. See also by the same author chapter 6 of The Birth of the 124
Modern World 1780-1914, Blackwell, Oxford 2004.
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 8.125
 According to Irfan Habib (edited by) the ancient terms for India implied an inherent geographical 126
unity, whereas for example Sanjay Subrahmanyan underlines the fact that the Arabic term ‘al-Hind’ 
from which ‘India’ originated had a vague meaning, which included northern India but was not clear 
about the peninsular area of the subcontinent. Moreover, the term could extent to Cambodia, 
Thailand and Indonesia.
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and the Himalayas, it does not necessarily mean that its inhabitants felt a sense of 
belonging to it.
 Colonialism, Modernisation, Education
  As Ernest Gellner maintained, “colonialism was not simply a matter of one set of people 
dominating others; it involved a move from one kind of a society to a profoundly different 
one” . Under the pressure of British colonialism, Indian society underwent a radical 127
process of transformation, which was painful and complex, since it fostered the disruption 
of the traditional Indian social structure, the disintegration of the traditional economies and 
the questioning of traditional values. 
  As a matter of fact, after the Industrial Revolution and the British military conquest of 
India, the subcontinent started being looked at as a market for the goods of the new British 
industries, as a huge basin from which raw materials for those same industries were 
siphoned off and, later on, as a market for foreign capitals. The imposition of money 
economy caused the dismantlement of the previous economic and social order. If, on the 
one hand, this new economic system paved the way for modernisation, on the other hand 
it contributed to the creation of a stagnant and backward society. In fact, village handcrafts 
and porto-industries were ruined by the penetration of cheap industrial goods from Europe. 
Peasants, having taken to cash crops, were deprived of food security and economic 
stability, since the new cultivations were subjected to the fluctuations of the market. A 
growth in population, the emergence of new classes of absentee landlords and the 
introduction of alien legal concepts, like private property , tore to pieces the village social 128
relationships. The major urban centres started being flooded by people from the rural 
areas and underwent increasing processes of impoverishment and proletarianisation . 129
  It was especially from the second half of the nineteenth century, when the colonial state 
had become hegemonic in the subcontinent, that the effect of modernisation became 
stronger.  The British Raj needed a centralised system in order to extract systematically as 
many resources as possible to the advantage of British economy. To achieve this, a set of 
 Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford 1994, 159.127
 A major cause of economic distress was for instance the fact that the British demanded the 128
payment of the land revenue in cash, without providing the alternative to pay for it in nature, an 
option that had always been conceded in the pre-colonial past, even when a monetary collection 
was requested. Also the land inalienability and mortgage, if on the one hand monetisation and 
circulation of money possible, on the other hand created a stratum of landless labourers. 
 Giorgio Borsa, Le origini del nazionalismo in Asia Orientale, edited by G. C. Calza, Università di 129
Pavia, Pavia 1965,121-129.
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reforms was gradually introduced. These included the establishment of a modern 
administration for the more efficient collection of revenue; the institution of a uniform 
judiciary system in the European mould; the development of railway, navigation and 
telegraph networks which connected several parts of India and India with the world . In a 130
nutshell, to serve the imperialistic purposes, a modern ‘nation-state’ was created and the 
subcontinent was unified under the same administration .131
  But modernisation  at the political level would not be enough without a parallel change 132
at the cultural level. Indeed, the British had realised that compactness and unity for the 
colony were not attainable without introducing Western education. The East India 
Company Act , introduced in 1813, required the English trading company to allocate one 133
lakh (100,000) of rupees for the promotion of education among Indians . Yet, that 134
measure remained dead letter, because the question of education had been the focus of 
an heated debate between two opposite sections of Britain, namely the Orientalists and 
the Anglicists. The recommendation of the Charter Act of 1813 was a consequence of the 
fact that, as per the Act itself, the territories under the control of the EIC would be taken 
over by the British Crown. Therefore, the principle of sovereignty of the Crown placed 
 Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e nazionalismo musulmano”, 145-46.130
 As a matter of fact, the subcontinent in pre-colonial history was unified under the same 131
administration only for short periods. It was the administrative and economic unification of India 
under the British rule which for the first time made India a political unity for about a century. The 
last area of the subcontinent to be conquered by the British was the Kingdom of Punjab in 1848. 
Yet a decisive battle for the British hegemony over India had already taken place in Assaye in 1803 
during the second Anglo-Maratha war, after which the Maratha confederacy was defeated and 
placed under the control of the EIC.
 Of course, the modernisation in question was just partial. The several reforms of the socio-132
political system were in fact aimed at keeping the colonial order, namely at achieving obedience for 
the central power. Colonial modernisation, according to the very logic of colonialism, had not the 
scope of transforming the Indian subjects into citizens, much less was it sensitive to the principles 
of equality or to the expansion of franchise. It was the Indians that started asking for civil - and 
afterwards national - rights.
 The East India Company Act, also known as Charter Act of 1813, represented a remarkable 133
turning point in the colonial affairs and in the India-Raj relationships. Besides affirming the principle 
of the sovereignty of the Crown over the EIC territories and encouraging the promotion of 
education of Indians, among its most important measures were the abolishment of the commercial 
monopoly of the English trading company and the nullification of the prohibition of missionary 
activities in India. It was the end of the non-interference to which the EIC had conformed according 
to its nature of trading firm. Therefore, the act had heavy repercussions on Indian society. On the 
one hand, the abolishment of the EIC monopoly and the following penetration of British industrial 
goods into India exposed the subcontinent to a market, monetary economy. As a consequence, 
new social classes, both in the rural and urban areas emerged. On the other hand, the new 
moralistic stand of the rulers towards their subject contributed, more or less directly, to the growth 
of nationalism.
 This was a very meagre sum and corresponded approximately to the pension conferred to a 134
minor prince like the Nawab of Surat when he was deprived of his authority by the British in 1800. 
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upon the British sovereign and Parliament the moral responsibility for the welfare of the 
population of the colony . The diatribe was about what kind of education deserved to be 135
sponsored. The Orientalists were in favour of the enhancement of the traditional system of 
education in the vernacular languages. Substantially, in their opinion, if the traditional 
teaching - both for Hindus and Muslims predicated on religion - was potentiated and 
developed, it would be possible to implant a modern and western culture on it. For the time 
being, the translation of the most relevant European books in the main Indian language 
was enough. Opposed to this view were the Anglicists who, driven by the faith in progress 
and bred in the evolutive vision of history, supported the introduction of a modern English-
based educational system. Their conviction was that the vernaculars were not suitable to 
express modern, rational and scientific concepts; the monopoly of the literate classes  136
was not to be perpetuated; the translation of the most representative books of the 'West' 
was too costly; ultimately and more importantly, the permanence of traditional religious 
education was not conducive to the formation of a class of Indian collaborators who could 
help the British ruling over India. In few words, bringing the old schooling system to an end 
would be equally beneficial for Indians and British. 
  Eventually, it was the Anglicist school that had the upper hand. At that time, the cultural 
terrain was in their favour, thanks to the spread of utilitarianism and of evangelic 
humanitarianism. Utilitarians, who had Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as their most 
influential contributors, saw India as the abode of irrationality and obscurantism. Believing 
in reason and progress and considering moral action as the maximisation of utility, namely 
economic well-being and happiness for the majority, they maintained that the colonial rule 
should commit itself in guiding India along the path of civilisation and modernity. On the 
other hand, according to humanitarians, Indians were a people of pagans who had to be 
converted to Christianity. It was therefore a moral obligation for the British colonisers to 
advocate the material and moral progress of the people over which they ruled. Thus, both 
the exponents of these two schools of thought, although informed by very different 
principles, agreed that India had to be civilised; the introduction of a system of education 
based on the English one would be the bridgehead of such process of civilisation. This 
 The state responsibility for education in England had been enacted, after a long debate, in 135
1833.
 Among the Hindus, the great majority of both teachers and students were brahmans. The pandit 136
would teach how to write, basic maths and grammar, and holy religious texts. The quality of the 
schools was very diverse; it was better in the urban areas, where education was based on sanskrit. 
The Muslims were taught Arabic and Persian and read the Quran. At the university level, there 
were a few centres, sort of academic religious institutions, where scholars learnt religious 
doctrines, philosophy and literature.  
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image of India as a backward place was, as seen above, consistent with the increasing 
contempt towards everything Indian. With the strengthening of British rule, not surprisingly, 
India had ceased to be a place to love and dream of. Now that it was firmly dominated, it 
needed to be shown the right path. Cultural equality was questioned and the British 
considered themselves morally and historically superior. So, also the philosophical 
consideration of the utilitarians and the humanitarianists provided, more or less unwittingly, 
the justification for the British colonialism.
  Then, apart from moral motivations, the British had practical reasons to encourage the 
diffusion of European culture and English language. In fact, they needed to recourse to the 
collaboration of certain sections of the Indian society in order to administer a country as 
big and complex as India. The British in the colony had always been few and they 
occupied only the top ranks of the bureaucracy and of the army, whereas for the 
intermediate and lower positions they had to rely on the natives . Moreover, the Charter 137
Act of 1833 established that no Indian could be discriminated from entering the service of 
the Company on the ground of birth, skin colour, or religion . So, in order to create a 138
class of collaborators and to comply with the recommendation of the Charter Act, in 1835 a 
resolution of the Government of India (also known as Bentick Resolution from the name of 
the then-Governor-General) paved the way for the creation of new publicly-financed 
schools, based on the study of English and of western subjects taught in English . The 139
famous Minute of Education  by Thomas Babington Macaulay, young member of 140
Parliament of Scottish origins and would-be well-known historian, proved to be decisive in 
giving the colonial cultural policy this new turn. 
 This was due on the one hand to climatic reasons, being Indian climate utterly unfavourable to 137
Europeans, and on the other hand to the fact that the cost of maintaining British employees on the 
spot would have been too high and would have resulted in siphoning off part of the resources 
aimed at carrying out the imperial designs. This pattern was quite common in the history of the 
subcontinent, since also during the Islamic empires, the conquerors, in scarce number and lacking 
the experience to rule the country, had to resort to the collaboration of those learned castes which 
by tradition were employed in the service of the state.
 First session of the Eleventh Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Act 138
LXXXV (28th August 1833), par. LXXXVII.
 Few years before, in 1829, English had substituted Persian as the official language for the 139
administration of the Raj. 
 For the role of Macaulay in the debate see Antonio Recupero, “Macaulay, l’ “interpretazione 140
whig della storia” e l’istituzione della lingua e dell’istruzione inglese in India (1813-1835)”, in Le 
Carte e la Storia, 9.2 (2003), 47-57. For the complete text of the Minute of Education see G.O. 
Trevelyan, The Competition Wallah, Macmillan, London 1866, 317-330. For further details see by 
the same author, The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay, Macmilan, London 1908 (first publ. 1876).
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  Nonetheless, be it clear, neither the resolution nor the minute were implementing acts. 
On the contrary, they were no more than suggestions for the colonial government . Thus, 141
for example, among British officers, several stood against the diffusion of English and, if 
they wished to, they were free, if not to overtly oppose such policy, at least not to promote 
it . 142
  Therefore, the diffusion of the imperial language and of western ideas was not an 
imposition from above. Actually, there was no need to impose it. In fact, the exigencies of 
commerce, especially in those areas where it was more developed like Calcutta and 
Bombay, had led many Indians to learn English, although often only in a superficial way. 
Clerks, writers, interpreters employed by the EIC had to be somewhat comfortable with 
that language. More importantly, those castes of intellectuals  that by tradition had been 143
working in the service of the state did not fail to realise the advantages that the knowledge 
of English could bring. So, being an indispensable element to enter the huge 
administrative system of the colonial state, the rulers’ tongue started to circulate among 
Indians before the British decided to encourage its learning as a means of cultural 
assimilation . 144
 Parimala Rao (edited by), New Perspective on the History of Indian Education, Orient 141
Blackswan, New Delhi 2014, 14.
 Before the resolution of 1835, it was possible to have only rudiments of western education 142
provided by the company chaplains and a few European or Eurasian single individuals. Yet, there 
were few exceptions. In Calcutta, in 1816 the people of Calcutta had raised money so that the 
Anglo-Indian Vidyala College could be founded. Here English and modern subjects were taught. 
This school had much success and received the plaudit of Rammohun Roy, staunch promoter of a 
new system of education, based on rational thinking. In Bombay, the creation of the English School 
in 1825, which did not have any government support but was funded by Indian private contributors, 
mainly from the affluent Parsi community. (J.C. Masselos, Towards Nationalism. Group affiliations 
and the politics of public associations in nineteenth century Western India, Bombay Popular 
Prakashan, Bombay 1974, 22). This school suffered from many attempts from Elphinstone, the 
governor, who wanted to close it down [Parimala Rao, “Promiscuous Crowd of English Smatterers: 
the Poor in the Colonial and Nationalist Discourse in Education, 1835-1912”, in Contemporary 
Education Dialogue, 10 (2), 2013, 232]. The success and popularity attained by these institutions 
explain the keenness of Indians to expand their knowledge.
 These were mainly Brahmans and other writer castes, who by tradition and birth were men of 143
learning. Historically they worked in the administration and as bureaucrats in all Indian states, also 
in the Muslim ones. So, during the Islamic period (1200-1700) the members of these castes 
became proficient in Persian, as much as, during the British period they learnt English to be hired 
by the European rulers. 
 Not only Brahmans mastered English. The enrolment data in schools and colleges during the 144
1840s show that also lower and artisanal castes took to English education, whereas in this period 
Brahmans dominated only the Sanskrit colleges. It was by the 1870s that Brahmans dominated 
English education in the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras (Aparna Basu, The Growth of 
Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1974, 
152.
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  Apparently, so far so good for the British, who did not have to trouble much to have at 
their disposal a class of collaborators. Yet, the introduction of English language and culture 
and its diffusion at the all-India level had very soon huge repercussions on Indian society. 
It was a phenomenon of the utmost importance for the future of colonial India, since it 
provided for the first time Indian intellectual classes with a lingua franca, a common 
platform of thought, and, last but not least, with profound knowledge of the British liberal 
political culture. These so-called westernised middle-classes became carrier of a modern 
and rationalistic outlook and unveiled the inherent contradictions of colonialism. For this 
reason, while appropriating western education, the educated Indians became crucial 
catalysts for modernisation while fighting against superstition, inculcating rational thinking 
and struggling to empower the lower classes through the new system of education. 
  But before dealing with the seminal role of the intellectuals, let us try to look more into the 
question of the new English schools, where the complexity of the coloniser-colonised 
encounter is particularly evident. 
Indians and Modern Education
  The opening of educational institutions after the Bentick Resolution did not follow any 
systematic pattern. As has been seen, the administrators were free to shut down English 
schools as much as they could open new vernacular ones . But even if there were 145
enthusiastic British in the administration, willing to promote an English-based educational 
system, the financial resources allocated by the government at their disposals were 
modest, with the obvious consequence that the number and the quality of the schools left 
much to desire . Naturally, the flaws of this system could not be ignored by the Indians. 146
Therefore, the defects of the government schools were somehow compensated by the 
foundation of several English schools by Indian individuals or by progressive voluntary 
 Rao, New Perspectives, 15.145
 In the words of the eminent historian and diplomatic K.M. Panikkar “Nowhere was education 146
more official, more directed to the maintenance of the status quo, to the discouragement of 
curiosity and enquiry as in India. That was inevitable. The system of education under the British 
rule was meant, to a very large extent, to uphold the status quo. It was no part of British 
educational policy in India to encourage curiosity or a sense of intellectual adventure”. Yet, 
although Panikkar see the educational system as an imposing system built up by the colonial state, 
he recognised that “it helped to create a common Indian mind; and a reasonable uniformity of 
standards all over India” [in K.M. Panikkar, The State and the Citizen, Asia Publishing House, 
Bombay 1960 (first pub. 1956), 149]. Of course, standardisation reached only those who had 
access to education, which were still a small minority. The great majority in fact was still part of the 
traditional cultural milieu [K. N. Panikkar, Colonialism, Culture and Resistance, Oxford University 
Press, 2010 (first published 2007) New Delhi, 48].
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associations which often had the support of British liberals and missionaries . These 147
schools struggled in order to include in the fold of education also girls and low caste or 
untouchable children. The colonial state provided Indian with a space that could allow 
them to bring about far-reaching changes in the educational field and gradually widen the 
opportunities for non-Brahmins, even if inequalities were not erased. As a matter of fact, 
for a long time high castes had more chances than any other caste thanks to their 
traditional inclination for knowledge and administrative activities.
  The founders of these schools were people who believed in the diffusion of education 
and in the innovating social power inherent in the acquisition of a new rationalistic and 
scientific knowledge. They understood that in the colonial context there were new needs, 
new intellectual aspirations and thus the traditional system of thought was not enough to 
respond to the challenges of the changing times. The knowledge imparted by these 
schools was not aimed to the obtainment of clerical jobs in the colonial administration, but 
a wider scope, since it was modelled on the European curricula, with a wide choice of 
subjects such as higher mathematics, sciences, English literature and radical 
philosophy , which rarely were taught in the government schools . 148 149
  Thus, the significance of the introduction of a modern education with English as teaching 
medium by no means can be reduced to the fact that it represented an opportunity to find 
a job in the colonial administration, as maintained by some writers. No doubt, it had 
practical advantages and allowed the Indians to climb the social ladder, but it was not only 
that. Indians were not passive receivers of the language of the dominators and did not 
apathetically assimilate the cultural and social values inherent in such language. They 
 Both the imperialist view and the post-modernist school deny the participation of Indians in 147
creating and funding education in India. For example Martin Carnoy (Education as Cultural 
Imperialism, Longman, New York 1974) does not take into consideration the Indian effort in 
expanding education; whereas Gauri Vishwanathan, Masks of Conquest. Literary Study and British 
Rule in India, Columbia University Press, New York 2014 (first pub. 1989) does not pay the due 
attention to the fact that it was part of the vibrant Indian tradition to appropriate itself of new ideas 
and that British culture and literature were incorporated in their system of knowledge. For a 
scathing and convincing critique of these works see the introduction in Rao, New Perspectives, 
1-42.
 Rao, New Perspectives, 20.148
 Note must be taken that as a consequence of the poor quality of government schools, also Arya 149
Samaj and Anjuman schools were established in Northern India. Therefore, if on the one hand a 
liberal and secular education contributed to the creation of a common Indian mind, on the other 
hand, a community-based kind of education divided students and teaching along religious lines.
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were “ready to assimilate anything useful that came from anywhere” , adopting it in, and 150
adapting it to, the colonial context. 
  As a matter of fact, the curiosity showed by the British to know Indian civilisation - even 
though, as well-known, it was often part of the imperial agenda - was mirrored by the same 
curiosity of the Indians to know western civilisation. Therefore, Indians had an active role 
in diffusing a European model of education and were not mere object of a colonial over-
imposition of an external and alien system. They were scholars and as such, to them, 
knowledge had no flag nor boundaries. 
  Thence, in this sense it is improper and misleading to look at the spread of the imperial 
language and western education with a dichotomising approach, even if it might be 
tempting to consider it as a mechanism of British conquest vis-à-vis Indian resistance to it. 
In fact, when it comes to encounters between different cultures, things are always much 
more complex. It is true that the colonisers wanted to achieve the cultural assimilation of 
the colonised in order to better rule them. It is also true that the new Indian need and 
desire to learn English was a result of colonialism itself, in a way similar to today’s urge to 
learn English under the pressure of americanisation. Nevertheless, the new knowledge did 
not mean to break with the past and to reject in toto indigenous ideas. On the contrary, 
education provided the tools whereby Indian thought and culture could be rediscovered, 
re-assessed, criticised. Western ideas where absorbed in a critical way and inserted in the 
larger frame of local ideas. The by-product of this process was often a creative and 
productive synthesis, as I will try to show for what concerns the formulation of the idea of 
the nation. Therefore to draw a clear-cut line between modern and traditional education 
does not make sense and takes us back to the ‘East’-‘West’ division of which the British 
were so fond. In the same way, to depict the British as over-imposingly introducing English 
is just one side of the question. If undoubtedly some of the colonial administrators held that 
education had to perpetuate a conservative social order and that peasants classes and 
lower castes had to be kept out of its reach, there were others that sincerely contributed to 
the spread of education and supported with their own means the private schools that were 
 Eric Hobsbawm, On History, Abacus, London 1998 (first published 1997), 220. This had always 150
been a characteristic of Indian history, since India, much before the arrival of the Europeans, had 
been inserted in the highly developed and complex system of trade of the Indian Ocean where the 
merchant ships connected the Western and Eastern coasts of India respectively with the Arabic 
Peninsula and the Eastern Coast of Africa and with Malacca and the Moluccan and Banda Islands. 
This fascinating trade system had favoured the circulation not only of goods but also of ideas, 
which were often appropriated, braided with traditional beliefs and implanted in the the Indian 
social and cultural contexts. 
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emerging thanks to the initiative of Indians . Also Hindu priests, notorious for not being 151
radical in their outlook, in certain areas of India such as Maharashtra supported the Indian 
reformers and tackled caste restrictions . On the other hand, many Indians - often 152
western educated and generally landlords and members of those social groups that 
benefitted from the preservation of a feudal social order - strongly advocated a two-tier 
system such that higher education was confined to upper castes and vocational education 
for the masses. They stalled the effort to establish compulsory education in the name of 
defending Indian identity. This pattern could be seen during the attempts to introduce mass 
education in 1870 and in 1910-11, which notwithstanding the support of some influent 
colonial authorities were both defeated by Indian conservative forces who were against the 
social mobility that a universal education could carry . A western, English-based 153
education, then, did not necessarily make its beneficiaries modern. 
  That there was a certain concern in the British and Anglo-Indian circles about the new 
secular education in India is evident. The fact that western education could be the British’s 
‘highroad back to Europe’  was not ignored by the colonisers themselves. When the 154
Chapekar brothers murdered two British officials in Pune, English education was blamed 
for it. In that respect, the Secretary of State wrote to Lord Curzon: 
"I think the real danger to our rule in India, not now but say 50 years hence, 
is the gradual adoption and extension of Western agitation and organisation; 
and if we could break the Hindu party into two sections holding widely 
different views, we should, by such a division, strengthen our position against 
 In this sense the examples of Francis Warden and Annie Besant are very telling. The former, 151
member of the Governor Council of Bombay in the 1820s, opposed the policy advocated by the 
Governor Elphinstone of limiting education to Brahmans alone in a region were by tradition 
vernacular education had been quite inclusive (see Parimala Rao, “A Century of Consolidation and 
Resistance. Caste and Education in Maharashtra 1818-1918”, in History and Society, Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library, Occasional Paper, n. 54, Delhi, 2014, 8-9) The latter on the 
contrary was in favour of a religious and moral kind of education, as the institution of the Hindu 
Banaras College proved. Gokhale was contrary to it and refused Besant’s proposal to be the Hindu 
representative of the would-be college (See Gokhale Papers, NAI, From Besant to Gokhale, 1st 
May 1907).
 Rao, “Caste and Education”, 11.152
 Parimala Rao, “Compulsory Education and the Political Leadership in Colonial India” in Rao, 153
New Perspectives, (151-175). The first attempt was an initiative of the colonial state, coinciding 
with the Elementary Education Act in England. The second was made by Gopal Krishna Gokhale.
 This was a comment made by the Governor of the Presidency of Bombay, Mountstuart 154
Elphinstone quoted in Kenneth Ballhatchet, Social Policy and Social Change in Western India, 
1817-1830, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, 249.
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the subtle and continuous attack which the spread of education makes upon 
our present system of Government ”.155
In the Bengalee, edited by the liberal leader Surendranath Banerjea and printed in 
Calcutta, we find an illuminating editorial that gives us further idea of the debate going on 
about the system of education in India. Banerjea’s article was a rejoinder to a previous 
piece by Theodore Morison appeared in the Times, according to which secular education 
was not suitable for the people of the subcontinent. Banerjea reported  Morison’s opinion, 
which was applauded by the Anglo-Indians: 
"A system of purely secular education in this country has destroyed our 
religious consciousness - lowered our character, spoilt our manners, in a 
word has made us a class of mere intellectuals. Too exclusive a study of 
European literature, modern science and modern philosophy, has 
undermined our traditional habits of thought, and has alienated us from our 
ancient loyalties, giving rise to a spirit of irreverence and self-assertions, 
which from the political point of view is a fact of the most disquieting 
nature” .156
Banerjea’s brilliant reply, worth quoting, disputed the labels foisted on Indians as per the 
British convenience. He rejected the orientalist cliché of India’s otherworldliness and 
claimed that Indians had the right and capability to be equally masters of their spiritual and 
material welfare. He asserted therefore the primacy of reason in the temporal affairs and 
advocated the separation of state and church in line with the secular principles. He 
acknowledged the conservative social function of religion in inculcating into people a 
mindset less reluctant to criticise authority and object to social rules:
“To keep the educated Indians riveted to their moorings, the only thing 
necessary is to teach them the dogmas of their respective religions. Has not 
Tolstoy pointed out that the Church in Europe has ever been the most 
powerful ally of the King? When the Church succeeds in capturing the soul, 
the government finds no difficulty in ruling the body. From the point of view of 
the autocracy, the ideal people are those whose intellect has been drugged 
 Hamilton to Curzon, 20th September 1899, Curzon Papers, NAI.155
 Bengalee, “Secular education in India”, 29th January 1907.156
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and paralysed. [...] The Pioneer which only the other day accused the 
educated Hindus of being grossly superstitious and votaries of a degraded 
form of religion, now humbly turns round and accuses them of being soul-
less sceptics [...].But our journalistic critics who today are disconsolate over 
our so-called scepticism are the very men who get fearfully perturbed at any 
signs of the life of our religions that may appear on the surface. One day we 
are soul-less materialists, the very next day we are the followers either of 
militant Hinduism or jehad-preaching pan-Islamism. [...] It would be a most 
comfortable arrangement if we could be persuaded to look only after our 
spiritual welfare and have all temporal affairs in the hands of our English 
rulers [...]. But we advice our Anglo-Indian friends to leave our religion alone 
and not to trouble themselves with our souls and to remember that the only 
relations we have with them are in this world and that we mean to have those 
relations modified according to the needs and regulated by the standards of 
this world and not those of the next” .157
  By reading this and similar articles, it is not difficult to understand the vibrant atmosphere 
that characterised India in this fermenting period. In the words of Masselos “[i]t must have 
been exhilarating to be a graduate (…), to belong to a small and select group possessed 
of a sense of mission and a belief in the possibility of effecting change. Exhilarating also to 
be caught up in the excitement of new ideas, in their discussion and in their spread” . 158
The new intellectual instruments and the new cultural references provided by education 
brought a lively cultural change in the class of literati, who soon became catalyst of a 
somehow revolutionary process of modernisation. 
The Reaction of Indian Intellectuals to the Process of Modernisation. Giorgio 
Borsa’s Theory of Modernisation
  The question of modernisation deserves further reasoning . Often the word 159
‘modernisation’ is being interchangeably used as a synonym of europeanisation or 
westernisation, with both negative or positive connotations according to the ideological 
 Ibidem.157
 Masselos, Towards Nationalism, 79.158
 For obvious reasons of space, it is not possible here to pursue an in-depth analysis of the 159
debate that has been going on for a long time and that has dealt with modernisation along with 
democratisation and development.
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stand taken and therefore as something to reject or to support. Such interpretations are 
not useful for a better comprehension of the problem, because they consider cultures as 
single blocks, immutable entities, not rarely judged and rated by Western scholars 
according to how far they promote human progress, that is to say, in many cases, 
capitalism . 160
  The hegemonic thinking of the ‘clash of civilisations’ along with the concept of ‘historical 
irreducibility’ of cultures has further contributed to crystallise these positions . On the one 161
hand, the Eurocentric historiography holds that modernisation is a paradigm of progressive 
change that has been originated in the superior 'West' and propagated horizontally to ‘the 
rest’; in this deterministic view, by and large, the unmodernised countries should learn from 
the lessons and experience of Europe and its cultural appendices. On the other hand, both 
the neo-orientalist scholarship and the different religious fundamentalisms focus on the 
essential specificity of each culture and maintain that in virtue of this essence cultures are 
unchangeable . 162
  So, mutual influence between cultures is always superficial, if not impossible, because a 
channel of communication does not really exist. It is true that it was in Europe (and North 
America) that the main changes in the political, economic and social spheres took place 
after the Industrial Revolution and the American and French Revolutions. Nonetheless, 
despite the European temporal advantage, seeing modernisation as a process of 
exportation and diffusion of European institutions, values, and techniques is simplistic and 
misleading. In fact, modernisation is a complex, multidimensional, phenomenon, that may 
appear in different spheres with different timings and outcomes. No society is completely 
modern or completely traditional. On the contrary, elements of modernity and tradition are 
present in all societies and political structures, even if in variable proportions. In societies 
generally considered traditional there can be individuals who struggle to reinvent and 
contest their own culture in order to make it modern. They fight to dissolve oppressive 
social customs and practices adopted to the detriment of certain sections of society; they 
try to universalise education and to create a cultural substratum that is more favourable to 
 See, for instance, how the definition of ‘Third World’ has been misused [Vicky Randall, “Using 160
and Abusing the Concept of Third World: Geopolitics and the Comparative Political Study of 
Development and Underdevelopment” in Mark T. Berger (edited by), After the Third World, 
Routledge, New York 2009, 32- 43].
 See Michelguglielmo Torri, Guido Abbattista, and Guido Samarani. "La nascita del mondo 161
moderno in Asia orientale, di Giorgio Borsa." Contemporanea 11 (1), 2008, 115-138, here 116.
 See how Karen Armstrong in her work The Battle for God. Fundamentalism in Judaism, 162
Christianity and Islam, Harper Perennial 2004 (first published 2000) depicts fundamentalism, 
despite its apparent being wedded to the past, as a modern reaction to modernisation.
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a scientific and rational system of thought; they tackle the most dehumanising aspects of 
religion and foster a separation between secular and religious identities. 
  Unquestionably, the fact that Europe underwent deep transformations which allowed it to 
reach a certain level of modernisation in the political and economic sectors before the rest 
of the world had huge consequences. As a matter of fact, this chronological favour position 
allowed the Old Continent to export through colonialism its models - which had inevitably 
European peculiarities - to the places with which it got in contact and to bring about at 
least some factors of change. Outside the original context, the modernising process did 
present similarities but also differences from the European one, because modernisation 
cannot be but a global historical process which has its own characteristics; it is a synergic 
phenomenon of interaction between cultures, values, institutions, techniques and varies 
according to the particular historical, political, economic and cultural circumstances. Thus, 
modernisation is not a prerogative of the Western world, nor it is something culturally alien 
to the rest of world. By and large, its development is constructive and dynamic only if 
advanced by the local elites and moulded by the intermingling of groundbreaking ideas 
and deep-seated local tradition and according to the indigenous needs. 
  If we look at India, modernisation was by no means shaped exclusively by the new 
European values which percolated into the subcontinent through colonialism . Yet, it was 163
a painful, laborious, disruptive development for Indian society, since it provoked a profound 
and long-lasting crisis to which the local elites responded in different, often contrasting 
ways. The modernising process imposed by the British domination was instrumental to 
pursue the colonial exploitation and was predicated on the establishment of new 
administrative and physical infrastructures; in fact, the achievement of the ‘imperial 
commitment’  was possible only in a system that presented at least some characteristics 164
of modernity. Therefore, quite obviously, to modernise the political institutions and 
structures of power of the colony was not conceived to benefit the Indian subjects.  So, this 
modernising development, being a by-product of colonisation, implied undeniably violence 
 The Anglo-saxon and American academias have been generally less inclined to perceive 163
modernisation as a creative process which implies adaptation to indigenous cultures. On the 
contrary, their view has been quite Eurocentric, since it is held that unmodernised countries should 
learn from the experiences and lessons of the superior 'West'. See for example Niall Fergusson’s 
constant justification of British and American imperialism in this sense. Such neoconservative and 
neocolonial positions have been acerbated by today global Islamophobic wave.
 B.R. Tomlinson, "The Political Economy of the Raj: The Decline of Colonialism." The Journal of 164
Economic History 42.01 (1982): 133-137. The term ‘imperial commitment’ indicates the payment of 
the Home Charges, the expenses for the Indian Army and economic policies aimed at creating the 
free circulation of British manufactures. Of course, it was the Indians that were burdened with 
these costs. 
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and sufferance for the colonised. But this fact should not prevent us from seeing that the 
response of the Indian elites to the British hegemony was not necessarily homogeneous 
and compact, much less invariably shaped by closure and resistance. Foreign domination 
produced different kinds of reactions among Indian intellectuals, who, deprived of any 
political influence , started to question the colonial dominance in the cultural sphere, 165
namely where they could still exercise their agency thanks to the intellectual means at their 
disposal. Therefore, they were the first to investigate the reasons why Europeans could 
impose their hegemony over India and to elaborate diverging strategies vis-à-vis the 
perturbing transformations that were taking place. The answers given by the intelligentsia 
mirrored the disquieting cultural conflict within Indian society triggered by the British 
dominance and inherent in every process of modernisation . 166
  In this regard, it is worth taking into account the interpretation that the Italian historian, 
Giorgio Borsa, gave as early as in the 1960s and 1970s . According to Giorgio Borsa the 167
process of modernisation in India, and more generally in Asia, was given momentum by 
the impact of the European colonialism and by the following crisis of the traditional 
societies. Yet, from a certain point onwards, modernisation ceased to be an external 
imposition. Instead, it became a conscious will, an endogenous process motivated by the 
need to elaborate an indigenous idea of modernity: the development of modernisation 
could be achieved only thanks to the autonomous initiative and effort of the Indian 
intellectuals. Therefore, the modern world was the result of two dialectic moments: on the 
one hand, European domination and, on the other hand, the Asian reaction to it.168
Western ideas had to be re-elaborated and fruitfully combined with the Indian ones in the 
attempt to defy the European hegemony. In this process of appropriation, domestication, 
refusal or circumvention of exogenous ideas in the framework of endogenous ideas, the 
results could be different and diverging. The synthesis of the new ideas could be more or 
 Not only Indian intellectuals, but Indians in general were excluded from the highest levels of the 165
political and economic systems.
 These cultural conflicts explain also certain phenomena of the contemporaneity that are 166
characterising areas like the Middle East, where extremist fringes reject in toto modernisation as 
an intrusion of western culture aimed at wiping out local traditions. Religion, in its most fanatic 
forms, is perceived as the only sphere in which it is possible to find shelter from the modern, 
aggressive, secular world. Fear is always enemy of liberal attitudes.
 I am grateful to Professor Michelguglielmo Torri for suggesting Borsa’s theory as an useful 167
instrument to understand the process of modernisation in Asia. Its modernity remains still today, 
after several decades from its elaboration. The theory of modernisation was formulated mainly in 
Borsa, Le origini del nazionalismo and in Giorgio Borsa, La nascita del mondo moderno in Asia 
Orientale. La penetrazione Europea e la crisi delle società tradizionali in India, Cina e Giappone, 
Rizzoli, Milano 1977.
 Borsa, La nascita del mondo moderno, 10.168
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less affected by European or Indian ideas. Hence, also those ideas formulated by the 
indigenous intellectuals and regarded as traditional and essentially Indian, had a certain 
component of ‘modern’ ideas. 
  In his interpretation, Borsa identified three different phases in the responses that Indian 
intellectuals and ideologues gave to the colonial penetration. The first two were opposite, 
but equally abortive. 
  So, the first strategy that some Indian intellectuals used to counter the foreign domination 
was one of sheer refusal of European ideas and institutions. Modernisation was 
condemned as an aggressive attack to Indian tradition and identity. In this view, Indian 
culture was by no means inferior to the European one. On the contrary, the decline of its 
ancient essence had been caused by Buddhism and by popular versions of Hinduism 
(Vaisnavism). These, and not the innate superiority of the conquerors, had made possible 
the penetration into India of Muslims and Europeans. By and large, according to this 
essentialist approach, the solution to overcome the decadence of Indian civilisation was to 
bring back the Hindu, high-caste dominance in order to recapture the genius of the golden 
age and to revive the forgotten system of thought and institutions . Foreigners were a 169
threat to this project, ergo the rejection of any imported liberal institution. Yet, however 
understandable this attitude of closure was, it had the main defect of not taking into 
account that the technological-military superiority of the Europeans had been achieved 
thanks to conditions and processes that had been generated by the application of certain 
ideas in the political and economic spheres. Therefore, it was totally incapable to cope with 
the challenge of the 'West'. Moreover, in a spirit of polemic contraposition, the supporters 
of this position could attribute a highly symbolic significance even to practices that, despite 
inhumane, were expression of the Indian identity and therefore became warhorses of 
resistance against colonial interventions (in this light the dispute over the sati ritual or child 
marriage should be looked at). Again, the battle against the infiltration of modern ideas 
became fiercer whenever the social prestige and influence of the traditional landed classes 
was at stake, as the struggle taken up by certain sections of Indian society against the 
universalisation of primary education starkly demonstrates. This phase, in Borsa’s opinion, 
corresponded with the Revolt of 1857 .170
 See J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society, Twentieth century Bengal, University of 169
California press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968, 16. The author deals with Bengal, yet the 
approach of the revivalists was the same in the other regions of India, being a typical response to 
the penetration of modernisation.
 Borsa, Le origini del nazionalismo, 140-148.170
 66
  The second response, epitomised by Bengali babus , was contrary to the above-171
mentioned one. Some of those Indians who had access to an English-based education 
and were more exposed to the contact with Britishers rejected their own culture, 
abandoning and, not rarely, even ridiculing social habits that were still very meaningful in 
the Indian context. Nonetheless, this path was altogether abortive. In fact, those who, very 
superficially, adopted British manners and customs not only were ostracised by their Indian 
fellows - often so much as to be victims of social death - but they were also despised by 
their dominators, who, especially from the second half of the nineteenth century, embraced 
an increasingly racist ideology . Notwithstanding the level of westernisation reached by 172
their subjects and regardless of the sincerity and enthusiasm in espousing the manners of 
the white man, the British did not change their stand in considering them inferior human 
beings and unworthy of being included in the ruling ranks. Unfortunately for the Indians, 
already estranged from their own society, this British treatment added insult to the injury. 
All in all, the westernised Indian suffered from the same “better than thou” attitude which 
he used to judge the social habits of his compatriots and which made him distant from 
them. Furthermore, the uncritical internalisation of western culture made him reluctant to 
oppose to the colonial state.
  The third strategy - a sort of compromise between the previous two - was the most 
taxing, long and complex. It demanded an effort of reflection and critique of the Indian 
culture which would result in a sort of adjustment between tradition and new ideas. It was 
an attempt to find an alternative, indigenous, and autonomous formulation of the idea of 
modernity, that eventually ended up in becoming a form of resistance against the colonial 
system. In fact, Indian intellectuals  appreciated that, in order to defy the British superiority, 
it was necessary to deeply modify the Indian socio-political system. But this could not be 
achieved without a grandiose cultural transformation. So, the work of the Indians that 
adopted this strategy was highly significant, since it advocated new forms of social 
behaviours which questioned the traditional mindset.
  How this transformation had to be realised depended on the outlook of the Indian 
intellectuals. The Indian liberals believed that it had to rest on three main pillars, namely 
 Giorgio Borsa, "Nationalism and the beginning of modernisation in Eastern Asia/Il nazionalismo 171
e l’ingresso dell’Asia Orientale nel mondo moderno”, Il Politico (1964): 320-356, here 342-343. See 
for example Harry Derozio [Michelguglielmo Torri, “L’Indianistica italiani dagli anni quaranta ad 
oggi”, in Giorgio Del Zanna and Agostino Giovagnoli (edited by), Il mondo visto dall’Italia, 2004, 
247-263, here 255].
 Racism escalated especially after the so-called Great Mutiny of 1857 and was corroborated by 172
the publishing of “On the Origin of Species” in 1859 in which Darwin exposed his theory of 
evolution.  
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the expansion of educative institutions, the critique of the social mores and the reform of 
religious tradition. By and large, they struggled to provide their Indian fellows with equal 
opportunities vis-à-vis birth-privileges, to create wider spaces of social freedom and to set 
in motion a process of emancipation from religion, which had to be revised through the 
lenses of rationality and equality. This creative synthesis could result in a new revitalised 
and improved society, liberated from those backward elements which characterised a 
feudal and patriarchal order. To these Indian intellectuals, the colonial state was agency of 
liberal values. Great Britain indeed was at the time the most liberal country in the world. 
British history, which with the springing up of the new system of education was taught in 
schools, was imbibed of the struggle for civil liberties and individual rights. The political 
events that characterised Europe all over its history inspired Indians. Enlightenment, 
positivism, radical humanism, liberalism, Jacobinism and nationalism started becoming 
familiar to the Indian intelligentsia. With the French Revolution, liberalism as a programme 
of social action and as political thought had a dramatic and universal reach . Equality, 173
fraternity, liberty and a social and political organisation liberated from the obscurantist 
influence of the Church turned into topics of debate also among Indian literati. To them, 
learning English language and embracing liberal ideals promised a wider, better world. 
Caught in the ferment of the new ideas, then, these Indians had their reasons for 
accepting the British presence. They trusted that England would confer India that same 
liberty for which English people had fought in the course of history . 174
  Nonetheless, also the intellectuals that took an anti-modern and anti-British stand 
accommodated elements of European modernity in their ideology and advocated their own 
conceptualisation of modernity. Significantly enough, figures like Tilak, Gandhi or Savarkar, 
in whose thought the weight of the traditional ideas was undoubtedly greater, pursued a 
modern curriculum of education. Both Tilak and Savarkar were inspired by Giuseppe 
Mazzini and by his concept of secret societies, whereas Gandhi’s philosophy was deeply 
impacted by Lev Tolstoy’s and John Ruskin’s ideas. What is more, their formulation of the 
idea of the nation was a modern phenomenon. They defined the Indian nation in the 
modern sense of the term and, in doing so, they drew both from indigenous, ‘traditional’ 
elements and from European ones. But this process of adoption and adaption of the latter 
to the Indian context was not always acknowledged by the Indian ideologues, who often 
tried to show that elements of modernity had already existed in the Indian tradition, and 
 Borsa, Le origini del nazionalismo, 151-152.173
 See Torri, Abbattista, Samarani. "La nascita del mondo moderno in Asia orientale, di Giorgio 174
Borsa.”, 117-19.
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then ideas coming from outside were redundant. So, the Indian nation, with its glorious 
history had just to be revived.
  Therefore, the encounter of ideas and their combination created a vibrant cultural 
renaissance. The outcome was different, because the relationship between ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’ ideas was mutable. Yet, as Giorgio Borsa maintained, all the ideologies that 
resulted from such variable synthesis represented autochthonous and original ideas of 
modernity. They were far from being a mere imitation of the European modernity. 
  What is particularly praiseworthy of Borsa’s sophisticated theory of modernisation is that 
it was formulated with great clarity very early, especially if we take into consideration the 
fact that only of late some scholars of India, mainly in the British and American academic 
world, have started dealing with modernisation as a process of exchange and interaction 
and not as a phenomenon that, originated in Europe, reproduced itself identically in the 
civilisations with which it got in contact. In other words, Borsa rejected the Eurocentric 
argument - still very popular in certain environments - that modernisation was inherently 
European, an expression of the Western civilisation and, as such, it manifested itself 
always and everywhere with European characteristics: in Borsa’s view, on the contrary, 
modernisation is not a liquid that could be transferred from a civilisation to the other , 175
since it acquired local cultural peculiarities according to the historical experience and 
cultural backgrounds of the different civilisations of the world. For this reason, Borsa’s 
theory is still a very useful intellectual instrument and interpretative model to understand 
the origins of the modern world and to counter those interpretations of history that draw a 
clear-cut line between 'East' and ‘West’.
  In fact, even forty years later the publication of Borsa’s La nascita del mondo moderno in 
Asia Orientale, the cultural transformation that characterised Indian in the nineteenth 
century is still target of never-ending polemics in the scholarly world. What creates 
particular disquiet in the scholarly minds, especially in the post-colonial countries, is the 
appropriation of liberalism. Often defined as cultural hegemonisation and Brahmin 
liberalism, this phenomenon is superficially dismissed by some scholars as naive self-
colonialism. 
  If it is true that sometimes, as seen above, Indians found themselves in the bewildering - 
yet not unusual - situation of those who love and ape their enemy, we must keep into 
account that the vogue of liberalism and more generally European ideas cannot be looked 
down on as an eccentric vagary of a few privileged Brahmans. As a matter of fact, the 
 Borsa, La nascita del mondo moderno, 10.175
 69
curiosity - sometimes compulsive - towards everything European was expression of needs 
and requests inherent in Indian society. In the same way, the liberalism by which Indians 
were inspired was “a conjunctural phenomenon, rather than simply a lineage or influence 
diffused from Europe to Asia, from metropole to colony. It reflected attempts by people - 
not all of them elite - to grapple with the consequences of globalisation, the intrusion of 
colonial state and the collapse of embodied authority of popes, mandarins, or Brahmins 
which had all happened within a generation” . Literature, philosophy, history were the 176
spheres where Indian civilisation was compared to the European one and subjected to 
analysis, revisitation, rediscovery. The use of civil religion; the fight against superstition; 
the dignity to the individual vis-à-vis the oppression of family and community; the condition 
of peasants, women, outcaste; the role of the state; the condition of Indian economy; all 
these were topics that created a lively atmosphere in the press and in the universities and 
whose discussion was favoured by the encounter with a different culture. It was allowed 
also by the new space of action provided by the colonial state in the sense that this did not 
implement excommunication if somebody did not conform with the prescribed social rules 
imposed by the constraints inherent in Hindu society.
  This is not to say that the nineteenth century was Anglophile. Of course it was not. The 
backdrop of the cultural rebirth was that of a country appallingly impoverished by the 
colonial state, where Indians were excluded from power and were branded as an inferior 
breed, where the wounds of the Revolts of 1857 were still open and sore. What can be 
certainly said is that the nineteenth century was an extremely significant period for the 
history of India, fundamental for the building of the cultural identity of the subcontinent. 
Furthermore, it is hardly deniable that it was a century when British and Indian culture 
were very close to one another, despite - or because of - colonialism. This relationship was 
not an unidirectional movement from the Indian side. On the contrary it was favoured also 
by the British, or at least by the most enlightened ones, who were willing to foster those 
ideals that, in theory, were at the very basis of the British rule and who wanted to facilitate 
a dialogue between Indians and British. So, without questioning the violence, hatred, and 
cultural shock always innate in the dynamics of colonialism, we should not fail to see that 
the century in question was one of the most important in the Indian intellectual adventure. 
The origins of the philosophical and - later on - scientific renaissance of the subcontinent 
must be found in these decades of cross-fertilisation of ideas which created new 
 C.A. Bayly, "Liberalism at Large: Mazzini and Nineteenth-century Indian Thought”, 355-374, 176
here 355 in C.A. Bayly, Eugenio F. Biagini (edited by), Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalisation of 
Democratic Nationalism (1830-1920), Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2008.
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generations of scholarship in which novel combinations of heterodox ideas were 
incorporated in the fold of Indian culture . Western ideas of rational criticism and enquiry 177
along with ethical philosophical concepts were inserted in an indigenous context. In this 
way, the new classes of modern-educated people were never totally detached from their 
Indian fellows . 178
The Role of Indian Intellectuals in Indian Society
  Of course, this revolutionary cultural change, although not completely limited to the 
educated Indians, could not percolate top downwards to the grassroots level of Indian 
society, where the great majority was still illiterate and too busy to live by the day. 
Nevertheless, this should not adumbrate the social importance of educated Indians. They 
were undoubtedly pivotal agents in the transformation of traditional society and could act 
independently from their class and caste of origins.  As a matter of fact, Indian intellectuals 
were making an effort to create a public opinion and a civil society. In virtue of the 
appropriation of the postulates of liberal thought, Indians started promoting the idea that 
“both individually and collectively men are endowed with qualities which enable them to 
look beyond selfish or class interests”. Therefore, Indian intellectuals and, among them, 
social reformers saw “the possibility of an objective view of social and political action” . 179
The instruments utilised by the enlightened Indians to sensitise people on matters of public 
interest were several. An outstanding phenomenon of the nineteenth century was the 
spontaneous flowering all over India of public voluntary associations, which promoted 
social and educational activities. Their purports were mainly the expansion of education, 
the discussion of political issues, the reform of religious tradition and the critique of social 
 A similar phenomenon can be seen, mutatis mutandis, in the period between the middle of the 177
12th century and the middle of the 13th century in Europe, where, thanks to the encounter with the 
Islamic culture, a flourishing intellectual renaissance took place, especially in the Euro-
mediterranean area. The emergence of scholastic philosophy, logics and dialectics has its roots in 
that period and was promoted by the effort made by princes, merchants, translators, priests and 
monks in order to circulate the most important works of Islamic thinkers. So, military conflicts, 
epitomised by the Crusades, were only one aspect of the relationships between Islamic world and 
Europe, which were characterised by deep mutual influence, both in the material and in the 
intellectual field. For a reconstruction of the Islam-Europe relationships see Franco Cardini, Europa 
e Islam. Storia di un malinteso, Laterza, Bari 2003 (first publ. 1999), passim.
 Or at least one can argue that the divide between educated and non-educated classes was not 178
wider than the one which existed between the few people that commanded a vernacular literature 
language and the multitude familiar only with the spoken version of the same vernacular. The 
divide between educated and non-educated individuals existed also for people speaking the same 
vernacular, given the difference between spoken and written, literary language.
 K.M. Panikkar, In Defence of Liberalism, Asia Publishing House, Bombay 1962, 38.179
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mores. These associations often had more than one branch in the same region. They 
addressed the government with memorials and petitions, whereas in order to educate the 
people, they ran meetings, public explanations, lectures. Another very important means in 
the hands of intellectuals was journalism. Thanks to the diffusion of the lithographic press, 
an enormous number of newspapers could be established, both in English and in the 
vernaculars of the region to which they belonged, often bilingual or at times even 
trilingual . They dealt with debates which concerned international, national, political and 180
social issues and their articles demonstrate how ideas were fresh and vivid in the 
subcontinent . Their perusal show that "British radical doctrines concerning education, 181
civic responsibility and constitutional empowerment […] found appropriate 'ecological 
niche' in India at this time because of the particular conditions that prevailed in the 
subcontinent” . In line with the centuries-old characteristic of the subcontinent to 182
exchange and appropriate exogenous ideas, Indian intellectuals were endowed with a 
great ability “in reconstructing and relocating these arguments within their own traditions 
that they were beginning to historicise” .183
  So, for instance, in the opinion of eminent social reformists like Ramakrishna Gopal 
Bhandarkar and Mahadev Govind Ranade , espousing the principles of rationalism, 184
Enlightenment and humanism did not mean to reject their own culture. Engaged in the 
effort to give dignity to the individual vis-à-vis the dictates of the castes, Bhandarkar found 
an historical justification for social reform, claiming that custom and religion were two 
different things and so the old religious texts had to be interpreted according to the 
requirements of the times. Ranade agreed with this ‘method of tradition’ and tried to 
 By the 1870s the variety of Indian newspapers owned and edited by Indians was strikingly 180
huge. Yet, the official figures of their circulation are not completely reliable to give the right 
impression of the extent of sensitisation they were raising. In fact, the oral tradition was still in 
existence and the newspapers were often read out at public spaces so that also people who could 
not afford to buy them or who were not able to read had the chance to be informed of what was 
happening. The colonial government was well-aware of this and feared the danger of newspapers 
read out loudly in “the bazaars”. See Uma Das Gupta, “The Indian Press 1870-1880. A Small 
World of Journalism”, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1977), 213-235, here 230-231. 
 The Vernacular Press Act of 1878 demonstrates that the vernacular press was by no means 181
less abreast with the most debated topics of the time. It gives an idea of how much the colonial 
government had become preoccupied about the circulation of ‘seditious writings’ in vernacular 
newspapers. 
 C.A. Bayly, “Rammohun Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism in India, 1800-1830” 182
in Modern intellectual history, Vol. 4, no. 01 (2007), 25-41, here 41.
 Ibidem.183
 They were active in the Bombay presidency where the influence of European ideas had been 184
felt very early thanks to the reform of the educational system introduced by the governor 
Mountstuart Elphinstone (1819-27). Significantly, Ranade was the political guru of Gopal Krishna 
Gokhale.
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corroborate the importance of social reforms by using scriptural citations and the 
egalitarian teachings of the saint-poets of the bhakti tradition . In polemic with the 185
European critics who considered the ‘Oriental races’ doomed to backwardness and even 
extinction unless they made way for the western spirit of social emancipation and religion, 
Ranade maintained that it was a peculiarity of the history of India to be reinvigorated after 
all invasions. In fact, “the nation (…) after a temporary submerging under the floods of 
foreign influences, has reared up its head - absorbing all that is best in the alien civilisation 
and polity and religions” . That process had always been a catalyser towards social 186
evolution. In the same way, it would not be a break with the past to absorb what Europe 
could teach the Indian nation, provided that the longed-for change “from credulity to faith, 
(...) from status to contract, from authority to reason, from organised to unorganised life, 
from bigotry to toleration, from blind fatalism to a sense of human dignity”  occurred in 187
respect of the cultural tradition. These reformists did not idealise the past, but relied on 
history to validate their projects of social reformation. The approach adopted by Ranade 
and Bhandarkar was a strategic way to involve the masses, but not only that. More 
importantly, it was part of the wider process, undertaken by the Indian intelligentsia, of 
societal reconstruction on the basis of the re-working of European ideas in the light of their 
local traditions. Essentially, instead of being passive objects of the western model of 
modernisation, Indians were shaping their own model of modernity by creatively 
intermingling values coming from their own tradition and values coming from the European 
one . This reformist and modernising movement was not limited to Hinduism. The 188
Rahnumai Mazdayashan Sabha had been formed in oder to elevate the social condition of 
the Parsis and to bring Zoroastrianism back to its original pureness. The Muslims had a 
great reformer in Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), who founded the British Indian 
Association in 1866 and the important Anglo-Muslim College in Aligarh few years 
afterwards with the purpose to introduce the Indian Muslims to a new modern form of 
education. Ahmed Khan elaborated a new reading of the Quran in the light of reason 
against the petty interpretation formulated by the ulema that opposed any influence of the 
European ideas. 
 Aravind Ganachari,  Gopal Ganesh Agarkar: The Secular Rationalist Reformer,  Popular 185
Prakashan, Mumbai 2005, 19-20.
 Sudharak (Reformer), “Social Evolution”, 16 October 1893.186
 Ibidem.187
 It is worth taking note of the fact that a process of restoration of orthodox, brahmanical 188
Hinduism ran parallel to the process of its reformation. See ahead.
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Hence, both Indian press and voluntary associationism played a remarkable role as 
organs of public education and political consciousness; through these powerful means, 
educated men in India, although a small group, could exert some influence on a large 
“bank” of people and could knit together the different parts of India. Along with the subjects 
taught in the new schools, newspapers and associations acted as a powerful social 
solvent to link one generation to the other and diffused the liberal spirit that would 
characterise the nineteenth century. In fact, thanks to the newly acquired familiarity with 
the history of Great Britain, imbibed with the struggle for the achievement of civil liberties, 
thanks to the interest kindled by British political philosophy with its stress on individual and 
people freedom, and thanks to the discussions which revolved around the principles of 
equality and nationality, which marked contemporary European political events, the Indian 
public achieved a new political awareness of the problems which affected their own 
society. They compared their own situation with the one of the most advanced European 
countries and found that there was no space for the  concepts of nationality, freedom and 
unity in India’s reality. The analysis of the Indian political and social conditions unveiled the 
fact that the lofty ideals celebrated in British history had no equivalent in India and that the 
paternalistic and benevolent principles enunciated by the Charter Acts had no practical 
fulfilment there. By and large, Indian intellectuals realised that what some European 
countries had previously achieved was not exclusively a by-product of the ''West'', but 
more broadly a by-product of human reason and therefore every human being and every 
people were entitled to equality and freedom. The liberal Indians were not dazzled by the 
''West'', nor were they showing a servile behaviour towards the British rule by appropriating 
themselves of certain ideals. Colonial agency, both in its institutional and intellectual form, 
was used initially to empower the marginalised groups of Indian society and later on to 
judge and denounce the same foreign rule. 
  The role of intellectuals in the colonial Indian society is worth analysing further, although 
briefly . The fact that the educated Indians after 1857 started defining themselves as a 189
class had a confusing effect on the following studies that attempted to understand the role 
of this section of the Indian society. When Indians like Surendranath Banerjea, Gopal 
 For this section I referred to Michelguglielmo Torri, "Westernized Middle Class", Intellectuals 189
and Society in Late Colonial India, in John L. Hill (edited by), The Congress and Indian 
Nationalism: Historical Perspectives, Curzon Press, London 1991, 18-55 and Michelguglielmo 
Torri, Regime coloniale, intellettuali e notabili in India. Politica e società dell'era del nazionalismo, 
Franco Angeli, Milano 1996, 63-107. The author, like Sumit Sarkar (see his conclusions in 
Swadeshi Movement, 431-438), applies convincingly the concept of traditional intellectual to the 
educated Indians and to analyse their social function.
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Krishna Gokhale or Aurobindo Ghosh defined themselves as part of a new dynamic class 
of people, they sincerely felt to be part of it. They also felt the responsibility of having an 
important mission, that is to bring progress and liberty to the Indian ignorant masses, 
something which attributed them a legitimate social importance. Substantially, they 
perceived themselves as a westernised middle class. In the colonial officials’ perception, 
on the contrary, the educated Indians were a Westernised elite, a closed caste group, 
incapable of representing the views of the chota log, because unaware of the real popular 
needs. It is between these two definitions that the historiographical interpretation of the 
educated classes kept on oscillating.
  However, in the 1970s, the Cambridge school generally questioned the very existence of 
a westernised middle class. According to the Cambridge historians, the Westernised 
Indians could act only on behalf of magnates (moneylenders, heads of villages, 
merchants, landlords): they were just compradors, mediators between the colonial 
administration and the influential local leaders. Therefore, they had no independent 
agency. In this interpretation, then, Indian intellectuals were not protagonists, but mere 
objects of Indian history, whereas, as seen, their action in the colonial society cannot be 
easily dismissed.
To help us understand better the social relevance of Indian intellectuals, Antonio Gramsci’s 
considerations on Italian history and Risorgimento can be a useful tool. In Gramsci’s 
interpretation intellectuals are not an autonomous and consolidated social group. They are 
the most advanced group within a very internally diverse middle social stratum, whose 
creation is favoured by the process of modernisation. The importance of intellectuals does 
not derive from their belonging to a particular social class, but from their their capability to 
act as spokesmen, ideologues, organisers, and leaders of social classes different from 
their original class of belonging. Thus, they have no common economic interests. 
  If we use Gramsci’s theory in the Indian situation, we can see that also Indian 
intellectuals were distinct from the rest of the society, not for caste or class belonging, but 
for their knowledge and for their capability to discern, better than others, long-run 
tendencies . It is true that Indian intellectuals were indeed a small group, mostly coming 190
from high castes, definitely proud of their origin and having a certain contempt for manual 
occupations from which they kept off, concerned to preserve social harmony and to bring 
about social changes only in a gradual and pondered way. Yet, they did not form, nor were 
 See also Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908, Orient Blackswan, New 190
Delhi 2013 (second impression of the second edition 2010, first edition 1973), 436.
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they the representative of, an elite . On the contrary, they were becoming ideologues and 191
organisers of social groups that, in certain cases, were still in the process of acquiring a 
definite shape. So, they could act as mediator of powerful patrons, but not all politically 
conscious and active Indians were mediators, as the Cambridge scholars maintained. 
Moreover, the groups of Indian intellectuals and Westernised Indians did not necessarily 
overlap, even though they considerably intersected. As a matter of fact, not all intellectuals 
were westernised, since some had studied in vernacular schools (even though they were 
affected by the overall cultural climate) and not all westernised Indians were intellectuals 
or in favour of modernisation. 
  What is important to understand at this point is that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
a politically dominant middle class in the modern meaning of the term had not consolidated 
yet. The most influential Indian classes were still conservative and in favour of the pre-
colonial social order. So, the Indian society, despite the cultural change triggered by the 
colonial penetration and by the activities of Indian intellectuals, was still under the cultural 
hegemony of the traditional classes. For this reason, it would have been impossible for the 
intellectuals to pursue the sought-after social reforms. It was in the name of social reform 
that, at the beginning, the educated Indians accepted the British rule. They were moved by 
the conviction that the condition of subjugation of their country would be overcome thanks 
to the providential contact with England. In their view, the colonial state could be 
instrumental to bring social reforms that could improve India in terms of inclusivity and 
gradually return political power to the Indian people. Liberal Indians like Ranade, 
Chandavarkar, Agarkar and Gokhale firmly believed that “the British rule had given India 
time and opportunity to rebuild, renovate, and repair its economic and social structure and 
consolidate itself into a single nation” . Nevertheless, how society had to be reformed 192
 Namely, they did not have a big proportion of wealth or political power. Some were actually very 191
poor and it would be difficult to define them elite or subalterns.
 B.R. Ambedkar, Ranade, Jinnah and Gandhi, Jullandhar, Bheem Patrika, 1964, 49. Maybe, 192
Ambedkar’s position towards imperialism is too soft. Yet, what is interesting is the fact that, unlike 
the nationalist historiography, he realised that criticising and fighting the British rule did not 
necessarily mean to tackle the oppression and injustice perpetrated by Indians to the detriment of 
other Indians. 
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was a controversial issue and motive of clashes between different social groups . In such 193
a situation, the position of the social reformers was not tenable. Isolated in respect of both 
their social classes and their extended families, they were victims of social ostracisation 
and incapable of attaining any political respectability or social clout. For this reason, the 
choice to provide the Indian National Congress with an exclusively political programme 
was certainly sign of political realism and understanding of the Indian situation, since it 
proved more persuasive if traditional and emerging social groups were to be gathered 
around the flag of the all-India party. This led to an evolution in the role played by the 
intellectuals, who became organisers of those social groups that were increasingly turning 
hostile towards the British Raj, because the collaboration with this did not guarantee any 
longer mutual - although uneven - advantages. 
  Indian intellectuals, then, were a crucial social force, because they were able to elaborate 
a strategy that united various social groups in an inter-class and inter-caste alliance. By 
and large, Indian intellectuals became the spokespersons of those groups that were 
progressively undergoing the contradiction existing between the interests of the Indian 
people and those of the colonial state. 
  Therefore, since the foundation of the Congress, its leadership decided that the pursuit of 
social reforms was not responsibility of the party. Instead, the battle against social evils 
had to be carried out - if it ever was - by other organisations, such as, for instance, the 
Servants of India Society, created by Gopal Krishna Gokhale. But this and similar 
organisations remained quite marginal. Substantially, the Congressmen, namely the 
politicised intellectuals, appealed to the government for political reforms, presenting a set 
 Every Indian, ‘moderate’ or ‘extremist’, realised that the advent of the British rule over India 193
meant ‘the loss of political power and prosperity’ [Ratan Khasnabis, “Evolution of Economic 
Thinking in Modern India” in S. Bhattacharya (ed.), Development of Modern Indian Thought and 
the Social Sciences, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2007, 7]. In the same way, all wanted 
freedom for India. Yet, on the one hand, the liberal reformers realised that in order to build the 
nation it was necessary to create citizens that had equal rights in front of the law and equal social 
opportunities regardless of their race, religion or caste. Hence, their stress on the importance of the 
spread of education so that everybody could be included in the nation in fieri. They were aware 
that a huge work of social rejuvenation had to be taken up and that freedom from the British yoke 
would not suffice. On the other hand, the so-called extremists, politically near to the notables that 
had been allies of the British rule, appealed to the colonial state until it proved in favour of the 
permanence of the feudal order, whereas when political and social reforms jeopardised the 
hegemonic control of the landed elites, they started asking for independence. The contest around 
the spread of primary education is ideologically very meaningful, because it is indicative of the 
opposite vision for the future nation.
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of grievances , that could mediate between the different and diverging interests of the 194
Indian society. So, thanks to the Congress the discussions on the Indianisation of the Civil 
Service, the expansion of representative institutions and responsible government, the 
degradation of Indian economics, the role of the colonial state and its merits and faults 
were brought to the all-India political arena, something which made the British worriedly 
aware that things were changing. 
The foundation of the Indian National Congress
  The Indian National Congress, formed in 1885 as an umbrella to put together the 
previously-formed regional associations , became the all-India political platform used by 195
the Indian ‘professional agitators’ to convey their malcontent to the British dominators. 
Rather than a party stricto sensu , the Congress was a sort of parliament  where all the 196 197
regional delegates gathered once a year for few days to discuss and decide the most 
pressing matters to be dealt with and for which to agitate in the Imperial and Legislative 
Councils. It presented demands to the government, but it had no means of forcing the 
government to concede them. 
  The ideological cohesion within the all-India organisation was possible thanks to the fact 
that its pattern was basically made by a handful of men. This was mainly due to the open 
nature and to the loose structure of the Congress. As a matter of fact, the Congress had 
 Many of these were predicated on accurate investigations carried out by eminent scholars, 194
mainly economists, like Naoroji, R.C. Dutt and Ranade, just to mention few. Having revealed the 
predatory nature of the British Raj and questioned the fact that the latter was aimed at the 
wellbeing of its subjects, these scholars were given a posteriori the designation of nationalist 
economists by the historiography. Their studies signed the beginning of the application of the 
scientific method in the economic field and they work was extremely meaningful to question certain 
putatively universal and axiomatic principles of economic liberalism, such as free trade and non-
interventionism of the state. See Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in 
India, Economic Policies of Indian National Leadership 1880-1905, Har-Anand Publication, New 
Delhi 2010 (first published 1966) and the more recent article by Jayati Ghosh, “Dissenting 
Economists. The late nineteenth-century Indian tradition”, in Claudio Sardoni and Peter Kriesler 
(edited by) Keynes, Post-Keynesianism and Political Economy, Essays in Honour of Geoff 
Harcourt, Vol. 3, Routledge, London 1999, 94-109.
 Of these, the most important were the British Indian Association, the Indian Association, the 195
Poona Sarvajanika Sabha, the Bombay Presidency Association, the Madras Mahajan Sabha. Their 
leaders became important personalities within the Congress.
 It was only thanks to the Constitution of Nagpur in 1920 elaborated by Gandhi that the Indian 196
National Congress was transformed from a movement into a party in the modern sense of the 
word. See, among others, Michelguglielmo Torri, “L’Evoluzione del Congresso da movimento a 
partito dominante e il ruolo di Gandhi (1919 – 1939)” in Giorgio Borsa (edited by), Nazionalismo e 
società in India, Il congresso nazionale indiano 1885-1895, Centro studi per i popoli extraeuropei 
dell’Università di Pavia, Franco Angeli, Milano 1988, 84-154.
 The name was significantly inspired by the Congress of Philadelphia of 1774.197
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no formal constitution, because its members realised that, since there was an uneven 
representation and support according to the different provinces, this could create quarrels 
around the predominance of stronger provinces such as Bombay, Madras and Bengal. The 
non-official spokesmen for the single regions were the well-established provincial 
associations which acted more or less officially as Standing Congress Committees and 
sent their delegates to attend the yearly Congress. This meant that the Congress could be 
set up in a locality wherever there was an organisation which lent it its support. Yet, the 
Congress had hardly any real control over these bodies and could not instil a certain 
directing spirit into them. Moreover, politics at the provincial level was vey important, 
especially the one in the most influential provinces, and it was reflected also at the all-India 
level, where it found in the Congress an authoritative national platform. Also the Subject 
Committee, that is the most important committee until the twentieth century that decided 
the issues to be debated during the Congress, until 1903 was composed as per the choice 
of the Congress circles rather than by province and had a non-specified number of 
delegates. The logic behind such loose and informal composition was that the Congress 
needed to be consolidated, to enlarge its basis and so everybody was welcomed. 
Moreover, to the Congress leaders, it was important to give their party at least the 
appearance of a representative body. Nonetheless, given the absence of a formal 
hierarchy, it was the secretary of the Congress and the leaders of the most active political 
associations that dominated the Congress .198
  The Congress leaders at the time of its foundation did not distinguish themselves for 
wealth, property, social and ritual status (or if they did, it was not the main reason why they 
could lead the Congress). On the contrary, they owed their position at the head of 
Congress to their proficiency in the English language and to their knowledge of the 
functioning of the administrative machinery, indispensable criteria to have access to the 
all-India political arena. By and large, their group partly overlapped with those Indians 
reformers  - who attempted to take advantage of the new space of action created by the 199
penetration of colonialism in order to revolt against the constraints inherent in Indian 
 Gordon Johnson, Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism. Bombay and the Indian national 198
Congress, 1880 to 1915, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1973, 36-52.
 It can be said that the reformers tried to carry out those changes in Indian society that the 199
Congressmen, for political realism, could not pursue using the platform of the All-India party. As a 
matter of fact, the issued related to social reforms were polarising and divisive and Indian 
politicians were well aware of it. As a consequence, they preferred to focus their action on political 
reforms. Yet, the work of the reformers at the cultural level was extremely important and 
complementary to the action of the Congress. For example, it was Reformer newspapers that 
initially denounced British racism.
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traditional society by bringing about a cultural transformation, often appropriating 
themselves of new ideas coming from Europe. More specifically, they were a by-product of 
that distorted and complex process of modernisation that the colonial state had set in 
motion. This, in order to impose the obedience to its central power to the Indian subjects, 
had gradually deprived the local notables of their authority. The notables - usually 
landlords, merchants, religious authorities, moneylenders, etc. - were traditionally the most 
powerful elements at the apex of rigid vertical structures within which, as happened 
elsewhere in feudal societies, they were connected in the role of patrons to several clients 
in a relationship of reciprocal dependency . These notables - otherwise called bosses or 200
magnates by the historiography of the Cambridge school - had had the function of 
collaborators since the aftermath of the Revolt of 1857. Their collaboration had been very 
important for the good working of the system, in a period when the colonial administration 
could not yet penetrate to the very bottom level of society. So, in exchange of the 
maintenance of social order and of the payment to the Raj of a prefixed amount of tax 
revenue, the authority of the notables, although reduced, was preserved. This system of 
collaboration started changing with the centralising action of the colonial state, which, 
dictated by the need to optimise the administration efficiency and to mobilise more 
resources, gradually eroded the long-standing informal alliance with these most influent 
groups of Indian society. The progressive dissolution of the vertical structures paved the 
way to the formation of mixed horizontal segments that grouped people coming from 
different castes and classes. The Indian intellectuals were the most advanced elements in 
this heterogenous group and included also the leading lights of the Congress. As seen 
above, although numerically and economically  non influent, they had the intellectual 201
capability to articulate and give voice to the claims of new emerging social groups, besides 
their own. Substantially, according to the theory of Gramsci, they were intellectuals and 
thanks to their function of theorists and ideologues, they could organise an anti-colonial 
movement gathered around the Indian National Congress. 
  The foundation of the Indian National Congress was a major achievement of the anti-
colonial movement and it represented a huge step forward in terms of organisation of the 
 A clear example is the Jajmani system, that is a system of relations between upper and lower 200
castes, where the lower castes performed certain services and functions for the upper caste and 
received grain in exchange. 
 The education based on English and on European subjects was an important social elevator. 201
Therefore members of rich and powerful families did not have any necessity to acquire that kind of 
education. Those who engaged in it generally came from high caste families with modest financial 
means who invested in the education of one or more members of the family with the hope that they 
could achieve a job in the bureaucracy or in the liberal professions. 
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movement at the all-India level. If we take into account the several divisions within Indian 
society it appears all the more as a remarkable feat. Yet, this is explainable with the impact 
that the colonial state had on India.
From political rights to national rights
  The wave of enthusiasm and hope roused by appointment to the Viceroyalty of the liberal 
Lord Ripon (1880-1884) and the introduction by the same of the Indian Government 
Resolution of 1882  which transferred into Indian hands the responsibility of local bodies 202
did not last long. The process of institutional reforms, furthered with the Indian Council Act 
of 1892 , involved gradually more Indians in the administration, but the key levers of 203
power remained in the hands of British officials . Furthermore, the Vernacular Press Act, 204
the controversy about the Ilbert Bill  and the Arms Act had starkly demonstrated that the 205
Anglo-Indian community, whose strong core was the bureaucracy of the Indian Civil 
Service , had no sympathy for the people over whom they ruled. Lord Ripon’s successor, 206
Lord Dufferin, not only reduced the public expenses in favour of the construction of 
strategic railways in Quetta, but also refused the participation of Indians in voluntary 
 With the reform scheme of Lord Ripon, municipal and local boards were created in most of the 202
provinces. The effect was a raise of new taxes in localities and provinces to run the cost of these 
new institutions. It was a way of lowering administrative costs (For a critical comment on the 
reforms implemented by the British Raj, see Bidyut Chakrabarty, Rajendra Kumar Pandey, Indian 
Government and Politics, Sage Publications, New Delhi 2008, pp. 235-268).
 The Indian Council Act increased the number of non-official Indians in the councils. It became 203
mandatory for the government to consult the representative bodies and institutions, approved by 
the government, before selecting nominees for the councils. The act gave no right of elections but 
the provision relating to the drafting of the regulations gave permission to various bodies of Indians 
to recommend people for nomination. This right was conferred on university senates, corporations, 
municipalities and district boards, chambers of commerce and associations of landholders. 
 Something that not surprisingly kept characterising the reforms, the Government of India Act of 204
1935 included. Beyond the appearance of being concessions conferred by the British benevolence, 
the main purpose of reforms was to placate popular discontent and to control mass agitation.
 This was the casus belli for a violent campaign of opposition against Lord Ripon in The Times 205
and other Anglo-Indian newspapers. The bill aimed at eliminating an anomaly which characterised 
the Indian judiciary system, according to which an Indian magistrate operating in a district tribunal 
could not judge an Englishman, while that could be done by an English magistrate hierarchically 
inferior to the Indian one. Although the bill’s consequences would have not been of any particular 
significance, the Anglo-Indian community could not accept the very principle on which that 
measure was predicated, namely racial equality. The Bill was defeated in the British Parliament 
and Lord Ripon resigned in favour of Lord Dufferin.
 This was the above-mentioned Covenanted Civil Service, reserved to the British. It was the 206
group that actually ruled India together with the Viceroy, who was not part of the bureaucracy, but 
appointed by the Prime Minister in London. As in the case of Ripon, there could be diverging views 
between the Viceroy and the members of the Civil Service. The latte was very powerful and often 
had the upper hand. 
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military corps aimed at the defence of the north-western borders. Not surprisingly, the 
Viceroy’s decisions attracted Indian opposition, since they corroborated the fact that British 
imperial interest had the priority over Indian people’s interests. Besides, by rejecting Indian 
volunteers, it was shown to which extent the British dominators distrusted their subjects. 
This reflected the new atmosphere which characterised the British-Indian relationships. In 
fact, the last quarter of the nineteenth century was the nadir for the liberal ideals that, at 
least on the paper, were the foundation of the British presence in the subcontinent. The 
British attitude was, generally speaking, one of scorn, contempt, and disregard towards the 
Indians, who were more and more systematically victims of racism . The prevailing 207
ideology of the British in India became, if not paternalistic, openly autocratic and 
authoritarian. With the triumph of imperialism over Asia and Africa, the bombastic 
discourse of the mission civilisatrice became meaningless. British absolute rule in India 
was justifiable per se and not because it preluded representative government. The only 
justification was the superiority of the British people, which now was cultural, moral, 
climate-related and racial. According to Stephen, it was preposterous that the empire 
professed to be progressive or rational. It was, in fact, informed by power, not by liberty:
"How can you possibly teach great masses of people that they ought to be 
rather dissatisfied with a foreign ruler, but not much; that they should express 
their discontent in words and in votes, but not in acts; they they should ask 
from him this and that reform (which they neither understand nor care for), 
but should on no account rise in insurrection against him” .208
  This development greatly contributed to change the nature of the Indian National 
Congress. Substantially, at the moment of its foundation, the all-India organisation had not 
a well-structured nationalist ideology. Its leaders, in fact, did not initially elaborate a 
nationalist discourse. What they actually asked for in the late nineteenth and early 
 The cleavage between the British and the Indian communities had started growing deeper after 207
the Great Mutiny of 1857. The discrimination perpetrated in the aftermath against Indians 
contributed to a great extent to create among them a sense of separateness, of different identity 
that in the following decades would become nationalistic. 
 In Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 208
Thought, University of Chicago Press, London 1999, 29. Stephen was legal member of the 
Imperial Executive Council (1869-72) and judge of the Indian High Court (1879-01). He was the 
main theorist of the new imperial ideology.
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twentieth century was the entitlement to civic and political rights within the Empire, on the 
basis of the Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 . 209
  Even though in the opinion of colonial writers and officials they represented exclusively 
the bourgeois interests, and the Hindu nationalists who afterwards came to the political 
fore ridiculed them as political beggars, if not traitors, for their ‘pray, please, protest’ 
attitude, the reality is that the Congress leaders gave India a ‘global voice’ . It was the 210
Congressmen who produced the ‘authoritative statement’ to show the world what the 
people of India wanted . By and large, they demanded as their prerogative those same 211
rights that should have been conceded them according to the British political liberal 
tradition. In fact, they aspired to become citizens of the British Empire, because they were 
subjects of the Crown and, as such, they had to be admitted into the rights of the British 
people. So, for instance, in Manchester, 1909, Banerjea stated:
“India in the enjoyment of the blessings of self-government, India prosperous, 
contented and happy, will be the most valuable asset of the empire, the 
strongest bulwark of Imperial unity. And the Empire thus knit together upon 
the basis of common civic rights and obligations, may bid defiance to the 
most powerful combination that may be formed against it, and may gaze well 
serenity and confidence upon those vicissitudes which, as all history tells us, 
have wrecked the fortunes of States and thrones which relied upon the 
security of physical rather than upon the paramountcy of those moral laws 
 This was promulgated after the termination of the EIC administration in India after the revolt of 209
1857. By proclaiming the sovereignty of the Crown over British India, the Proclamation declared 
that all the inhabitants of India were considered subjects of the Sovereign, they would enjoy equal 
treatment and protection in front of the law and they would not be discriminated on the basis of 
creed or race in having access to offices.
 C.A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties. Indian Though in the Age of Liberalism and Empire, 210
Cambridge University Press, Delhi 2012, 204. Note must be taken that the gradual modification of 
the rigours of imperialist domination and the introduction of self-governing institutions in the British 
colonies were, at least to some extent, the result of the pressure and of the work of sensitisation of 
Indian liberal leaders. They contributed to the awareness of the condition of India both among their 
people and among British people in Great Britain. To think of democracy in India and other British 
colonies as the outcome of British liberal government is misleading and unconvincing. On the 
contrary, Indians were conscious that they were dealing with the most liberal country in Europe and 
they believed that sympathy for, and advancement in, their cause could be achieved more easily in 
England, somehow trespassing the autocratic colonial government. See for example the Speech 
by Surendranath Banerjea, “Faith in England”, quoted in W.T de Bary, Sources of Indian Tradition, 
Columbia University Press, New York 1958, 678. 
 Robert Osborne to P.M. Mehta, 18th April 1884, Mehta Papers, NAI.211
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which represent the index-finger of Divine Providence in the dispensation of 
human affairs” .212
  While acknowledging the benefits that the British Raj had carried in terms of internal 
peace and security, Banerjea emphasised also the mutual advantage that a united Empire 
could have both for Great Britain and India. But such unity was durable only if Indians 
could enjoy civic and political rights in the space of the Empire.
 The claim to become imperial citizens, formulated before the conceptualisation of the 
Indian nation, was based on the premises of the liberal ideas of citizenships that 
prescribed justice and liberty. It transcended the Indian identity, in order to claim a wider 
imperial subject identity. In other words, for the colonised Indian, it was a tenable strategy 
for self-definition and a reasonable discourse to counter colonialism without being anti-
British . Yet, the British kept on regarding Indians as only subjects, and not as citizens.213
  So, the leaders of the Congress grew increasingly disenchanted with the effects that the 
British domination was having over India. The fact that the Raj and the welfare of Indians 
were incompatible could not go further unnoticed. As a matter of fact, the Congressmen 
and other important figures linked to them carried out accurate and rigorous scientific 
studies and analyses of the official data of the colonial state that highlighted that the 
poverty of India was man-made. More precisely, British domination was considered the 
cause of a continuous flow of wealth funnelled out of India in favour of England. So, the 
studies of Indian economists demonstrated that, regardless of the bonhomie of official 
proclamations, the real objective of the Raj was the systematic extortion of the resources 
of the subcontinent to the advantage of Great Britain and the creation in India of a market 
for British industrial products. This “drain of wealth”  was the main reason of the 214
progressive impoverishment that the Indian subcontinent was undergoing. Thus, as 
 Surendranath Banerjea, A Nation in Making, Oxford University Press, London 1927, 266.212
 It is worth mentioning that the concept of citizen of the Empire did not exist in the late 213
nineteenth century when Indians were asking for it. Only with the idea of a British Commonwealth 
of Nations, the word ‘citizen’ started featuring in British common law. Therefore, what Indians 
wanted to enjoy was not a codified status, but a potential one (see Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming 
Imperial Citizens. Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire, Duke University Press, Durham and 
London, 2010, 5). 
 There is not need to insist on the well-known theory formulated by R.C. Dutt and Dadabhai 214
Naoroji [Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and un-British Rule in India, Publication Division, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi 1962 (first publ. 1901) and Romesh 
Chunder Dutt, The Economic History of India, A.M. Kelley, New York 1969, 2 Vol. (first publ. vol.1, 
1902, vol. 2, 1904)]. Suffice it to say that the expression ‘drain of wealth’ became a catchy phrase 
that had a great nationalist resonance among Indians. It immediately pointed out to the condition of 
subjugation and exploitation of the Indian people at the hands of the British: it was a powerful 
critique of imperialism.
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Gokhale underscored in the numerous powerful Budget speeches he delivered as a non-
official member of the Imperial Legislative Council, the colonial rule was not responsible to 
Indian people. Indeed, since the British rule was at the origin of Indians’ material 
sufferings, the trust in it was not unconditional. Gokhale stressed this when he explained 
that “when Indians talk of loyalty to British connections it is not similar to that of feudal 
Europe or Rajput India but based on Enlightened self-interested” .215
  Therefore, there were reasons for creeping malcontent. As has been seen, the huge 
difference between ideological currents in the 'West' and the social practices applied in the 
colonies contributed to fade Indian expectations. But what really created an unbridgeable 
rift between Indians and British was the rampant racism that permeated official decisions 
and behaviours. That Indians within the space of the Empire were by no means perceived 
by the British as the citizens they wished to be was confirmed by the colonial policies 
towards Indians in South Africa and in other colonies where they were exploited as bonded 
labour . This condition of inferiority among Indian people inevitably created antagonism, 216
competition and vulnerability, namely those factors that determine the growth of nationalist 
feeling in a people. Threatened in their identity and deprived of the possibility of being 
considered on a level of equality with the British people, Indians started developing a 
sense of separateness and otherness; it provoked a reaction by which Indians implicitly 
defined themselves as the people who were targeted by the racist attitude of the British. 
Such a discourse brought about a reformulation of the Congress ideology, that became 
more clearly nationalist , that is to say, aimed at the achievement of national rights. The 217
dream of England as mirror of the Indian future  was not going to be realised in 218
(un)British India. 
 Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Madras, G.A. Natesan 1928, 299.215
 British policy in South Africa became a sort of litmus with which the Congress judged British in 216
general [David Omissi, “India: Some Perceptions of Race and Empire” in D. Omissi and A.S. 
Thompson (edited by), The Impact of the South African War (Basingstoke; Palgrave 2001) chapter 
2; especially 219-20, here 27].
 A brief clarification is here needed. The use of the terms ‘nationalist’ and ‘nationalism’ creates 217
always confusion, especially in the European context, where it retains a negative connotation. As a 
matter of fact, when in Europe we talk of nationalism, we automatically associate it with the 
overbearing and violent versions of it, namely the one based on racial and cultural identity, which 
became very influential in the European continent in the nineteenth century and was responsible 
for the wars that divided Europe until the Second World War. In India, e contrario, it still has a 
positive undertone, since it was the ideology and movement which gave India freedom from its 
dominators. Nonetheless, both liberal and race/culture-based forms of nationalism can be found all 
over the world. For example, in Italy, the nationalist ideologies formulated by Mazzini and by Crispi 
were very different. In India, Gokhale and the reformers imagined a nation that was opposite to the 
one of Tilak’s and his acolytes. 
 K.N. Panikkar, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectuals and Social Consciousness in Colonial 218
India, Tulika, New Delhi 1995, 22.
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  In other words, the British discrimination to the detriment of their subjects made the latter 
discover a new individuality for themselves, something which at the beginning was not in 
contradiction with the will to remain part of the British Empire. It was a sense of 
distinctiveness that had already been perceived in the past , but for the first time it was 219
articulated at the All-India level. What is important to emphasise here is that such novel 
consciousness of Indianness could emerge because, differently from previous historical 
periods, the geographical wholeness of the Indian subcontinent, so clearly marked out by 
the sea and the mountains, was now also politically and culturally constituted . This new 220
awareness of India as a territory for the nation in fieri had been favoured equally by the 
unified administration and by the educational system. In particular, from 1848 onwards the 
political borders of the British Raj overlapped with the geographical borders of India, so 
that Indian people were gathered around the same polity. On one side the Indian Army, the 
railways, the system of post and telegraph, and on the other side the constructive action of 
the press and the Congress with its emphasis on national problems exerted a synergic 
action which provided Indians with new cultural, social and geographical knowledge and 
experience. Therefore the Indian nation could be described as formed by the people 
inhabiting India, now a territorial unity . 221
The influence of liberalism on Indian nationalism
This concept of close relationship between territory and nation was a typical characteristic 
of the British liberal nationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . Indeed, 222
European liberalism was a major source of inspiration for the leaders of the Congress in 
their formulation of the idea of nation and the ideology that would remain the foundation of 
the all-India party in the future. The Indian leaders who guided the Congress until the first 
two decades of the twentieth century made no mention of an eternal, innate, natural Indian 
nation, contrarily to certain naturalistic nationalist trends that had started circulating in India 
and had become dominant in Europe. The idea of nation formulated by the Congressmen 
in this period was enlightened, open, and far-reaching because it was aimed at the 
 See above.219
 Panikkar, Colonialism, Culture and Resistance, 92.220
 According to Christopher Bayly, from the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate onwards, the term 221
‘Hindustan’ acquired the meaning of land inhabited by Muslims and Hindus and in this sense it is 
possible to appreciate Akbar’s project to create a common peaceful space of co-living for Hindus 
and Muslims (See Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 38).
 Torri, “Nazionalismo Indiano e Nazionalismo Musulmano”, 160.222
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peaceful coexistence of a multitude of identities, and, as a consequence, it insisted on the 
individual will of becoming part of the nation. It was mainly Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the 
most important spokesman of the moderate leadership of the Congress, who gave voice 
and power to this concept. Through his powerful speeches, Gokhale made public and 
promoted the idea of nation that he and other liberals wanted to build. According to this 
view, a nation could be ‘made’ in the future, if there was a common project for whose 
realisation every individual, every citizen would bring about their contribution. In other 
words, Indian liberals, sensitive to the huge diversity of their country, did not see any limit 
in the lack of objective elements of cohesion such as a common language, a common 
religion and a shared history. In point of fact, those elements were by no means relevant 
bonds in the imagined nation, since what would tie Indians together was the promise of 
future progress and freedom . This vision was insightful because it did not advocate a 223
single cultural denominator, be it of caste or religion ; in a society as diverse as India, the 224
superimposition of a narrow identity would lead to exclusion and oppression, to resistance 
and protest, and eventually to the failure of the national project itself. Therefore, in this 
phase, the ideologues of the Congress, although in great majority Hindus, did not see any 
religion as the cement that could keep the nation together. They were secular because 
nationalism to them meant the overcoming of any form of particularism and communalism. 
It was a secularism that had to be realised at the political level and circulated through 
political education, something which, later on, would percolate to the cultural level. In sum, 
they believed that secularism and secularisation had to interact; a secular state would 
generate a secular culture, where reason would have primacy on mythos and 
 In the period taken into consideration, freedom did not mean independence from Great Britain. 223
Indian leaders were endowed with great political realism. They understood very well the economic 
and political context in which India was inserted and knew that it was idle talk to speak of 
independence. Only in 1930, under the leadership of Gandhi, the Congress explicitly asked for 
poorna swaraj, that is complete independence. But by then, the relationships between India and 
England and the international scenario had much changed and India had more space of 
negotiation.
 Although most of the Indian people neither shared their Parsi religion nor understood their 224
mother tongue, the fact that Dadabhai Naoroji and Pherozeshah Mehta gave voice to the Indian 
cause is a significant example to comprehend the nature of this nationalism.
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superstition . It was not an anti-religious or irreligious ideology, because it conferred 225
equal freedom to all religions. Although intended to prevent religious strife, this secular 
outlook was inherently weak, because it did not take into consideration the fact that the 
separation between the public political sphere and the cultural and religious private sphere 
promoted by the British Raj was fictitious. For, in the colonial state, the religious 
preoccupations of Indians did not remain confined to the private sphere but found a legal 
space in the public political arena. For this reason, later on, the “discourse and politics in 
the public arena became so easily tinged with interests which were more narrowly 
communitarian than broadly 'national' in character” . Proof of this was the way in which in 226
the future Hinduism could exert a strong political influence on the decisions of the 
Congress.
  It is very interesting to see how the liberal idea of nation had several sources of 
inspiration. One was certainly Giuseppe Mazzini, whose conceptualisation of nation 
echoes in the words of a few Indian nationalists in this period. Maybe the best example of 
the appropriation of the spirit of Mazzini’s nationalism resounds in what Surendranath 
Banerjea wrote in 1909:
"Is India already a nation? If not, what can be possibly be meant by Indian 
nationalism? How can we adore or worship an entity that exists only in some 
people's imagination? Questions of this ignorant and unreasoning kind are 
being perpetually asked by men whose understanding seems to have 
developed as little as their emotions. in truth nationalism is as much a faith 
and a creed and is as much the embodiment of an aspiration as any of the 
commonly accepted religions. The yearning of the heart, the aspirations of 
 On the complex question of secularisation I have already referred to the discussions in EPW, 225
“Revisiting Secularisation”. What is important to underline here is the different starting point that 
the discourse on secularism and secularisation had in India. In fact, if we consider modern 
secularism in Europe, it has its roots in the historical process of cultural secularisation which 
formulate theories on the secular nature of government. In the course of history, then, secularism 
and secularisation strengthened each other, because the two processes were somewhat parallel, 
and religion gradually lost its function of social control. On the contrary, in India secularism and 
nationalism emerged together and when Indian nationalist began to talk of secular state, the hold 
of religion on society was still very strong. That is why scholars like T.N. Madan talk of secularism 
in India as an over-imposition from a handful of members of the westernised elite to the detriment 
of the masses, with whom they were out touch and to whom religion is still the lens through which 
interpret the world. The legal doctrine of secularism was not corroborated by the historical process 
of secularisation, therefore, Madan concludes, secularism is not suitable for India (Triloki N. 
Madan, "Secularism in its place." The Journal of Asian Studies 46.04 (1987), 747-759).
 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and community in South Asian Islam since 1850, 226
Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2001, 91.
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the soul, which religion in its usually accepted sense, has always 
endeavoured to satisfy, this new faith and new creed satisfies as much as 
any other [...]. Nationalism does not mean mere nation worship. so 
understood, it may easily degenerate into a glorified form of selfishness, as it 
has actually done in some Western countries. it means that the point of view 
from which life and its many problems are to be looked at is not the good of 
the individual, but that of the nation, that the nation itself is to be regarded as 
a living entity, as real and as concrete as the individual, and which has as 
clear and as decided functions in the life of Universal Humanity and in the 
system of relations that we see around us, in one word, in the immanent life 
of the Absolute, as the individual has in the life of the nation" .227
  The Italian Risorgimento thinker, who never dealt with India or generally with Asia in his 
works, held a fascination for Indians because the context in which he had operated was 
very similar to the Indian one. In other words, Italy, like India, having been divided in 
regional states for centuries, was a very heterogeneous polity; like India, it had been 
sacrificed in name of imperialism. In the eyes of an Italian who wanted to formulate a 
national discourse for Italy, it was preposterous to try to convince an inhabitant of Naples 
and an inhabitant of Milan that they had the same blood and that they shared the same 
history. Even mutual comprehension was very difficult, since they spoke two vernacular 
languages that had very little commonalities. Yet, if they had not been Italians in the past, 
they could become such in the future. Then it was the moral and political task of the 
nationalist ideologue to give the would-be citizens of Italy a reason, a strong motivation to 
be part of the nation in the making. So, in Mazzini’s opinion, nationality was a common 
thought, a common aim and a common principle; these, in his view, were the only 
essential elements to make a nation . By and large, in Mazzini’s thinking, national 228
consciousness had to be built thanks to a common project of moral revolution that would 
be prodrome of political revolution. Nationalism thus had to be transformed in a sort of 
secular and humanising religion and the nation was not only based on the popular will, as 
the French Revolution had taught, but also from above, that is from God. The national 
 Bengalee, 17th July 1909. See also Surendranath Banerjea, “Joseph Mazzini" in Speeches and 227
Writings of the Hon. Surendranath Banerjea (Madras 1907), 391-415.
 Simon Levis Sullam, "Mazzini and Nationalism as Political Religion", in Bayly, Biagini, Mazzini 228
and the Globalisation, 107-124, here 112, quoted from 'Nationalité': quelques idée sur une 
constitution nationale', La Jeune Suisse, 19, 23, 30 September 1831, in Scritti Editi e Inediti, vol. 6, 
125.
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mission became a mission of divine origin that did not clash with being part of the universal 
humankind. In Mazzini’s words: "When God places a people in the world and says to them: 
Be a nation! He does not say: isolate yourself; enjoy life as a miser with his treasure. He 
says: March, your head raised, among the brothers I gave you, free, without constraints, 
as is fitting for the one that carries my word in his chest” . These words definitely 229
appealed to Indians who were trying to conceptualise their nation. Mazzini’s this-worldly 
spirituality combined well with the process of reformation of the religions in India . The 230
Mazzinian inspiration is easily brought to our mind by Gokhale's words:
“Public life must be spiritualised. Love of country must so fill the heart that all 
else shall appear as of little moment by its side. A fervent patriotism which 
rejoices at every opportunity of sacrifice for the motherland, a dauntless heart 
which refuses to be turned back from its object by difficulty or danger, a deep 
faith in the purpose Providence that nothing can shake – equipped with 
these, the worker must start on his mission and reverently seek the joy which 
comes of spending oneself in the service of one’s country” .231
The ‘worker’ was, in Gokhale’s outlook, the educated Indian, that is the brain of the nation. 
They had cleared the jungle and laid the foundations for the future work of political 
education and national advancement. Thanks to them, ‘the idea of a united and renovated 
India’ was no more ‘idle dream of a few imaginative minds’ . The role of education, for 232
 Ibidem.229
 It is significant that the most popular and translated wok of Mazzini was On the Duties of Men 230
(Manushyon ke kartave in Hindi). It sold thousands of copies. The work of the Risorgimento thinker 
dealt with a modernising religion which empowered the individual and the race in a march towards 
the Divine Spirit, very similarly to what the Brahmo Samajists advocated. The essence of divinity 
was the unity and wisdom of the human race (Bayly, “Liberalism at large”, 362). It is also 
interesting, as Bayly notes, that the the association Young Bengal, founded in the 1840s was the 
non-conspirational version of the Giovine Italia and that the 1857 Mutiny was interpreted by Indian 
as the abortive attempt by Italians to get rid of the Austrian domination in 1848 (Ivi, 357-58). This 
shows that Mazzini exerted his influence when he was still alive. 
 G.A. Natesan (edited by), Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Natesan, Madras 1920, 915.231
 Ivi, 914.232
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Mazzini  as much as for Gokhale, was pivotal in creating a public, common 233
consciousness. 
  Also Mazzini’s belief that the amelioration of the life of the people was responsibility of the 
state was meaningful in the Indian context, where Indians had to advance requests to the 
colonial state for their welfare. Like Mazzini, they did not embrace the principle of laissez-
faire dictated by orthodox liberals. Nonetheless, as a further demonstration of the creative 
exercise of appropriation of exogenous ideas by Indian thinkers, the political thought of 
Mazzini could be selected or rejected according to the changing circumstances in which 
ideas could have a better application . So, for instance, Mazzini inspired also Aurobindo 234
Ghosh , whose nationalism was very different from Banerjea's or Gokhale’s one. The 235
Abhinav Bharat Mandal, the secret association founded by the Hindu nationalist Savarkar, 
Tilak’s pupil, moved from the most revolutionary of Mazzini’s ideals and adopted terroristic 
methods such as the “guerra per bande” (guerrilla warfare). The Mazzinian association 
planned the assassination of Gokhale, that was avoided thanks to the intervention of 
Savarkar himself. According to the ideologue of Hindutva, the attacks done by Gokhale on 
revolutionary and secret societies in England provoked some members of the Abhinav 
Bharat Mandal, that, at a secret meeting passed, the resolution to kill Gokhale. In occasion 
of that meeting, Savarkar was present and stood up and defended Gokhale and his fervid 
patriotism. Savarkar spoke of deep affection and reverence for each other .236
 "EDUCAZIONE, abbiamo detto; ed e' la gran parola che racchiude tutta quanta la nostra 233
dottrina. La questione vitale che s'agita nel nostro secolo è questione d'Educazione ... Si tratta 
dunque di trovare un principio educatore ... che guidi gli uomini al meglio, che insegni loro la 
costanza nel sacrificio ... E questo principio è il DOVERE. Bisogna convincere gli uomini ch'essi, 
figli tutti d'un solo Dio, hanno ad essere qui in terra esecutori d'una sola legge” [Levis Sullam, 
"Mazzini and Nationalism as Political Religion”, 122, quoted from ‘I Doveri dell'Uomo', (1860), 
Scritti Editi e Inediti, vol. 69, 16].
 That Mazzini was a thinker to which Indians were attracted can be seen also by the reading of 234
the newspapers. An article in a newspaper of Allahabad, Maryada, in Hindi, on 16th February 1911 
traced a comparison between patriot and devotee, saying that the former is superior to the latter 
because it gave the formidable advice to 'attain liberty by devoutly serving the national God' to his 
countrymen and seeks no reward for his services. he quoted the instances of Shivaji, Maharana 
Pratap and Guru Govind Singh,  Mazzini, Garibaldi, Washington and Horatius. They add to the love 
for God the love for the country (See Native Press Report for the United Provinces 1911, NAI).
 See Bande Mataram, 22nd September 1907: “Nationalism is simply the passionate aspiration 235
for the realisation of the divine unity in the nation, a unity in which all the component individuals, 
however various and apparently unequal their functions as political, social or economic factors, are 
yet really and fundamentally one and equal. In the ideal of nationalism, which India will set before 
the world, there will be an essential equality between caste and caste, between class and class… 
while we insist in reorganising the nation into a democratic unity politically we recognise that the 
same principle of reorganisation ought to inevitably assert itself socially”.
 Selected works of Veer Savarkar, My transportation for life, Vol. 2, Abhishek Publications, Delhi 236
2007, 177.
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  Besides Mazzini, whose echo abounds in the writings and speeches of the Indian 
nationalists, a range of other figures enriched Indian thinking. Remarkable was the 
influence of Edmund Burke on Gokhale, among others. The eighteenth-century Irish liberal 
recognised in India the potentiality of nationhood and saw the British presence as a 
hindrance to it . Significantly enough, Burke’s well-known Reflections on the French 237
Revolution  became a very popular textbook in Indian colleges because the British 238
considered it appropriate to counteract the effect of the French revolutionary ideals thanks 
to its emphasis on gradual change and social order. But when Burke became source of 
political inspiration in the national sense in virtue of his view on liberty, which to him was 
birthright of the humankind, Lord Curzon wanted to remove it from the texts of the Calcutta 
University, because ‘dangerous food for the Indian students’ . Further, John Stuart Mill, in 239
Gokhale’s opinion, had greatly contributed to moulding the ‘new India’ . Mill’s influence is 240
very much felt in the speeches of Gokhale, even though certain aspects of his thought 
were ignored, because prejudiced against Asian societies. Friedrich List’s National System 
of Political Economy  played a considerable role in Indian economic thought of Naoroji, 241
Ranade, G.V. Joshi, and Gokhale who framed a sophisticated critique of the colonial 
economic system. Ranade was strongly influenced by List’s argument that weak 
economies necessitated systematic state protection in order to achieve industrialisation. 
Also Gokhale mentioned the economist of German origins in the Imperial Legislative 
Council while stressing the need of state intervention to compensate the unbalance 
created by the free market to the detriment of the poorest countries:
“When a country, industrially backward, with antiquated methods of 
manufacture, dependent largely on manual labour, comes into the vortex of 
 Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 237
Thought, University of Chicago Press, London 1999, 189. The author makes reference to J.F. 
Taylor (edited by), Edmund Burke, "Speech on the State of Representation of Commons in 
Parliament”, in Writings and Speeches, Little Brown, New York 1901, (7), 94-95.
 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution, London, Penguin 1968.238
 Suresh Chandra Ghosh, “The genesis of Curzon's University Reforms, 1899-1905” in Rao, New 239
Perspectives, 224-268, here 235, quoted from Curzon Papers, Letter from Curzon to Maclean, 
14th February 1900, letter 44. Yet, the Senate of the University, still independent from the 
governmental control before the reforms later on introduced by Lord Curzon, could refuse the 
proposals in terms of textbooks advanced by the Viceroy and by the government (Ibidem).
 Gokhale Papers, NAI, From Gokhale to John Morley, 9th May 1897.240
 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, London 1885. List took part in the 241
debates of economic development in 1820s in the United States of America and was inspired by 
Hamilton’s Outline of American Political Economy (Philadelphia, 1827). The purpose of national 
economy in List’s opinion was to encourage capitalist industrialisation (See Eric Hobsbawm, 
Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 29) 
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universal competition - competition with countries which use steam and 
machinery and the latest researches of science in their production - the first 
effect is to sweep off local industries, and the country is thrust back on 
agriculture and rendered almost entirely agricultural for some time. but then, 
here, he [List] says, comes in the duty of the state. When such a situation is 
reached, the state, he [List] says, should step forward, and by a judicious 
system of protection it should foster such industries as are capable of being 
fostered, so that the country may once again enter on its industrial path with 
the aid of the latest appliances ad ultimately stand successfully the 
competition of the whole world” . 242
But how, Gokhale wondered, could it be realised, since the protection of Indian industries 
clashed with the principle of colonialism and Indian interests were not represented in the 
government ? Furthermore, it is worth noting that List clearly formulated the liberal 243
concept that a nation to have historical justification had to be of a certain size , assertion 244
which Indian nationalists, with their emphasis on territory, concurred with.
  On the contrary, the theory of free trade of Smith was not that attractive for India - but the 
same can be said about Canada - which was struggling to develop their economy in 
contrast with the more powerful British one. Also Ricardo’s theory of rent was rejected on 
the basis that rent conditions were very different in India . 245
  So, an interesting, twofold phenomenon was taking place in India. On the one hand 
nationalism was a reaction to the morally, materially, and intellectually unbearable 
European domination. On the other hand, the principle of nationality and the idea of nation 
on which it was predicated, but also liberalism and its critiques, were European values 
which, after an attentive perusal, Indian nationalists, selectively and critically re-read and 
incorporated in their ideology. Yet, this is not necessarily a contradiction. In fact, the anti-
colonial movement is a further, very significant, demonstration that Indian intellectuals and 
nationalists, when looking for alternatives routes to escape from the yoke of the British 
 “Import Duty on Sugar’, in R.P. Patwardhan, D.V. Ambekar (edited by), Speeches and Writings 242
of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Deccan Sabha, Asia Publishing House, Vol, 1, Poona 1962, 9th March 
1911, 335.
 In its moderation and intellectual balance, Gokhale maintained that neither protectionism nor 243
free trade had to be taken as absolute dogmas; they had to be rejected if considered universal 
unquestionable truths; in fact, also protection could make the rich richer and the poor poorer (See 
The Leader, Editorial, 11th April 1911).
 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 30.244
 Gosh, “Dissenting Economists”, 97.245
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rule, did not elaborate a theory where Indian past and western modernity were non-
communicating watertight compartments. In other words they did not always idealise the 
past and condemn the modernity which came from the 'West'. There were many 
productive in-between ways. Then to define Indian nationalism as a derivative discourse 
originated exclusively from the post-Enlightenment European rationalism grossly 
oversimplifies this fundamental development of Indian history. The definition of 
derivativeness might be accepted only if it suggests that nationalist discourse and thought 
had many different sources and did not derive only from the 'West'. But is it not redundant 
to make such an argument? Is not the history of world, of which the history of India is part, 
a crossroads where not only goods but also ideas travel and create common patterns that 
emerge in all cultures, even though conjugated according to the different human 
experiences? 
  It is true that the material domain of the state was perceived as the founding moment of 
modernity  and the Congress itself gave meaning to the colonial state as strategic agent 246
of major qualitative changes at the political and social level. Yet, this is not a convincing 
justification to “subsume Indian history into the history of imperial institutions or political 
discourse (…). For we need to consider both the indigenous inheritance of the Indian state 
and the pattern of class formation within Indian society under colonialism which 
appropriated this foreign political apparatus” . The colonial state was not created ex 247
novo. On the contrary, the Mughal empire bequeathed a legacy of cultural and institutional 
cohesion, bureaucracy and a system of knowledgeable rules that were inherited by the 
British Raj . Moreover, in pre-British Indian history the reactions to certain practices and 248
policies of British rule were grounded on popular ideas of political morality and good 
 Sugata Bose, Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia. History, Culture, Political Economy, Oxford 246
University Press, Delhi 1998 (Revised edition 2004, Sixth edition 2013), 99.
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 293. Also the opposite posture is by no means commendable, 247
because “a national culture that does not have the confidence to declare that, like all other national 
cultures, it too is a hybrid, a crossroads, a mixture of elements derived from the chance encounters 
and unforeseen consequences, can only take the path to xenophobia and cultural 
paranoia” (Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Is Indian ‘Civilization’ a Myth?, Permanent Black, Delhi 2013, 
7).
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 295. So, for example, the ‘Institutes of Akbar’ (a mix of maxims for 248
good kingship), Islamic ethnology and revenue and military details, along with the police reporting 
(Akhbarat-i-kotwali, pre-colonial daily reports of the police chief of a city) can be considered the 
forefathers of British surveys, mapping, and police reporting. In the same way, many elements of 
the colonial discourse on crime, caste, thagi, sati had precedents in the Mughal state, even if for 
the British they had the purpose to create an international hierarchy for racial rule (Ivi, 294).
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government that had been used in the past as forms of popular resistance against 
indigenous rulers . 249
  Then, Indian nationalism was determined by a combination of the distorted all-pervading 
effects of the colonial state with the structures and ideologies of the Indian past. The idea 
of the Indian nation was in the same way by-product of the synthesis of Indian culture and 
British culture, both characterised, in varying proportions, by elements of modernity and 
rationality.  
 Nation in the unmaking. The dividing effect of the British Raj
  The members of the Indian government did not hesitate to define the Congress, despite 
its moderate tones, a ‘factory of sedition’. Civilians like Valentine Chirol and Reginald 
Craddock qualified its members as part of a small westernised elite , an insignificant 250
‘minuscule minority’, totally patronising and unrepresentative of the Indian masses . Yet, 251
this belief did not turn out to be very appeasing. There was somebody that perceived the 
leaders of the Congress as a potential modernising middle class, not different from the 
ones that had operated in the Italian Risorgimento or in the American war for 
independence . 252
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 14.249
 Significantly the same category that has been used later on by several historians to define the 250
Indian intellectuals.
 Even twenty years after the creation of the All-India party that in the meanwhile had grown 251
stronger and had carried out important campaigns, Lord Minto, the Viceroy, wrote: “What is going 
on in India is altogether peculiar in comparison with other revolutions. Gambetta and Clemenceau 
and before them Cavour, Garibaldi and Mazzini were fighting for what they believed to be the 
liberties of the people and had the support of a great majority of their fellow countrymen. I have 
always thought the regeneration of Italy a very fine story, though it was led by extremists who were 
not over scrupulous; but here the position is entirely different. There is no popular movement from 
below. The movement such as it is, is impelled by the leaders of a class very small indeed in 
comparison to the population of India, who, if by some miracle they obtained the reins of 
Government, are totally  incapable of ruling and would not for an instant be tolerated by the people 
of India as a whole” (Minto Papers, NAI, Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Morley, 4th November 
1906).
 “All that you say about Indian revolution as compared with French or Italian ditto is extremely 252
interesting, for you are at close quarters and on the ground with these new agencies. Of course, I 
go with you in general reading of the situation. The only question is whether the clever, 
enlightened, educated fellows will ever have the influence and power enough to draw the mass 
after them against British rule. Every revolution that I have ever heard of, came from above and not 
from below in the first instance – a few applying a match, the many bringing torches after. Try this 
in USA, in our civil war, in the work of Cavour, Mazzini & co, of Rousseau and so on” (Minto 
Papers, NAI, Letter from Lord Morley to Lord Minto, 30th November 1906). This letter was a reply 
to the consideration made by Lord Minto in the letter quoted in the previous footnote.
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  Therefore, on the one hand, the Raj tried to support and circulate the idea that speaking 
of India as a nation had neither historical, nor logical foundation; in this view, such a 
discourse was preposterous because India did not possess ‘any sort of unity, physical, 
political, social, or religious; no Indian nation, no “people of India”, of which we hear so 
much’ . India was rather a subcontinent, which was tied together only by the action of the 253
colonial state, which was the guardian of peace and social order. 
  On the other hand, the colonial state started adopting divide-et-impera policies in order to 
create conditions as to perpetuate, demarcate and officialise social, political, and religious 
divisions, so that the dreaded making of the nation could be postponed, if not prevented. 
As a matter of fact, in view of setting apart the subjects of the subcontinent and favour the 
imperial interests, the colonial state set up a work of social engineering (accomplished 
through new social sciences like sociology and anthropology, but also more practically 
through censuses) so that new supra-local caste and religious categories could be 
redefined, and in some cases invented. Hence caste and religious communities were now 
interpreted as rigid and impermeable groups, having a well-defined identity since ancient 
times . The British definition of community in religious terms - which deliberately did not 254
take into consideration class, region, language - and the use of religions as a social 
demarcator to enumerate and govern the complex Indian social fabric was a denial of the 
policy of non-interference with religious matters. It created the concepts of majority and 
minority and consequently the claims of the Hindu majority and the muslim minority in 
petitioning with the Raj on the basis of their religious belonging. 
  The second step undertaken by the colonial officials was to provide these newly-formed 
social constructs with patronage, so that resources were delivered by the colonial state 
according to communal criteria. As a consequence, the newly-defined communities were 
brought into the political fore and pushed to consolidate their identity vis-à-vis the other 
communities and in contrast with the wider national identity that was contemporaneously 
 This is how the question of the Indian nation was dismissed by John Strachey in his 253
authoritative India, London 1888, 5.
 The construction of the Indian Muslims and the Depressed Classes must be inserted in this 254
framework of exercise of the colonial power.
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emerging . So, one community was pitted against the other, because each one started 255
being depicted - but also perceiving itself - as a group with political, economic, and social 
interests different from, if not divergent with, the ones of the other communities. In other 
words, the data collection and classification by tribe, caste, community accomplished by 
scholar-officials of the colonial state heavily contributed to create a misleading 
understanding of the groups in which Indian society was divided. In fact, within the 
structure of the colonial political system, religion and caste became for the first time strong 
forms of ethnic identity, fixed, identifiable and connected with political action . Just to 256
mention a few examples, by 1880s the entire Indian army was defined by caste and 
ethnicity. So for instance the ‘martial races’ were opposed to the effeminate Bengali 
people. In the same way, titles conferred to ‘natural leaders’ were different according to the 
religion of the person awarded. The criteria of religion and caste were introduced in 
 The emergence of communalism has been object of study for many scholars. For reasons of 255
space, we cannot insist too much on it. Suffice it to say that the term itself has created polemics 
since it implies the illegitimacy of the development of nationalisms different from the mainstream 
one. Reducing Muslim nationalism to the level of communalism means to ignore the reasons that 
drove Muslims leaders to formulate a separate idea of nation for their community. It is a strategy 
not to recognise the responsibilities of the majority community. To define communalism as a false 
consciousness and as the belief that because a group of people follow a particular religion, they 
have common social, political and economic interests is a tautological explanation [See Bipan 
Chandra, “The Indian National Movement and the Communal Problem” in Nationalism and 
Colonialism in Modern India, Orient Blackswan, New Delhi 2010 (first pub. 1979), 262]. According 
to the Cambridge historian, Christopher Bayly, Muslim and Hindu conflict had a pre-history and it is 
not a by-product of the British rule (C.A. Bayly, “A pre-history of Communalism? Religious Conflict 
in India, 1700-1860”, Modern Asian Studies, 19 (2), 1985, 177-203). Social and ideological forces, 
before the advent of the British, were giving shape to a particular antagonism between the two 
communities: “If ‘communalism’ was ‘constructed’ during the colonial period (as many Indian 
academics think) (…) then it was certainly constructed in part from materials already at hand: from 
memories, antagonisms and aspirations which already existed, albeit set amongst competing and 
antithetical sentiments” (See Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 49). Yet, Bayly’s interpretation neglects 
how conflicts that might have existed at the local level were transferred at the All-India level. 
Among the numerous works on communalism, see: Sandria Freitag, Collective Action and 
Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi 1989; Bipan  Chandra, Communalism in Modern India, Vikas Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1984; Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims, 1880-1923, Paperback, 
Cambridge 1994; Farzana Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in 
Colonial India, 1860-1947, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989; Gyanendra Pandey, The 
Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1990; 
Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930, Manohar Publications, 
New Delhi, 1991.
 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 225. By hedging a Muslim community as an electoral 256
constituency “the British inevitably created arenas for ritual competition in which over time personal 
commitment to Islam melted with public assertions of religious solidarity to create a newly 
politicised vision of community. The result was the flowering of a new communal rhetoric and, 
ultimately, of the Pakistan movement” (ibidem).
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censuses and the institution of separate electorates in 1909, 1919 and 1935 constitutional 
reforms administratively implemented the colonial dominant thinking .257
  At this point, in order to avoid confusion, what is important to clarify, although briefly, is 
that religious and caste communities had never before constituted a factor of political 
mobilisation. This by no means implies a negation of the fact that such communities were 
long-standing entities and that for centuries they had been regulating the existence of 
Indians by prescribing certain social practices. Yet, their relevance was exclusively social 
and they had no clout at the political level. Caste communities had generally only a local 
reach, that is to say that endogamy was practised in the range of small areas, at best of a 
city; whereas people of the same religion were very diverse in terms of ritual practices, 
social status, language and ethnicity. So, for example, most probably, a Hindu peasant and 
a Muslim peasant had much more in common between each other than with their 
coreligionists, who were part of the elite classes. Further, it is unlikely that the masses of 
the people identified themselves with Hinduism; rather, they defined themselves as 
devotees of the one of the multifarious religious traditions that made up what later was 
categorised as Hinduism. And the same can be said of Muslims, who were divided in 
Shias, Sunnis, and other sects, and were more or less influenced by Sufism or by the 
religious interactions with Hinduism. The truth is that, before the consolidation of the British 
Raj in the course of the nineteenth century, the most important relationships in Indian 
society were the pyramidal structures that linked patrons and clients, namely relationships 
of economic and political dependency based on mutual convenience that generally 
characterise pre-modern societies. These patron-client relationships cut across caste and 
religious links, since the interaction between different caste and religion members was 
commonplace. In sum, the sense of belonging to the communities in question had always 
been heterogenous, fluid, and indistinctly defined, mainly because diluted by clientelistic 
solidarities. Later on, with the consolidation of the colonial state, what took place was an 
horizontal crisis that commonly characterises a society which is undergoing the pressing 
development of modernisation. This crisis pitted some social groups against others in the 
struggle to be entitled to rights or to be benefited from the allocation of the resources of the 
state.
  Nevertheless, because of the divide and rule strategy pursued by the British dominators, 
a more clear-cut sense of identity started being defined within the same caste or religious 
group, as being member of a specific group became a requirement in order to get benefits. 
 See Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, The New Cambridge History of India, III.4, 257
Cambridge University Press, 1994, chapter 4, 113-159.
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In other words, being clearly and unmistakably identified as part of a certain religious 
community or even caste became at a certain point expedient to ask for political power 
and state protection. The extension of the elective principle intensified the demands based 
on religious, class, local, regional basis . This afforded 'a restricted say to a handful of 258
Indians in local and provincial bodies occasion[ing] new strategies to balance the interests 
of the individual and the community' . Individuals claimed to represent the interests of 259
internally differentiated communities so the balance was always very precarious. The elites 
claimed to be speaking on the behalf of the masses of their community, even it was very 
heterogenous and it was difficult to a actually represent it as a whole.
  So, it is undeniable that the colonial state was a catalyst of this collective discourse and 
that it created a fertile ground for the forging of community identity. Yet, what actually came 
into being was a system of interactions between, on the one hand, the manipulative 
practices of the colonial state and the responses of Indians to such practices, and on the 
other hand between the different groups of Indians - tribes, castes or communities . 260
Thus, for instance low caste leaders, needing new ideological basis to question the old 
 The more recent interpretation of Indian history as a clash between different religious 258
communities is legacy of the colonial argument that archaic and watertight religion-based or caste-
based communities had always been a characteristic of the subcontinent. Often, as a consequence 
of the same argument, the Partition of India is interpreted teleologically as a necessary, inevitable 
development, because Hindus and Muslims had always been divided by an unbridgeable cultural 
rift. Nevertheless, this view is no less preposterous than the view that sees Indian nation as a 
timeless presence in the history of India. In reality, the emergence of Muslim nationalism was the 
outcome of the effect of British colonial policies on the one hand, and the reaction to the novel 
Hindu aggressiveness (also this being, at least partially, a byproduct of the colonial action) on the 
other hand. Moreover, the relationships and understanding between Muslims and Hindus was 
affected by the changing power relations in the course of history. The reconstruction of history runs 
parallel to this change. On the intensifying Hindu and Muslim interaction in the between the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, see the enlightening work by Vasudha Dalmia, Munis D. 
Faruqui, (edited by), Religious Interactions in Mughal India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 
2014. For the conceptualisation of a Muslim nation see the groundbreaking work of Ayesha Jalal, 
The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1985; Torri, “Nazionalismo indiano e nazionalismo musulmano”, 
passim. On the consolidation of new religious and caste identities see Harjot Oberoi, The 
Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition, Oxford 
University Press, Delhi 1994; Rosalind O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict, and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao 
Phule and Low Caste Protest in Nineteenth-Century Western India, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1985, Ayesha Jalal, ‘Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South 
Asia’, in Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (edited by), Nationalism, Democracy and Development: 
State and Politics in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1997.
 Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 87.259
 On the contrary, Susan Bayly [“Caste and ‘Race’ in the Colonial Ethnography of India”, in Peter 260
Robb (edited by), The Concept of Race in South Asia, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1995, 
165-218] and David Washbrook and Christopher Baker [South India, Political Institutions and 
Political Change 1880-1940, MacMillan Co. of India, Delhi 1975] maintain that this interaction was 
mainly dictated by the self-interest of ‘the opportunist magnate and caste association boss’. Indians 
ideas are once again dismissed in favour of the ever sought-for material interest.
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social and religious order, gave new meaning to certain existing symbols, rituals and 
historical contests .261
  But there were also other forces operating in the magma of Indian social fabric that 
fuelled animosity between social groups. The aggressive discourse of Christian 
missionaries strongly contributed to make the local religions feel jeopardised and 
threatened. The reaction of Hindu religious reformers was the attempt to rationalise and 
simplify Hinduism, that had been until then a polymorphous aggregate of many religious 
traditions rather than a homogenous religion stricto sensu. Therefore, Hindu reformers 
selected the system of thought of few Hindu traditions - generally those close to 
Brahmanical worship because it was to brahmanical castes that this intellectuals belonged 
- in order to provide Hinduism with elements of coherence and uniformity so that it could 
turn into an authoritative and powerful counterweight to challenge the intrusiveness of 
Christianity. Unfortunately, yet, also Muslims became target of the new aggressive posture 
acquired by Hinduism. Hindu militancy manifested itself also with a strong proselytising 
action in order to reduce conversions to Christianity but also to bring Hindus converted to 
Islam back to the fold of the new mould of Hinduism. Religion, then, was transformed into 
a polarising factor between religious communities . So, for example, the ban on cow-262
slaughter promoted by the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj spurred tension and hostility 
between Muslims and Hindus . This process of restoration of a ‘pure’ Hinduism ran 263
opposite to the effort made by figures such as Rammohan Roy or Ranade to free Hindu 
religion from its most irrational and fanatical aspects. The colonial state rode the wave and 
gave impetus to the enmity between communities. Mr. Beck, principal of the Muslim 
Aligarh College, branded the Indian National Congress as a Hindu body that wanted to 
monopolise power and government appointments; the societies for the protection of cows, 
that were emerging all over India, were just a telling instance of what the Muslims would 
experience at the hand of a powerful Congress . Again, in Pune the government 264
 A striking example of this is the manipulation of the figure of Shivaji in the contest between 261
Brahmans and non-Brahmans in nineteenth-century Maharashtra. See O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict, 
and Ideology, passim.
 For this process of semitisation of Hinduism see Romila Thapar, “Imagined Religious 262
Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity”, in Modern Asian 
Studies, 23 (2),1989, 209-231.
 According to the Islamic tradition, a cow is sacrificed during the celebration of the Id-ul-Adha. It 263
was the decision of the British raj in 1888 by the Northwestern Provincial High Court in Allahabad 
not to consider the cow as a holy animal and to punish with imprisonment anybody who said that 
Muslims by practicing the sacrifice during Bakr-Id had offended hindu religion that gave momentum 
to the movement.
 Sudharak, (Reformer), “Mr Beck and the Mahomedans", 5 February 1894.264
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prohibited the playing of music - essential in the celebration of Hindu festivals - in the 
neighbourhood of any place of public worship “where congregational worship in silence is 
enjoyed”, which meant mainly mosques. The prohibition had been enforced 
notwithstanding the fact that playing music outside religious places had never given rise to 
disturbances until that moment. Moreover, the Muslim leaders, consulted by the British 
authorities, had not objected to the celebration with music of Hindu festivals. Yet, the 
colonial measure created a legal space where what until then had been considered a 
normal religious practice could be turned in a motive of grievance and communal 
antagonism .265
  Thus, the picture we have now is very complex. The Congress leaders had to fight 
against the colonial state, but also against identities that were slowly emerging and were 
being legitimised by the colonial action. What is more, since its foundation, the Indian 
National Congress was received by the educated Muslims  with mixed feelings. For 266
example, The Pioneer of Allahabad ridiculed the Congress for claiming to be a national 
party, whereas the Azad of Lucknow denigrated The Pioneer for spreading discord . In 267
fact, note must be taken that the condition of the Muslims after the end of the Mughal 
Empire, and especially after the Great Mutiny of 1857, was generally worse than that of 
the Hindus. Regarded by the British as the main responsible for the revolt, the Muslims 
had not been favoured by colonial policies and attitudes. These aimed to preserve tradition 
and hierarchy according to the new line of non-intervention adopted after the rebellion and 
were generally in favour of the Hindu high castes. On the contrary, most of the Muslim 
middle classes had kept aloof from western education, industry, and trade. This condition 
of inferiority in political, social, and economic terms contributed in making Muslims even 
more wary of the Congress, whose unwillingness in accommodating safeguards that could 
ameliorate the situation of their Muslim fellows made these believe that there was no 
space for them in the party and that this was expression of the Hindu majority. Moreover, 
reformers like Syed Ahmed Khan played an important role in instilling suspicion in his 
coreligionists towards the all-India party. According to the founder of the Anglo-Muslim 
 Sudhrak (Reformer), “Uncalled for Activity”, 13th August 1894. Note must be taken that the word 265
‘communalism’ used with the connotation that acquired in the 20th century was never used to 
indicate the episodes of violence flared in 1880s and 1890s. The press talked of two castes, two 
sects, two classes, but never of two communities or communalism, which was not considered the 
cause, being these bigotry, ignorance, religious prejudice, materially based social and political 
rivalries (Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 85).
 These were members of the ashram classes, who knew Persian and Urdu, and played a role 266
very similar to those played by the Hindu brahmans in terms of political and social reform.
 Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 90-91.267
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college, it was the cooperation with the British Raj that could lift the condition of the 
Muslims and not the participation in the Congress . This is not to say that there was no 268
Muslim taking part in the Congress. Actually, if some kept aside, others saw the 
opportunity to use the platform of the Indian party to press for the advancement of Muslims 
in terms of education and public employment achievements. Generally, though, the 
participation of the Muslims to the Congress in the first years was lukewarm to say the 
least. Between 1885 and 1905 they were around one tenth of the Congress delegates, 
even if the Muslim population of India was around one fifth of the total population . This 269
went to corroborate the idea that there was a cleavage between the two communities, 
namely the Hindu majority vis-à-vis the Muslim minority. So, for instance, when a Muslim 
was elected President of the 1897 Congress, a leading Muslim newspaper, the Moslem 
Chronicle wrote in an editorial that “the Muslim community, in clear and unmistakable 
terms and in emphatic protest, had made known their view that he [Sayani, the Congress 
President] did not, would not and could not represent them” . That this was the opinion of 270
the entire community is rather difficult to believe, in the first place because there was no 
consolidated community at the time. What is sure is that among the educated Muslims a 
sense of separateness was surfacing. The Congress was growingly regarded as a Hindu 
organisation and this caused a great deal of uneasiness among the Mohammedans. As 
has been above, in fact, certain sections of Hindus were showing impatience towards their 
Muslim fellows, as the activities of the Arya Samaj and the cow protection associations 
demonstrated. The fact that even after the alliance between the Congress and the Muslim 
League marked by the Lucknow Pact of 1916, national leaders - Tilak in primis - kept 
talking of the nation in terms typically Hindu and to identify it as the Gau Mata  to be 271
protected did not help stimulating a sense of comfort and security in the Muslims . It is 272
 Ahmed Khan is generally considered the father of Muslim separatism because of his pro-British 268
and anti-Congress posture. Actually he never formulated a clear idea of Indo-Muslim nation, mainly 
because he considered the Muslim community as integral part of the Indian nation. And this was 
generally the belief of the Indian Muslim leader and ideologues until the 1930s. For a short 
biography of Syed Ahmed Khan see Rajmohan Gandhi, Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu-Muslim 
Encounter, State University of New York Press, Albany 1985, cap. 2. 
 Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 157.269
 In K.K. Aziz, A History of the Idea of Pakistan, Vol. 3, Vanguard Books, Lahore 1987, 818.270
 The mother cow.271
 For example, during a speech to promote the Home Rule League, in order to invite more 272
volunteers to subscribe to it with a contribution of one rupee each, Tilak reminded the audience 
(they were especially Hindu merchants) that an ancient Hindu tradition prescribed to donate one 
anna for every rupee earned for cow protection [Stanley A. Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale. Revolution 
and Reform in the making of Modern India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1989 (first 
published 1961) 279]. 
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not surprising that the latter started developing a sense of distinctive identity vis-à-vis the 
Hindu one. Even if that was a ‘negative identification’, in a few decades, it contributed to 
unify the divided Muslims of India. 
The Congress and the masses
  Therefore, while the Congress was still envisioning, negotiating, contesting, creating its 
nationhood, others were emerging and were being defined. How could the Congress 
peacefully subsume these diverging identities within their nationalist discourse? How could 
Congressmen acquire legitimacy as the leaders of the people, in a country where the great 
majority of Indian population was appallingly poor? How could they carry along the 
poverty-stricken masses and sensitise them to the national cause? The leaders of the 
Congress were aware of the innumerable divisions that cut across Indian society. From 
this awareness stemmed their decision to concentrate on (at least putatively) unifying 
issues and to avoid to press for social reforms. Unity was the most important goal . It has 273
been seen above how the idea of nation formulated by the ideologues of the Congress 
insisted on freedom as something that could be achieved only after a slow and tough 
process of political, economic and social maturation. Then, for the Congress leaders, 
talking of democracy could not be disconnected from education, because, in line with the 
principles of liberalism, only a mature people was fit for democracy. It was the task of the 
leading lights of Indian society to guide and empower the masses and gradually bring 
about the necessary political, economic, and social transformations in order to create a 
cultural substratum where liberty could easily flourish. In this sense, the words of 
Surendranath Banerjea, Bengali moderate leader, are explicative of what the 
Congressmen meant:
“I feel that, if we have to advance in social matters, we must, so far as 
practicable, take the community with us, by a process of steady and gradual 
uplift, so that there may be no sudden disturbance or dislocation, the new 
being adapted to the old, and the old assimilated to the new. That has been 
the normal path of progress in Hindu society through the long centuries…
beneficent are the activities of the Brahmo Samaj, but behind them is the 
 For instance, since 1888 no subject could be discussed if a majority of the Hindu or Muslims 273
delegates objected.
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slower but larger movement of the general community, all making towards 
progress” . 274
  Such paternalistic approach was not exclusively result of the liberal influence of thinkers 
like Edmund Burke or John Stuart Mill. On the contrary, the traditional culture of the high 
castes, to which most of the Congressmen belonged, gave priority to the preservation of 
social harmony and discouraged mass upheavals. So, certain liberal values and ideals, 
such as the importance of gradual change and tradition or the distrust towards the masses 
so recurring in authors like Burke, gained ground because they corroborated, at least in 
part, the ethos of the high castes . Caught in between the contradictions of the period of 275
transition they were experiencing, the Congress liberal leaders were sincerely in favour of 
the expansion of democratic institutions, but at the same time they were concerned to 
preserve the social order in which they were still occupying a position of privilege. Split 
between identities of spiritual and temporal individuals, they struggled to find a balance 
between the two. The mobilisation of the masses was not considered a viable solution, a 
fortiori because it could jeopardise the very national project by creating deep social 
fissures. According to this view, then, the soundest path towards national elevation was to 
promote political reforms. Thanks to these, Indians could experiment to exercise freedom - 
and no less to dispute the colonial discourse that they were unfit for it - and, more 
importantly, to learn to be citizens regardless of their caste or creed. But such approach of 
the Congress leaders, generated by a naive faith in progress, failed to address the plight of 
the masses, on behalf of whom the Congressmen claimed to speak. This is not to say that 
the Congress was not aware of the conditions of the peasants and workers. On the 
contrary, thanks to the economic analysis accomplished by Congress leaders or by 
scholars politically close to the all-India organisation, the causes of Indian poverty had 
been authoritatively pinpointed. Moreover, the Budget speeches in the Imperial Legislative 
Council, wonderfully mastered for more than a decade by the eloquence of Gokhale, 
reveal how the amelioration of the situation of the lower strata of society was 
indispensable for the building of the nation. As a matter of fact, the poverty of the indian 
masses, even if the Congressmen did not advocate the class interests of peasants and 
workers, was considered an issue of the maximum importance and was included among 
 Banerjea, A Nation in Making, 398.274
 According to the varnasharna dharma, that is the moral law that regulate the life of the Hindus, 275
everybody needs to abide by the duties attributed to each social condition. It is the duty of the 
superior classes to guarantee social conservation. 
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the requests to be advanced in front of the colonial government since the foundation of the 
Congress - but even before by other previously-formed Indian associations. Yet, from the 
practical point of view, urging questions for the improvement of peasant conditions, land 
policies in primis, were never really tackled for the main reason that any rearrangement of 
the land system could arouse the hostility of the landlords, who were increasingly joining 
the Congress. Also the other requests of the Congress did not involve any immediate 
beneficial effect for the impoverished masses. For example, in the proposal to reform the 
Legislative Council, according to which half of the members had to be elected there was 
no mention of mass votes, but the right to elect was restricted to ‘those classes and 
members of the community, prima facie, capable of exercising it wisely and 
independently’ . Again, universal franchise was not taken into consideration as a 276
possible option for India, if not in the long run, because the electorate had to be educated 
first. Furthermore, the demand for introduction of simultaneous examinations in India and 
England, aimed at increasing the number of Indians in the civil service and to facilitate 
their access to higher posts, did not really affect the masses. Contrarily, it unveiled how the 
potential redistribution of public employment could be a controversial question amongst 
Indians. As matter of fact, employment in the service of the colonial state had been 
prerogative of a small class of individuals, that is the traditional literate communities and 
those who knew English . Therefore, this privileged group perceived the enlargement of 277
public job opportunities as an open door for the penetration of new social groups to their 
detriment . The issue of simultaneous examinations, then, was not indiscriminately 278
considered a desirable measure. As reported in a letter to Naoroji by Dinshaw Wacha in 
 Johnson, Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism, 15.276
 We have seen how also these were mostly belonging to high castes, because the requirements 277
to be proficient in English, the familiarity with new administrative procedures, the experience with 
Indian society, both urban and rural, gave the Brahmins more chances, having them an older 
attitude towards studying and knowledge.
 Broomfield provides a useful interpretative framework in his work and shows how the Hindu 278
bhadralok (dominant elite of nouveau riches in Bengal who were economically dependent on 
landed interest, bureaucratic jobs and clerical activities and who belonged to high castes, whose 
prescriptions they conformed with) were split between giving priority to birth or ability, to democracy 
or privilege. In the author’s words: “They [the Hindu bhadralok] wished to develop the adopted 
institutions which had served them so well in the nineteenth century and yet they were concerned 
to preserve the social order, with its ascribed advantages for themselves. They knew that further 
institutional development would bring increasingly insistent demands from the lower orders for 
accommodation: for the wider opening of the doors of the schools, colleges, and offices to non-
Bhadralok. They were understandably apprehensive of the social effects of such accommodation 
and uncertain of their own ability to control the pace and direction of change”, in Broomfield, Elite 
Conflict in a Plural Society, 318. The contest between new social groups, no more dependent on 
the patronage of superior groups, for capturing new opportunities in terms of economic and political 
resources is a critical phenomenon, inherent in modernisation. 
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his role of member of the Public Service Commission, Hindus and Muslims alike in 
Northern India had unanimously given their evidence against simultaneous examination . 279
On the contrary, the introduction of communal representation divided public opinion along 
religious lines. So, what clearly appears is that it was extremely difficult for the Congress to 
raise questions that, despite thought of for the common good, did not provoke resentment 
and discontentment in one or more sections of the nation. 
  In this scenario, it was very difficult to provide the anti-colonial movement with a popular 
basis. The main problem was that the idea of nation formulated by the Indian leaders, 
although appreciably moderate and advocating unity and a common better future, could 
hardly be a factor of mobilisation. It could be understood exclusively by those Indians who 
had a certain level of education and who shared the same liberal, democratic values. It 
goes without saying that for the most of India’s population the Congress ideology was idle 
talk; the Indian masses could not be satisfied by a promise of progress postponed in an 
undefined, vague future which was not combined with concrete political contents and 
measures aimed at ameliorating the living conditioning of the poor. The fact is that there 
were different levels of politics and the good politician at the all-India level needed to 
speak the language of the dominators, rather than that of the masses at this historical 
moment. And this is something that some leaders knew very well. For example, Gokhale 
was conscious of the fact that his work was popular only among the educated classes, 
whereas he had no sympathisers or supporters among the ignorant masses, who had no 
idea of who he was and which work he was doing . We cannot say by the context what 280
exactly Gokhale meant by saying this, whether he was regretting to be unable to speak the 
same language as the masses or not. Yet, what matters here is that he was aware of the 
fact that one important part of his work was to be carried out amongst the educated 
classes, who had to be trained in the ‘religion’ of the nation, so that in the future, in their 
role of intellectuals, they could contribute to enlarge the basis of the nation in the making. 
It was a sort of cascade effect that, although slowly, would eventually reach down to the 
masses. But, in the meanwhile, the masses were kept aloof from the nationalist 
movement. 
 Wacha to Naoroji, 9th March 1888, Naoroji Papers, NAI, quoted in Johnson, Provincial Politics 279
and Nationalism, 27.
 Gokhale was reported saying this in 1909. Moreover he maintained that in the mofussil he 280
counted 2 percent of the educated classes as his supporters and sympathisers, 15 per cent in 
Poona, and 50 percent in Bombay (quoted in Johnson, Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism, 
117 from Weekly Report DCI, 20 February 1909, in Home Political B, June 1909, 104, NAI).
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  That the nation elaborated by the intellectuals of the Congress was informed around 
principles of rationality and equality is confirmed by the innumerable speeches and 
writings of the nationalists against caste and gender disabilities, among other issues. So 
even if the nationalist intellectuals did not contemplate the populistic mobilisation of the 
masses, this did not mean that they were not sincerely working to create the conditions for 
a better future for all the members of the nation. The effort made to introduce elementary 
education was an important step in that direction because the Congress leaders knew that 
elementary education - free and universal - was an indispensable intervention to create 
equal opportunities for all. Moreover, the very logic to welcome different groups of interest 
within the Congress allowed increasingly more people to take part into the building of the 
nation. Yet, this inclusive stand became a factor of weakness for the all-India party, as the 
most progressive forces within its fold were confronted by the conservative elements that 
had joined the party in the course of time. The split of Surat in 1907 made the leaders of 
the Congress reflect about the fairness of excluding the dissidents, led by Tilak. Gokhale 
maintained that it was preposterous to believe that “democratic methods can be at once 
applied to-day in this ancient land, caste-ridden, and priest-ridden for long centuries”  281
and that it was a paradox to include in the Congress exponents of currents that were not in 
line with the party ideology and that jeopardise the existence of the party itself. In 
Gokhale’s opinion there had to be a certain homogeneity, because “the Congress is not a 
legislative assembly, where all interests must be represented. It is a propagandist 
movement whose effectiveness for advance must depend upon the unanimity with which 
its operations are conducted and which must be paralysed in proportion as it has divided 
counsels at its heart” . Following the split of Surat a new constitution was introduced 282
under the supervision of Gokhale and according to it only members of associations 
affiliated with the Congress could join this one. The schism within the Congress and the 
exclusion of the extremist strand left the moderates at the head of the all-India party, being 
Gokhale and Mehta the most important figures until their deaths, both happened in 1915.
  Nonetheless, following the radicalisation of Indian politics, the Congress and its methods 
had lost credibility in the new context. As Banerjea wrote in the Bengalee, the oft-
mentioned progress had become a void word:
 Gokhale to  Besant, 5th January 1915, Gokhale Papers, NAI. Italics is mine.281
 Gokhale to Bupendranath Basu, 14th December 1914, Gokhale Papers, NAI. The reconciliation 282
took place only at the Lucknow Congress in 1916, after Gokhale’s and Mehta’s death the previous 
year. 
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“It is only when Mr. Gokhale tells the country in effect that there is practically 
no limit to the amount of political progress achievable under present 
conditions that he, in a way, lays himself open to criticism. Not that we are 
prepared for a moment to deny that any amount of political progress is 
consistent with India's forming a part of Empire. But how is this progress to 
be achieved? Mr. Gokhale seems to imagine that the only question here is a 
question of character, capacity and qualification. But how are we to develop 
our character, particularly our capacity for the exercise of freedom, or to 
qualify ourselves for Self-government, if the bureaucracy will not place us in a 
position to do so? […] Not only cannot the qualities on which Mr Gokhale so 
rightly insists be properly developed except through a transformation of the 
life which our people live and the concrete institutions of the country, political 
and social, but one serious obstacle in our way is the reluctance of the 
bureaucracy to part with power” .283
According to Banerjea, it was necessary to organise the forces of public opinion and 
exercise pressure on the bureaucracy in order to overcome the situation of stalemate of 
the pan-Indian party. How public opinion had to be organised and mobilised was not clear. 
This remained the main weakness of the moderates after the 1909 reforms and with the 
increasingly enlargement of parliamentary system. As Broomfield has shown in his work 
on Bengal, Banerjea’s group was unable to speak the languages of electoral politics while 
relying on their respectability to get votes. Therefore, they did not understand that electors 
were concerned with personal advantages and obligation to the candidates, regardless of 
the latter beliefs or experience in the political field . 284
The Hinduisation of Politics
  The split of Surat and the rift which was opened in its aftermath within the Indian National 
Congress has been object of many studies and an in-depth analysis of it does not lie in the 
compass of this research. What is expedient to draw attention to here is that Tilak was the 
promoter of a new form of nationalism that had emerged concomitantly with, and in 
opposition to, the liberal and moderate version of nationalism. Tilak in the Bombay 
province, along with Lajpat Lal Rai in the Punjab, and Aurobindo Ghose and Bipin Chandra 
 Bengalee, 8th July 1909.283
 Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society, 58.284
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Pal in Bengal - calling themselves nationalists or rashtravadi - became exponents of this 
neo-nationalism which had no admiration for the British sense of fair-play and justice, for 
its tradition of democracy and individual freedom. In their opinion, the Congress was just 
an obstacle against a deeper and decisive development of the political situation of India. It 
was a safety-valve and a party of beggars. This nationalism, and the idea of nation 
envisioned by it, was influenced, on the one hand, by the romantic-naturalistic discourse 
on nation that was becoming dominant in Europe and, on the other hand, by the new 
conservative religious tendencies, epitomised especially by the Arya Samaj and the 
Ramakrishna Mission that had surfaced as a reaction to the social reformist movement. 
Such religious matrix of the extremist nationalism was very conservative; this stemmed 
from the threat that western influence posed to the soul of Hindu cultural identity; as a 
reaction to such menace, it was necessary to spread the traditional faith and oppose the 
westernising activities of the reformers, who were not representative of the ethical 
consciousness of the nation; rather, they were lackeys of the British rulers, antinational, 
and serving their own self-interest. 
  This double influence had a twofold outcome. In the first place, it was a clear departure 
from the voluntaristic, liberal nationalism that the intellectuals of the Congress had 
embraced. It revolved around the main concept that the nation was a cultural fact and 
every people who had a common history and culture had an innate and eternal right to 
gather and form one nation; the more their culture was ancient and pure, the more the 
nation could succeed in its consolidation. Therefore, it gave priority to the cultural 
commonality and did not attribute any relevance to the individual will to be part of the 
nation, since the latter existed a priori and could not be disputed. In this outlook, the nation 
became object of a sentimental and irrational adoration, since it embodied the essence of 
the civilisation of a certain people. The nationalism of the extremist strands of Indian 
resistance, then, was not forward-looking, but stood on a romantic and uncritical adoration 
of a glorious (often invented) past and was based on sentiment rather than reason. It was 
a militant and intransigent form of resistance, that had no patience towards any 
compromise with the colonial state. Violence was a legitimate means to fight those who 
opposed and hindered the existence of the perpetual nation . 285
  The second outcome was that, in the extremist perspective, the revaluation and 
glorification of Hindu tradition, religion, and culture corresponded increasingly to their 
identification with the authentic Indian civilisation. Hinduism was the unifying factor, 
 The constitutional agitation advocated by the Congress admitted every form of opposition 285
except rebellion, collusion with a foreign invader and terrorism. Violence therefore was rejected.
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supported by a set of Hindu and Vedic unificatory myths, such as for instance the figure of 
Shivaji, who, from Tilak onwards, was depicted by the Hindu right as a champion of Hindu 
religion against the Muslim invaders. Consequence of this was that also Muslims started 
being perceived as outsiders, as a separate body within the Indian nation; the numerous 
phenomena of cultural and religious interactions between Hindus and Muslims were 
systematically ignored or dismissed as something that had contributed to contaminate and 
weaken the Hindu pureness. Religion therefore turned into a powerful means to popularise 
this cultural form of nationalism and awaken the masses to their national consciousness. 
All this could not but alienate Muslims’ sympathies. In addition to this, any intervention by 
the colonial state or any campaign by the social reformers aimed at mending certain 
discriminating aspects of social practices prescribed by religion was fought as a intolerable 
intrusion to the preservation of the Hindu law. This catchy association between foreign 
domination (and what in the extremist view was its cultural appendix, that is the reformers 
and the Congress) and the fear of imperilment for the Hindu religion was, not surprisingly, 
much more appealing to the concerns of the ordinary people than the promise of progress 
in the long run. Thus, as we will see ahead, what was presented as a revolutionary and 
uncompromising national battle against the foreign oppressor enforced and encouraged 
the continuation of a social system predicated on traditional loyalties; fighting against 
westernisation meant to be condescending with those social disabilities perpetrated in the 
name of religion. Democratic freedom was not contemplated in the independent India 
envisioned by the extremists. Then, their socially reactionary ideology was not at variance 
with their putatively politically progressive ideology. 
The Swadeshi movement and the cleavage between Hindus and Muslims
  The aggressive imperialism of the Viceroy Lord Curzon  (1899-1905) accelerated the 286
deepening of the fissure between the liberals and the neo-nationalists, but also between 
Hindus and Muslims . In reaction to the meagre success of the Congress, stigmatised for 287
 The Viceroy had withdrawn some of the concessions granted by his predecessors in the fields 286
of academic education and local government. He had restricted the autonomy of universities from 
the officialdom and reduced the representation of non-official Indians in the municipalities. What is 
more, Lord Curzon had decided to implement the Partition of Bengal. On the partition of Bengal, 
along with Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement, see J. R. McLane, “The Decision to Partition Bengal 
in 1905” in Indian Economic Social History Review, 2 (3) 1964, 221-237; G. Johnson, “Partition, 
Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 1908” in Modern Asian Studies, 7 (3), 1973, 533-588.
 There were also fringes of anarchic terrorists that resorted to violence against officials of the 287
colonial state and attempted to organise a rebellion through the activities of secret associations. 
Among them there were for example Vasudev Balwan Phadke and Har Dayal.
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its ‘mendicancy’ strategy, the cultural nationalism of the extremists, calling for a bolder 
approach against British rule, gained momentum at the all-India level. What contributed to 
give the anti-colonial movement a wider dimension was especially Lord Curzon’s decision 
to partitioning Bengal (1905-1911), a masterpiece of the divide-and-rule British policy . 288
Officially justified by the need for better administrative efficiency, the Partition of Bengal 
was actually a clear political move. It had a double purpose. On the one hand, it was 
meant to be a punishment for Bengal, focus of the political resistance against British rule; 
on the other hand, the creation of a Muslim-majority province was motivated by the need 
for captivating the support of the Muslim population vis-à-vis the anti-colonial movement. 
Several Muslim zamindar and patrons seized the opportunity of the partition to get the 
share of power denied until then. Among them there was Khwaja Salimullah, Nawab 
Bahadur of Dacca. The British pro-Muslim patronage resulted in their advocacy in the 
creation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. The protest against the Viceroy’s drastic 
measure marked the beginning of the swadeshi  movement: following the Partition, the 289
swadeshi movement stopped to be only intellectual but became something which attracted 
emotional support. It covered the years between 1905 and 1908 and spread in the urban 
areas of Bengal, mainly Calcutta, in some parts of Maharashtra and of the Madras 
Presidency and in Punjab. The swadeshi movement involved mainly the Hindu middle 
classes  that had adopted measures such as boycott of British goods and institutions 290
and picketing. On the contrary, the Muslims in Eastern Bengal and Assam had welcomed 
the creation of a province where they were the majority of the people and where, as such, 
they could better control the educational institutions and government jobs that were 
generally prerogative of the Hindus. Thus Muslims - also in West Bengal - opposed the 
anti-partition movement organised by the Congress, because they perceived the creation 
of a Muslim-majority province as a measure aimed at providing chances to ameliorate the 
conditions of their community. But there were other reasons why the Muslims did not 
partake into the protest, some of which had their prodrome in the previous years.
  The protests against the partition of Bengal brought to the forefront the extremist, cultural, 
intransigent nationalism promoted by Tilak. This, allied with Bepin Chandra Pal, emerged 
 The province was divided into two administrative units, West Bengal and in East Bengal-Assam. 288
In the latter, the majority of the population was Muslim.
 Literally meaning ‘one own country’s’.289
 The social strata involved in the protests were mainly the intellectual proletariat, that is young 290
students and educated professionals; some big zamindars, mainly Hindu; amlas or officials and 
dependants of patriotic landlords, employees in the government offices, private firms and certain 
industries (Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement, 427).
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on the national scene and started speaking of Indian nation, rather than of Mahratta nation 
as he had done so far, in Hinduised terms. He used the same tactics that he had adopted 
in the Bombay Province, that is the introduction of religion as a factor of mobilisation of the 
masses. Yet, the manipulation of the sacred cult of the motherland, identified with the 
Goddess Kali, the worship of Ganesh, and the ablutions in the Ganges excluded the 
Muslims and gave inevitably the swadeshi movement a Hindu connotation that created a 
further gulf between Muslims and Hindus. Moreover, the swadeshi Indian manufacture was 
more expensive and this went to the detriment of the poor peasant, who was mostly 
Muslim. This was combined with the fact that there was no real social programme that 
could attract the masses for long. The violence perpetrated by bands of angry individuals 
against those who did not want to rebel and boycott the cheaper British goods contributed 
to further alienate the support of the lower classes. Overall, the swadeshi movement had a 
limited success. It contributed to enlarge the market for Indian goods and to stimulate 
some capitalistic experiments, but indigenous industries were still too few and also 
national schools and colleges were not widespread enough as to satisfy the needs of the 
country. All in all, in 1908 the imports from Manchester were bigger than in 1905 . It was 291
the organisation and the decisions of the leaders that prevented the protests against the 
tyrannical Lord Curzon from growing into a great opus pacis and make the movement 
really national. The Hindu undertones of the movement could not but create a strong 
division between Hindus and Muslims. The Muslims, being the focus of a discourse that 
considered them as invaders and as the main factor of deterioration of the Hindu religion, 
remained unconvinced. A striking example of the Hindu posture was the celebration of the 
Shivaji festival for the first time in Calcutta in 1906: with it, the image of the Muslim looters 
 Richard Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, University of California Press, Berkeley 1975, 291
178.
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crossed the lines of the region and became national . As intelligently pointed out by the 292
Soltan, a Calcutta newspaper:
"The man who advocates the holding of such festival cannot help 
stigmatising the Musalman rule in India as tyrannical and highly oppressive 
towards Hindus, because Shivaji's spirit of nationality, bravery and patriotism 
cannot be shown in bold relief, unless placed on a dark background of 
Musalman anarchy, oppression and lawlessness.
The exploits of Shivaji may justly be compared with those of Chenghiz Khan 
and Tamerlane, with this difference, that while the latter plundered vast 
dominions, the devastations wrought by the former were limited to provinces 
only. And it had yet to be shown that Shivaji had any vast patriotic schemes 
in his contemplation. It may be that towards the end of his life he turned his 
attention to the work of doing good to his country and countrymen.
We know that the object of our Hindu brethren in celebrating the Shivaji 
festival is neither to wound Musalman feelings nor to vilify the reign of 
Aurangzeb. But the noble purpose with which they are working has an 
inseparable connexion with the history of the Musalman rule in India. In order 
to give high praise to Shivaji, one cannot but censure Musalman rule. Cannot 
the annals of the Hindu race point to a single hero whom even the tongue of 
slander dare not call a chief of dacoits or a treacherous men? How can our 
Hindu brethren wipe away from the page of history the record of Shivaji's 
inhuman conduct towards Afzal Khan and his army? ”.293
 The depiction of the Muslims as invaders and persecutors was not something new even in 292
Bengal. Just to give an impression of how widespread that image was, it is worth mentioning that in 
1870s Romesh Chander Dutt, the eminent economist, had written some novels in which Muslims 
were described according to that same commonplace stereotype. Also Gokhale had delivered a 
speech in the Imperial Legislative Council on the Seditious Meeting Bill in 1907 in which he implied 
that Muslims were not Indians, at least not Bengalis. He said: “But surely it cannot be beyond the 
resources of statesmanship to devise a scheme whereby while the expected advantages of the 
partition of Bengal are fully secured to the Muhammadans, the people of Bengal may also have 
their grievances removed”. If some have seen this as the justification for the judgement that 
between 1885 and 1909 the Congress “in reality was the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of Hindu self-
consciousness” (Aziz, Idea of Pakistan, vol. 3, 818), I rather see this statement as a confirmation of 
the strong anti-Islamic feelings circulating in India, from which also liberals like Gokhale were not 
completely immune.
 Soltan, 8th June 1906, in Native Press Report for Bengal 1906, NAI.293
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  The author condemned the manipulative appropriation and reinvention of the historical 
figure for political purposes and registered the divisive potential of denouncing the Muslims 
as invaders and exploiters. 
  A dangerous process of communal crystallisation - a blissful delight for the British - was 
taking place in both sides. Those who had been benefitting from the Partition of Bengali 
did not hesitate to stoke ill feelings between Hindus and Muslims. For instance, the Nawab 
Salimullah accused Gokhale - on the basis of a forged interview appeared on the Chitisaka 
of Dacca - of sowing the seed of sedition and rousing the Bengali people against the 
Partition . Sectarian literature started circulating and forging an atmosphere of mutual 294
distrust. The spread of the print was instrumental to increase the level of tension. So, for 
example, another Calcutta newspaper, the Mihir-o-Sudhakar. certainly less liberal in 
outlook that the Soltan, reported a poem that, although maybe not expressing the 
sentiments of a reactionary, sectarian Islam, tended to create them:
"Alas, Alas! (they) incited Seraj-ud-dowla,
the crafty intriguing nation, 
by thus denouncing Englishmen before him.
Still the Hindu brothers call upon the Mahomedans
to make them comrades.
Never be beguiled, never, never
For the sake of the treacherous.
This is not Seraj, this is the Englishman.
This is not Mirjafar,
He by worshipping whom the Hindus were rulers, is always
humble.
To whom Agir and Agin all are subjects.
And who are worthy to be worshipped by the Hindus!
For the trifling insignificant Hindus.
Say, why need he fear?
Oh Mohammedans beware
of the perverted swadeshi.
Let nobody mix, let nobody combine
With the crafty Hindu.
 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 17 October 1906 retrieved among the paper clippings in Miscellaneous, 294
Servants of India Society Papers, NMML.
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The king does what he pleases.
Is it proper for the subject to quarrel with the King?
Beware, beware of Mahomedans,
our religious book prescribes loyalty to the King!
This is why I say, you brother, son of Moslem, sing joyously glory to
the Britisher!”295
  The Congress was steadily more identified with the interest of the Hindu community. In 
the words of Mohamed Ali, the eminent Muslim leader, the Congress was ‘avowedly Hindu’ 
in its ‘sympathies and aspirations’ and it drew ‘its energising forces from Hindu religion and 
mythology’ . The editor of the Comrade wryly believed in Indian unity, yet he disliked the 296
kind of sneaky Hinduised nationalism that tried to exclude the Muslims pretending to 
represent the all nation. He also labelled Gokhale as ‘the mild Hindu of Poona’. Of 
Gokhale was also said that he was a man animated by religious prejudices, because in a 
speech in Manchester, he had represented the Swadeshi movement as an outcome of 
resentment against the Bengal partition scheme, thereby proving that he had gone to 
England to support the cause of the dissatisfied Bengalis alone and not that of the whole 
of India . In this scenario, it is not surprising that inter-communal violence flared up in 297
several districts, both in West and East Bengal.
  The annulment of the Partition of Bengal in 1911 generated bitter disappointment and 
anger among Muslims, who felt betrayed and ridiculed by the colonial state. This 
exacerbated the communal dissonance between Hindus and Muslims: the former were 
considered by the latter responsible for the colonial decision and blamed for conspiring 
 Mihir-o-Sudhakar, 25th December 1908, in Native Press Report for Bengal 1908, NAI.295
 Comrade, 19th August 1911.296
 Riyaz-ul-Akhbar, 24th February 1906, in Native Press Report for Untied Province 1906, NAI.297
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against the elevation of the Muslim condition and for being selfishly unable to concede 
protection to the minority. . 298
  What is more, the creation of separate electorates  for Muslims in the Morley-Minto 299
Reform Scheme in 1909 had expedited that process of development of distinctive religion-
based communities, which started organising themselves around their own political 
agenda. In fact, in the debates over the separate electorates in the years before the 1909 
reforms, it was maintained by the British that territorial electorates were not suitable for 
India, for the fact that they would have benefited the urban middle-classes/upper-castes 
who had taken advantage from the British Raj, mainly journalists and lawyers, and who, 
not by chance, supported the nationalist movement. Communal representation was thus 
held to be better . The electorate system had to be the reflection of a society which was 300
divided in watertight compartments along lines of caste and religions. The Muslims were 
made a constitutional minority and conferred separate electorates at all levels of 
representation. This went to the advantage of the Ashraf classes, namely those that had 
sought for British patronage to create the All-India Muslim League few years before. The 
Morley-Minto Reforms created an historical precedent. Thereby, it legitimated in the 
political arena a religious minority that had never had a common history of organised 
 Among those who were against the reunification of Bengal there was Mohamed Ali. A letter 298
from a reader, a certain Birbal, to the Comrade disapproved Mohamed Ali’s “consistent and 
persistent attempt to underline the differences between the Hindu and Mahommedans [which] 
could not have conduced to the advancement of our people, a thing which both you and myself 
equally desire. Progress is what we all want, and progress depends on a profound faith in 
tomorrow not on a superficial acquaintance with today. There is no great future for those who are 
occupied with the littlenesses of the present. I do not for a moment deny that there exists conflict of 
interests between the different communities which constitute a society. One cannot ignore the 
obvious. But to turn a fraction into a faction is not a highly commendable thing. Religious 
differences, at any rate in these modern days, need not, and as a matter of fact do not, create real 
divisions among men. The fundamental divisions are all due to economic causes. The problem of 
the conflict of interests between landlord and tenant, capital and labour, master and slave cannot 
be explained but has to be resolved. And the reason is that life is infinitely more insistent in its 
demands on poor humanity than after life. In future the real fight between the different communities 
in India will not be over faith, but over bread” (Comrade, 19th October 1912).
 The introduction of separate electorates for the Muslim population was based on the 299
recommendation of the Royal Commission on Decentralization of 1907, to which also Gokhale 
presented his evidence, written and oral.
 Dietmar Rothermund, “Emancipation or Re-Integration. The Politics of Gopal Krishna Gokhale 300
and Herbert Hope Risley” in D.A. Low (edited by), Soundings in Modern South Asian History, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1968, 131-158.
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political activity and that had been multifarious in terms of regional, economical and 
ideological belonging .301
Conclusion
  Therefore, having dealt with the emergence of nationalism in India, let us draw few 
considerations to conclude this chapter. The contradiction between cultural nationalism 
and liberal ideas of the nation were inherent in the Indian national movement right from the 
beginning. Illiberal, exclusive and rightist forces were ideologically a very organic part of 
Indian political discourse since the nineteenth century. The political leadership of the 1880s 
and 1890s envisioned a united, secular, modernist, and democratic India. But the unity, 
fragile and superficial, had to be realised in the future after a common effort, with the 
steady involvement of the different strata of society. The growing disillusionment with 
British liberalism and democracy gave strength to deeper traditionalist and religious 
loyalties. The nationalism of the extremists encompassed such trends in order to enlarge 
its basis and make it more comprehensible to the common man. So, the identification of 
the nation with the Hindu majority was a shortcut in order to give emotional popular 
support to a movement that was incapable to involve the masses and to fill the cultural gap 
that stood between the leaders and the people. Stoked by symbolism, the masses 
responded promptly to the nationalist appeals. Hinduism was seen as an easy way to 
popularise this nationalism and to give it a more indigenous connotation. Religion, often in 
its most fanatic and narrow-minded tones, was tactically made use of in order to readily 
mobilise the masses ‘reservoir’. If this afforded the nationalist leaders, at least 
provisionally, a mass following, the repercussions on society were heavy and remained in 
the long run. Muslims, already uneasy towards the Congress, felt excluded from the 
 It is worth mentioning that amongst the issues discussed during the debates over the reforms, 301
also the important question of untouchables was raised. The point was whether the untouchables 
had to be considered part of the Hindu community or regarded as a minority and, as such, 
conferred separate electorates. The issue was raised by the Aga Khan in his letters to Minto in 
which the former maintained that being the untouchables non Hindus, then the Muslim minority, 
bigger in proportion to the Hindus, needed to be awarded a larger ratio of the separate electorates. 
Yet, the opposition of the Congressmen led to the withdrawal of the provisions which wanted a 
separate electorate for untouchables as well (See Shabnum Tejani, Indian Secularism. A social and 
Intellectual History 1980-1950, Permanent Black, New Delhi 2007, 202-203). It is worthy of note 
that until the advent of Gandhi on the political fore, masses were not included, except for short 
periods of time. On the contrary, Muslims kept being excluded from the discourse of the Congress, 
except for short periods. The inability of the Congressmen in carrying Muslims along, combined 
with the British strategy of ‘divide-and-rule’ eventually created a point of no return and Muslims 
leaders elaborated their own nationalism and their own idea of nation.
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discourse on Indian nation that was becoming dominant with the decline of the moderates. 
The response of some Muslim leaders and intellectuals was to use the same methods 
adopted by Hindu nationalist leaders and invoke religion as a means to consolidate their 
community vis-à-vis the Hindu one, as happened during the swadeshi movement. The 
action of the colonial state in taking advantage of such tense situation made things worse. 
  So, the Congress found itself dovetailed between a liberal discourse, undoubtedly 
inclusive and rational, yet hardly able to captivate and carry along the people, and a Hindu 
discourse that, not only more or less unwittingly led to the exclusion of the Indian Muslims, 
but also was by no means more ‘national’ than the liberal one, since it was based on an 
idea of the nation that did not advocate the end of social and economic disabilities, much 
less the empowerment of the Indian people. The liberal leaders could not contrast such 
new populistic forces and at the same time had to accommodate some requests of the 
religious sections of society in order to confirm its representative nature and have their 
support. After Gokhale and Mehta passed away, figures like Tilak, Besant and Gandhi took 
over the control of the Congress. Their public religiosity and their political language further 
advocated the impression that the Congress was a Hindu body and that India was 
imagined mainly as Hindu. 
 This is the reason why to talk of an undefined, monolithic nationalist movement is 
equivocal and confusing. It means to ignore the origins of patterns that implied inclusion or 
exclusion, democratic or undemocratic principles, equality or disability. Even though there 
is no idea of the nation intrinsically more legitimate or authentic than another, the results 
achieved by them in society in terms of peace, democracy, and inclusion are a gauge to 
evaluate them. When, on the one hand, the Marxist and ‘postmodern’ views consider the 
anti-colonial movement as an altogether bourgeois phenomenon and, on the other hand, 
the nationalist historiography treats all Indian nationalists as saints, they attain an 
ideological reductio ad unum of the different ideas of the nation. Since the different 
repercussions carried by these ideas are swept aside, such historiographical perspectives 
hardly provide any answer to the political and social crises of the last century of Indian 
history.
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 GOKHALE’S IDEA OF THE NATION. BETWEEN NATION AND EMPIRE
Introduction
  In this last chapter, I will attempt to analyse Gokhale’s idea of the nation. In order to deal 
with it, it will be necessary to draw attention to Maharashtra, namely to what during the 
British rule was called Bombay Presidency. This region, where Gokhale was born and was 
publicly active in the first part of his political career, underwent the sway of British 
liberalism since 1818, when it fell under British control. Here the traditional Hindu society 
found its antithesis more in those educated classes that - influenced by the modern 
Western ideas and ideologies - advocated social reform, rather than in British rule and 
Christianity. This created social tensions resulting into conflicts between those who were in 
favour of a pre-colonial feudal order and those who supported modernity. The same 
clashes would be later transferred to the national political fore. It was in the context of 
Maharashtra that Gokhale got in touch with the Indian version of liberalism, purged from 
some of its Western exclusive and discriminating attitudes, so that it could fit with the 
Indian colonial situation and be interwoven with some indigenous humanitarian elements. 
It is this kind of liberalism, inspired by the new ethos in favour of the liberation of the 
individual from those restrictions that stalled his freedom of action, that constitutes the 
bedrock of Gokhale’s nationalism. It was in the spirit of liberalism that Gokhale formulated 
his idea of the nation. As will be shown, the Gokhalean nation was predicated on the need 
to create an Indian civil society, spread education, encourage socio-religious reform, and 
apply constitutionalism to politics. Gokhale’s thought is also relevant to understand the 
ideological foundation of the Congress leadership, since it was Gokhale that broadened 
and systematised ideas already embraced by the liberal Indian politicians. 
Nationalism, Nationalisms
  As seen in the previous chapter, the contact with Europe through colonial domination 
brought modernisation to India. This is to be intended in the sense that European 
influence, having caused the disintegration of Indian society, provoked among the 
educated Indians a response that set in motion an autonomous and autochthonous 
process of modernisation. The conscious will of the Indian intelligentsia to pursue an 
education moulded on the European one gave them the intellectual means to formulate, 
on the one hand, a critique of the colonial order and, on the other hand, a re-assessment 
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and, then, re-working of their own tradition and reform of their society by trying to eradicate 
social evils. By and large, European ideas, values, principles, ideologies, and political 
theories were seen by the Indian intelligentsia as invaluable achievements for the republic 
of literati, who selectively appropriated and inserted them in the framework of local 
traditions and values. The syncretic result shaped a new form of modernity, that was 
different from the European notion of it: it was Indian, because predicated on the need and 
peculiarities of India in the colonial context. So, far from being an ‘imperial category’ or a 
‘derivative discourse’ - unless by ‘derivative’ we mean that it derived from the encounter of 
ideas coming from different strands - the modernity promoted by the Indian intellectuals 
was part of the complex societal transformation that they had undertaken in order to defy 
the British hegemony, which was increasingly identified with an hindrance to India’s 
progress. Therefore, modernity became an indispensable building block to define Indian 
identity vis-à-vis the British one.
  Thus, the elaboration of a nationalist ideology and of the idea of the nation in the modern 
meaning of the term implied the acceptance of the modern world. Yet, nationalism 
celebrated also a precise historical-cultural identity and an ancient tradition - however 
invented they were - as essential Indian elements that needed to be defended against the 
impact of modernity, since those elements differentiated the Indian people from the British. 
So, nationalism was also the refusal of that same modern world from which it originated. In 
other words, nationalism was caught in between the acceptance of European values and 
the negation of the traditional ones. This impasse could be overcome thanks to the 
different blends of tradition and modernity, which presupposed a difficult process of re-
elaboration of Indian culture. But the outcome was never of a clear-cut or definite kind, 
since in the course of its development, Indian nationalism had always two souls: one was 
liberal and modernising and the other traditional and conservative. And these influenced 
and penetrated one another to a variable extent . 302
  What acted as the engine for the elaboration of the idea of the nation and of a nationalist 
ideology was the colonial state, that overlapped with the geographical unity of the Indian 
subcontinent. This state was not a reproduction of an European state. On the contrary, the 
colonial state drew much on the Mughal system in terms of personnel, army, police, 
bureaucracy, but also ethos, discourse, and knowledgable rules . In fact, the Mughal 303
 Borsa, Origini del nazionalismo, 6.302
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 293-95.303
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emperor Akbar  had built a centralised and bureaucratic empire that presented some 304
characteristics of modernity very similar to the European absolute monarchies. Even if its 
consolidation was interrupted by Akbar himself , the Mughal state remained significant 305
for the EIC and the British Raj. Not only did the Mughal-colonial continuity give legitimacy 
to the British domination, so that, for instance, the personnel recruited by the British 
perceived themselves as men who perpetuated the irenic rule of Akbar under his 
successors, although these were de facto powerless; it also provided the colonial state 
with practical instruments such as the Akhabarat-i-Kotwali, namely daily reports from the 
police chiefs of the different cities, islamic ethnology, revenue and military data that 
represented the precedents of colonial surveys, mapping and police reporting . Both 306
colonial and modern India, thus, were shaped by the encounter of ideas, that is by the 
fusion of British/European and indigenous elements. That is way, as Bayly said, “any 
attempt to subsume Indian history into the history of imperial institutions or political 
discourse is patently self-defeating. For we need to consider both the indigenous 
inheritance of the Indian state and the pattern of class formation within Indian society 
under colonialism which appropriated this foreign political apparatus” .307
  The political unity conferred by the colonial state to the Indian territory was a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a sense of nationality. As explained by 
Gellner, nationalism is a political principle that prescribes the coincidence between political 
and national unity . State is a conditio sine qua non of nationalism, the latter being a by-308
product of the former. And nations in their modern meaning exist only as functions of a 
particular kind of territorial state or of the aspiration to establish one, but also in the context 
of a particular phase of technological and economic development. So, “nations do not 
make states and nationalisms, but the other way round” .309
  Another fundamental component in the formulation of nationalism is the role played by 
the educated classes. The Indian intelligentsia, thanks to a conscious political action, 
struggled to confer a national character to the political unity. By doing so, they tried to 
 On the Islamic secularism of Akbar see Michelguglielmo Torri. "La grande tradizione dell'Islàm 304
laico nel subcontinente indiano”, in Rivista storica italiana 120.3 (2008), 859-882, here 870-80.
 Douglas E. Streusand, The Formation of the Mughal Empire, Oxford University Press, Delhi 305
1989, 41-43.
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 294.306
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 293.307
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1.308
 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 309
1990, 10. See also the fundamental works of Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. A study in its 
Origin and background, Transactions Publishers, New Brunswick 2005 (first publ.1944) and 
Carleton B. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931), passim.
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forge a new national culture, that is, what Gellner defined ‘cultural homogeneity’. So, a 
basic precondition for the formulation of nationalism was the link between state and 
culture: nationalism cannot exist without a homogenous culture, as shown by the diverging 
efforts made by Gokhale and Tilak. But, again, as clearly explained by Borsa’s theory of 
modernisation, the culture appropriated by nationalism and proposed as national was a re-
invention, both in its modernising and traditionalist version. Even if presented, as Tilak did, 
as an ancient, forgotten culture, expression of a glorious past, it was just a modern re-
elaboration of one of the pre-existent cultures that, in the nationalist view, had to become 
dominant and cement the nation in the making. Yet, the selective nature of nationalism and 
its advocacy of a ‘pre-culture’ , in this case the Hindu one, to the detriment of others was 310
fraught with danger for social integration, as, in the ideology of Hindutva, belonging to a 
certain religion meant to have certain advantages or disadvantages. Being an Indian 
Muslim corresponded to having an inferior social status. Also the emphasis given to the 
introduction of a modern system of education should be inserted in this framework of 
culture-state connection, because it provided the basis of a common culture from which 
Indian liberals could start conceiving their own national culture. The attempts by Gokhale 
to introduce universal, mandatory education should be seen as the conscious need to 
unifying the nation around a new culture aimed at creating citizens. Both strategies, then, 
were aimed at giving a new form of superior culture to the Indian political unity in the 
making. 
  Also the English language, promoted thanks to the diffusion of the print and to official 
administrative mechanisms, was a meaningful factor. Even though not differentiating the 
Indian people from the British people, English became the lingua franca that created a 
community of intercommunicating elite. In the same way, Hindi was artificially constructed 
as the national language and promoted thanks to the printed works in order to afford it 
more prestige, if not an aura of ‘eternity’ . It is interesting that in the 1930s Gandhi 311
attempted to develop and maintain a single Hindi language combining the Hindu and 
Muslim variants of the common language of North India, while at the same time providing 
a national alternative to the language of the colonisers. However, Gandhi’s effort was 
 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 48-49.310
 Ayesha Jalal has shown how also poetry and oral tradition contributed in creating national 311
identity, more than maintained by Anderson. See Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 47.
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opposed by a powerful pro-Hindu and anti-Urdu group took over the Hindi Sahitya 
Sammelan formed by the National Congress to propagate the language . 312
  Not differently from Europe, namely where nationalism had its original home, also in India 
nationalism was a recent phenomenon, that had its foundation moment in the colonial 
modern state. And as happened in Europe, it was Indian nationalism that made the nation 
politically relevant . Nations, in fact, are not 'as old as history’. And it was nationalism 313
that, far from awakening them, created them anew. So, nations are essentially modern 
entities, emanating from nationalism and national consciousness. The opposite 
primordialist assumption that holds that nations are natural and, as such, have alway 
existed in the course of history is itself an argument of the nationalist ideology, that ignores 
the fact that, only in the Age of Revolution, the nation acquired its modern connotation. In 
England, the nation emerged in the course of the seventeenth century, whereas in the rest 
of Europe it raised between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries and was 
corroborated by the ‘principle of nationality’ form the 1830 onwards . It was in this period 314
that the sense of belonging to the nation prevailed over any other loyalty . Beforehand, 315
then, the catalyser of European history was the loyalty to a fief, a town, a patron or 
monarch, a religious confession: these criteria of self-identification could overlap or be 
contrasting according to the different historical circumstances. On the contrary, following 
J. Bhattacharyya, “Language, class and community in Bengal’, in South Asia Bulletin, VII, 1 and 312
2, Fall 1987, 56-63. According to Gandhi, Hindi was the language of the people and of village India, 
and it opposed English rather then Urdu. He was in favour of a colloquial form of Hindi which he 
called Hindustani. When the Congress held in Nagpur in 1920 declared Hindi-Hindustani the 
national language of India, so that as far as possible all proceedings of the Congress were to be 
held in that language, Muslim members resented and felt excluded [Vasudha Dalmia, “Introduction: 
Hindi, Nation, and Community”, in Shobna Nijhawan (edited by), Nationalism in the Vernacular. 
Hindu, Urdu and the Literature of Indian Freedom, 42].
 This is not to say that the development of nationalism followed a certain necessary pattern, 313
because this would imply to embrace a determinist vision of history. What I am trying to say is that 
certain concepts and categories, although to a changing degree, always characterise nationalism, 
even if they mutate according to time and space. No nationalism is identical to the other, in the 
same way as no historical phenomenon exactly repeats itself in different circumstances. 
 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 20.314
 So, when Anthony Smiths (Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Basil Blackwell, 315
Oxford 1986, 10-13) indicates the way Greek or Romans looked at other peoples, diplomacy and 
relations between political entities, the defence against invaders as evidence of the presence of a 
modern kind of nation also in ancient times, he ignores the fact that belonging to a nation did not 
mean to give priority to the common interests vis-à-vis the particular ones, to common good vis-à-
vis privilege. The fact that citizenship was conferred to Italian populations and, afterwards, to the 
populations of the all Roman Empire after the Edict of Caracalla favoured a process that was 
similar to the formation of nation in modern sense. Yet, that process was stalled by the fall of the 
Roman Empire (Torri, “Nazionalismo Indiano e nazionalismo Indo-Musulmano” in Mario Mannini 
(edited by), Dietro la bandiera. Emancipazioni coloniali, identità nazionali, nazionalismi nell'età 
contemporanea, Pacini Editore, Ospedaletto (Pisa), 139-99, here 147.
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the consolidation of the modern nation-states, nationalism became the cause of social 
unification and integration: it was the force that contributed to overcoming particularisms in 
order to gave uniformity to the state and legitimate it among the people, but also to 
emancipate oppressed peoples from foreign domination. 
  Therefore, once the nations emerged, also the need to prove that they had always 
existed manifested itself in order to give historical legitimacy to the new political entities. 
But such explanations were political and ideological, by no means they had 
correspondence in the historical or anthropological reality. 
  By and large, there were two main conceptualisations of the nation: according to one, 
prevailing in Germany and theorised by Herder, Fichte, and Hegel among others, nations 
were defined by objective elements such as race, language, religion, culture, common 
history and the occupation of a well-defined territory; in this view, nations had always 
existed and were by no means a recent phenomenon. Humankind, according to Johann 
Gottfried Herder, had always been divided in nations, which were essential and closed 
groups, because defined by natural and immutable characteristics.
  According to the other conceptualisation of the nation, mainly defined by Voltaire, 
Rousseau, Renan, and Mazzini, it was the voluntaristic element, the individual will, that 
made the nation, even if some objective elements were also necessary . 316
 Apart from these explicit definitions of the nation, another important form of nationalism 
was the English one, which followed the revolutions of the seventeenth century. The 
Cromwell Revolution had an anti-feudal and anti-monarchy character that fostered the 
development of a popular national consciousness. Such national awareness was 
combined with the Puritan principles of the value of the individual and of his liberty against 
the power of the state and the church. It was especially the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 
that accorded English nationalism an even more marked liberal connotation. The outcome 
was a blend of liberalism and nationalism, being the latter the spontaneous integration of 
the individual into the nation. So, by the close of the seventeenth century, national 
consciousness permeated the English people so deeply that nationalism stopped having 
 See Federico Chabod, L’Idea di Nazione, Laterza, Bari 2011 (first published 1961), 70-75.316
 124
any problematic connotation . The faith in the British constitutionalist tradition was also 317
the foundation of the nationalism of the New World: it was Thomas Paine, with its Common 
Sense (1776), that contributed to the theorisation of the American Revolution, that he 
regarded as an historical event that had not roots in the past, but looked to the future of a 
new free nation in the making predicated on British liberal values and ideas of the French 
Enlightenment. Since the American nation had no historical or cultural shared elements 
that could serve as objects of nationalism, it was the voluntaristic element to be 
emphasised in definition of the idea of the nation .318
  Indian nationalists were inspired, to a different degree and for different reasons, by all 
these three kinds of nationalisms. The models of other nations were important precedents 
to imagine their own nation. But in their conceptualisation, Indian intellectuals made use 
also of precolonial patriotisms  and political discourses on good government, that 319
significantly were shared between Hindus and Muslims. If we consider patriotism as “love 
of country”, that is to say an emotion of kindness, sympathy, fidelity, and loyalty that people 
feel towards their land and their political institutions , it is very probable that there were 320
analogies between European and Indian patriotism and that some developed 
simultaneously. As Bayly argued “popular ideas of political morality and good government, 
represented in this ethical literature, remained an encompassing discourse of South Asian 
politics well into the nineteenth century. These ideas informed political debates and 
instances of popular resistance under indigenous rulers. They also informed reactions to 
 According to Borsa, this explains why “il nazionalismo nella storia seguente del popolo inglese 317
sia stato più spesso qualche cosa di sottinteso e di scontato che di proclamato e come il pensiero 
politico inglese del secolo XIX, che pur vide il nazionalismo britannico esasperarsi 
nell’imperialismo, offra così poche meditazioni sul nazionalismo, sulla sua teoria e sulle 
conseguenze a paragone con il pensiero continentale contemporaneo”(Borsa, Origini del 
nazionalismo, 17). See also Hayes, who maintained that “[in] England the seventeenth-century 
conflict between king and Parliament was settled towards the close of the century in favour of the 
later. Henceforth the king was a figurehead, a kind of animated banner. But this did not lessen 
English patriotism or stay the progress of English nationalism, Autocratic monarchy had already 
accomplished its nationalising function in England. Popular loyalty to a king had passed into loyalty 
to his law and now it passed definitely into loyalty to the nationals state. The political philosophy of 
John Locke, the Whig, and that of Lord Bolingbroke, the Tory, might differ in emphasis and detail, 
but not in glorification of the English nation and the “British constitution”. England pioneered in the 
new popular nationalism” (Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, New York, Macmillan 1960, 
41-42).
 “Patently what distinguished the American colonists from King George and his supporters as 318
neither language nor ethnicity, and conversely the French Republic saw no difficulty in electing the 
Anglo-American Thomas Paine to its National Convention” (Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 
20). 
 In India it can be found in certain regions between 1400 and 1800. Nineteenth-century Indian 319
nationalists wrote about this period as nationalities-in-making.
 Hayes, Nationalism, 10.320
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policies of British Government and resistance to it. Ultimately, some of them passed into 
and influenced conceptions of popular nationalism and nationality in the nineteenth 
century ”. Yet, patriotism, while instinctive in its origin and root and connected to the 321
experience that people have of space and geography, is more naturally and readily felt by 
a small community in a restricted area than with a large nationality in a broad expanse of 
territory . It can be turned into nationalism in the modern meaning only in the presence of 322
a state that will make local groups of people become thoroughly aware of it as a political 
unity. Patriotism then was more advanced in the pre-colonial times in those periods when 
commercial expansion was more dynamic, that is when people had a sense of the space 
beyond the village and when the process of state building was more advanced . An 323
example was the Mughal period. Akbar’s state building has already been mentioned. His 
advanced concept of state was carried on by Akbar’s successors, Jahangir and Shah 
Jahan, but interrupted by Aurangzeb. In the period between Akbar and Aurangzeb, 
Hindustan was a communication unity: Persian letters circulated and reached clerical elites 
and bureaucracy. In the Ain-i-Akbari, the institutes of Akbar, the empire is depicted with a 
strong sense of place, set of regional communities, holy men, territorial aristocracy, fine 
products and marvels . 324
  After the decline of the Mughal Empire and before the consolidation of the British 
domination, what characterised the political history of the subcontinent was a process of 
formation of a system of states not different from the one existent in Europe. It is likely that 
such state formations, once consolidated and stabilised, could have been basis for as 
many nations. Yet, the British conquest brought to a halt this process and a new state that 
englobed all India and its innumerable communities - not yet gathered in one or more 
nations - was created . Then, it was the European presence to give another shape to the 325
sense of belonging and identities which were earlier emerging, and did not create them ex 
nihilo.
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 14.321
 Hayes, Nationalism, 10.322
 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 8. In this sense what Gellner said about illiterate and not 323
industrialised societies being unable to have sentiment of community which went beyond the 
village is disputable. This field needs further investigation. Yet, it is a very complicated sphere of 
research since we have to take into consideration also the sentiments of the illiterate who were the 
overwhelming majority of the population before the twentieth century. As rightly noted by 
Hobsbawm, it was the elite who wrote about the ideas and feelings of the illiterate. But we cannot 
extrapolate from the elite to the masses (Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 48).
Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 38.324
 Torri, “Nazionalismo Indiano e Nazionalismo Musulmano”, 159.325
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  Hence, before its unification under the British Raj, India did not possess any of the 
elements among those attributed in Europe to the concept of the nation: it was utterly 
fragmented from the ethnic, linguistic, and religious viewpoint. Even history was not an 
element of commonality, since India had never been entirely under the control of the same 
political entity, apart from short periods of imperial unification. History, then, was the history 
of the states into which India had been divided in the course of history. The only 
characteristic of unity, thus, was a well-defined territory, separated from the rest of the 
continent by the Ocean and the Himalayan mountains . 326
  What emerges from the above brief discussion is that nationalism is not an event: it is a 
process, a very complex process indeed. And this is made even more complicated, if 
possible, in the colonial context, where the elite that has the task to popularise the idea of 
the nation and to mobilise the masses and sensitise them to the nationalist cause is 
different, ethnically and culturally, from the rulers. What is interesting about the nationalism 
promoted by the Indian National Congress is that it was never anti-British and it did not 
absorb those characteristics that nationalism was acquiring in the same period in Europe, 
where it was taking a dangerous ethnic and rightist turn. British individuals contributed to 
the advancement of the Indian nationalist battle from the foundation of the Indian National 
Congress until the end of the British Raj. The contest between Indians and British, 
colonised and colonisers, took place in the political public sphere, but at the state level, the 
two groups collaborated and the suggestions and advice offered by the Indian politicians 
and intellectuals were often incorporated in the ideologies and practises of the colonial 
state. To Aurobindo, the posture of the ‘Moderate’ Congressmen was expression of the 
intellectual contrast between subjection and independence, something which he regarded 
as ‘the half-way house between life and death’: 
“Their ingenuity discovers an intermediate condition in which the blessings of 
freedom will be harmoniously wedded with the blessing of subjection; and to 
this palace in fairyland they have given the name of colonial self-government 
(…). But the Moderate delusion is really a by-product of the Loyalist delusion 
(…) the Moderates are a hybrid species, emotionally Nationalist, intellectually 
Loyalist. It is owing to this double nature that their delusions acquire an 
infinite power for mischief. People listen to them because they claim to be 
 Torri, “Nazionalismo Indiano e Nazionalismo Musulmano”, 145.326
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Nationalist and because a sincere Nationalist feeling not infrequently breaks 
through the false Loyalist reasoning. Moreover by associating themselves 
with the Moderates in the same platform the Loyalists are enabled to 
exercise an influence on public opinion which would otherwise not be 
accorded to them. The gospel according to Sit Pherozshah Mehta would not 
have such power for harm if it were not allowed to represent itself as one and 
the same with the gospel according to Mr Gokhale” .327
  In other words, in Aurobindo’s opinion, the ‘Moderates’ had been culturally hegemonised 
by the British rulers. That the Moderates looked gullible to the young impatient new 
nationalists such as Lajpat Rai and Aurobindo is comprehensible, especially, as seen 
above, when at the turn of the century there was general lack of enthusiasm towards the 
Congress. A new idea of the nation was taking shape, not only in the sense that a nation, 
to be regarded as such, had to claim and fight for its rights, rather than begging for them - 
a concept that already been present in Tilak’s idea since his coming to the fore . But 328
also, and more importantly, the Indian definition of the nation was undergoing a 
transformation similar to the definition of the European nation in the period between 1880 
and 1914, emphasising objective elements, like ‘race’ and ‘blood’, and therefore the nation 
as a separate unity. A passage from Aurobindo’s writings is useful to illustrate the 
difference in tones of the period:
“All political ideals must have relation to the temperament and past history of 
the race. The genius of India is separate from that of any other race in the 
world, and perhaps there is no race in the world whose temperament, culture 
and ideals are so foreign to her own as those of the practical, hard-headed, 
Pharisaic, shopkeeping Anglo-Saxon. The culture of the Anglo-Saxon is the 
very antipodes of Indian culture. The temper of the Anglo-Saxon is the very 
reverse of the Indian temper. His ideals are of the earth, earthy. His 
institutions are without warmth sympathy, human feeling, rigid and accurate 
like his machinery, meant for immediate and practical gains. The reading of 
democracy which he had adopted and is trying to introduce first in the 
 “The Empirical Argument”, April 1907, in Sri Aurobindo, Nationalism, Religion, and Beyond. 327
Writings on Politics, Society, and Culture (edited by Peter Heehs), Delhi and Ranikhet, Permanent 
Black 2005, 138.
 According to Tilak, ‘no nation rules another for altruistic reasons’ (Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, 328
189). If Indians wanted equality and liberty, they had to seize them and not simply agitate for them.
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colonies because the  mother country is still too much shackled by the past, 
is the most sordid possible, centred on material aims and void of generous 
idealism. In such a civilisation, as part of such an Empire, Indian can have no 
future. If she is to model herself on the Anglo-Saxon type she must first kill 
everything in her which is her own. If she is to be a province of the British 
Empire, part of its life, sharing its institutions, governed by its policy, the fate 
of Greece under Roman dominion will surely be hers. She may share the 
privileges and obligations of British citizenship - thought the proud Briton who 
excludes the Indian from his colonises and treats him as a lower creature, will 
perish rather than concede such an equality - but she will lose her Indian 
birthright. She will have to pass a sponge over her past and obliterate it from 
her life, even if she preserves the empty records of it in her schools. The 
degradation of a great nation, by the loose her individuality, her past and her 
independent future, to the position of a subordinate satellite in a foreign 
system, is the ideal of the Convention. It is sheer political atheism, the 
negation of all that we were, are and hope to be. The return of India on her 
eternal self, the restoration of her splendour, greatness, triumphant Asiatic 
supremacy is the ideal of Nationalism. It is doubtful which ideal will be more 
acceptable to the nation, that which call in it to murder its instincts, sacrifice 
its future and deny its past for the advantage of an inglorious security, or that 
which asks it to fulfil itself by the strenuous reassertion of all that is noble and 
puissant in the blood it draws from such an heroic ancestry as no other 
nation can boast?” .329
  Along with the depiction of the Congress as the advocate of political servitude, the 
Nationalists  elaborated a systematic critique of liberalism. For example, Tilak's 330
interpretation of the Gita , namely the most important part of the epic poem 331
 “India’s Mission”, May 1908, in Sri Aurobindo, Nationalism, Religion, and Beyond, 142-143. 329
Note how Aurobindo, while professing the essential separateness between British people and 
Indian people, used an Orientalist argument that depicted the former as earthy, worldly, material 
and the latter spiritual and endowed with an ‘eternal self’. The Convention is here used to indicate 
the Congress after its break-up at Surat.
 When I use this word with capital letter I mean the self-definition that the ‘Extremists’ gave to 330
themselves in opposition to the Moderates. Of course, this had the main purpose to indicate who 
the ‘real’ nationalists were. 
 Tilak wrote it in the jail of Rangoon, where he spent six years. The Gita was translated from 331
Sanskrit into Marathi and published in 1915. See Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Srimad Bhagavad-Gita 
Rahasya or Karmayoga Sastra, trans. B.S. Sukthankar, Tilak Brothers, Poona 1971.
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Mahabharata, was a critique of liberalism. It contained Tilak's political and ethical 
philosophy and was received in India as a political text more than a religious one. The Gita 
was the will to action, the theory of individual action. It presumed a collective unconscious 
that had to be made conscious. British liberalism was criticised because of its 'will to live' 
and its over self-interest. Liberalism, in Tilak’s view, was a set of obligations and duty to 
institutions like the state, where primacy was given to the interest, and not to ethics: it was 
therefore unacceptable . But apart from the anti-liberal stand, Tilak sought support from 332
the Gita for his defence of caste: he saw caste duties as essential for universal social 
regeneration and spiritual salvation . This reminds us once again that some of the 333
‘extremist-Nationalists’ who were louder in opposing the colonial rule were defending their 
pre-colonial caste privilege. 
  The refusal of liberalism - with all its consequences - was, in the Nationalists’ opinion, a 
necessary position in order to defy the ‘incomplete nationalism’ of Indians like Banerjea or 
Gokhale and to formulate a nationalism that was authentically Indian. Therefore, liberal 
nationalism was shunned as un-national, because it was in favour of the state institutions 
and thus of the permanence of the colonial order.
  Let us just anticipate what will be dealt with below, that is to say that the concept of 
Indianness, defined in more or less inclusive ways by the different nationalist ideologues, 
was not the most important factor of Gokhale’s nationalism. Emphasising the potential of 
becoming citizens of the Empire, Gokhale wanted to overcome the discrimination against 
Indians that the new Victorian liberalism prescribed. In this sense, being subjects of the 
Crown was more important than being Indians in order to be admitted into the rights of 
citizens and to be able to participate to representative institutions and build the nation. 
Then, Gokhale’s idea of the nation was transitional between Empire and nation: its study is 
helpful to understand that claiming citizenship by appealing to the status of subjects could 
be more fruitful than appealing to the status of Indians. As shown by Sukanya Banerjee, 
this was a strategy of several groups and individuals between metropole and colony that 
had a sense of imperial belonging while identifying themselves as Indians. The articulation 
of an imperial citizenship was based on the concept of abstract equality inherent in liberal 
values and proclaiming each individual equivalent to every other, irrespective to class, 
 Shruti Kapila, “Self, Spencer and Swaraj”, in Modern Intellectual History, 109-127, here 332
118-120.
 Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 305. See also G.V. Saroja, Tilak and Sankara on the 333
Gita, Sterling Publishers, Delhi 1985, 131-79.
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race, language, etc . So, to be, or to aspire to be, imperial citizens was more 334
advantageous to be ‘racialised’ Indians in the Indian colonial context. 
Renascent Maharashtra
  The comparison between Gokhale and Tilak does not lie within the compass of this work. 
What is worthy of note is that both came from Pune in Maharashtra  and belonged to the 335
same caste group, that is the Chitpavan Brahmans, who represented “a unique case in 
Indian history of priests who had both temporal and spiritual power” . 336
  Maharashtra was the country of Shivaji Maharaj (1627-1680) the warrior king that defied 
the hegemony of the Mughal Empire during the rule of Aurangzeb Alamgir (1658-1707). 
Maharashtra was also the country that fell under the EIC rule only as late as in 1818 . 337
  As in the rest of India, also here the individual was subordinated to the community by the 
institution of caste. But there were regional variations in the formation and rigidity of such 
an institution. The region of Maharashtra followed the south Indian pattern of twofold 
division of caste - ‘Brahmin and the rest, consisting of warriors, traders, peasants, artisans 
and untouchable castes called non-Brahmins or Brahmanetar’ . The dominant caste, that 338
is the Brahman elite, denied spiritual and temporal space to the masses, who, as a 
reaction, gave life to the popular Vaishnava Bhakti movement, devoted to Vishnu, instead 
of Shiva, worshipped by the Brahmans. The Bhakti spiritual leaders, who came from 
different caste background and comprised even some women, denied any social or 
spiritual value to caste and, because of this, were often subjected to persecution by 
Brahmans . Brahminism and Bhakti developed independently and interacted only 339
marginally. Yet, after the rise of Shivaji there were important changes in the social structure 
of the region. On the one hand, a powerful caste of Marathas emerged: it was formed by 
 Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizenship, 11.334
 Area where Marathi is the dominant language, mentioned since the first century AD, but only 335
from the seventh-century evidence, it was possible to map the region. During the British Raj it was 
divided between the Presidency of Bombay and the Central Provinces and other princely states.
 Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, 2.336
 Even after the establishment of the British Raj, though, many Maharashtrians wanted a revival 337
of the Peshwai and tried to re-establish the svarajya in 1844 and in 1857, but both these attempt 
were abortive. Another rebellion against the British was attempted in 1879. For the history of 
Maharashtra before the defeat of the Peshwai see Stewart Gordon, The Marathas, 1600-1818, 
(Vol. 4) Cambridge University Press, Delhi 2009 (reprinted, first pub. 1998), passim.
 Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 2. The Bengal pattern of caste formation was totally 338
different and had allowed a certain level of mobility (Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Politics and 
the Raj: Bengal 1872-1937, K.P. Batch, Calcutta 1990).
 Eleanor Zelliot and Rohini Mokashi-Punerker (edited by), Untouchable Saints: An Indian 339
Phenomenon, Monahar, Delhi 2005, 27.
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those who fought with Shivaji . On the other hand, Shivaji’s son Shahu appointed an 340
influential Chitpavan , Balaji Vishwanath, as his Peshwa (Prime Minister) in 1713. This 341
took over the power and founded the so-called Peshwai, by which Chitpavans achieved 
the control of the state and used their position to enforce the Brahminical code of social 
behaviour and to perpetuate the stratification of society. This was a strategy to counter the 
new opportunities opened up by the consolidation of the Maratha polity. By and large, 
"those coming from lower castes and achieving high positions and prosperity in this 
manner naturally vied for a higher ritual status [social and ritual status were in fact 
interdependent]. On the other hand, their sudden rise aroused jealousies of the higher 
caste-groups, who would look for some opportunity to humiliate them, mainly on the 
grounds of caste. Vying of the lower caste-groups for higher ritual status on the one hand, 
and an equally strong opposition to their claims by the jealous higher caste-groups on the 
other, caused constant friction among different caste-groups” . Therefore, during the 342
Peshwa rule, it was the government that enforced caste rules, so that what was custom in 
other parts of India was enforceable legally in Maharashtra. In fact, the Peshwas were 
defined go-brahmina pratipalak, namely protectors of the holy cow and of Brahmans . 343
  When the British established their hegemony in Maharashtra, they found advantageous 
to use the know-how of the elite, that is to say the Brahmans, in terms of administration. 
But the British officials also wanted to avoid to overturn the position of the Brahmans, 
towards whom they felt a positive fear, particularly towards the Chitpavans, since these 
were the immediate pre-British rulers of the Deccan and could represent a threat to the 
new colonial rule. The governor Elphinstone, that is the man that controlled the territories 
of Bombay after 1818, although hating the institution of caste, did not want to undermine 
 Note must be taken that the use of the term ‘Maratha’ in the nineteenth century is not related to 340
casteist Maratha groups, but as a name of a nationality, as Tilak and Phule, despite in different 
ways, did.
 The Chitpavans were a Brahman jati (sub-caste), also defined as Poona, Deccan or Maratha 341
Brahmans. The other jati of Brahmans were the Deshasthas, who were not as ahead as the 
Chitpavans in terms of education, wealth, occupations in the colonial bureaucracy but were 
however important in the social and economic structure of the village in banking, trading, 
accountancy activities and regarded themselves as the real aristocracy, since the Chitpavans were 
relatively new to Maharashtra (Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, 19).
 Sudha V. Desai, Social Life in Maharashtra under the Peshwas, Bombay Popular Prakashan, 342
Bombay 1980, 40. See pages 30-61 of the same book for the complex question of caste. See for 
example the controversy between Brahmans and Prabhus over the eligibility of the latter to perform 
the thread ceremonies. The Prabhus, an economically strong community with a percentage of 
literacy inferior only to the Brahmans, were regarded as a threat for the consolidation of the 
Chitpvans’ power in the state. 
 Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 8. See also Hiroshi Fukazawa, The Medieval Deccan: 343
The Peasants, Social System, and States, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1991, 91-108 for cases 
of government enforcement of rules according to caste prescriptions.
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the fabric of Maharashtra society. Notwithstanding the fact that he saw the Chitpavans as 
“intriguing, lying, corrupt, and licentious race of people” , he understood the value of the 344
Brahman caste to preserve the social order and wanted to win them over Western ideas in 
order to introduce slow and gradual changes and to try to limit the access of education to 
them so that they could reconcile with the foreign rule . Elphinstone’s rule then was 345
conciliatory in the sense that Brahmans could keep their prominence thanks to their 
literacy and adaptability and benefitted the most from the new educational institutions 
founded by the British . This position of advantage afforded by their professional 346
competence gave them the respectability in the eyes of the colonial rule and of the people. 
Moreover, the rational disciplines introduced with European education slowly undermined 
the traditional values of some of Brahmans, who adopted an open-minded approach 
towards certain social issues and took advantage of the space of social freedom 
guaranteed by the colonial rule.  
  Despite the sympathy that, to different degrees, the colonial officials could have towards 
the institution of caste as a practical means to keep social order, the colonial state led to 
the dilution of caste restrictions since it did not contemplate the enforcement of the rules 
prescribed by caste and the implementation of excommunications when those rules were 
broken. More importantly, if, in the past, not complying with their own caste prescriptions 
implied social death, with the British rule, there was the possibility of alternative 
employment in the form of low-salary white-collar jobs. Thus, the reformers who married 
widows, forbidden by the Hindu law, or infringed other caste restrictions could have 
alternative means of livelihood other than their ancestral occupation . Then, the colonial 347
rule resulted more favourable for questioning the inherent constraints in Maharashtrian 
Hindu society. For example, a section of the Brahman priests performed Vedic rituals also 
to non-Brahmans, something forbidden by the Dharmashastras . Moreover, the English 348
education, as seen in the previous chapter, acted as powerful social solvent and the 
English-educated reformers started bringing change in terms of mentality and social 
practices. Among them there were radical figures such as Jotirao Phule, who, influenced 
 Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, 23.344
 Ravinder Kumar, “The New Brahmans of Maharashtra”, in D.A. Low (edited by), Soundings in 345
Modern South Asian History, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1968, 95 – 130, here 98.
 M.S. Gore, Non-Brahman Movement in Maharashtra, Segment Book Distributors, Delhi, 1989, 346
43.
 Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 10.347
 Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 7. The Dharmashastras are literary texts in Sanskrit 348
that deal with the Hindu Dharma, namely the Hindu religious and social duties. 
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by the Christian missionaries, completely rejected the value of the Dharmashastras . 349
Phule, significantly, never used the term ‘Hinduism’: he regarded it as ‘brahmanism’ 
because to him, Hindu religion was a preserve of the Brahmans.
  The process of interaction between colonial ‘modernity’ and Indian ‘tradition’, with which 
we have dealt quite extensively in the course of the second chapter, was particular 
flourishing in Poona, the ‘hub of Maharashtra’, also during the Peshwai. Several schools 
were founded with the purpose to spread new ideas and to extend education to larger 
sections of the populations. The Poona English School, the Deccan College and the New 
English School were just the most influential among the educational institutions that were 
created in this period by enlightened Indians. These, namely the by-product of the new 
cultural and intellectual climate change, were generally Brahmans who believed that it was 
impelling to liberate Maharashtra from the social evils of caste and superstitions before 
achieving political freedom. It was the British rule, as the social reformer Lokahitawadi 
Gopal Hari Deshmukh (1832-1892) maintained, that had opened the eyes of the Indian 
intelligentsia .350
  In order to comprehend the vibrant and creative atmosphere of this period, let us briefly 
go through some of the most relevant figures of social reform in Maharashtra and the 
public organisations founded by them in order to a new common sense about important 
social and political issues. Bal Shastri Jambhekar (1812-1846) was a journalist and social 
reformer that opposed child marriage and supported women’s education. He started a 
movement in favour of the remarriage of widows and another one in favour of the 
readmission of Hindus who had converted to Christianity. He founded two newspapers, the 
Bombay Darpan and the Dig Darshan, and made them instruments of social reforms . 351
Jambhekar’s articles in the Darpan such as ‘The Evidence of Ram Mohun Roy in England 
(22 June 1832), ‘Knowledge is Power’ (24 August 1832), ‘Influence of a free and impartial 
public Press’ (12 October 1832) are imbibed with liberal ideas . Ramkrishna Vishwanath, 352
 The most authoritative work on Phule is Rosalind O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology. 349
Mahatma Jotirao Phule and low caste protest in nineteenth-century Western India, Cambridge 
2002 (first published 1985). I would suggest also the reading of Phule, Jotīrāva Govindarāva 
Phule, Selected Writings of Jotirao Phule, (Govind P. Deshpande, edited by), LeftWord Books, 
Delhi 2002.
 Kumar, “The New Brahmans of Maharashtra”, 110.350
 Ganachari, Agarkar, 16.351
 See G.G. Jambhekar (edited by), Memoirs and Writings of Acharya Bal Shastri Jambhekar 352
(1812-1846), Vol. 2, Pub. G.G. Jambhekar, Poona, 1950, 44-47, 50-57, 64-69 quoted in Raja Dixit, 
“Liberalism in Renascent India with special reference to J.S. Mill and Maharashtra” (draft paper), 
presented at Conference on Motilal Nehru and his Times at NMML, New Delhi, 16 and 17 January 
2014, 5.
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Lokahitawadi, Hari Keshowaji, and Krishna Shastri Chiplunkar, all conversant with western 
economic and political thought, produced works in Marathi on economics that show the 
influence of liberal thought and formulated a sort of blue-print for the industrial 
development of the country. Vishwanath, in particular, in his Thoughts on ancient and 
present conditions of Hindustan and the fitter consequences (in Marathi, Bombay 1843) 
elaborated a critique of the economic nature of the Raj and maintained that the only way 
for India to be rescued was to develop a scientific and industrial culture. Lokahitawadi, the 
Tharkhadkar brothers and Bhau Mahajan (1815-1890) attacked the dictatorship of the 
dharmashastra and advocated gender and caste equality and education for all . In 353
particular, Bhaksar Tarkhadkar (1816-1847) and Bahu Mahajan denounced the exploitative 
nature of the British rule, while acknowledging the significance of scientific thinking in the 
Indian context. Moreover, Mahajan was the first to introduce the literature on the French 
Revolution to the Marathi-speaking public through the Prabhakar, the reformist newspaper 
he edited . Daboda Pandurang Tarkhadkar (1814-1882), brother of Bhaksar, wrote 354
against caste and superstitions which enslaved the country. According to him, a general 
change had to be pursued in line with rationality and social equality . Ganesh Vasudev 355
Joshi (1828-1880)  was with Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901) founding member of 356
 J.V. Naik, “Social Reform Movements in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in 353
Maharashtra: a Critical Survey”, in S.P. Sen (edited by), Social and Religious Reform Movements 
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Indian Institute of Historical Research, Calcutta 1979, 
284-85.
 Raja Dixit, “Liberalism in Renascent India”, 5.354
 Ganachari, Agarkar, 17.355
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introduced in 1870. He was also the lawyer of Vasudev Balwant Phadke, the man that started the 
revolt of the Deccan peasants in 1876-77. Phadke, a young Chitpavan that worked as a clerk in the 
Military Finance Office in Poona, underwent the influence of Joshi and started promoting the 
peasant’s cause. He organised those groups who were oppressed by the moneylenders and who 
finally rebelled against them. The revolt, dictated by a class consciousness, was unsuccessful, but 
represented a warning for the colonial government, besides being very alarming for the landed 
interests and the moneylenders. See Parimala V. Rao, “New Insights into the Debates on Rural 
Indebtedness in 19th century Maharashtra”, EPW, 24 January 2009, 55-61, here 56-57.
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the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha (PSS) , which was created as a mediatory body between 357
government and society. Joshi also tried to give the peasants of the Deccan the support of 
the PSS against the Revenue and Survey Department . He was an economist that 358
greatly contributed to framing an elaborate critique of the economic policies of the British 
Raj. Joshi, Ranade and Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917) broadened and systematised the 
economic analyses elaborated by the early economists. Ranade and Narayan Ganesh 
Bhandavarkar (1855-1923) were among the founders of the Prarthana Samaj, that had 
many commonalities with the Brahmo Samaj created by Rammohan Roy in Calcutta. The 
main purpose of the Prarthana Samaj was the democratisation of Hinduism, inspired by 
the Bhakti tradition, especially by the seventeenth-century saint Tukaram , who was 359
compared to Buddha and Jesus. Only those who were willing to eat bread made by a 
Christian and drink water fetched by a Muslim - practices normally forbidden by caste - 
could become members . The Sabha had also a paper, the Subodh Patrika, that 360
advocated the abolition of caste, being ‘the greatest monster we have to kill’ . V.R. 361
Shinde (1873-1944), a graduate in comparative religion at Oxford, was close to Ranade 
and his Prarthana Samaj. He started being interested in the interaction and conversation 
between religions, especially Hinduism and Christianity. His thought shows the notable 
role played by non-Catholic Christianity in democratising Hinduism. Shinde was the first to 
use the term ‘bahujan’ to indicate the mass of the people as opposed to ‘abhijan’, the elite, 
 The PSS was formed in 1870 and made up of a committee of Brahmins, the members had to 357
prove that their mandate was wanted by at least 50 adult men from any caste or community (108, 
see also the Constitution of the PSS). The majority of the members were part of the professions 
and were mostly Hindus and Brahmins (Johnson, “Chitpavan Brahmans and Politics”, 108). Their 
main concerns were: education, taxation, land revenue, public employment and they submitted 
petitions and organised agitations. They supported the Ilbert Bill and were in favour of an extension 
of local self-government and of the reform of the legislative council. Moreover, they wanted the 
Indianisation of the civil service. This were questions that interested all politicians in the 
subcontinent. In fact, the PSS had a leading role in the Congress. He was seized by Tilak and his 
group in 1895, after Tilak’s ideas became incompatible with those of Gokhale, Ranade and 
Agarkar.
 Yet, the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha was not in favour of the redistribution of land and opposed 358
the restrictions over land acquisitions. Its members held that the only adequate measure to 
ameliorate the plight of the peasants was to encourage agricultural economy through investments 
carried out by the landowning classes (G. Johnson, “Chitpavan Brahmins and Politics in Western 
India in the late Nineteenth and Early Twenties”, in Leach and Mukherjee (edited by), Elites in 
South Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970, pp. 95-118, here 115-16).
 For the poetry of the Bhakti poet-saint see Dilip Chitre (trans.), Says Tuka: Selected Poetry of 359
Tukaram, Penguin, Delhi 1991. “The Brahmin who flies to rage at the touch of a Mahar, that is no 
Brahmin. The only absolution for such a Brahmin is to die for his own sin (Ibidem, 115).
 Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 12.360
 L.V. Kaikini, The Speeches and Writings of Sir Narayan G. Chandavarkar, MGPM, Bombay 361
1911, 72.
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and, like Phule, saw the Indian society as dichotomised . Gopal Ganesh Agarkar (1856 362
-1895) was a fearless agnostic and pure rationalist. He was closely cooperating with 
Gokhale in the publishing of the Sudharak or Reformer, refused any divine explanation to 
deal with mundane society and had very advanced views in terms of social issues, that led 
him to dissociate from Tilak . Jotirao Phule (1828-1890), a non-Brahman, attacked the 363
caste system even more vigorously and accused Hinduism, and not the British Raj, of 
being the real cause of Indian decadence. He wanted all non-Brahamns, untouchables 
included, to emancipate themselves by providing them with a new common identity that 
could challenge Brahmans’ hegemony .364
  By and large, it was mostly Chitpavan Brahmans that were in the vanguard of social 
reform. They could take advantage of their literacy to impose their authoritativeness also in 
this field. To foster their causes and disseminate their ideas, as seen, they started several 
papers and favoured the growth of journalism, transforming Marathi in a language suitable 
to express modern ideas and knitting together the centres of Marathi-speaking areas 
thanks to the print . They founded public organisations and societies aimed at 365
volunteering activities and at creating a common space of intellectual exchange . Yet, 366
their influence did not derive from their ability to organise themselves as a caste for 
political goals, much less as a class as among the them there was not any pattern of 
poverty or affluence . Notwithstanding the common history and common bond that gave 367
them a sense of pride, superiority, and consciousness of their identity, the Chitpavans’ 
responses to the British rule and to the the problems inherent in Indian society were 
different. There was a bitter competition among them and they never formed a united front 
at all. Rather they embraced diverging ideological positions . So, some started to be 368
 Govind P. Deshpande, The World of Ideas in Modern Marathi, Phule, Vinoba, Savarkar, Tulika 362
Books, Delhi 2009, 18.
 See Ganachari, Agarkar, passim.363
 Significantly enough, though, among the higher strata of non-Brahman castes there was 364
discontent about being associated with the ‘bottom’ of Hindu society (O’Hanlon, Caste, Conflict, 
and Ideology, 279).
 Johnson, Chitpavan Brahmins and Politics, 105.365
 See for example the Student’s Literary and Scientific Society, founded in 1848 by students and 366
professors of the Elphinstone College. Almost all educated Indians of Bombay were its members. 
They had several branches, besides three Marathi schools and four Gujarati schools for girls under 
their care (Ganachari, Agarkar, 18).
 Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 23-36.367
 Maybe this was fostered by the wider area of discretion left to the individuals since there were 368
no caste panchayats or formal system of organised interference in domestic matters, unlike other 
caste groups). Wide area of discretion to the individuals (Gordon Johnson, “Chitpavan Brahmins 
and Politics in Western India in the late Nineteenth and Early Twenties”, in Leach and Mukherjee 
(edited by), Elites in South Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970, pp. 95-118, here 
100.
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influenced by the ideas of Europe and to think that the British were a Godsend, whereas 
others were convinced that they were the cause of Hindu misery. Thus, the progressive 
outlook of some Chitpavans was counterbalanced, especially from the 1870s onwards, by 
the conservative and orthodox perspective of others, that had their main representative in 
Vishnu Shastri Chiplunkar (1850-1882) and, as I have already said, Tilak (1856-1920). 
Chiplunkar and Tilak belonged to an economically powerful class and were personally 
concerned with the defence of land interests. Also outside Maharashtra their support came 
from the landed classes. They looked at the social reformers as betrayers of caste 
interests, they called them un-Nationalists, while defining themselves Nationalists. 
Therefore they identified the nationalist cause with that of the moneylender and the big 
landlord. They opposed the education of non-Brahmans and the revisitation of the 
institution of caste. Their attitude towards the land issue is a gauge through which it is 
possible to evince their stand in terms of preservation of the social order. As a matter of 
fact, the possession of land in India equated to having ‘a little kingdom’ , because it 369
implied a master-servant relationships between the landowner and his agricultural labour 
in a such a way that the former had total control over the latter and his family. That Tilak 
did not want to see such relationship revised was unequivocal. In fact, he attacked the 
colonial rule for “changing the traditional well-established master-servant relationship by 
giving power to the servants to appeal to the government against his master” . He 370
forcefully opposed the Reformers for the same reason, since he thought that through their 
teachings they endangered the social structure on which the immense authority and power 
of the landed elites dwelled. He blamed the government and not the moneylenders for the 
peasant’s indebtedness and, unlike Naoroji or Ranade never asked consistently the 
reduction of the land revenue . When the Government of Bombay, following the Deccan 371
famine (1875-76) and revolt (1876-77), passed the Deccan Agriculturist Relief Act (DARA) 
in 1879, Tilak criticised such measure saying that an alien government had no right to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the Hindu society and that, by intervening on behalf of the 
peasants, the harmony of the villages would be destroyed . Very candidly, Tilak wrote in 372
 Shan Mohammad, Writings and Speeches of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Nachiketa, Bombay 1972, 369
26 in Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 28.
 “The Khoti Bill”, Editorial, The Mahratta, 29 January 1899.370
 See Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 54-95.371
 Rao, “New Insights into the Debates on Rural Indebtedness in 19th century Maharashtra”, 372
55-61, here 57. The article provides further evidence of the opposite stands taken by Tilak’s group 
and the reformers.
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1883 that is ever “a nation should spring up in India, that will be able to govern itself, it will 
be a nation with Poona Brahmans [Chitpavans] at its head” .373
  So, though Ranade, Chiplunkar, Tilak, Gokhale, ect. were all Chitpavans, it is misleading 
to place them in the same group. However, this is exactly what the British officials did: they 
perceived the Chitpavans as a homogenous group and did not see the inherent 
contradictions in such a multifarious social group. Richard Temple, Governor of Bombay 
(1877-80) wrote to the Viceroy Lord Litton (1876-80) that:
“They are inspired with national sentiment and with an ambition bounded only 
with the bounds of India itself (…). They will never be satisfied till they regain 
their ascendancy in the country as they had it during the last century. And 
British rule is the one thing which is an absolute bar to their aspirations.”374
  The fact that the British stereotyped the Brahmans and oversimplified their variety and 
responses to the colonial presence was dictated mainly by ideological reasons. In other 
words, being the most politicised group in the region, the Chitpavan Brahmans were 
perceived as a dreadful threat by the foreign rulers, who found expedient to delegitimate 
their authority by depicting them as detached from the masses and therefore incapable of 
representing them. Valentine Chirol in his well-known Indian Unrest  (1910) corroborated 
that ‘conspiracy theory’ by holding that Brahmans were tainted with disloyalty and 
preserved an unbroken tradition of hatred towards British rule .375
  Among new powerful ideas coming from Europe, whose revolutionary potential the 
educated Indians did not fail to appreciate, also ideas about history and historical methods 
penetrated into India, both thanks to the establishment of educational institutions and to 
the circulation of Anglo-Marathi journals. History, in the scientific and Rankean meaning of 
the term, became part of a pedagogical programme according to which every would-be 
government employee had to undergo. So, the scope and understanding of history greatly 
 “Brahmins at New York”, The Mahratta, 6 March 1881.373
 Johnson, “Chitpavan Brahmins and Politics in Western India in the late Nineteenth and Early 374
Twenties”, 108.
 Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, 32. At the same time, the British formulated also the 375
‘usurper theory’ according to which the Brahmans had become Peshwas by seizing illegitimately 
the power of the non-Brahmans. James Grant Duff with his History of the Marahtas (1826, with a 
more widely circulated edition of 1863) and Edward Forster with A passage to India were the most 
influential to spread this theory and create a set of stereotypes that would in the future be 
appropriated by the anti-Brahman movement (Ibidem, 25-26).
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changed in comparison with the previous popular historiographical tradition . At Bombay 376
University, history was taught in English to BA students, who became familiar with works 
on Europe, constitutional and political history of England and the history of India, 
especially Mill’s work. Maratha history was introduced as a separate subject from the 
1870s, with Grant Duff’s History of the Marahtas as the principal text. In the teaching of 
history, Western/modern was always opposed and superior to Indian/myth.
  Grand Duff’s work was part of a series of historical surveys to study the process of the 
establishment of the Company rule over the Peshwai, accomplished in 1818. It marked the 
beginning of a new historiographical discourse, which had a number of publications by 
European historians, especially British, as its main expression. The main arguments that 
emerged from Grant Duff's historiography was that the Marathas could rise only because 
the states over which they imposed their dominions had been previously weakened by a 
set of factors. Even though it perpetuated certain prejudices, in primis that the Brahmanical 
character of Peshwai was treacherous and deceitful, the significance of Grant Duff's book 
lay in the fact that it took into account the specificity of the Marathas, not anymore 
considering them a minor segment of the narrative of the Mughal Empire, and this gave 
them a sense of separate identity. Grant Duff had, of course, the purpose to celebrate the 
glory of the British conquer and to show how the Marathas were now inserted in the 
pattern of the Pax Britannica. Although in line with the Eurocentric historical philosophy 
according to which human actions unfolded along a process of evolution from barbaric to 
civilised societies, Grant Duff’s history played an important role in stimulating the rise of 
Maratha nationalist historiography .377
 Prachi Deshpande, Creative Pasts. Historical Memory and identity in Western India, 1700-1960, 376
Permanent Black, New Delhi 2007, 87-88. Before the advent of the British rule, there were two 
forms of Marathi historiography. The first were the bakhars, written in Marathi by Brahman 
eulogists. They were prose of historical narrative, in the stylistic form of letters, mainly produced in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Maharashtra, even though the earliest dated back to the 
sixteenth century. They focused on families events and prominent figures' lives. Events were 
presented in sequence. After the British conquest of the Maratha region they did not completely 
disappear, but were used in order to articulate different claims. Of course the historical narratives 
presented by the bakhar was extremely different from the kind of positivistic history promoted by 
the British. that follows that the use of exaggeration, the inconsistency in using dates and names, 
mythological references did not make them 'history' and this contributed to the British argument 
that India lacked a sense of history (Ibidem,19). In the bakhars, Shivaji is represented as a divine 
figure which fights the Muslims. He is the Hindu leader par excellence (Gordon, The Marathas, 3). 
then, there were the povadas, oral and poetic forms of heroic commemoration, contemporaneous 
to the bakhars, transmitted by professional performers, with a wider circulation than the latter. They 
represented and narrated "a collective space for ordinary people and soldiers to identify with a 
larger political tradition while simultaneously enabling loyalty to military chiefs" (Deshpande, 
Creative Pasts, 13). 
 For the early British historiography on the Marathas, see Deshpande, Creative Pasts, 71-77.377
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  It has already been stressed how history was an integral part of the colonial discourse 
that exalted Western superiority and triumph over the Orient. Yet, while British wanted to 
use history to hegemonise the Indian mind, Indians used another kind of history to spur a 
nationalist consciousness. History re-writing thus turned into a field of contestation over 
which Indians struggled to take control in order to refute the British discourse and express 
collective identities of different kinds . The new Indian interest in history was also kindled 378
by the dialogue between Christian missionaries and Brahman priests, an exchange that 
fostered the moulding of identity of one’s Other . That historical narrative and identity 379
were closely linked was plain to Indians. As early as 1881, the publication of the PSS, the 
Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, complained about the un-national nature of history 
teaching:
“What can we expect from a system under which our students read more of 
Milton, Racine, and Goethe than of Ramdas and Tukaram? However much 
we may deplore it, it is an undeniable fact that the gulf is widening by slow 
degrees between the educated classes and the masses of the country. 
While our university-men, trained under a system of linguistic studies, at 
once exclusive and ahistorical, disconnect themselves from the history of 
the country, the vernacular masses who have little else to stand upon except 
the traditions of the past, set their faces firmly against the abstract lectures 
we read to them, feel no sympathy with our unhistorical descents on 
national degeneracy, and give us little help in our theoretical projects of 
reform” .
380
 Deshpande, Creative Pasts, 80. It is worthy of mention that historical plays and novels 378
remained important popular sources of historical narrative. Marathi historical plays, which were 
much more produced than historical novels and circulated among the population of both urban and 
semiurban population, had a huge boost with the unrest of national politics. Marathi playwrights like 
N.B. Kanitkar (A Drama in Four Acts, 1898) and N. Dhavale used their plays to decry the 
Reformers and their ideas (Ivi, 155). Moreover, in both historical plays and historical novels what 
generally appeared was that the Maratha nation was under constant thereat from Muslims. So, the 
duty of the Peshawar, the warriors, etc., was to protect  Hindu women, cows, and Brahmans. 
Maharashtra was depicted as the male protector of the women, while the woman symbolises the 
nation (Ivi, 161). See Ivi, passim, for the diverse rebuttal of Marathi historians. Some of them were 
also the advocates of social reform and of the nationalist cause: the building of the nation and the 
writing of history went on pari passu. This historiographical reaction had, among other things, the 
merit to spur a search for documents about the Maratha polity, with the discovery of important 
family sources. 
 Gordon, The Marathas, 3.379
 “Indian Vernaculars and University Reform”, Journal of the PSS, October 1881, in Writings and 380
Speeches of the Hon. Rao Bahadur G.V Joshi, Arya Bhushan, Poona 1912, 1016.
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 Aware of the important role that history could play to legitimise nationalist claims, George 
Clarke (later Lord Sydenham of Combe), Governor of Bombay (1907-13) sent periodically 
instructions to make history a non-compulsory subject and to remove the history of 
England from the curriculum at the Bombay University. Mehta and Gokhale strongly 
opposed Clarke, but he finally won his battle . In sum, Indians vindicated a ‘national’ 381
history. Ranade’s The Rise of Maratha Power (Bombay 1900)  was the history of a 382
people reacting to foreign domination. Ranade used the historical narrative to show how 
nationalism had unified Maratha society in the previous century and how Shivaji, depicted 
as a secular and national leader, by integrating the different castes, had followed the 
heterodox and egalitarian spirit of the Bhakti poets. The spirit of moderation and toleration 
was, for Ranade, the most stable element of the Maratha ‘empire’, whose period was 
characterised by unity rather than by reaction towards the Muslims. In Western India, the 
Muslims were few and they had undergone the influence of the Hindus. Ranade also 
rebutted the myth of the usurper theory , because a spirit of nationalism had always 383
been the characteristic of the Maratha people and had united all classes and castes; the 
interests of all members of the Maratha society were essentially compatible . The Bhakti, 384
according to the Marathi intellectual, was a set of religious values in which Hinduism and 
monotheistic Islam were blended and the brahmanical values and differentiation of caste 
were rejected. To him, patriotism was a combination of religious and political ends, not 
different form the European Reformation of the sixteenth century . Both in the Bhakti and 385
in the Reform there was a spirit of heterodox religiosity that had instilled new life and 
energy into the nation by revolting against the corrupt religious authorities. 
  Ranade’s interpretation of history is useful to understand the nation that he envisioned, 
something relevant also for Gokhale’s conceptualisation of the nation. Gokhale, Ranade’s 
pupil, was in fact greatly inspired by his master in his political thought. Ranade was 
influenced by the Varkari tradition, a strand of the Bhakti that emphasised universalism 
and radical humanism. In his view, the consolidation of the Maratha power was the 
 Aravind Ganachari, “Imperialist Appropriation and Disciplining the Indian Mind (1857-1917)”, in 381
EPW, Vol. 43, n. 5, (Feb. 2-8 2008), 77-87, here 78. See also Nanda, Gokhale, 62-63 for 
Gokhale’s defence of the teaching of the history of England. 
 M.G. Ranade, Rise of the Maratha Power, Bombay University Press, Bombay 1961. The book 382
was strongly criticised by Tilak for its ‘unjustified generalisation of the contribution of Bhakti Saint 
poets in the formation of Maratha nationalism’, whereas ‘only Ramdas and not others contributed 
to the synthesising of best elements of Brahminism and the warrior caste in a determined 
combination’ (The Mahratta, 9 February 1901, 4 in Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism).
 See above footnote 74.383
 Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, 43.384
 Ranade to Gokhale, 24 June 1899, in Gokhale Papers (NAI).385
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‘glorious political culmination of the socio-religious enlightenment experienced by the 
Maratha people under the inspiration of the Varkari sants' . In his interpretation Shivaji 386
was the peak of the universalist forces and he had a vision of a state based on something 
called Maharashtra Dharma , that is an inclusive, tolerant and pluralistic ideology, 387
namely the political concretisation of the Bhakti spirit. The Indian nation in the making had 
to be built on equally rational and humane foundations, following a sort of climax in which 
Varkari - Shivaji - Peshwa - Maharashtrian/Indian nation  came in succession. This was 388
in stark contrast with what Tilak thought of Shivaji, whom he saw as a Hindu leader who 
had been able to mobilise large strata of the society against foreign invaders, namely the 
Muslims .389
Gokhale’s Idea of the Nation
 Gopal Krishna Gokhale: a Premise
  Before starting dealing with the conceptualisation that Gokhale elaborated of the Indian 
nation, let us just briefly pinpoint the factors that constituted his intellectual framework and 
the surrounding context. 
  In the first place, it is worth specifying that Gokhale’s period was one of transition. Indians 
had just started to painfully acknowledge the predatory nature of the British Raj and were 
trying to reconcile with the fact that the European modernising ideas, which had led to a 
 J. Lele ‘Caste, Class and Dominance: Political Mobilization in Maharashtra’ in Frankel F. and M. 386
S. A. Rao (eds.) Dominance and State Power in Modern India. Decline of a Social Order, vol. II, 
Delhi University Press 1989, 115-211, here, 149.
 Gordon explains that the only formulation of Maharashtra Dharma appears in a text that 387
predates Shivaji by four hundred years and, as it is interpreted by the nineteenth and twentieth-
century Marathi historians, it is an artefact of the researchers. It is only a detail of the relations 
between the several castes and does not include any kind of Hindu national programme (Gordon, 
The Marathas, 65-66). Contrary to Ranade, Vishwanath Kashinath Rajwade (1863-1926), deeply 
influenced by the conservative Chiplunkar, saw Maharashtra dharma as an clear political ideology 
aimed at protecting the Hindu nation from the Muslim invasion (Deshpande, Creative Pasts, 105). 
Instead, in Phule’s opinion, there was no continuity between Shivaji and the Peshwas, being the 
latter oppressive Brahmans that had broken the previous social order and imposed their hegemony 
(See Gail Omvedt, Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society: The Non-Brahmin Movement in Western 
India, Scientific Socialist Education Trust, Pune 1976, passim).
 Even if not as explicitly as in Chiplunkar or Rajwade, also in Ranade’s humanism, with its stress 388
on historical periods were brahmanical spiritual and political dominance was very strong, 
Brahmans were given a central position. On Ranade there are no recent works. For his life and 
thought see Ramabai Ranade, Ranade, His wife’s Reminiscences, Government of India, 
Publications Division, New Delhi 1963, passim; D.R. Jagirdar, Mahadeo Govind Ranade, 
Government of India, Publications Division, New Delhi 1971, passim; Richard P. Tucker, Ranade 
and the Roots of Indian Nationalism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1972, passim.
 See Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, on the Shivaji Festival, 158-66. This was equally 389
against the cultural revolt advocated by Phule and the Ranade’s pluralistic national vision.
 143
complex process of cultural induction, did not find application in the vision of the colonial 
state. The trust in the benevolence of the British domination could not be guaranteed, 
unless the foreign rulers started lending an ear to Indians’s grievances. It has already been 
shown how the responses to the British Raj were diverse and complex and how any 
watertight category is not self-explanatory, much less satisfying. Lato sensu, we have 
identified three different responses to the colonial rule: the traditionalist approach, which 
rejected en bloc all that was Western; the revivalist approach, that idealised the past and 
regarded it as better than the present: religion was rational and society had been 
historically fairer ; utlimately, the approach of the liberals who did not embrace either of 390
the two previous perspectives: their standpoints varied, ranging from conservative 
postures to uncompromising rationalism. These categories are conventionally helpful only 
with the caveat that in such fluid context, clear-cut definitions of the ideologies of the 
members of the Indian intelligentsia cannot be readily used. Since there were many 
contradictions and ambivalences in the intellectual and political mindset of the individuals 
of this period, it is problematic to connote them as definitely orthodox, progressive, or 
conservative. Their values, principles, and ideas often encroached upon one another. 
Additionally, it must be taken into account that homogenising explanations and 
simplifications are often legacy of the colonial historiography, either by-product of its 
political purposes or of its lack of interpretation instruments, and hence misleading. 
  Secondly, liberalism was a seminal informing element in Gokhale’s worldview. In the 
Indian colonial sphere, British liberalism turned into a different political philosophy and 
became Indian. It was sectioned and underwent a profound probing so that individualism 
could be combined with more equality and social justice, both within Indian society and vis-
à-vis the British coloniser. Indian liberalism altogether served the twofold purpose to fight 
the British Empire using the latter’s intellectual and ideological weapons and to challenge 
the reinforcement of social and economic inequalities carried out in the name of 
nationalism. To keep this into account helps the researcher not make the mistake to look at 
Indian nationalism only in a ‘coloniser vis-à-vis colonised’ perspective, but to attentively 
look into the contradictions inherent in the movement itself.
  Modernity, as a consequence of the cultural appropriation of liberalism and other sets of 
ideas, is another important concept with which Indians had to start dealing with after the 
encounter with Great Britain. Gokhale, like many other educated Indians, realised that it 
 So for example, there were revivalists like Bishnubava Brahmachari that, although looking up to 390
Vedas for moral customs and rituals and maintaining that also directions for social reform could be 
found there, were also interested in the emancipation of women (Ganachari, Agarkar, 21).
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was the achievement of modernity in the course of its history that had led to English 
superiority in terms of power of organisation, patriotism and capacity for government . 391
India had to appropriate those elements that had allowed the advancement of the 
European nations to set in motion a radical transformation of society. The predominance of 
the ‘West’ was not static nor unchangeable, something corroborated by the rise of 
Japan . Thanks to a receptive approach towards a modern and scientific 392
Weltanschauung, a new vision of life for the individual could be embraced and a humane, 
democratic and secular society could be reached through the instrumentality of the British 
rule. For this reason, in Gokhale’s opinion, the consolidation of the colonial state over India 
was one of the most relevant phenomena of modern times. It was exactly the function of 
bridge of the colonial domination that made the liberals cautious in attacking the British 
Raj. 
  A further important aspect of the reception of liberalism is that, through it, Gokhale 
internalised some of the notions of Orientalism. Ergo, a certain idea of India as spiritual 
and otherworldly was embraced; India had been stationary for many centuries; ‘East’ and 
‘West’ were perceived as essentially opposed in the course of history. Yet, a past 
characterised by backwardness and obscurity was not an insurmountable obstacle for the 
building of the Indian nation, which had to be realised by looking forward, towards a better 
future. What could stall the national project were other, more dangerous, stereotypes, 
which Gokhale, in fact, rejected. Among these, there were for example the perception of 
Hindus and Muslims as belonging to different, incompatible civilisations or having different 
race characteristics. So, while fighting for Indian unity, Gokhale had to defy these 
prejudices, often misused by certain nationalists to achieve leadership and political 
mobilisation.
  By and large, then, liberalism was important at different levels. For the transformation of 
society in terms of a new balance between individual and community; for the 
conceptualisation of the nation, envisioned as including all the people inhabiting the Indian 
territory unified by the British Raj and moving along the line of progress; for imagining India 
as separate and opposed to the ‘West’; and finally to delineate a concrete state project 
that had to rest on a constitutional political system inspired by the British liberal tradition 
and that would gradually represent the Indian people, irrespective of their cultural 
differences. 
 See Gokhale’s fascinating “East and West in India”, paper read at the Universal Races 391
Congress held in London, July 1912, Speeches and Writings of Gokhale, Vol. 2, 380-88, here 381.
 Gokhale, “East and West in India”, 383.392
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  Ultimately, another significant point to clarify is that Gokhale was not part of the Indian 
elite. As a matter of fact, Gokhale came from an impoverished background. His father had 
to abandon his studies because of paucity of economical means and accepted a petty job 
position in a village. Gokhale could pursue his education only thanks to the brother’s 
willingness to sacrifice himself for the sake of Gopal Krishna’s education. In those years, 
Gokhale lived in such poverty that, in order to save some money, he had to read under the 
light of a street lamp . If Gokhale was privileged, he was such only in virtue of the 393
awareness of his family, who gave him the best English education: being Chitpavan 
Brahmans, they belonged to a caste group that in the past had achieved religious, social, 
and political clout thanks to their literacy . Thus, it was not difficult for them to recognise 394
the invaluable significance of education as a means of elevation. Gokhale, then, could 
become influential in the Indian colonial situation thanks to the intellectual instruments that 
he achieved in the top educational institutions in Western India, namely the Deccan 
College in Poona and the Elphinstone College in Bombay. It was here that Gokhale 
became familiar with new sets of ideas and started becoming familiar with the innovations 
introduced by the Western coloniser and originally interpreting them. This form of 
interaction with the European element is what shaped India and, in this sense, the 
educated classes had a seminal social function, although having no power, nor political 
responsibility. In playing this role, they were advantaged by the free power of criticism, 
that, despite the systematic attempts of the colonial government to restrict it, was a 
constant characteristic of the period, embodied in the powerful instrument of the press. 
Liberty of communication had become for the Indian intelligentsia a ‘political Doctrine’ .395
  In trying to unfold the narrative I will not dwell on Gokhale’s biography. I will just consider 
such aspects as those that played a crucial role in moulding his thought . As far as the 396
idea of the nation is concerned, particularly significant issues such as education, 
amelioration of society, discrimination, civil rights, Hindu and Muslim relationships, and the 
role of history will be dealt with. 
  In the course of my research, I have consulted many primary sources. Yet, Gokhale’s 
private papers (Gokhale Papers, National Archives of India, New Delhi) and Gokhale’s 
 T.K. Shahani, Gopal Krishna Gokhale. A Historical Biography, RK Mody, 1929, 29-33.393
 Yet, Gokhale, like Tilak, was married by the family to a ten year-old girl from the same caste 394
when he was only fifteen year-old. 
 Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 167.395
 I have already indicated Nanda, B.R. Nanda, Gokhale. The Indian Moderates and the British 396
Raj (First published 1977), published more recently in Three Statesmen. Gokhale, Gandhi and 
Nehru, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2004 as the best Gokhale’s biography.
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Speeches and Writings  have certainly been the most helpful. Gokhale’s private papers 397
are useful instruments to see Indian politics from a backstage perspective. It is interesting 
to see how certain clashes between Indian political figures were not brought to the political 
fore by Gokhale in order to keep the credibility of Congress intact and not to leave it 
vulnerable to the British attacks. Moreover, among the recipients of Gokhale’s 
correspondence, along all the span of his life, there were several British individuals that 
were more or less linked to the all-India political party: their advice was highly reputed by 
the Indian politician, who never adopted an anti-British posture. That Gokhale acquired a 
huge visibility and became a ‘public men’ far beyond India and Great Britain borders is 
evinced by the numerous letters that he received from Indian individuals and organisations 
scattered throughout the space of the Empire that appealed to Gokhale in order to find in 
him a supporter of their battles. These - of which the most important is of course the battle 
for Indian rights in South Africa - generally revolved around questions of citizen rights in 
the Empire and are evidence of the fact that to look at Gokhale only from the angle of the 
nation cannot suffice. There was a continuous interaction between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, 
but also between nation and Empire, between ‘periphery’ and ‘periphery’ and one 
influenced somehow the other. It is also worthy of mention the fact that the ‘man’ Gokhale 
as he appears from his private correspondence was, especially in the second part of his 
life - that is when he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council as non-official member 
- influenced by the religious teachings of Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) and the 
Ramakrishna Mission. Yet, this did not have an effect on the ‘politician’ Gokhale, who kept 
his secular vision of the nation.
  The Speeches and Writings, though, constitute the most important documents in terms of 
nation-making, since it is exclusively through public addresses that a certain idea of the 
nation can be popularised and legitimised. In fact, a conceptualisation of the nation that 
remains limited to the private sphere has no purpose: it has no political relevance, no 
power; it is a mere intellectual exercise. The collection includes speeches in English and 
English translations of speeches in Marathi or Hindi, directed to different kinds of 
audiences, from the members of the Imperial Legislative Council, to Indian students and 
British organisations interested in the Indian cause. Also Gokhale’s most important 
writings, such as the written evidences for several commissions of which Gokhale was 
member in order to investigate political or economical issues, can be found among the 
volumes. What appears especially from the Budget Speeches, apart from the wonderful 
 I have used the latest version, that is the one published in the 1960s.397
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capacity of mastering the English language that recurs in the entire work, is that Gokhale’s 
arguments were always based on reason and accurate statistics, never aimed at rousing 
irrational passions. This was mainly due to the training from which, since 1887, Gokhale 
benefited under Ranade in questions of revenue, finance, and general administration. In 
his speeches in the Imperial Legislative Council, Gokhale showed how indian economic 
problems had to be considered and looked at from the economically unprivileged classes 
point of view. He understood the importance of giving protection to the cultivator, of 
providing free and compulsory education to the children employed in the indian factories, 
of liberating the destitute form the excessively burdening taxes. Moreover, he proved how 
poverty in India was man-made and not an innate characteristic of India. If the British had 
brought the invaluable Pax Britannica, their domination was also responsible for the plight 
of the poverty-stricken masses.
Engaged in Social Reform
  With these current themes Gokhale dealt, since the beginning of his public life in Pune, in 
the English section of the Sudharak , the Anglo-Marathi weekly that Agarkar founded in 398
1888 when he dissociated from Tilak because of their incompatible views on social 
issues . In the articles of the weekly it is possible to discern a young Gokhale’s views on 399
many issues. Also the ascendancy of Agarkar’s agnosticism can be noticed.  
  Gokhale had reached a certain degree of intimacy with both Tilak and Agarkar during his 
teaching years in Pune at the New English School, which was created by the two men . 400
These, together with Ranade and Naoroji, were surrounded by an aura of myth and public 
respect that did not leave Gokhale indifferent. Yet, thanks to his apprenticeship at 
Ranade’s feet and in virtue of the conservative standpoint that Tilak had in respect of 
social reform - a standpoint that was at the antipodes of Ranade’s attitude - Gokhale 
increasingly leaned towards Agarkar, with whom he collaborated until 1895, when the latter 
 In the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, in New Delhi, only the issues from the 30 May 398
1892 to September 1895 are kept. Even in Pune, where I have visited all the main libraries and 
archives, I could not find further issues.
 According to Shahani, the differences between Tilak and Agarkar emerged in 1882-83 when the 399
two, imprisoned on a charge of sedition, were forced to share the same room for a few months and 
realised their ‘impassable gulf in thought’ (Shahani, Gokhale, 60).
 The awareness that only a minority was touched by the benefits of the British education began 400
to spread and this is why Agarkar, Tilak and Chiplunkar decided to start the New English School, 
which was animated by a missionary spirit and was competitive compared to the government 
institutions because the fees was  much lower. It was a success and the founders had to create the 
Deccan Education society in order to administer the New English School and in order to found new 
schools in the country.
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died precociously. The disenchantment towards the rashtravadis came after the 
controversy over the Age of Consent Bill  that aimed at raising the age for consummation 401
of marriage from ten to twelve years. Mating with a girl below that age was equivalent to 
rape. Although the government measure was just cosmetic and did not really ameliorate 
the plight of girls, it roused a terrible wave of protest by the conservative sections of Indian 
society that saw it as a serious offence to the Hindu wives and an intolerable interference 
in Hindu religious matters. The Bill became the terrain on which Tilak and his party 
confronted the reformers, among whom there was also Gokhale. The reformers organised 
a meeting to sensitise the people on the need to support to bill, but it was interrupted by a 
group of local rowdy students, supporters of Tilak. The episode made Gokhale take a more 
decisive stand towards Tilak and his acolytes:
“The conduct of ‘leading men’ of Poona which culminated in the disgraceful 
rowdyism of Wednesday last had fairly sickened me. It has exercised a 
deciding influence on my wavering mind and I am now most exceedingly 
anxious to be relieved of the necessity of keeping up any kind of connection 
with them (…). I am longing for the time when I shall have nothing to do 
directly with these people” .402
  Gokhale started working at the New English School in 1886, where he taught English 
language and literature. When the following year the school developed into what would 
become the prestigious Fergusson College, Gokhale started lecturing also in History and 
Economics. Shahani, who was a student at the college when Gokhale was assistant 
master, wrote in his teacher’s biography that among the books adopted there were Burke’s 
Reflections, from which Gokhale dwelled especially on the speeches on American taxation 
and conciliation; the trial of Warren Hastings; John Bright’s speeches; Milton’s Paradise 
Lost; Macaulay’s history of England: Southey’s Life of Nelson and other works that made 
the would-be Congress leader familiar with the history of the colonisers and with the first 
British thinkers . 403
  In 1887, as previously mentioned, Gokhale started his collaboration with Ranade. 
Ranade’s prominent political programme was to raise the position of the Indian people 
 It was a Parsi journalist, Behramji Merwanji Malabari (1853-1912) that agitated for the abolition 401
of infant marriage.
 Letter from Gokhale to G.V. Joshi, 3 March 1891, Gokhale Papers (NAI).402
 Shahani, Gokhale, 53-54.403
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under the British Raj and in order to do so, the Government of India and the British 
Parliament needed to be made aware of the views of the people. It was the task of the 
representatives of the people - who were actually self-appointed since there was not 
franchise by which the masses could choose them - to fill the void between the 
government and the common man and to strive in the diligent application and investigation 
of those subjects which they meant to agitate. In these years, Gokhale was engaged in 
writing articles for several organs and compiling petitions and memorials for the 
government, especially on the behalf of the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha, the ‘mother of the 
Indian National Congress’.
  It was particularly during the meeting of the PSS that Gokhale and the young men that 
gathered around the leading figure of Ranade discussed about relevant questions on 
society and politics. During these formal meetings, the members drew petitions and 
appeals, often after having carried out thorough investigations among the people in order 
to appreciate the responses and effects that certain policies had on the masses. But apart 
from institutional meetings, the Sabha Hall was a space where every evening animated 
discourses of an informal character took place. All possible subjects likely to engage the 
attention of the educated men were dealt with. The history and the political philosophy of 
the West were read and discussed and their possible relevance and application in the 
conditions of India were thoughtfully examined. The presence of a set of circumstances 
peculiar to India and vastly different from that of the European countries was prominently 
upheld by Ranade in the propagations of his views. Economic questions and the feasibility 
of reviving Indian industry on modern scientific lines were freely discussed; and perhaps 
no other subject kindled more interest than the poverty of India . It is here that Gokhale 404
became familiar with Ranade’s thought and from the foundations acquired from the 
exchange with his guru he elaborated his own views. It is here that Gokhale could also 
benefit from the scholarly advice of Ranade’s friend and collaborators expert on economic 
issues, Ganesh Vyankatesh Joshi, with whom he kept a constant friendly and professional 
relationship, mainly through correspondence. 
  Nonetheless, in 1896, the PSS fell under the control of Tilak and his supporters, who 
wanted to seize public institutions after having faced the defeat in the Age of Consent Bill, 
eventually passed in 1892. The Reformers created another body, the Deccan Sabha, 
whose meetings were held at Ranade’s house. The Sabha, proclaiming the ‘spirit of 
liberalism implied in freedom from caste, creed and regional prejudices and a steady 
 Shahani, Gokhale, 68.404
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devotion to all that seek to do justice between man and man’ , was established in 1896 405
in order to counter the famine broke out the same year. Its members, among whom there 
was also Gokhale, did not hesitate to coordinate and cooperate with the Bombay 
Government in order to carry out measures to provide relief to the people affected by 
deprivation. Yet, the Deccan Sabha was systematically attacked by Tilak, who faced its 
competition by denigrating its members as having ‘no legs of their own to stand on the 
political platform’ . In Gokhale’s words, the aim of the PSS in Tilak’s control was ‘to drive 406
out of public life all workers who sympathise with the cause of social reform by discrediting 
them with the masses by all manner of means’ .407
  From this vibrant period in the PSS and from the closeness to the great reformer thinkers 
of the time, Gokhale inherited the capability to look at any matters from a rational and 
open-minded standpoint; he embraced the conviction that the colonial state was a pivotal 
agent for changes in society. State intervention was not necessarily an evil. Yet, the 
colonial state could be a key actor in bringing qualitative changes in Indian society and 
state. It could be helpful to take advantage of its powerful agency. As Ranade explained, 
“the state in its collective capacity represents the power, the wisdom, the mercy and 
charity, of its best citizens” . 408
  Moreover, there was no inherent contradiction between national and rational spirit. If 
Ranade accepted the fact that in the past India had often been moved by blind religious 
prejudices, it was now time to look ahead. A deeply religious man, Ranade did not hesitate 
to reject fatalism, superstition, and credulity. Overcoming such degrading attitudes was the 
 The Deccan Sabha Circular dated 4 November 1896, quoted in Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s 405
Nationalism, 85.
 “The attack on the Poona Sarvajanika Sabha’, The Mahratta, 22 November 1896, quoted in 406
Rao, Foundations of Tilak’s Nationalism, 85.
 Gokhale to Naoroji, 3 September 1896, Gokhale Papers, NAI. Not bearing the influence that 407
Ranade wielded in political matters, Tilak thought he might strike at the root of Ranade’s influence 
and take the PSS from his hands. In a latter to G.V. Joshi, Gokhale said that “they [Tilak and his 
group] gained their object by introducing into the Sabha, on the day of the annual meeting, a large 
number of new members who practically turned out the old man raging committee and pointed a 
new one, composed for the most part of men who simply hate Mr. Ranade for his opinions in social 
and religious matters, and who are unable to understand - and who have never cared to take 
interest in politics. They further appointed an Assistant Secretary, who, during the days of the 
Consent Act agitation, had gone to the length of trying to get hold of some draft or other in Mr. 
Ranade’s hand and forward it to the Government and this put the Government in possession of 
positive evidence of Mr. Ranade’s doing the work of the Sabha” (Gokhale to G.V. Joshi, 8 February 
1896, Gokhale Papers, NAI). Gokhale was so much affected by the all story that he wanted to be 
relieved of all public responsibilities and lead an entirely retired life (Ibidem). Tilak’s imprudence in 
managing the activities of the PSS led to a ban from the Government just after twelve months 
(Gokhale to Besant, 5 January 1915, Servants of India Society Papers, NMML).
 M.G. Ranade, Religious and Social Reform, Bombay 1902, 103.408
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necessary step towards social evolution and regeneration, an indispensable, though slow, 
process that could afford India the possibility to achieve progress and internal freedom, 
according to its own peculiarity and historical experience:
“Our European critics are more wise in their generation and some of the 
wisest among them have demonstrated to their own satisfaction that all 
oriental races have had their day and that nothing is now left to them but to 
vegetate and die, and make way for their betters political elevation and social 
emancipation, religious of spiritual enlightenment - these gifts have not been 
and will never be, according to their philosophers vouchsafed anymore to the 
Indian races. (…) [H]appily for us these prophecies are not true and what is 
more it is in our power to falsify them. (...) If indeed history and science both 
declared against us, we might find necessary to pause. But the history of this 
great country is but a fairy tale, if it has not illustrated how each invasion from 
aboard has tended to serve as a discipline of the chosen race and led to the 
gradual development of the nation to a higher ideal of not of factual facts at 
least of potential capabilities. The nation has never been depressed beyond 
hope of recovery but after a temporary submerging under the floods of 
foreign influences, has reared up its head - absorbing all that is best in the 
alien civilisation and polity and religions. (... ) [W]hat is it, some of you ask, 
that you require of us to do in this work of internal freedom? I would reply the 
evolution that we should seek is a change from constraint to freedom - 
constraint imposed by our own weaker nature over the freedom of our higher 
powers. It is a change from credulity to faith, from credulity which behoves 
without grounds to faith which builds itself a firm foundation (...) from status to 
contract, from authority to reason, from organised to unorganised life, from 
bigotry to toleration, from blind fatalism to a sense of human dignity. This is 
what I understand by social evolution, both for individualism and societies in 
this country” .409
  The egalitarian and humanitarian message of the saint-poets of the Bhakti tradition, 
which, as seen, Ranade rightly saw as a syncretic experiment that braided Hinduism and 
Islam and denied caste belonging as an indicator of spiritual progress, could contribute to 
 “Social Evolution”, speech held by Ranade at the sixth National Social Conference in Allahabad 409
in 1892, Sudharak, 16 October 1893. Italic mine.
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create a universal spirit that transcended religious differences and rejected caste 
restrictions. The Shastras were meaningful for their spirit, and not to be taken to the letter. 
Only an internal evolution guided by reason and self-conscience, which did not ignore 
Indian past and tradition, could lead to an amelioration of Indian society that followed an 
autonomous pattern . 410
  Gokhale became thus convinced of the fact that religious injunctions had to be turned into 
civil restraints which could be more conducive to change, progress, and adaptation to the 
new spirit of the time. Yet, this development, he recognised, was problematic. Gokhale did 
not regard religion per se as a divisive factor. On the contrary, as he had learnt from his 
master, there was a universal spirit that transcended all religions. But when religion 
crystallised into a tradition that was resilient to social transformation, that tradition had to 
be overcome for the sake of the common good and individual’s dignity. The different 
religious communities of India had to work together in order to achieve the objectives for 
the benefit of the whole nation . The Hindu-Muslim controversy - at the time the term 411
communalism had not gained ground yet - was one of the biggest concerns of Gokhale, 
the others being compulsory education as the bedrock for lasting national progress and 
the future of the Servants of India Society, founded in 1905, and embodying the dreams 
and devotion for the Indian nation.
  Unfortunately, though, we have seen how there were forces working in opposite direction 
and how the need of self-preservation created new social tensions. A secular, liberal, and 
rational approach to Indian problems was not considered appropriate for India. That this 
made social reform even more problematic had been quite clear to Gokhale since the 
beginning of his activities among the reformers. As the Poona situation clearly showed, 
 According to G.V. Joshi, Ranade’s close friend, “Ranade’s was a lofty patriotism, not merely a 410
nationalist’s narrow-minded zeal for his country’s good, and had its roots deep down in his religious 
convictions. He had an unflinching faith in the high destiny of India (…). As a student of history he 
regarded India as a nation specially marked out by Providence for the leadership of the world’s 
progress in its highest passes. Otherwise Indian history had no intelligible meaning.. Norther nation 
on earth has been having such a prolonged course of training and discipline (…). His firm 
conviction - it was a religious conviction - was that India was emphatically the ‘Land of Promise’ 
and that we were God’s ‘elect’ - the chosen people - under training and discipline during long 
centuries for the high function of guiding and leading the world on the final goal” (G.V. Joshi to 
Gokhale, 25 July 1901, Servants of India Society Papers, NMML). Gokhale did not agree, because 
he believed that the source of his activities was secular. In fact, for some years “Mr. Ranade was 
an agnostic and though he soon emerged from that stage, his interest in public questions and his 
patriotic activities were as earnest and devoted during his agnostic day as later. This, is my humble 
opinion, supports my interpretation of his life’s work more than yours” (From Gokhale to Joshi, 5 
March 1906, Gokhale Papers, NAI).
 “The Hindu-Mohamadan Question”, Gokhale’s speech at the Deccan Sabha in Marathi, 11 July 411
1909, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 308.
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political and social causes could be aporetic. The elevation of the woman’s condition, for 
instance, resulted particular sensitive in Indian patriarchic society:
“Let us not content ourselves with only attending the national congresses and 
the provincial conferences like the holiday patriots we are said to be, but for our 
own well-being and for doing to others what we expect others to do towards us, 
endeavour with pure hearts and clear consciences to do what we can for the 
proper elevation of our womankind and assigning her her just position in human 
society. (…) [H]ere we have to fight not with the intelligent rulers from whom we 
demand rights and claim privileges, but we have to deal with men, who have for 
ages enjoyed the sweets of tyranny, and are not to part with any of their real or 
supposed rights, and their so-called natural leaders who, instead of trying to 
disabuse them of their ideas do all they can to perpetrate the error only for the 
gain of cheap notoriety [clear reference to  Tilak]. Let us awaken those who are 
apathetic and neutral, and enlisting their sympathies on the side of truth and 
justice, secure an addition to the despairing band of reformers. Or political 
activities meet with less opposition only because they entail no self sacrifice, 
while that constitutes the chief title to be enrolled as a real social reformer. The 
battle of social reform had further to be waged against man's organised 
appetites and hence the necessity for greater struggle” .412
  The reformers in Poona had made much effort to enforce widow re-marriage, seeing that 
as a consequence of the institution of child marriage, something which also hindered 
women’s education. Ranade and Lokahitawadi had arranged the first widow re-marriage in 
1896, encountering the scathing criticism of the anti-reformers and the threat of 
excommunication from the orthodox. Tilak compared Rakmabai, a woman from Pune who 
forcefully advocated education for women and denounced the lot which they had to bear, 
with thieves, adulteresses and murderers. Like criminals, similar women had to be 
punished . It is quite clear that, apart from the willingness to defend ‘orthodoxy’, such 413
positions were in favour of keeping certain strata of society in their obscurity, so that they 
could be more readily exploited. On the contrary, Gokhale had a very progressive position 
about women and supported their empowerment during all his political career. As early as 
 “Hindu society and reform”, Sudharak, 16 October 1893.412
 “The Law for the Restitution of Conjugal Rights. As it stands and Should be Amended”, The 413
Mahratta, 12 June 1887.
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in 1897, he spoke in London about female education in India. In Gokhale’s view, the need 
of education for women was even more urgent due to the fact that rigid and bigot religious 
beliefs affected much more women than men, being shut out from all other intellectual 
pursuits, making their lives stationary and difficult to keep the pace of the civilised world. 
Also Gokhale held child marriage as the main responsible for the degraded condition of 
women. It set in motion a vicious circle, as it was not possible to eradicate the inhumane 
practice of child marriage without the spread of education, but a wide diffusion of 
education was not feasible as long as child marriage persisted. The situation was slightly 
better among the Brahmins of Bengal, the Parsees and the Native Christians, whereas it 
was appalling for the whole of the Mahomedan community and the vast bulk of the Hindu 
one . Only education could emancipate them from superstition and ignorance. He said:414
"It is obvious that, under the circumstances, a wide diffusion of education, 
with all its solvent influences, among the women of India, is the only means 
of emancipating their minds from this degrading thraldom to ideas inherited 
through a long past and that such emancipation will not only restore our 
women to the honoured position which they at one time occupied in India, but 
will also facilitate m ore than anything else, our assimilation of those 
elements of Western civilisation without which all thoughts of India's 
regeneration are mere idle dreams” . 415
  In 1912, namely almost at the end of his life, in supporting the Special Marriage Bill , 416
Gokhale maintained that:
"It is quite true, as we have seen from opinions expressed both in this 
Council and outside, that the Bill represents ideas which are in advance of 
the views of the bulk of the Hindu and Muhammadan communities today; but 
I am quite sure that with the spread of higher education among indian 
women, with late marriages coming more and more into vogue - and late 
marriages must lead to choice marriages, i.e. to free choice by the marrying 
parties - with these things coming with the dignity of the individual freedom 
 “Female Education in India”, Educational Congress, London 1897, Speeches and Writings, Vol.414
2, 178-79.
 “Female Education in India”, 178.415
 This had been advanced by Bhupendranath Basu in the Imperial Legislature. It aimed at 416
revising the Hindu Marriage Act of 1872 and made the institution of marriage from a sacrament to a 
civil contract.
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realised better and better, and last, but not least, with the steady fusion of 
different creeds and different races, which is bound to take place under the 
stress of our growing nationality (…). It is quite true that a very large majority 
of our countrymen are strongly against the Bill. At the same time even the 
strongest opponent of the Bill cannot deny that there is a very influential and 
enlightened minority in support of the Bill” .417
  A speech on the ‘depressed classes’  is also useful to understand that, in Gokhale’s 418
envisioned nation, neither progress nor freedom were achievable without social equality. 
For this reason, the conditions of the depressed classes had to be improved with utmost 
commitment of every and each individual not only on grounds of humanity, but also in 
terms of national interests. Both Gokhale and Ranade perceived the appalling inhuman 
treatment of low caste Indians by higher caste Indians as worse than the treatment 
reserved to ‘coloured’ immigrants in the white colonies. In front of the Dharwar Social 
Conference Gokhale delivered a speech that is worth quoting at length:
"The condition of the low castes - it is painful to call them low castes  is not 
only unsatisfactory, it is so deeply deplorable that it constitutes a grave blot 
on our social arrangements; and further the attitude of our educated men 
towards this class is profoundly painful and humiliating (…). I think that all 
fair-mined persons will have to admit that it is absolutely monstrous that a 
class of human beings with bodies similar to our own, with brains that can 
think and with hearts that can feel, should be perpetually condemned to a low 
life of utter wretchedness, servitude and mental and moral degradation and 
that permanent barriers should be placed in their ways so that it should be 
impossible for them ever to overcome them and improve their lot, this is 
deeply revolving to our sense of justice (…) We may touch a cat, we may 
touch a dog, we may touch any other animal, but the touch of these human 
beings is pollution! (…) When everyone was expressing himself in indignant 
terms about the treatment that our countrymen were receiving in South 
Africa, Mr Ranade (during one of his speeches in occasion of Gandhi's visit 
from South Africa) came forward to ask of we had no sins of our own to 
answer for in that direction (…). Mr Ranade very justly asked whether it was 
 “Special Marriage Bill”, 26 February 1912, Imperial Legislative Council, Speeches and Writings, 417
Vol. 2, 264-65.
 This is how the British Raj had defined the outcaste and low-caste people.418
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for those who tolerated such disgraceful oppression and injustice in their own 
country to indulge in all that denunciation of the people of South Africa" .419
Gokhale rebuffed any cultural-historical justification of the discrimination prescribed by the 
institution of caste: 
 "It is sometimes  urged that if we have our castes, the people in the West 
have their classes, and after all, there is not much differences between the 
two. A little reflection will, however, show that the analogy is quite fallacious. 
The classes of the West are a perfectly elastic institution, and not rigid or 
cast-iron like our castes” . (…). 420
  If castes were said to be eminently useful for the preservation of society, they were utterly 
unsuited for purposes of progress. In fact, “modern civilisation has accepted greater 
equality for all as its watchword, as against privilege and exclusiveness, which were the 
root-ideas of the old world” . Therefore, the elevation of the depressed classes was a 421
question of justice, humanity and national interest. The work ahead would be hard and 
demanding strenuous effort, but it was the higher and holier duty, for which especially the 
young educated men of the nation had to struggle:
“How can we possibly realise our national aspirations, how can our country 
ever hope to take her place among the nations of the world, if we allow large 
number of our countrymen to remain sunk in ignorance, barbarism or 
degradation. Unless these men are gradually raised to a higher level, morally 
and intellectually, how can they possibly understand our thoughts or share 
our hopes or co-operate with us in our efforts? Can you not realise that so far 
as the work of national elevation is concerned, the energy, which these 
classes might be expected to represent, is simply unavailable to us? I 
understand that that great thinker and observer - Swami Vivekananda - held 
this view very strongly. I think that there is not much hope for us as a nation 
unless the help of all classes, including those that are known as low castes, 
is forthcoming for the work that lies before us. Moreover, is it, I may ask, 
consistent with our own self-respect that these men should be kept out of our 
 “The Elevation of the Depressed Classes”, Dharwar Social Conference, 27 April 1903, 419
Speeches and Writings, Vol. 3, 260-61.
 “The Elevation of the Depressed Classes”, 261.420
 “The Elevation of the Depressed Classes”, 263.421
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houses and shut out from all social intercourse as long as they remain within 
the pale of Hinduism, whereas the moment they put on a coat and a hat and 
a pair of trousers and call themselves Christians, we are prepared to shake 
hands with them and look upon then as quite respectable?”  422
Then, it was a matter of social evolution, without which the material and moral elevation of 
the nation could not be attainable. How could the inhabitants of India become and feel 
Indians if they were continuously reminded that they were second-class individuals?
  Even though Gokhale preferred to pursue a political career within the Congress and to 
fight for the political advancement of the country, he never abandoned completely his 
battles to reform Indian society. So, if, on the one hand, his commitment to constitutional 
methods qualifies him a moderate, yet, on the other hand, this category does not explain 
his advanced and powerful stand in favour of the disadvantaged sections of the nation. For 
this reason, in 1905, Gokhale founded the Servants of India Society in order to put in 
practice the ideals that he wanted to see realised in the nation in the making. It aimed at 
building up the future of the Indian nation by propagating social and political ideas inspired 
by liberalism. It was also aimed at compensating the loss of influence that the Congress 
was undergoing, affected by apathy and lack of enthusiasm. According to Gokhale, what 
India needed was the energy of young educated men, sort of national missionaries, who 
could renounce their material interests and dedicate themselves to the secular cause of 
the nation, as the sanyasins did in the service of God .423
That preamble of the constitution of the society was a confession of Gokhale’s political 
faith . There we find clearly formulated his idea of the nation:424
“A stage has been reached in the political education and national 
advancement of the Indian people, when, for further progress, the devoted 
labours of a specially trained agency applying itself to the task in a true 
missionary spirit, are required (…). The growth, during the last fifty years, of a 
 “The Elevation of the Depressed Classes”, 262.422
 Already in 1903, while urging the elevation of low castes, Gokhale had asked: “Cannot a few 423
men - five per cent, four per cent, three, two, even one per cent - of hundreds and hundreds of 
graduates that the University turns out every year, take it upon themselves to dedicate their lives to 
this sacred work of the elevation of low castes? My appeal is not to the old or the middle-aged - the 
grooves of their lives are fixed - but I think I may well address such an appeal to the young 
members of our community (…). What the country needs most at the present moment is a spirit of 
self-sacrifice on the part of our educated young men” (“The elevation of the Depressed Class”, 
262).
 Nanda, Gokhale, 171.424
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feeling of common nationality, based upon common tradition, common 
disabilities and common hopes and aspirations, has been most striking. The 
fact that we are Indians first, and Hindoos, Mahomedans, Parsees and 
Christians afterwards, is being realised in a steadily increasing measure, and 
the idea of a united and renovated India, marching onwards to a place 
among the nations of the world worthy of her great past, is no longer a mere 
idle dream of a few imaginative minds, but is the definitely accepted creed of 
those who form the brain of the community – the educated classes of the 
country […]. The results achieved so far are undoubtedly most gratifying, but 
they only mean that the jungle has been cleared and the foundations laid. 
The great work of rearing the superstructure has yet to be taken in hand, and 
the situation demands, on the part of the workers, devotion and sacrifices 
proportionate to the magnitude of the task […]. Public life must be 
spiritualised. Love of country must so fill the heart that all else shall appear 
as of little moment by its side. A fervent patriotism which rejoices at every 
opportunity of sacrifice for the motherland, a dauntless heart which refuses to 
be turned back from its object by difficulty or danger, a deep faith in the 
purpose Providence that nothing can shake – equipped with these, the 
worker must start on his mission and reverently seek the joy which comes of 
spending oneself in the service of one’s country.”425
  The Mazzinian tone of ‘religious’ nationalism is strongly perceivable here. Nationalism 
was spiritual because the mission of the nation was divine. The nation became the ideal to 
actuate in the future; from memory of the past it had to be transformed in aspiration, from 
sentiment to concrete will. In Mazzini’s words: 
“Una nazionalità comprende un pensiero comune, un diritto commune, un 
fine comune: questi ne sono gli elementi essenziali (…). Dove gli uomini non 
riconoscono un principio comune, accettandolo in tutte le sue conseguenze, 
dove non è identità d’intento per tutti, non esiste Nazione, ma folla ed 
aggregazione fortuita, che una prima crisi basta a risolvere” .426
 “Servants of India Society”, Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale (edited by G.A. Natesan), 425
Natesan Pub., Madras 1920, 914-16.
 Giovanni Mazzini, Nazionalità, Qualche idea sopra una costituzione nazionale; Scritti editi ed 426
inediti, Edizione Nazionale, VI, 125-126, quoted in Chabod, L’Idea di Nazione, 71.
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  The Servants of India  had to be inspired by fervent patriotism and serve the cause of 427
the country in a religious spirit, promoting the national interest through constitutional 
means. They had to be animated by a deep faith, a spirit of selfness service and not to be 
disheartened by difficulty or danger. The objectives of Gokhale’s association, which had its 
headquarters in Poona , as per the constitution were: creating among the people a deep 428
and passionate love of motherland; organising the work of political education and agitation 
and strengthening the public life of the country; promoting relations of common good-will 
and cooperation among the different communities; assisting educational movements, 
 The first three recruits of the society were G.K. Devadhar, who would become the greatest 427
Marathi social reformer, A.V. Patvardhan and N.A. Dravid. The Servants of India Society had a 
Jesuitical discipline and was under the authority of the First Member, namely Gokhale. The 
aspirant members had to take seven vows that prescribed a simple life in the service of the country 
and undergo five years of special discipline and supervision aimed at building their characters and 
at internalising the spirit of the organisation. Moreover, as part of their training, the recruits had to 
tour several months throughout India. That this strict discipline could endanger the freedom of the 
individual was not ignored by Gokhale: “My difficult for some time was the one to which you have 
so prominently referred, the danger of individual liberty. But in the end it was thought necessary to 
run the risk involved in it, as otherwise, there was but small chance, with our disorganised and 
undisciplined public life, and the want of self-restraint which characterises most of our young men if 
any really useful work being done by the society” (Gokhale to Krishnaswamy Iyer, date not 
specified, Gokhale Papers, NAI). Wolpert speaks of autocracy of the First members. We found the 
same judgement in Gordon Milburn, who maintained that the spirit which animated Gokhale was 
the same of the rules of the Servants of India Society, that is of a society of Jesuits "with Mr 
Gokhale himself as its virtually autocratic head” (Gordon Milburn, England and India, George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd, London 1918, 22). From the exchange of letters between Gokhale and the 
members of the Society, though, the autocratic attitude of the First Member cannot be evinced. 
Rather, what appears from the correspondence is that, due to hierarchy within the Society, some 
young members complained about the excessive power of the senior members and about the lack 
of democracy. Abuses and indifference towards the wishes of the junior recruits were reported. 
Gokhale was aware of the perfectible nature of his creation and was willing to accept changes in 
the constitution. About the criticism on the internal  management of the Society, he wrote: “All this 
talk of autocracy, inner and outer circles, and so forth shows a spirit which I can only deplore. If 
members thought more of how they might serve the country and the society and less of what 
power they personally enjoyed themselves, it would not occur to them to make these complaints. I 
don’t say that the Constitution of the society is perfect; but last year on my return to India, we had a 
special session, in which all important suggestions were considered and I was given to understand 
that every one - except Basu - was satisfied with other deliberations. However I see that the sore is 
still running. Well, the best way to find a remedy - if one can be found, of which I am not sure, - is 
to ask every member to draft definite amendments to our rules and regulations; they met, if they 
like, even draft altogether new constitutions (…). I don’t mind how radical or even revolutionary the 
changes are and I certainly don’t want any part of the constitution not be regarded as sacrosanct 
(…). We might then have a special session in December for this one matter alone, at which after 
stating my view at the beginning of the first meeting, I will leave all decisions to be arrived at in my 
absence and by a majority of votes. My only object is that the strength of the Society will be built 
and nothing will give me greater pleasure than that it should be built up with the co-operation of all” 
(Gokhale to Deva, 10 July 1914, Servants of India Society Papers, NMML).
 The headquarters of the Servants of India Society are still in Pune, in the same compound of 428
the prestigious Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics. 
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especially those advocating the education for women and backward classes; spreading 
industrial and scientific education; elevating the depressed classes . This goals were, in 429
Gokhale’s opinion and in accordance with the Congress line, more easily achievable if 
India remained part of the British Empire. It was a strategic move towards the long-term 
goal of nation-building. In other words, India would fall apart, balkanised as it was, if it did 
not benefit, for the necessary span of time, of the political unity brought by the British Raj. 
Apart from being a way to gain, if not benevolence, at least neutrality from the government, 
the declarations of loyalty to the Raj were sincere, because Gokhale was convinced that 
peace and order, which only the colonial state could guarantee, were indispensable 
conditions of ‘our mastering the first lessons of the new polity’ and fundamental requisites 
of progress .430
 Nevertheless, despite the acceptance of the British connection ‘as ordained in the 
inscrutable dispensations of Providence for India’s good’, Gokhale’s national association 
roused suspicion and even hostility among British officials. For example, Lord Curzon did 
not trust Gokhale’s Servants of India Society, because ‘you cannot awaken and appeal to 
the spirit of nationality in India and, at the same time, profess loyal acceptance of British 
rule’ . Unlike for Indians, nation and Empire were not compatible.431
  By and large, the Servants of India Society was a sort of political academy, which 
emphasised political culture and intellectual development : when its members were in 432
Poona, they had to attend courses in history, economics, public finance, law and 
journalism in order to prepare themselves to get in touch with the realities of Indian life . 433
It was very different from the ashrams created by Gandhi, where inmates were trained in 
 It is worthy of note how industrialists wanted to sway their influence on the Congress and on the 429
organisations close to it. In fact, the great industrialist Ratan Tata, who was, with the Aga Khan (Sir 
Sultan Muhammed Shah, 1877-1957), the greatest sponsor of the Society wrote to Gokhale that 
among the purposes mentioned in the pamphlet there was no mention to future efforts to stimulate 
the industrial development of the country (Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, 164), something that was 
added later on. Also Motilal Nehru, G.A. Natesan, Tej Bahadur Sapru helped raise funds in favour 
of the society.
 V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, My Master Gokhale. A Selection from the Speeches and Writings of 430
Hon’ble V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, (T.N. Jagadisan editor), Model Publications, Madras 1946, 54.
 Lord Curzon to Lamington, 24 July 1905. Curzon Papers, NAI.431
 Nanda, Gokhale, 466.432
 About the library at the headquarters of the Servants of India Society Gokhale wrote that it had 433
as its central idea “the growth of freedom all over the world. You will find in it an account of all 
nationalistic and humanitarian movements that have ever been started in any country. There will 
also be there standard histories of every country in the world. Books bearing on the ancient 
greatness of the three races inhabiting India at present – the Hindus, the Mahomedans and the 
Parsees – will also be there” (Gokhale to Krishnaswamy Iyer, 29 September 1906, Gokhale 
Papers, NAI). 
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ascetic self-restraint and moral discipline, away from modernity. It is worthy of mention 
what Gandhi thought of Gokhale’s Society:
It is simply an indifferent imitation of the West. (…) What do these ‘servants’ 
think of religion? Why should there be large buildings in India? Why should 
not huts be enough? It is like digging up a mountain to kill a mouse. When 
will the mission undertaken by Prof. Gokhale end? How much money will it 
cost? What a superstition that only an M.A. or B.A. could become a ‘servant’! 
It is like the castor-oil plant passing for a mighty tree in a barren land. I do 
feel that the aims of Phoenix [first ashram established by Gandhi in South 
Africa in 1904, based on a self-sufficient village economy] as well as the way 
of life there surpass those of the Society (…). What we are doing here is the 
real thing, what goes on in Poona is, leaving aside the motive, unreal. The 
motive is good, but what is being done is bad (…). The work of Mr. Gokhale’s 
‘servants’ cannot be regarded as proper. It is likely to add to our slavery. If I 
tried to turn East into West, I also would sigh like Gokhale and lose heart 
(…). We do not aspire to improve India; we want to improve ourselves. That 
alone can be our aspiration, the rest is all false (…). We have to rid ourselves 
of the fetish of literacy and mundane knowledge” . 434
  Not only was there a wide intellectual gulf between Gokhale and Gandhi, but also their 
worldview was strongly antithetical: in Gokhale’s view, the basis of life was material, 
whereas, in Gandhi’s view, it was spiritual. Gokhale, of course, realised that material 
progress and moral progress had to move forward together: the elevation of the 
unprivileged, for instance, was certainly a moral issue, but also a material one, because 
without social equality the would-be nation was destined to fail. Then, moral advancement 
was not attainable without basic improvements in the ‘mundane’ field. The spread of 
education among the masses, was one such improvement. All in all, modernisation had to 
be morally acceptable. But the modernisation promoted by Gokhale was not, differently 
from what Gandhi maintained, a mere imitation of the ‘West’. Rather, according to 
Gokhale, the advent of the British in India had brought the two currents of ‘Eastern’ and 
‘Western’ civilisation in mutual contact, so that the new India could be built on the 
 Gandhi to Maganlal Gandhi, 27 January 1910, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, The Collected 434
Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 10, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of 
India, Navajivan Trust, Ahmedamad 1963, 137-140.
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absorption of the best elements of both and placed in the far-reaching path of human 
progress. ‘East’ and ‘West’ could communicate and influence one another.
India: the land of an ancient civilisation
  Of course, Gokhale was a men of his time and, as we have mentioned, there are 
recurring Orientalist themes in his thought. Gokhale internalised the stereotyped image of 
India as a cultural entity that had been static and dormant for centuries. Refractory for a 
long time to progress and to the concept of liberty, yet India had woken up after the 
encounter with England and Western knowledge and was then ready to raise its head:
“[Indian] people did not develop a love of free institutions; they paid no 
attention to political questions, and for that they were now paying the penalty. 
Their religious ideals had been largely responsible for their having been 
content to live under the rule of foreigners. Their religion taught them that 
their existence in this world was only a temporary sojourn to qualify them for 
a better state of things in the next world. Brought up under a teaching like 
that, it was not surprising that their people had been content to allow the task 
of government to be undertaken by anyone sufficiently strong to grasp it, 
provided they were not oppressed too much, and were allowed to have 
freedom in the exercise of personal and domestic duties. Their great desire, 
indeed, was to be free to pursue the higher purpose of existence as they 
understood it. But now they were coming under new influences, for a spirit of 
nationality had been aroused in India, and it was making steady progress. 
The more the people came to understand the dignity of free institutions the 
greater would be their progress in this new direction” .435
 Thus, while accepting some cliches of the Orientalist scholarship, Gokhale elaborated a 
reaction to the hegemonic historiography on India, mainly epitomised by James Mill’s work 
on British India. Since Gokhale was not an historian, his vision of history is not systematic. 
Unlike Ranade or other nationalists, he did not wrote any history book. Nevertheless, he 
also contributed to create a new narrative of history to counter the demeaning historical 
vision of the British dominators. This appears in several speeches. 
 “Indian View of Indian Affairs”, Address to the Fabian Society, London, 9 October 1905, 435
Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 327.
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  In the first place, what was India for Gokhale? India was a territory, a sacred territory on 
which Indians had been living for centuries, defined by precise geographical boundaries 
and characterised by an ancient civilisation. This perception of India came from British 
historical works on India, but also from more recent Indian ones. It is important to take into 
account, in fact, that Indian historiography had undergone a very important turning point. 
Stimulated by the new attention attributed to history by the colonial government in terms of 
education and, at the same time, willing to show that Indian civilisation was not what the 
Orientalist paradigm wanted it to be, Indian historians wrote the first histories of India, both 
in English and in vernacular languages. India was, in the new historiography, the territory 
under the administration of the British Raj. So for example, in the 1850s, Tarincharan 
Chattopadhyay’s and Kedar Nath Datta’s Bharatbarsher Itihas (History of India, 1859) 
were published in Bengali. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838-1894) emphasised the 
political significance of history, whose writing was a collective act that could gave rise to a 
national collective consciousness. Radha Kumodh Mookerjii (1880-1964) and Kashi 
Prasad Jayaswal (1881-1937) portrayed the evolution of the political system of ancient 
times and showed that an idea of India in nuce could already be found in Ashoka, 
Chandragupta and Harsha . Also for those scholars that adopted a more scientific 436
approach towards history and utilised the economic method to explore it, such as Naoroji 
and Dutt just to mention the most illustrious names, India was the space whose population 
and resources were exploited by the British Raj. In the same way, also to Gokhale, India 
was the land inhabited by an ancient race since centuries. Gokhale attributed to that race 
a high degree of civilisation, reached ‘long before the ancestors of Western nations 
understood what civilisation was’. It was preposterous to hold that ‘because we came 
under the rule of foreigners, (…) we are like some savage semi-civilised people whom you 
have subjugated’ . That civilisation had found expression in the flourishing of philosophy, 437
literature, sciences and arts. So, India was not only the birth-place of great religions. Yet, 
India in the past was not known for that love of liberty, the appreciation of free institutions, 
and the national idea which one finds to be so striking characteristics of the West. 
Moreover, “the country which was once the cradle and home of a noble religion, a noble 
philosophy, and science and art of every kind, is at present day steeped in ignorance and 
superstition and all the moral helplessness which comes of such darkness” . In ancient 438
 Iggers, Qang, Mukherjee, A global History of Modern Historiography, 229-32.436
 “England’s Duty to India’. Speech delivered at the National Liberal Club in London, 15 437
November 1905, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 340.
 “Female Education in India”, 177.438
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India people were learned, knew many languages, were accorded the respect of the 
community, had an important role in performing rituals, both Vedic and Buddhist. Yet, this 
prosperous period of contribution to the human progress ended in the eleventh century 
with the coming of the Muslim invaders: it was the beginning of the age of darkness, the 
seven centuries of obscurity, from which India had emerged only thanks to its connections 
with the West :439
"A great Eastern civilisation, stationary for many centuries, is being once 
again galvanised into life by reason of its coming in contact with a younger 
and much more vigorous civilisation of the West. The retention of all that is 
great and noble in our national life, as it has come down to us from the past, 
and the fullest absorption of what is great and noble in the life of the West, as 
revealed to us by our connection with England - this is now the work which 
has to be accomplished before we can once more hold our head high as a 
nation. How far such an ideal union of the different elements constituting the 
two civilisations is possible time alone will show”.440
  Gokhale, thus, accepted the periodisation of Indian history based on the one proposed by 
James Mill and articulated in a Hindu, Muslim, and a British period . But this should not 441
make us believe that Gokhale perceived Hindus and Muslims as belonging to two different 
and conflicting civilisations. For India, according to Gokhale, was inhabited by three 
ancient great races, that is to say the Hindus, the Muslims, and the Parsees . Moreover, 442
in Gokhale’s open-minded and universalistic view, in addition to retaining “many of those 
characteristics which once placed us in the van of the world’s civilisation – the depth of our 
 “Female Education in India”, 180.439
 “Female Education in India”, 178.440
 Michelguglielmo Torri rightly notes that “since Mill’s time, the only change has been a cosmetic 441
one: the Hindu period has become the Ancient Period, the Muslim Period has become the 
Medieval Period, and the British Period has become the Modern Period, whereas for the period 
after independence the label ‘Contemporary Period’ is sometimes made use of” (Michelguglielmo 
Torri, “For a New Periodisation of Indian History”, in D.N. Jha (edited by), The evolution of a Nation. 
Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial, Essays in Memory of R.S. Sharma, Manohar, Delhi 2014, 39-60, 
here 40. It should not surprise us, then, if Gokhale adopted the same periodisation. His main 
source was Romesh Chunder Dutt's Civilisation in Ancient India. In the smaller version of The 
Civilization of Ancient India that I could consult, namely Civilization of India, Ballantyne & Hanson, 
1901 London (first edition 1900), Dutt did not speak explicitly about that period as a dark age, but 
held that most of the people were not touched by any change. They continued their lives at the 
village level and their possibilities of following a certain religion was not precluded. 
 Gokhale to Krishnaswamy, 29 September 1906, Gokhale Papers, NAI.442
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spirituality, our serene outlook on life, our conception of domestic and social duty”, India 
had been enriched by those other peoples that have “come to make their home here [and] 
have brought their own treasure into the common stock. The India of the future will be 
compounded of all these elements reinforcing one another” . 443
  What Gokhale deeply disliked about the stereotypes of India, apart, of course, from the 
most denigrating ones, such as those that stigmatised Indians as uncivilised, was the 
reading of the Indian past only in spiritual terms, whereas India had reached outstanding 
results in numerous fields of human development. As early as 1894, the young journalist 
Gokhale scathingly criticised Annie Besant for her new creed, namely Theosophy, and for 
the way this added to the fallacious idea of other-worldly India, something which was 
pernicious for a people already blinded by religion:
“The Hindus are already over-religious, overfond of their past, loving the 
acquisitions of knowledge, the ease in philosophy and legendary lore so 
much that it has unnerved them for action in this age of progress and keen 
competition. It is no secret that they like the persons who play to their 
feelings with regard to the past and dislike those that try to open their eyes to 
the task, the Herculean task before hem, in the presents and in the future. 
Mrs Besant (...) made them idolise her as their guru and talk of her in the 
highest oriental complimentary style. She speaks of their past and only of he 
spiritual past and that too in most glowing colours without reference to any 
other sphere of activity. (...) The class most affected will be the upholders of 
the old order of things and those that are already the reactionaries in social 
reform” .444
 “East and West”, 388.443
 “A strong Current”, Sudharak, 5 February 1894. In the same article, some booklets on Besant 444
are suggested as further readings (Theosophy exposed or Mrs Besant and her guru; Who is Mrs 
Besant and why has she come to India; I did Past and Present). Unfortunately, I could not find 
them. It seems, anyway, that in this period, Besant did not have a good reputation. This had 
nothing to do with the fact that she was British, since it was mainly the liberals that criticised her, 
given her conservative positions as far as religion was concerned. In fact, the attacks against 
Besant continued in an other article (“Ideals and Forms”, Sudharak, 16 July 1894) in which it is 
said that she accepted also disputable practises of the Hindu religion, such as the nauch girls, sold 
and attached to the temples, or the overall concept of the extended family: “it is no use quoting 
from  Manu Smriti to show that in that sage's time the woman had a higher and nobler place in the 
social hierarchy. In that same book are to be found sentiments diametrically contrary. And the 
same is the case with our books (..). In it is not what the Shruties or the Smrities contain but it is 
what you actually find now here that should lead you to form your estimate of persons and things".
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  To keep emphasising the ‘spirituality’ of India meant to deny its capability to accept 
modernity and progress. In Gokhale’s vision, then, religion was not the most important 
element of cultural identity, especially if it was the legitimation for inhumane practices that 
denied human dignity. Religion had a social significance only as the foundation of private 
moral and it had therefore to be relegated in the individual sphere. What characterised 
India was its spirit of adaptation, its cultural cross-fertilisation, and its flexibility in absorbing 
useful elements and refusing redundant ones. In general, although conscious of the 
meaningfulness of the revisitation of history to corroborate the nation, Gokhale was 
convinced that the future held more than the past had yielded.
  It was especially the realisation of the despotic and racist nature of the British rule in India 
that legitimised the revisitation of the Orientalist vision of history, namely the forced-upon 
image of a changeless and unresisting ‘East’. The ‘West’ could no longer vindicate a moral 
superiority over India and the ‘Eastern’ world in general. That traditional view:
[C]ould not go on forever, and the protest of the Eastern world against it, as 
evidenced by the steady growth of a feeling of national self-respect in different 
Eastern lands has now gathered sufficient strength and volume to render its 
continuance on old lines extremely improbable, if not altogether impossible. 
The victories of Japan over Russia, the entry of Turkey among constitutionally-
governed countries, the awakening of China, the spread of the national 
movement in India, Persia and Egypt, all point to the necessity of the West 
revising her conception of the East – revising also the standards by which she 
has sought in the past to regulate her relations with the East” .445
The time had come to reset the power relations between ‘West’ and ‘East’ ‘on more equal 
terms’ and for India to retrieve its centrality on the historical stage, according to that 
process of rewriting history that commonly runs parallel to the process of nation-building.   
Between Nation and Empire
“East and West”, 380.445
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“I am by birth a Hindu, but for many years it has been the earnest aspiration 
of my life to work for the advancement of this country only as an Indian” .446
  This is how Gokhale defined himself in 1911, after almost one quarter of a century 
dedicated to the public of India. After a perusal of his documents, it is difficult to deny that 
he gave a truthful description of himself. Gokhale never regarded his being Hindu as a 
relevant factor in terms of political choices. His idea of the nation was clearly inclusive and 
his nationalism uncompromisingly secular. In a country religiously as diverse as India, the 
separation between politics and religion was just logical. The nation in the making had to 
be built on what was a cultural and territorial unity, namely the geographical space 
administered by the British rule. All the inhabitants of that space, regardless of their 
religion and caste belonging, were Indians.
  For the India of the future, Gokhale advocated a liberal egalitarian society and a united 
nationality based on citizenship. Political representation was an essential element to 
create an Indian public sphere and to educate politically the nation: it was a way Indians 
could work together, side by side, and bind themselves together into a nation by aspiring to 
their common progress and elevation. The attainment of freedom, although a long 
process, made by small steps, frequent disappointments and trying failures, was bound to 
happen.
   The nation would not identify itself with a particular culture, but it would be expression of 
the unity in diversity: all cultural elements, equally legitimate and rooted in the country, 
would be safeguarded by the state, which had the role of an arbiter. The well-being of India 
could not be limited to a particular community. For this reason, Gokhale laid great stress 
on Hindu-Muslim unity: he accepted separate electorates for Muslims, because he thought 
it was the only way to bring both communities together and win the distrust that the Muslim 
minority felt toward the Hindu majority.
  Yet, besides regarding India as a nation in the making, Gokhale regarded it also as part 
of the British Empire. He highly reputed the providential connection between England and 
India and hoped that the latter could be benefitted by the former’s guidance in the 
 “The council regulations”, 24 January 1911, speech by Gokhale in the Imperial Legislative 446
Council, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 76. Gokhale appealed to Madan Mohan Malaviya 
(1861-1946) not to press for the resolution moved by him in the Imperial Legislative Council in 
order to appoint a Committee which could consider which changes had to be introduced in the 
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concessions of the different communities. According to Gokhale this could create a wider gulf 
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assimilation of those elements of ‘Western’ civilisation without which Indian regeneration 
would have been difficult. In Gokhale’s opinion, the British people had come to India as the 
representatives of dynamism and progress and for that reason their rule had been 
accepted by Indians. In the first stage, British imperialism was noble, in the sense that it 
“would work for the elevation of all who are included within the Empire” . The benefits 447
were the introduction of a Western type of administrative machinery and the creation of 
infrastructures of which Indian had taken advantage and which had united the country; the 
uninterrupted peace and order, for which only the Englishmen stood for ‘at present state of 
things’ , whereas for a few centuries before the advent of the British the subcontinent 448
had been characterised by an overwhelming chaos; the fair dispensation of justice 
between Indian and Indian, while ‘when it comes to be a matter between Indian and 
Englishman, it is quite another story’ ; Western education with freedom of speech and 449
freedom of writing. This, in particular, was crucially consequential for the Indian nation, 
because it made inevitable that ‘the people of India, having been brought up on Western 
knowledge, would in course of time demand European institutions in the government of the 
country’ .450
 Though, the advantages enjoyed thanks to the contact with England were supposed to be 
a means to a greater end, and not an end per se. They should be aimed at the interests - 
material and moral - of the people of India . In fact, the educated Indians that started the 451
political work from the platform of the Indian National Congress, while acting ‘as 
interpreters between the rulers and the ruled to explain, on the one hand, to the people the 
intentions of the government, and to represent, on the other, to the rulers the grievances of 
the people’, claimed the full rights of that British citizenship to which Indians were admitted 
de iure, as per the Parliament Statute of 1833 and the Queen Proclamation of 1858 . 452
Nevertheless, the promise that ‘there would be no governing caste in that country and that 
the rule would be one of equality for the two races in that land’ was just a ‘legal fiction’ . 453
British imperialism, in fact, had become narrow, one ‘which look[ed] upon the world as 
though it was made for one race only and which is found in season and out of season of 
 “Our political situation”, Speech delivered by Gokhale in Madras, 25 July 1904, Speeches and 447
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setting up an image of its own achievements and standing in adoration before it” . This 454
brought about the tendency of repudiating concessions and the following change in the 
relationships between Great Britain and India. The point was the meaning attached to the 
word ‘Empire’. If it meant inclusion under the British flag, then India was part of the British 
Empire. On the contrary, if by ‘Empire’ it was meant ascendancy of race, ‘then India was 
only a possession of the British Empire, and not part and parcel of it’ .455
  This situation of over-imposed inferiority demanded that Indians engaged in a political 
work of the highest character. As a matter of fact, Gokhale maintained that
“A subject race has as much right and as much reason as, and perhaps more 
right and more reason, to have politics of its own than the races which are 
self-governing and dominant. You have to fight against the ascendancy of a 
dominant class, you have to fight to get admittance into those ranks of power 
which are at present closed to you” .456
 
  Gokhale saw Lord Curzon’s Viceroyalty (1899-1905) as a dramatic turning point in the 
attitude towards Indians. To Gokhale, Lord Curzon’s rule was comparable only with 
Aurangzeb’s ‘despotic’ rule: it was the negation of the ideals of liberalism. As a matter of 
fact, in Lord Curzon’s view, liberty was not ‘a factor of human progress’ , at least not for 457
the subject race:
“Lord Curzon, who dearly loves debating, thought it proper to attack the 
educated classes in regard to their constant reference to this Proclamation. 
He said in effect: “You base your claim for equality in the Queen’s 
proclamation. But what does it promise you? It says that you will have 
equality when you are ‘qualified’ for it. Now, here we have certain 
qualifications which can only be attained by heredity or race. Therefore, as 
you cannot acquire race, you really cannot have equality with Englishmen in 
India as long as British rule lasts”. (…) [L]ook at the unwisdom, the 
stupendous unwisdom, of the whole thing, telling the people of India that 
unless they were content to remain permanently a subject race in their own 
 “Our Political Situation”, 177.454
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country, their interests and those of the British rule were not identical. After 
this, how can any Englishman complain if my countrymen regarded, as they 
have latterly regarding, your rule in India as maintained, not to promote their 
interests, but for a selfish purpose?”458
The disdain and contempt that British had towards India was justified by the fact that in the 
past “we [Indians] have shown no disposition to quarrel with despotic forms of 
government”.  Yet, the British domination was morally unacceptable. Gokhale explained 459
that:
“We could put up with it under the Mughals and in the Native states, because 
it was their form of government. They did not rule us in one way and 
themselves in another. But it is not your method and you cannot apply it to us 
without despising us” .460
  Therefore, Curzon’s rule denied the liberal principles which, as England had professed, 
would enable the Indian people to govern themselves according to the higher standards of 
the West . It represented a radical change of course for the British policy until then 461
pursued in India and embodied the triumph of centralisation and bureaucratisation of the 
Indian political system. Moreover, it excluded the educated classes, who alone were the 
real spokesmen and public opinion of the country. In short, it was not a responsible mode 
of governance, since nobody could be identified with the interests of the Indian people. 
Gokhale saw in the worsening of the political situation a consequence of the consolidation 
of the colonial power; the officials, supported by a well-structured and modern apparatus, 
did not need anymore the approval of the people and could show the real face of their 
domination . The worst feature of British rule was that racial discrimination had become a 462
systematic phenomenon, something unacceptable from the moral side, because the 
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constant ‘atmosphere of inferiority’  was ‘steadily destroying our capacity for initiative and 463
dwarfing us as men of action’ . But also on the material side, it had resulted in a fearful 464
impoverishment of the people, because India was ‘for members of the dominant race a 
country where fortunes were to be made to be taken out and spent elsewhere. Thus, to the 
racial ascendancy of Englishmen, ‘absentee capitalism’ had been added .465
  The reason of all this was a plain absence of coincidence of interests between the 
Government of India and the people: actually, ‘the real interests of the people [did] not 
occupy the first place nor the second place nor even the third place on the slate of the 
Government” . Indians were excluded from the high level of offices; they had no power to 466
affect the position of the Government; they were deprived of their natural right to bear 
arms to defend themselves; in South Africa their humiliation was even more complete 
since they were treated outside the pale of civilisation. From the economic standpoint, the 
situation was disastrous to say the least and made the verdict against British rule even 
more emphatic. The annual income in India was £2 per head according to official 
estimates, whereas according to non-official analysis it was only a little more than £1 vis-à-
vis the £42 per head in England. Four-fifths of the people depended upon agriculture, but 
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that sector had been steadily deteriorating and not given adequate attention by the 
Government, compared to other sectors such as the railways, that could grant more wealth 
to England. The masses of India were poverty-stricken and subject also to more frequent 
famines and plagues, with consequent rising mortality rates. Thus, ‘this fearful 
impoverishment was bound to result from the peculiar character of British rule’ . The only 467
solution to such hapless situation was to transform the bureaucratic form of administration 
along more liberal lines so as to associate the people of the country with that 
administration . If twenty years earlier, Gokhale had maintained that “[t]he very presence 468
of this or that dominant foreign power in India sufficiently proves the incapacity of Indian 
peoples for self-government” , now he regarded Indians as politically mature and 469
therefore ready for self-government. Also the officials, in theory, admitted the necessity of 
associating the people with the government of the country. Yet,
“[T]hey object to admitting only a small proportion of the population to a share 
in the administration and they ask us to wait till the mass of the people have 
been qualified by education to take an intelligent part in public affairs!”470
  Having all this said, it was not surprising that ‘things have moved even in dreamy and 
contemplative India’ and that the educated classes ceased to believe that ‘the sole aim of 
British rule in India was the welfare of the Indian people, and that, under that rule, no 
distinction would be made between Indians and Europeans in the government of the 
country on grounds of race or creed to colour’ . Instead of their professed noble and 471
progressive values, the Englishmen in India had become guardians of a static and 
conservative order, according to the most rigid tradition of despotic rule, which was 
epitomised by the bureaucratic system, with its utter contempt for public opinion, its 
arrogant pretensions to superior wisdom, its reckless disregard of the feelings of the 
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people, and its cool preference of colonial interests to those of the governed . They had 472
betrayed the highest principles of British liberal tradition and history. What is interesting, 
though, is that Gokhale still appealed to those same principles and never took an anti-
British stance in order to ride the wave of popular discontent. Rather, he kept on 
expressing his loyalty to the the British Crown and valuing England’s connection with India. 
The reference to the ‘great Proclamation of 1858 on which we take our stand so largely in 
our constitutional struggle’ and to the Queen-Empress’s influence in favour of a ‘policy of 
justice and sympathy towards the Indian people’  recurs in Gokhale’s speeches, even 473
soon after the bitter humiliation of the Partition of Bengal. This is significant because it 
meant that British rule in India was actually un-British and it was necessary to address the 
British Parliament and Throne to denounce the bitter exasperation all round that Indians 
were experiencing. 
  Hence, the nationalist discourse elaborated by Gokhale was bidirectional. On the one 
hand, it had to appeal to the British liberals in the Parliament and to the Crown in order to 
make sure that India could attain its rightful place among the self-governing colonies of the 
British Empire. On the other hand, Gokhale spoke to his compatriots, to all sections of 
Indian population, in order to rouse a common impulse towards national progress and 
against the common wrong of colonialism. In this sense, it can be argued that Gokhale’s 
principle of nationality was conservative, since it did not advocate the end of imperialism 
per se, but only of narrow-minded and exclusionary imperialism. Internally, it opposed 
social unrest in name of gradualism and of future progress for everyone. 
India as part of the Empire
  To imagine the nation in the making inserted in the wider space of the Empire was 
essential in Gokhale’s nationalist ideology, and more generally in the Moderates’ ideology. 
In fact, Gokhale’s nationalism was a universal one, never requiring his fellows to hate 
foreigners just because foreigners. The making of the Indian nation was not in contrast 
with its belonging to the far-flung British Empire, that ‘great Empire’, whose major blessing 
was ‘what may be called modern civilisation’ . When Gokhale envisioned self-474
government within the Empire, he demanded the enjoyment of those civic and political 
rights as per the principles of the British political tradition and in accordance with the liberal 
ideals of citizenship that prescribed justice and liberty. Being subjects of the Crown, 
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Indians had to be admitted into the rights of the British people. In 1893, Surendranath 
Banerjea wrote on the columns of the Bengalee, that
“We are nor Englishmen or men of English race or extraction, but we are 
British subjects, the citizen of a great and free Empire; we live under the 
protecting shadows of one of the noblest constitutions the world has ever 
seen. The rights of Englishmen are ours, their privileges are ours, their 
constitution is ours. But we are excluded from them” .475
  Also Gokhale was asking for a common status in the imperial space, in line with the idea 
of a common and equal status across the Empire that gained currency toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, as the Imperial Conferences, held from 1887 onward, tried to 
codify . According to Gokhale and to other Indian liberals, it was a way to transcend their 476
being Indians and to offset their inferior racial status. India’s claim to equality was, in 
Gokhale’s opinion, question of ‘vital importance’. In fact, Indians were British subjects and, 
as such, they were supposed to be rights-bearing subjects. To subsume Indians’ 
discriminated racial status into imperial citizenship  meant to be recognised as a familiar 477
category, and not as the ‘Other’, and to counterbalance a condition of inferiority. Therefore, 
Gokhale adopted the rhetoric of political rights, based on formal equality, on the ‘legal 
fiction’ of the Parliament Statute of 1833 and of the Proclamation of 1858, which despite 
being generally ignored by the colonial state, kept on providing ‘the cornerstone for Indians 
claims to a citizenship based on universalist notions of equality’ . Moreover, by becoming 478
citizens of the British Empire and thanks to the achievement of equal civic and political 
rights, Indians could more easily overcome all those caste and religion divisions that 
represented an hindrance to unity and progress, that is to say to the building of the nation. 
Becoming citizens of the Empire, then, contributed to the making of the Indian nation in a 
contest where religion, caste, community could be put aside because they did not matter. 
Hence, while demanding imperial citizenship, Gokhale was trying to mould the secular and 
liberal nation. 
  The British government, on the other hand, kept an ambivalent position as far as imperial 
equality was concerned. For example, in 1897, addressing the premiers of the self-
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governing colonies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa), Joseph Chamberlain 
stated that Great Britain sympathised with “the determination of the white inhabitants of the 
Colonies which are in comparatively close proximity to millions and hundreds of millions of 
Asiatics that there should not be an influx of people alien in civilisation, alien in religion, 
alien in custom, whose influx, moreover would most seriously interfere with the legitimate 
rights of existing about population”, but at the same reminded his audience that the 
traditions of the Empire made no distinction in terms of race to colour .479
  It is especially from a speech held at a public meeting in Allahabad in February 1907 (of 
which an excerpt has been already quoted above) that we can see how asking for self-
government within the Empire and building the nation were by no means contradictory 
aspirations, rather they were complementary aspects of the same matter. According to 
Gokhale, India was undergoing a most important conjuncture, ‘one of those decisive 
moments when the mind of the people is about to take a great step forward and when a 
right judgement means so much new strength added to the nation and a wrong judgment 
is fraught with consequences far graver than on other occasions’. The situation was to be 
regarded with deep satisfaction in several respects. In fact, 
“The new century has begun well for the East. We have seen a great drama 
enacted before our eyes, which is exercising a profound influence over the 
relations between the East and the West. The very air around us is charged 
with new thought-currents. A new consciousness of power is stirring within us 
- a new meaning of our existence is breaking upon our mind. Lord Curzon’s 
repressive measures have only proved a blessing in disguise. The rapid 
growth of the Swadeshi sentiment all over the country - and Swadeshism at 
its highest means a fervent, passionate, all-embracing love of the motherland 
- must make every true Indian heart glow with pleasure and pride” .480
  Nonetheless, there were also motives for anxiety and misgiving. There was, in fact, a 
small body of foreign officials holding in their hands practically a ‘monopoly of all political 
power’, whereas on the other side, a vast mass of people appallingly poverty-stricken, lay 
inert and apathetic, only starting showing here and there signs of a new life. Between them 
there stood the educated class ‘already exercising extensive influence over the mass of 
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the people and bound by its capacity and education, its knowledge of the needs of the 
situation, its natural aspirations and its patriotism to leas the people in the new struggle’. 
This class was no more so-well disposed to British rule and was now determined to attain 
‘a political status worthy of the self-respect of civilised people’ . Their goal, although not 481
theoretically perfect, but practical attainable, was self-government within the Empire. The 
question was ‘not merely of dreams, but also of muscle and character, of capacity, of 
organisation, of sacrifice’. The cases of the French in Canada and the Boers in South 
Africa had shown that there was room in the Empire for a self-respecting India . Gokhale 482
acknowledged the extreme difficulty of the task and understood - yet he did not justified - 
the stand taken by some nationalists  that under the belief ‘that this goal could never be 483
attained, had begun to talk of another goal, even more impossible of attainment. They 
were like persons who sought to fly from the evils they knew of to those that they knew 
nothing about’. Moreover, the goal of self-government was in line with gradual change, as 
it would not dangerously topple over the entire established order. It would involve ‘a 
minimum disturbance of present ideas, and it meant proceeding along lines’ which they 
understood, while enlisting on their side ‘all that was high-minded, freedom-loving and 
honourable in England’, according to the genius of the British people that, ‘as revealed in 
history, is on the whole made for political freedom, for constitutional liberty’. That goal 
could be reached only by successive steps, each perhaps small, and not through any 
sudden or violent cataclysm. It could be reached exclusively by means of constitutional 
agitation, whose field was a very wide one, occupying the spectrum of possibilities from 
prayers and appeals to passive resistance, ‘including even its extreme form of non-
payment of taxes till redress was obtained at the other end’. Only physical force in the form 
of rebellion, aiding a foreign invasion or resort to crime were excluded . It was premature 484
to agree with the ‘loose talk’ that the Congress methods had failed, because the 
Congressmen had not yet exhausted one thousandth of the possibilities included in 
constitutional agitation. What was particularly dangerous was he idea of political boycott, 
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whose feasibility was absolutely preposterous. In the first place, the building up of national 
schools and colleges all over the country out of private resources would take years and 
years. And anyway, the more thoughtful advocates of national education urgeg the 
supplementing, and not the destruction, of the work done by Government in the field of 
education. In the same way, the boycott of Local and Municipal Boards and on Legislative 
Councils would mean to waste what little powers of administration and control Indian 
possessed to serve their people . The work of the Congress was invaluable because it 485
had enabled Indians to ‘think and feel nationally’, and had taught people the duties and 
burdens of public life. However, Gokhale said, the main work was to build up the strength 
of the nation. That work was three-fold:
“First, the promotion of a closer union among the different sections of the 
Indian community - between the Hindus and Mahomedans - and among the 
different sections of the Hindus themselves; secondly, the development of a 
stronger and higher type of character, firm of purpose, and disciplined in 
action; and thirdly, the cultivation of an intense feeling of nationality 
throughout the country rising superior to caste and creed and rejoicing in all 
sacrifice for the motherland, accompanied by a spread of political education 
among the masses” .486
It was especially the Hindu-Muslim question to be most difficult: it required the exercise of 
great tact and forbearance. But political education was largely doing an helpful work in he 
matter and creating a common platform of thought. 
  By and large, then, in Gokhale’s opinion, political emancipation through the medium of 
self-government had to be attained before national emancipation. It was political 
emancipation itself that could lead to the decomposition of the Indian individual into 
religious man and citizen. Only the emergence of a political subjectivity and the equality in 
front of the law in accordance with the liberal ideals of citizenship could make India a 
unified nation. 
  The priority of the issue of ‘imperial’ citizenship emerged vigorously when the disturbing 
condition of Indians in South Africa produced a lively debate in India on civic rights, 
political autonomy, civil liberties, equality and right to vote. The question had interested 
Gokhale since as early as 1897, when he had written an article for the India, the organ of 
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the Congress published in London, in which he had denounced the fact that Indians in 
India and in the rest of the Empire, could enjoy only ‘paper-equality, something that 
brought to mind that ‘after all, we are only British slaves, and not British subjects’. Thus, 
even if, at the beginning of the century, England ‘nobly strove for the emancipation of the 
slaves’, still in the closing years of the nineteenth century ‘some of her children would 
endeavour to proclaim the doom of practical slavery for three hundred millions of people 
under her own flag - for one-sixth of the whole human race - and that she would quietly 
look on while this outrage was perpetrated in her name!’ What was ironical, moreover, was 
that
“The Government of India has always been prompt in giving adequate 
protection to its English subjects, in whatever quarter of the globe they may 
need it. Will it not raise even a feeble protest, when the members of a British 
colony insult its Indian subjects in the most shameful manners, say that they 
are only black vermin, and not men, that they can live on the smell of an oily 
rag, that they breed like rabbits, and that it was a pity that they could not shot 
down and so on and so forth?”487
 The assertion that Indians were British subjects, or that they had a Government to look 
after them was just ‘bitter mockery’.
  At the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, in South Africa there were about 
150,000 Indians, most of them, around 120,000, in Natal. They were mainly indented 
labourers, ex intended labourers or their descendants . This gives an idea of the mobility 488
of labour within the space of the Empire, where, after the abolition of slavery, a urging 
need for cheap labour was felt. In the Imperial Legislative Council in 1912, Gokhale moved 
a resolution to press for the abolition of the system of intended labour, whose victims were 
easily comparable with slaves. The very fact that the system came into existence soon 
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after the abolition of slavery in 1834 was a sufficient explanation of its nature. Even though 
the matter had attracted the attention of the British Parliament in several occasions and 
the system was discontinued and resumed several times, the government provided 
‘illusory and ineffective’ safeguards to the labourers. The reason for this was that the 
magistrates and protectors, supposed to protect labourers from abuses and defend their 
interests, were members of the Colonial governments and, generally, there was an identity 
of interests with the white planters . Gokhale also questioned the positive aspects which 489
usually were adduced in favour of the system, namely that it ensured the continuation of 
the activity of sugar industries and other industries. But those were not ethically acceptable 
justifications, because any industry which fed such a system had to cease to exist. Also 
the fact that the labourers sent remittances home was misleading, as their salaries were of 
such a small entity that their remittances were at best Rs. 150, savings that could be much 
more easily attained in the mills of Bombay. Lastly, the people who decided to settle in the 
colony were not welcome at all . An aggravation for India was that it was the only country 490
at the time that provided indentured labour: it was a demeaning degradation and an insult 
for the all nation. Gokhale, in sum, did not restrain himself to make public the hypocrisy of 
the imperial government, both in dealing with the indenture system and with slavery. He 
said, in fact, that  
“[T]he friends of the planters in the House of Commons, when the question 
was brought forward there, said that the slaves were contented and they 
could not understand why the abolitionists wanted to disturb the contentment 
and the harmony of their lives. The Hon'ble Member [Mr. Fremantle, official 
member of the Council who spoke against Gokhale’s motion] said that 
Indians in the colonies certainly would not thank me for bringing forward this 
Resolution. Sir, I am quite content that he should earn their thanks by 
opposing the Resolution. Be his the thanks which the champions of slavery 
expected to receive from those who were anxious to continue in slavery! Be 
mine the denunciation, with which the advocated of abolition were threatened 
by those champions at the hands of slaves, unwilling to be free!”491
 “Prohibition of indentured labour”, Imperial Legislative Council, 4 March 1912, Speeches and 489
Writings, Vol. 1, 352-55.
 “Prohibition of indentured labour”, 358.490
 “Prohibition of Indentured Labour”, 364. The resolution was rejected.491
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  It was particularly in Natal that Indians were victims of a strong sense of contempt, 
notwithstanding the fact that they had greatly contributed to reviving the country thanks to 
their work. Durban, for examples, and other towns along the coast had been built mainly 
by Indians. Ill-treatment was directed also towards the community of traders, who were 
around 15,000. These once possessed political and municipal franchise, but the former 
had been withdrawn in 1866 and several attempts were being made to withdraw the latter 
as well. Also in Transvaal the situation was quite harsh and Indians had no right to land 
property, nor to vote. In front of the discrimination of Indians in the colonies of the Empire, 
Gokhale asked 
"What is the status of us, Indians, in this Empire? Secondly, what is the 
extent of the responsibility which lies in the Imperial Government to ensure to 
us just and humane and gradually even equal treatment in this Empire? And 
thirdly, how far are the self-governing members of this Empire bound by its 
cardinal principles? Are they to participate in its privileges only and not to 
bear their share of its disadvantages?"492
Gokhale held in high esteem Gandhi’s struggle, because it regarded it as in furtherance of 
the future interests of India:
“For better or for worse this country is now included in the British Empire and 
our progress must be towards complete equality with out English and other 
fellow subjects in that Empire. Here again as practical men, er are prepared 
to recognise that the attainment of such equality and the obliteration of race 
distinctions which it involves can be but a slow affair. But we have a right to 
insist that the movement must be in the direction of a steady removal of 
these distinctions which are numerous in all conscience and not towards 
adding further to them. In fighting for the principle that no humiliating 
disabilities shall be imposed by the statute-book of a British Colony on 
Indians as Indians, Mr. Gandhi is fighting for the assertion of our claim to that 
equality with which our hopes for the future are bound up” . 493
 “Indentured Labour for Natal”, 25 February 1910, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 1, 193.492
 “The Indians in the Transvaal”, 414.493
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Furthermore, Gandhi’s movement was expression of ‘great moral force’, because it united 
Indians without being anti-British:
“Look at the splendid manner in which the whole movement has been 
managed. Hindus, Mahomedans, Parsis, all held together as one man, 
forgetting their usual differences and suffering with wonderful self-restraint 
(…). Again look at the fact that though the struggle has gone on in an acute 
form all these months, not even the worst opponent of Mr. Gandhi has 
suggested the least suspicion about his loyalty or his general attitude towards 
the British Government” .494
  It was duty of the Imperial Government to secure justice to other subjects besides white 
residents of self-governing colonies. The root of Indians’ disgraceful condition in the 
colonies lay in the fact that ‘our status is not what it should be in our own country. Men who 
have no satisfactory status in their own land cannot expect to have a satisfactory status 
elsewhere. Our struggle for equal treatment with Englishmen in the Empire must therefore 
be mainly carried on in India itself’ . India’s future as a nation in the Empire was involved 495
in the struggle in South Africa.
  Therefore, it was increasingly felt how race had become a conclusive disqualification 
which would last as long as the British rule lasted , as was evident, inter alia, from the 496
restricted Indian access to the ICS . Hence, in India as well as in the space of the 497
Empire, Indians did not enjoy the sought-after equal citizenship, because Indians were not 
equals to Europeans: 
“If we were absolutely equal subjects to the King, we should in the first place 
be able to go to South Africa on the same terms as the Europeans and 
secondly, when we are there, we should be able to live in that country on the 
same terms as the Europeans. That also involves the question of free and 
equal British citizenship. Now, this second equality, if I may call it so, (…) 
 “The Indians in the Transvaal”, 414.494
 “Indians in the Transvaal”, 415-16.495
 “Budget Speech”, 29 March 1905, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 1, 83.496
 Data showed, in fact, that there was no steady increase of Indians in the service of the 497
Government of India: most of the new government posts created between 1897 and 1903 had 
gone to Europeans or Eurasians. Indians, thus, were still excluded from offices of trust and 
responsibility and regarded as unfit for the exercise of particular tasks (“Budget Speech”, 29 March 
1905, 84).
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means that if we were equal subjects of the King in South Africa when we go 
there and settle there, we should be able first of all to leave the country 
temporarily when we want to leave it and go back to it when we want without 
hindrance or trouble or difficulty. An Indian who wants to go to India and 
come back should experience no more difficulty than an Englishman 
experiences every time he goes to England and comes back” .  498
  Moreover, Indians were discriminated in their mobility from province to province, in their 
ability to own land and property. They could not trade on equal terms with Europeans and 
could not follow any other avocation. Indians could not provide the same sort of education 
that Europeans could give to their children; they were excluded from government service 
and from franchise. They were victims of social disabilities, since they could not stay in 
hotels, sit on benches in parks, walk on footpaths, or enter theatres. Indians were in no 
respect treated on terms of equality with Europeans. 
  It was this painful and delusory exclusion from citizenship, rather than its common 
enjoyment, that eventually created the political justification for the claim of national rights: 
Indians were equal in their suffering from common disabilities, sacrifices and sufferings. 
But for the time being, the Indian leaders kept demanding that Indians were recognised as 
British citizens and that all Indian subjects, naturalised or residents in India, were regarded 
as equal before the law .499
India as a Nation
  But how, in Gokhale’s view, was it possible to make the nation? We find an answer to this 
question in several speeches and writings by him. According to Gokhale, it was exactly the 
participation of Indian people to the government that would make them feel part of a 
shared project. In the first stage, self-government at the local level was greatly useful for 
that purpose since ‘it teaches men of different castes and creeds, who have long been 
kept more or less apart, to work together for a common purpose’ . What Gokhale wanted 500
 “South African Report”, Speech delivered by Gokhale in the session of the Congress in 498
December 2012, Bankepore, Behar, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 461-62.
 Sundara Sastri Satyamurthy, Rights of Citizens, Appendix B, Madras, Cambridge Press, 1919. 499
This was a resolution adopted by the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, 
which emphasised that the Statute of the Government of Indian Act of 1919 to be passed by the 
British Parliament should include the declaration of the rights of the people of India as British 
citizens (quoted in Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens, 192).
 “Mofussil Municipalities Bill”, speech delivered at the Bombay Legislative Council, 12 February 500
1901, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 124.
 183
for India was ‘a voice in the government of the country, not for the whole population, but for 
such portion of it as has been qualified by education to discharge properly the 
responsibilities of such association’ . Of course universal franchise was not 501
contemplated. The educated classes would prepare the people for self-government. 
Gokhale thus disputed what was said in the official circles that the interests of the 
educated classes and those of the bulk of their countrymen were distinguished: it was just 
a device to seek to repress the legitimate aspirations of Indian people and to ignore the 
requests made by the educated Indians. These spoke on behalf of the other classes and 
their influence was much bigger than what their number would suggest. They were the 
‘natural leaders of the people’: theirs was the Vernacular Press, whose contents did not fail 
to reach the masses; they had access in a hundred ways to the minds of the latter ; 502
whatever public opinion existed in the country, it reflected the views of the educated 
classes . Hence, in Gokhale’s opinion, the intellectuals were the most advanced social 503
stratum in Indian society. Gokhale perceived the intellectuals as a class, even though they 
came from different social classes (in the Marxian meaning of the term): he attributed them 
a social role that was not determined by class belonging, but by their capability to operate 
as spokespersons, ideologues, and leaders of the masses. Then, even though Sarojini 
Naidu depicted Gokhale as not immune from “the conservative pride of his brahminical 
descent which instinctively resented the least question of its ancient monopoly of 
power” , he never maintained - explicitly or implicitly -, unlike Tilak, that Brahmans should 504
be the leaders of the country. Rather, the leading lights of the society were, in Gokhale’s 
view, the intellectuals, the educated classes. It was the task of the ‘brain of the nation’, to 
work for a united and renovated India, so that this could move forward and aspire to find its 
place among the other nations of the world. The intellectuals had to sensitise Indians so 
that everyone could participate in the concretisation of a better future and in the 
consolidation of the nation. In this taxing mission, Indians would be benevolently benefited 
from the guidance of Providence that, according to Gokhale, as Ranade taught him, 
 “Congress Presidential Address”, 205.501
 “Congress Presidential Address”, 206.502
 “Self-Government for India”, 351.503
 In the file ‘Sarojini Naidu Collection’, among Gokhale’s private papers, there is a booklet, 504
Gokhale the Man, written by Sarojini Naidu, published in Hyderabad in 1915 da Pillai & Sons. In 
the same book, Sarojini tells an anecdote regarding Gokhale during the All-India Social Conference 
in Calcutta in 1911. At that conference, talking about the so-called Depressed Classes, Sarojini 
said that their inhuman condition was mostly due to “the tyranny of arrogant Brahmins in the past”. 
Gokhale, resented, told her in private that “it was no doubt a brave and beautiful speech, but you 
sometimes use harsh, bold phrases”. And he added “You – in spite of yourself – you are typically 
Hindu in spirit. You begin with a ripple and end in eternity”.
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governed the universe and the actions of men and of nations. It was the intellectuals’ 
responsibility to provide the ‘ignorant and unresponsive’ masses with a guidance, to carry 
them along and open their eyes, to moderate their susceptibility over religious issues. In 
this sense, it is possible to argue that Gokhale’s ideas are enclosed in a bourgeois 
perspective. Yet, Gokhale did not see the interests of the educated and uneducated 
classes as basically antagonistic. Education ‘had merely put a tongue into the mouths that 
were dumb before’ . The educated Indians played a relevant social role because they 505
had been the first to realise the strong impact that the encounter with the ‘West’ was 
having on their country. Thanks to the medium of Western education, they adopted ‘the 
Western way of looking at things’. As a matter of fact, they established within the society 
the conditions for future progress, something that required ‘a long process of discipline and 
purification and real adjustment’ . They understood that, although complex and painful, 506
such process was necessary, because only progress could lead to curbing the most 
retrograde aspects of tradition and eventually bring national unity. Under the influence of 
Western ideas,
“[T]hey [the first Western-educated men] bent their energies, in the first 
instance, to a re-examination of the whole of their ancient civilisation – their 
social usages and institutions, their religious beliefs, their science, their art, in 
fact, their entire conception and realisation of life. This brought them into 
violent collision with their own society, but that very collision drove them 
closer to the Englishman in the country, to whom they felt deeply grateful for 
introducing into India the liberal thought of the West with its protest against 
caste or sex disabilities and its recognition of man’s dignity as man – a 
teaching which they regarded as of the highest value in serving both as a 
corrective and a stimulant to their old civilisation” . 507
  This peculiar development introduced into India factors of great complexity and strong 
conflicts within Indian society. These manifested through a wave of reaction and revivalism 
that was likely to injure the idea of an Indian nationality that was slowly developing. In fact, 
Gokhale argued that the advancement of revivalism would deepen the lines of cleavages 
between the several sub-nationalities in India and the cause of united action would 
 ‘Reflections suggested by the Fifth Indian National Congress’, Sarvajanik Sabha Quarterly 505
Journal, January 1980, 8.
 “East and West”, 388.506
 “East and West”, 382.507
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suffer . The anti-English and anti-liberal sentiments that had started to grow and that 508
were directed indiscriminately against everything done by the British were regressive and 
dangerous. Such postures were suicidal because they implied also the refusal of British 
institutions. Revivalism was just not feasible for the welfare of a society. It was only 
possible to look ahead and build the future. Revivalist tendencies denied the fact that half 
a century of Western education and a century of common laws, common administration, 
common grievances, and common disabilities weakened the divisions of caste and 
creeds . 509
  This was also the reason why Gokhale opposed sectional representation as it was 
proposed by the Bombay government in the Mofussil Municipalities Bill . It is well-known 510
that, a few years later, in occasion of the so-called Morley-Minto Reforms, Gokhale would 
back the introduction of separate electorates for Muslims at the centre level as a way to 
overcome the differences that had emerged between the Hindu and Muslim communities. 
In the same way, Gokhale, at this stage, had no objection to Government providing for 
sectional representation by means of elections, provided that a minimum of half the seats 
was guaranteed to the general ratepayers. Gokhale maintained that there were already 
“causes for differences enough among the different sections in this land, and (…) the 
Legislature should not, in the best interests of the country, without the very strongest 
reasons, give any statutory recognition to these differences” . There was nothing, 511
according to Gokhale, in the nature of local self-government which implied any conflict 
between the interests of one section and another. The only chance of a conflict of interest 
arising between the two communities was over the question of slaughter-houses. But, in 
the case in which Hindu Councillors neglected to construct slaughter-houses for the 
benefit of Muslims and bother inhabitants, that it was in the power of the Government to 
require recalcitrant Municipalities to perform that duty .512
  What is interesting, apart from the fact that Gokhale did not deny to non-Hindus the 
possibility of having slaughter-houses at their disposal, is that the Hindu community was 
not considered by him as a whole by itself. Among the Hindus “there are so many castes 
 “Revivalism and Nationality”, part of a speech by Gokhale reported in The Mahratta, 19 October 508
1902.
 “Self-Government for India”, 351.509
 Since 1884, the Government retained the power of nominating up to a maximum of one-half of 510
members of the Municipal Corporations to represent sections and minorities. In the Bill discussed, 
thought, besides retaining that same power, it was proposed that sections and minorities should 
have seats specially assigned to them out of the minimum of one-half, thrown open to election. To 
Gokhale that was a step back (“Mofussil Municipalities Bill”, 117-18).
 “Mofussil Municipalities Bill”, 124.511
 “Mofussil Municipalities Bill”, 124.512
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and sections (…) and some of them stand so wide apart from one another, that it will be 
necessary to recognise their differences, and then where are the Government going to 
stop?”  According to Gokhale, the state was the arbiter between the different sections of 513
the society. Already as early as 1893, writing in the Sudharak, Gokhale had expressed 
such view in occasion of the Hindu-Muslim riots occurred in Bombay, maintaining that it 
was high time that “government should proclaim the equality of law and impartiality of 
justice to all classes, and not leave the thing to be done by the representatives of both 
sections” . In that unfortunate occasion, according to the young journalist, the 514
Government had taken a biased stand in favour of Muslims and the Anglo-Indian press 
had been systematically engaged in the divisive activity of ‘sensitising’ the Mohammedans 
on “what their state would be if the vote in the commons regarding the Simultaneous 
examinations were practically carried out and the consequent danger realised of having 
the ranks of the civil Service crowned with the Hindus” . Gokhale saw the 515
dangerousness of spreading the belief that Muslims were jeopardised in their religion by 
the Hindus, because “in a nation constituted as this Indian nation is, where different 
sections holding divergent views and opinions regarding politics, society and religion, it is 
always imprudent to allow such a belief to grow in one section, for it will ever prove a 
source of mischief and disaster” . According to Gokhale, what Government reported 516
about Muslims feeling ‘gradually but surely edged out of the position that have hitherto 
held in the country’ and that ‘the tendency of European systems of administration is to 
increase the influence of the Hindus at their expense’, was preposterous because:
“[A]t the present day neither the Hindus nor the Mahomedans occupy any 
position or have any status to speak of; that both of them are mere hewers of 
wood and drawers of water, and that if there is to be any edging out on the 
part of the Hindus, it must be in regard of the Anglo-Indians class and not to 
the Mahomedans who do not possess any greater dignity or power than 
themselves. (…) Short-sighted and narrow-minded officers of Government, 
who hate the Hindus for their political activity, never lose an opportunity to 
 “Mofussil Municipalities Bill”, 124.  Gokhale’s amendment, put on the vote, lost.513
 “Who is to Blame?”, Sudharak, 21 august 1893.514
 “Who is to Blame?”. It is worth mentioning that in the issue of the Sudharak of 25 September 515
1893, Gokhale denounced pro-Hindu meetings organised by Tilak, as he thought they were not 
conducive for reconciliation. It was the moral responsibility of the educated individuals of both 
communities to set the example and try to bring about a climate favourable for peace and dialogue.
 Sudharak, 8 July 1895.516
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flatter the Mahomedans to the top of their bent, thereby leading them to 
believe that government actually cherishes at heart a greater regard for them 
than for the Hindus and that it would shut its eyes if now and then they have 
just a little row with the Hindus to remind them of their physical 
feebleness” .517
  It is important to note that, from a perusal of Gokhale’s private papers, it is 
unquestionably evincible that the Indian politician always repudiated the narrow-
mindedness of certain forms of nationalism. He passionately believed that, in order to 
achieve national independence, it was first necessary to have a united nation, without 
politicised communities and caste divisions. The fact that the country never had a training 
in freedom and representative institutions was an urging caveat that a premature 
independence from the foreign domination could turn into the tyranny of one man over the 
other. This strong conviction, though, did not prevent Gokhale from accepting separate 
electorates . These, as Gokhale himself explained, were an expediency to minimise the 518
friction and ensure representation of minorities . 519
  Nevertheless, Gokhale’s limit was that he was too optimistic in his imagination of the 
nation. In his vision, in fact, the India of the future would almost inevitably succeed in 
bridging the gulf existing before different interests and diverging ideologies. His trust in 
future unity appears from various letters, and not only in public speeches. In a letter to 
Lawrence Jenkins he wrote that:
“Some assurances to Mahomedans had become necessary, but there was 
the danger of its being given in a manner which could have caused bitterness 
among Hindus as also among other minorities. Happily there is no room for 
such bitterness now. Personally I have always been, as you are aware, in 
 “The Bombay Government and the Bombay Riots”, Sudharak, 15 January 1894.517
 Note is to be taken of the fact that Gokhale saw certain limits in reservation policies which were 518
not based on merit. Writing on a memorial presented by the Belgaum Sarvajanik Sabha about the 
rules for the recruitment in the provincial service, Gokhale expressed his agreement with the lines 
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favour of separate Mahomedan representation. To my mind the most 
important thing just now is not to let any section feel any real or reasonable 
grievance, so that the new arrangements may be started with the utmost 
goodwill on all sides. And as regards Mahomedan representation particularly, 
what I value above everything else is to free the community from 
dependence upon government nomination. When this is done, their interests 
are generally far identical with ours that they are bound before long to come 
and range themselves by our side” . 520
  A few months later, Gokhale wrote to Wedderburn that he thought likely that, if the details 
of the Morley-Minto Reform scheme were worked out in the same liberal spirit as that in 
which the scheme itself was conceived, a new channel for the expression and even the 
education of public opinion could be supplied by the council . Moreover, he felt confident 521
that their backward colleagues, namely the Mohammedans and the landlords – and the 
constituencies that were behind them - before many years would be over, would ‘come into 
the same line with ourselves’. Then the full benefit of the reforms would be enjoyed by 
everybody . 522
  So, we can argue that Gokhale did not realise two important things. The first one is that, 
however right or wrong the Muslim fellows were in having the ‘impression’ that they could 
be vulnerable vis-à-vis the Hindu majority, what is important is that that impression turned 
into something dramatically real with the emergence of the ‘Extremists’’s cultural 
nationalism. Thus, for example, as a result of the cow protection movement, the Muslims 
started fearing that their religion and traditional habits were at risk. Even if the riots spread 
only in certain areas, all the body of the country was affected, so much that the tension 
between Hindus and Muslims acquired an all-India connotation. By and large, once certain 
 From Gokhale to Lawrence Jenkins, 29 January 1909, Gokhale Papers, NAI.520
 From Gokhale to Wedderburn, 24 September 1909, Gokhale Papers, NAI.521
 From Gokhale to Wedderburn, 3 December 1909, Gokhale Papers, NAI.  Gokhale made these 522
considerations although he regretted the fact that the Muslims were accorded an excessive 
representation in the Viceroy’s Council, so much that he defined it ‘monstrously unjust’ (ibidem). In 
the same letter, Gokhale reported a excerpt of a letter from Pherozshah Mehta, another advocated 
of the Hindu-Muslim unity, who, nevertheless, was ‘disgusted’ by the final reform scheme: “The 
Hindus will probably have sometimes no representative and sometimes only one! And this when 
they are about half the population of the [Bombay] Province and in point of education, wealth and 
public spirit by far the more advanced. In East Bengal too, things will be equally bad (…). What I, 
however, particularly dislike is the matter in which representation has been so arranged as to 
neutralise in practise the non-official majorities that have been created in the Provincial 
councils” (ibidem).
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forces had been released, it was very difficult for the respective elites to keep the masses 
under control. The negotiations and conciliations at the political level had not necessarily a 
direct effect at the cultural level. Even if Hindu and Muslim leaders were often ready to 
negotiate and come close to each other, at the popular level there were massive riots in 
many places all over India .523
  Secondly, when separate electorates were introduced by the Morley-Minto Reform, the 
division between the two communities was substantiated at the political level and became 
the platform from which renegotiating the power relationships in the new space created 
within the colonial machinery. 
  Therefore, the preconditions were established both for communal tensions at the 
grassroots level and for communal politics at the elite level. This is not to say that the 
Partition of India was bound to happen in 1947. Of course, several politicians struggled to 
try to find a viable solution for unity. Nevertheless, the political situation was extremely 
complicated and required a marked capability to find compromises. Working together, as 
Gokhale hoped, would not necessarily be enough to fight for the same demands.
  As far as the Hindu-Muslim relationships are concerned, it is expedient to further draw 
our attention to a letter that Gokhale wrote to Wedderburn in 1907 , after violence 524
between the two communities had flared up in East Bengal, during the protests against the 
Partition of Bengal . In that letter, Gokhale tried to inquire into the ‘unhappy disturbances’ 525
and to understand who was to blame. We have seen in the previous chapter how the 
Swadeshi movement was mainly led by the Hindu youth belonging to the middle classes, 
whereas Muslims kept aloof from the protests, since they saw the division of the Bengali 
province as an opportunity to get rid of their Hindu landlords. In his letter, Gokhale 
attributed responsibility to all three parties, that is to say Hindus, Muslims and British 
officials, even though to a different extent:
“There is no doubt that the officials have allowed the impression to spread 
(and have even openly encouraged it) that the Hindus were in their bad 
books and that the Mahomedan community was the special object of their 
favour and patronage. There is also no doubt that when the present 
 For example, in 1917, at the time of the cooperation between the Muslim League and the 523
Congress, there were huge riots in Howrah and other places in UP, Bihar, and Bengal. The union in 
political objectives did not correspond to the union of the masses.
 Gokhale to Wedderburn, 24 May 1907, Gokhale Papers (NAI), published in H.D. Sharma, 100 524
Best Letters: 1847-1947, Harper Collins Publishers India, New Delhi 2000, 100-104. 
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disturbances first began, there was a marked tendency to wink at 
Mahomedan rowdyism and leave the Hindus more or less to their own fate 
[…]. The supineness of the Executive in dealing with the situation even when 
it became clear that Mahomedan rowdies were getting altogether out of hand 
on all sides has made a painful impression in the country and unless a 
searching inquiry is made into how this temporary break down of the 
Government machine took place, the harm that has been done will  not be 
remedied.”   526
  In Gokhale’s view, the benevolent posture of the British officials towards the Muslim 
community was, very obviously, a stratagem aimed at damaging the nationalist movement 
and blaming it for the Muslims’ grievances, so that the latter would dissociate from the 
Congress and exclude the possibility of an union d’entente with the Hindus (and Muslim 
Congressmen). Such ‘charges and counter-charges’ between the two communities were, 
in the eyes of the Indian politician, extremely harmful to the real interests of both. The 
quarrel was deeply painful and humiliating to those ‘whose best hopes for the future lie in 
the two communities working together and whose best energies are given to promoting 
relation of harmony and co-operation between them” . The matter was overall frustrating 527
because it had ‘put back the clock progress by several years’. 
  Gokhale imputed the violent outbursts carried out by the Muslims to their belonging to 
‘the more ignorant and fanatical sections’  of their community. Their ignorance was 528
demonstrated not only by the circulation of the Red Pamphlet  that exhorted the Muslim 529
brothers to engage in a jihad against the Hindus ‘not on account of the boycott, but on 
religious grounds’, but also by their gullibility in believing the dominators’ promises of 
protection and patronage. 
  What Gokhale did not appreciate, though, was that the fanaticism of the Muslim 
community supplied only a partial explanation. As Sumit Sarkar maintains, in fact, “the 
 100 Best Letters, 102. Significantly enough, Ibrahim Khan, the author of the provocative Red 526
Pamphlet was let off with a warning, while Liakat Husain and Abdul Gafur, two among the few 
Muslim Swadeshi Leaders that advocated unity, were hounded down for sedition (Sarkar, 
Swadeshi Movement, 67).
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‘swajati’ movement, a social boycott in reverse (Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement, 281). The full text of 
the pamphlet was printed in the Bengalee, 5 may 1907.
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more important explanation lies in facts of social structure, creating a kind of built-in 
advantage for Muslim separatists, who could safely indulge in considerable anti-landlord 
and anti-mahajan demagogy directed against the predominantly Hindu, land-based 
bhadralok community of East Bengal” . Then, the exhortation to bring back the glory of 530
Islam was an easy medium to mobilise the Mohammedan masses, not different from 
Tilak’s adoption of Hindu symbols to politicise Hindu people. And the Partition was 
celebrated as the deliverance from the yoke of the zamindar and the mahajan, mostly 
Hindu. Therefore, Gokhale’s interpretations of the riots did not take into consideration the 
class factor and, as a consequence, he perceived the masses’ behaviour as irrational and 
fanatical. This is ascribable to the fact that, as a liberal, Gokhale adopted a paternalistic 
approach towards the common man, ‘the vast mass of the people of the country lying inert 
and apathetic, except when under the sway of a religious impulse’. These, being ‘plunged 
in abject poverty and ignorance’, needed the support and advice of the educated 
classes . Moreover, Gokhale was of opinion that a special responsibility lay with the 531
Hindus “who had an advantage over the other community in regard to the spread of 
education and who were therefore in a better position to appreciate the need of a growing 
nationality. They could also do a great deal towards the establishment of better relations if 
someone of them devoted themselves to education and other useful work among 
Mahomedans for the special benefit of that community” .532
  By and large, then, Gokhale attributed an active, positive role to the Hindu educated 
classes - privileged compared their Muslim fellows -, since they had ‘so far contributed far 
more than the other community to the present national awakening in India’ and, thanks to 
their more marked awareness in political matters, they could provide the Indian Muslims 
with the instruments of self-elevation. 
  Gokhale regarded the foundation of the Muslim League as “undoubtedly a cause for 
sincere congratulation that their Mahomedan brethren had at last shaken off their apathy 
of years in political matters”. At the same time, he did not fail to see that a separate 
organised movement of Muslim leaders, with a comprehensive programme of their own, to 
win special concessions for Muslims as a community in the administration of the country 
and demanding special concessions did not tend to diminish the growing difficulties of their 
public life . 533
 Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement, 67.530
 “The Work before Us”, 216.531
 “The Hindu-Mohammedan Question”, 308-9.532
“The Hindu-Mohammedan Question”, 307.533
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  Nevertheless, as seen above, Gokhale considered just temporary the controversial 
situation occurring between Hindus and Muslims and was somewhat sure that a common 
view would develop so that the objectives for the benefit of the whole nation could be 
achieved. In Gokhale’s view, in the long run, the Muslim League ‘must inevitably merge 
itself sooner or later into the larger and older organisation of the National Congress’ . 534
Significantly enough, then, preceding Nehru and Gandhi in what they would think more 
than thirty years later, in Gokhale’s view, the Indian National Congress was the only 
political organisation worthy of representing the nation .535
  But in order to attain national unity, it was necessary to overcome the most divisive 
aspects of the respective religions, that is what Gokhale called ‘tradition’, something that 
had played an important part in creating a breach between the members of the two 
communities in the past. So, even though the bulk of Muslims and Hindus did not differ in 
terms of race and both contributed greatly to the progress of the world, now they found 
themselves embracing different mentalities, so much so that the task to bring them back 
together at times appeared ‘well-nigh impossible’. But “spread of education, a wide and 
efficient performance of civic duties, growth of national aspirations and a quickening of 
national self-respect in both communities were among the forces which would ultimately 
overcome the tradition" and lead to a spirit of co-operation in all public matters . 536
Therefore, what Hindus and Muslims had been in the past did not matter in the India of the 
future. For that reason, any claim advanced in the name of historical importance or higher 
loyalty was not acceptable :537
“It [is] urged that the Mahomedans had ruled in India for five centuries. It 
must not however be forgotten that the Hindus had ruled for countless 
centuries before them and even afterwards, before the British came on the 
scene, the Mahomedan power had been broken and displaced over nearly 
the whole country by a revival of Hindu rule. Then it [is] said that there were a 
large Mahomedan populations in other countries – some of them self-
governing countries – and that invested the Mahomedans of India with 
 “Self-Government for India”, 351-52.534
 Writing to Wedderburn on the situation in India during the Swadeshi movement, Gokhale said 535
that the Hindu League and the Muslim League that had emerged in Upper India were respectively 
anti-Muslim and anti-Hindu and both anti-national (Gokhale to Wedderburn, 24 September 1909, 
Gokhale Papers, NAI)
 “The Hindu-Mohammedan Question”, 308.536
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special importance. [But that could not matter] in determining the extent of 
the representation which the Government of India should grant to its own 
subjects, unless it [is] on the assumption that in the administration of this 
country, those whose whole heart [is] not with India [are] to have preference 
over those whose [is]. Moreover the same could with equal reason be urged 
by Indian Christians and by Buddhists. Lastly, as regards the higher 
traditional loyalty of Mahomedans to British rule, the claim [is] not historically 
tenable. And even during the last two or three years Mahomedan names 
[have] not been altogether absent from the lists of those speakers and writers 
against whom the Government [has] thought it necessary to proceed, though 
it must be admitted that the number of such names [have] been extremely 
small” .538
  While opposing the view of those who urged that the Muslim community was specially 
important and should therefore receive the representation in excess of its fair share - with 
the undoubted and irresistible implication that the other communities were comparatively 
inferior and should receive less than their fair share -, Gokhale was in favour of separate 
electorates, but in the sense that they provided not the whole representation to which the 
communities were entitled, but “only so much as it was necessary to redress the 
deficiencies and inequalities of general elections”. He maintained that in the vested 
interests of Indian public life and future, first there should be elections on a territorial basis 
in which all communities without distinction of creed or race should participate and, then, 
special separate supplementary elections should be held to secure the fair and adequate 
representation of such important minorities as had received less than their full share in the 
general elections. According to Gokhale, in the circumstances of the country of the time, 
that was the only course which reasonably safeguarded the interests of all communities 
and prevented injustice to any of them in practice . Absolute unity in the country and 539
union among the different elements of the society were the highest aspirations of the 
Congress. The Congress movement in fact was
“A national movement, because it has fostered the consciousness of a 
political entity between the different nationalities in India (…).True nationalism 
 “The Hindu-Mohammedan Question”, 310-11.538
 “The Hindu-Mohammedan Question”, 309. The Government of India’s original scheme for which 539
Gokhale had agitated had been very much on those lines. 
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would oppose tyranny and injustice by even native tyrant with the same 
vehemence as injustice by foreigners” .540
Indians had to realise what was wrong in their country and what the situation really 
required. It was only ‘by combining what was best in the West with what was best in the 
East that they could hope to march forward’ . Gokhale added that541
“The India of the future, let us remember always, could not now be only a 
Hindu India, or a Mahomedan India; it must be compounded of all the 
elements which existed at present in India – Hindu, Mahomedan, Parsee, 
Christian, aye, and the Englishman who adopted India as his country. And 
they all could do something for that great cause. Every word they uttered, 
every action they performed, should help to promote by a continual process 
greater solidarity among them all, seeking in one way and another to remove 
those differences which had, unfortunately, kept them so long apart” .542
  For his appeasing position towards the Muslims and for his liberal and secular 
nationalism, Gokhale was attacked by the ‘Extremists’ in the columns of the Mahratta 
saying that in his anxiety ‘to please the Mahomedans, you have forgotten to perform your 
duty to the Hindu Community’ . The Marathi Hindu Punch, another Poona newspaper, 543
and the Bengali Bande Mataram even accused Gokhale of having conspired with Lord 
Morley in order to attain Tilak’s imprisonment for six years in 1908. The Hindu Punch, in 
particular, wickedly defamed Gokhale who was unjustly accused of having gone to 
England with public money to fall at the feet of the Secretary of State. In the same 
newspapers, Gokhale was called the honourable parrot and cartoons depicted him as a rat 
begging at the feet of the British or as a horse ridden and whipped by an Englishman . 544
Also the Ganapati Festival in Poona in 1909 was used as a platform to discredit Gokhale 
and correlate the accusations that he was the man behind Tilak’s deportation. It was 
especially “songs sung before large mixed audiences of students, women and children by 
 Speech by Gokhale quoted in “Liberalism and Nationalism”, The Mahratta, 11 July 1909.540
 “Indian Reception to Gokhale”, Speech delivered by Gokhale in London, 19 July 1912, 541
Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 395.
 “Indian Reception to Gokhale”, 393-94.542
 “An open letter to the Hon’ble Mr. G.K. Gokhale CIE, The Mahratta, 18 April 1909.543
 In the Gokhale Papers, there is a file ‘Hindu Punch defamation case”, in which cartoons and 544
translations in English are provided. The newspaper shut down because it had to pay a fine 
following the case filed by Gokhale against it.
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several melas, particularly by the Sanmitra Samal Mela [that] contain[ed] vile criticism and 
false, unfounded, and filthy charges against our respected fellow-townsman Hon. Mr. 
Gokhale” .545
  Gokhale’s liberal conceptualisation of the Indian nation had been already criticised by 
Tilak, who said that it was preposterous that so many religious nationalities could be 
brought together under the same political head in India:
“It is simply the height of narrow-mindedness in them who suggest that the 
inductive method of regenerating and perfecting parts before the 
regeneration of the whole should be given up in favour of one in which the 
regeneration of the whole is to be attempted before that of its parts” .546
Gokhale, on the contrary, asserted that:
“I recognise no limits to my aspiration for our motherland, I want our people 
to be in their own country what other people are in theirs, I want our men and 
women, without distinctions of caste or creed, to have opportunities to grow 
to the full height of their stature, unhampered by cramping and unnatural 
restrictions, I want India to take her proper place among the rest of the 
nations of the world, politically, industrially, in religion, in literature, in science 
and in arts. I want all this and feel at the same time that the whole of this 
aspiration can, in its essence and its reality, be realised within this Empire” .547
  Then, from a position of loyalty towards the British and from his acceptance of Western 
ideas, Gokhale envisioned the possibility of socially and politically integrating the India 
over which the British Raj had imposed a viable unity. Indians had lo learn how to live 
together. Only once the Indian nation was moulded, then there would be no further need 
for foreigners to govern them and India could become a self-governing dominion.
  The existence of the nation found its natural limits in the interest of the other nations and 
in the general interest of the well-being of whole humanity. According to the Mahratta, 
instead, the man who sought to embrace humanity was nearly off hist feet and universal 
 India, 5 November 1909.545
 “Revivalism and Nationality”, The Mahratta, 19 October 1902.546
 “The Work before Us”, 217.547
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benevolence was useless for the purpose of effective practical action. Moreover, the 
individual’s rights had to be surrendered to communities .548
Educating the Nation
  Even if Gokhale left the field of social reform to focus on the political one, he was never 
indifferent to those efforts to which he had dedicated himself at the beginning of his career. 
He always laid great emphasis on the need for the amelioration of the poor and on 
providing the masses with opportunities and means of self-elevation. The spread of 
primary education was pivotal in this sense. In fact, only if the entire population of India 
became literate, unity and progress in all its aspects - social, political industrial - would be 
hastened and facilitated. For this reason, free and compulsory elementary education 
became the object of one of Gokhale’s most important battles, carried out - and 
unfortunately lost  - in the last part of his career and life. The Servants of India Society 549
was instrumental in supporting Gokhale’s effort at the grassroots level. 
  We have seen above how in the Bombay Presidency, education was dominated mainly 
by Brahmans and the lower castes were generally disadvantaged. Yet, the reformers 
campaigned for the spread of education, which was in their opinion a fundamental medium 
to liberate the masses from superstition and ignorance and to further India’s regeneration. 
The Poona Sarvajanika Sabha and the Deccan Education Society had been very active at 
the time of the Hunter Commission  in promoting the need for introducing compulsory 550
primary education with the economic support of the government and in opposing the 
substitution of secular education with a religious one . Nevertheless, due mainly to the 551
protest of landlords and political leaders, the Hunter commission did not recommend the 
introduction of compulsory primary education. In general, it is important to note that 
 “Liberalism and Nationalism II”, The Mahratta, 25 July 1909. The Mahratta attacked liberal 548
nationalism in a series of three prolix editorials published on the issue of the 18 and 25 July and 1 
August 1909.
 Free and compulsory education was attained only after Independence. 549
 It was an Education Commission appointed in 1882 by Lord Ripon to inquire into the state of 550
education with special reference to the role of the government in maintaining the educational 
institutions and to the kind of education to be imparted. In the 1890s, the government handed over 
the management of the primary schools to elected municipalities. Here, were Indian Nationalists 
were in power, they could pursue their political agenda and exclude the undesirable people, that is 
lower classes and castes. For example in the municipality of Dapoli in the Bombay Presidency a 
supporter of Tilak, Vishnu Hari Barve, refused to give education to untouchable children, who had 
to sit in the veranda. Same thing in the Poona Municipality where nationalists were in power and 
defeated for 30 years the resolutions on compulsory education (Rao, New Perspectives, 163).
 This had been suggested by the missionaries and by the Nationalists (Rao, Foundations of 551
Tilak’s Nationalism, 140-141).
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opposition was not against Western education, because that was considered acceptable 
and a social elevator in high schools. Opposition was substantially against the 
indiscriminate spread of education which could fill the gap between masses and elites. The 
Indian leaders, as a matter of fact, advocated a two-tier system such that higher education 
was confined to upper castes and vocational education for the masses .552
  With the formation of the Indian National Congress, the supporters of mass primary 
education used the Congress platform to promote the cause. It was Gokhale that became 
the staunchest advocate of the spread of elementary education. What Gokhale wanted to 
introduce was very different from the ‘national’ education about which Hindu or Muslim 
leaders  spoke and which was substantially based on religious identity. Also some 553
leaders of the Swadeshi movement such as Aurobindo Ghosh, Bipan Chandra Pal and 
Lala Lajpat Rai were in favour of introducing religious subjects together with secular ones. 
Lajpat Rai introduced religion in the schools of the Arya Samaj in Punjab, whereas Vishnu 
Govind Vijapurkar established national schools in the Bombay Presidency and maintained 
that education was based on the caste system and the theory of rebirth . Gokhale, on the 554
contrary, was against religious education, because it was of no use for the material and 
moral advancement of the nation . 555
  In 1908, Gokhale had demanded the abolition of school fees, so that also the poorest 
families could take into consideration the possibility to send their children to school. In his 
view, the importance attached to education was a great breakthrough in the history of 
human civilisation. It was thanks to this attention that, in Gokhale’s opinion, during the 
nineteenth century, the Western world could reach three fundamental achievements for the 
furtherance of progress, namely the application of science to industrial processes, the 
employment of steam and electricity to annihilate distance, and the rise of democracy . It 556
 Rao, New Perspectives, 162.552
 Among these, for instance, there were Tilak, Syed Husain Bilgrami, Bishan Narain Dhar.553
 Rao, New Perspectives, 165.554
 In a letter from Annie Besant to Gokhale (31 March 1907, Gokhale Papers, NAI), Besant asked 555
Gokhale to sign some articles of the constitutions of an Indian university, the Hindu Banaras 
College, that she was about to create. They were to be signed by representatives of the great 
religions and Besant wanted Gokhale to be one of the representative Hindus. In the document 
attached to the letter it was mentioned that religion and ethics had to be part of true education. 
From a following letter, we understand that Gokhale declined. Besant wrote: “Dear Mr Gokhale, I 
am not quite sure what your objection is. If it is that you think that religion should not be an integral 
part of education. That it should be is with me a fundamental principle and we must agree to differ 
(... ). I believe that India has a been materialised, vulgarised and denationalised by leaving religion 
out of education and all my efforts are turned to returning religion to its proper place” (Besant to 
Gokhale, 1 May 1907, Gokhale Papers, NAI).
 “Elementary Education”, resolution moved by Gokhale in front of the Imperial Legislative 556
Council to start free and compulsory education, 18 March 1910, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 3, 73.
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was the introduction of the employment of steam and machinery that afforded a significant 
material advantage to the ‘West’ so that it could impose its industrial domination over 
India . While making a comparison with other European states, where the percentage of 557
population receiving education was still small, Gokhale invited the Council to consider the 
insignificant progress made by India, which was even more backward. In fact, 
notwithstanding the commitment of the EIC Despatch in 1854 and of the Education 
commission of 1882, Gokhale maintained that the data showed a progress of primary 
education since 1882 only from 1.2 to 1.9, even keeping into account the pupils going to 
unrecognised schools . Gokhale admitted that the principles of liberalism condemned the 558
very idea of compulsion, but that, as also Gladstone had to admit, was the only feasible 
way in which a state could attain the spread of education and reach out to all the strata of 
society .559
  If, initially, Gokhale pressed for the education of girls - since, as seen above, it was 
fundamental to raise the status of women to solve important social issues and to lead to all 
round development of national life -, he began with promoting school as compulsory only 
for boys, being aware that it was necessary to proceed with caution, since the issue of 
women education could be greatly divisive, as the clashes in Pune had taught in the past. 
By and large, Gokhale was induced to moderate his demands and to content duration and 
quality of education, so long as the principal of universality and compulsion were accepted.
  In the first resolution presented in front of the Imperial Legislative Council in 1910, 
Gokhale proposed compulsory education for children (only boys) between 6 and 10. 
During this period, employment of them as labour would be prohibited and subjected to a 
fine. The financial burden of this scheme would fall on the State and Local bodies with the 
proportion of 2 to 1. Gokhale’s expectation was to get the entire population of school-age 
boys at school in 20 years. Elementary education had to be made compulsory by the local 
bodies, enabled by an Act that had to be passed, in their areas. The principle of 
compulsion had to be applied only in those areas where already 33% of the male 
population was at school, in order to avoid compulsion as a premature measure in certain 
areas. Wherever compulsory education had to be introduced, it also had to be free. 
Anyway, the children with parents whose income was below 25 Rs a month, should have 
 “The Swadeshi Movement”, 9 February 1907, Lucknow, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 2, 225. 557
 “Elementary Education”, 76.558
 “Elementary Education Bill”, Imperial Legislative Council, 16 March 1911, Speeches and 559
Writings, Vol. 3, 95.
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free education . If Gokhale had initially proposed that education had to be first free and 560
only in the second place compulsory, he had to come to terms with the official opinion, 
according to which, as the financial situation had changed and new taxes had be 
introduced, the principle of compulsion had the priority, while free and compulsory 
education still remained the ultimate aim. 
  Gokhale’s proposal took a definite shape in the Elementary Education Bill of 1911. 
Gokhale’s Bill was based on the Irish Education Act of 1892 and the English education 
Acts of 1870 and 1876. Notwithstanding its moderation, the Bill was met with widespread 
hostility from different sections of Indian society and of colonial officials. Contrary to the 
official point of view, according to which mass education was a Western idea and, as such, 
it was not suitable for all the countries of the world, Gokhale reminded that the data of 
schooling children provided by the despatch of the Court of Directors in 1854 showed the 
Indian situation as better before the arrival of the EIC. It was therefore disputable that 
mass education was a concept belonging exclusively to the ‘West’ - in fact it was a 
comparatively recently development also there. Yet, what mattered was that the principle 
of mass education had to become universal: in those countries where education had been 
made free and compulsory, it had turned into a powerful factor of change . Also for India, 561
it was ‘the question of the question’. Upon it depended the well-being of thousands of 
children, the increased efficiency of the individual, the higher general level of intelligence, 
the stiffening of the moral backbone of large sections of the community . Against the 562
official objection that India was not ready for such a groundbreaking reform, Gokhale 
responded that similar objections had always been urged against every proposed reform 
and therefore note should not be taken of them. Also the official objection - a colonial 
warhorse since the formation of the Congress - that the educated classes wanted to 
represent the will of the people, which diverged in reality from theirs was rebutted by 
Gokhale, who said that "the educated classes might be in favour [of the Bill]; but what does 
it cost them to be in favour? The question does not really concern them, and mere heroic 
 “Elementary Education”, 81-82. Yet, in 1912, Gokhale changed his mind regarding the gratuity 560
of primary education. If, as a matter of fact, it was decided that it was not free for all (and only 
those children whose family’s income was below 10 Rs. were entitled to free education, so that the 
limit had be lowered compared to the previous idea), it was only to conciliate official opinion and he 
had decided to come to terms with that to convince the British majority to introduce the law. Yet, 
Gokhale admitted: “I have failed in my object. Official opinion has not been conciliated; and I do not 
see why I should allow room for a division in our ranks by adhering to this provision. I shall 
therefore be glad to go back to my original proposal in this matter that, where education is 
compulsory, it should also be free" (“Elementary Education Bill”, 18 March 1912, 128).
 “Elementary Education Bill”, 93.561
 “Elementary Education”, 84.562
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resolutions in favour of this proposal do not really count for much. On the other hand, if 
members of the backward communities assemble and express themselves in favour, the 
argument is used, what do they understand of the Bill? They have not the intelligence to 
understand what would be the effects of the Bill” . Gokhale mentioned as an example 563
that a short time before, a meeting of 2,500 Mahars, that is ‘one of the most depressed 
classes’, was held in Berar and passed a resolution in favour of the Bill. He added that he 
did not know if every member of that body had understood what the Bill was, but ‘they 
must have a fairly general idea that the Bill was intended to make education compulsory 
and that under it their children would be compelled to go to school so hat they might derive 
the benefits of education’ .564
  However, formidable opposition came from the Indian leaders, especially from the 
‘Extremists’ and from some sections of the Muslim League, something which is very telling 
of the contrasting social vision that characterised the nationalist movement. They wanted a 
national education different from the one proposed by Gokhale, because also the nation 
they envisioned was different. Among the members of the Legislative Imperial Council, 
R.N. Mudholkar, Mazhar-ul-Haq and a young Mohammad Ali Jinnah were in favour of free 
and compulsory education, whereas Gangadhar Chitnavis, leading landlord and money 
lender and supporter of Tilak through his Berar Provincial Association, was against the Bill, 
whereas M.D. Dadabhoy supported child labour and was therefore against a measure that 
would deprive capitalists of cheap workforce. Their position, Gokhale maintained, was 
dictated by mere class-interests. Subalterns were to remain such . Some Muslim leaders 565
feared that the compulsory classes of the Bill could be utilised to compel Muslim boys to 
learn non-Muslim languages. In order to remove all apprehensions on that point, Gokhale 
introduced an agreement according to which where there were 25 children speaking a 
particular language attending a school, provision should be made for teaching those 
children in that language, and further, where the number was less than that, it should be 
left to the community itself to say whether the children should come under the compulsory 
clauses of the Bill or not. Gokhale said that he had discussed that matter with several 
leading Muhammadan gentlemen - something which appears from his private papers - and 
he understood that such compromise would meet their view . Gokhale saw those who 566
could not understand the intrinsic value of mass education as incapable of comprehending 
 “Elementary Education Bill”, 138.563
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the dignity of man as a man, since they regarded ‘the poorer classes of the country as 
made solely to serve those who are above them’ ; whereas others were against the bill 567
because the officials were against it and preferred to embrace the official view on the 
matter because the latter have much to give or because 'they are so constituted that 
official favour is to them as the breath of their nostrils and an official frown is a heavy 
misfortune, and because they think nothing of bartering the birthright of our common 
humanity for something even less substantial than the proverbial mess of pottage’ . 568
Certain zamindars said they were against the Bill, because they did not want to contribute 
with their money. Moreover, they were concerned that the spread of child education would 
have made difficulty to find servants and other menial workers for the country. What is 
more, it was not commendable that children of the upper classes were forced to sit in the 
same classroom with children of the lower classes. Others commented that children of 
poor classes could become gentlemen, something that Gokhale did not even want to 
comment. Further objections referred to the risk of an education which could be prejudicial 
towards a certain religious community, to which Gokhale replied that education had to be 
secular in order to avoid any kind of prejudice or religious bias. To those who ridiculed the 
Bill as a limited measure that provided the masses only with the capability of writing and 
reading, Gokhale said that literacy, although basic, was better than illiteracy . But also 569
the Moderates were divided in their response to the Bill. Surendranath Banerjea, for 
instance, was against it because funds would be syphoned off from higher education, 
whereas Pherozshah Mehta wanted the Government of India to take care of the 
responsibility of primary schools and not the municipalities and districts because that 
would have been a pretext for government inaction. Those who were in favour of the Bill 
were some members of the educated classes and the backward communities. 
  With such complicated scenario, it is not surprising that Gokhale’s Bill was defeated. 
Gokhale came out exasperated saying that the opponents were only concerned about 
"providing better dividends for the capitalists” . The failure to introduce the Elementary 570
Education Bill was not ascribable to poverty or colonial rule, but to the reluctance of the 
Indian political leadership to place the interests of the nation above caste and class 
interests. The attitude towards an inclusive kind of education as the one proposed by the 
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Bill, although reasonably cautious, is a litmus of the pattern of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness that divided Indian nationalist leaders .  571
Conclusion
  To conclude, during his public life, Gokhale was involved in building a liberal, secular 
nation. The idea of the nation articulated by Gokhale was predicated on the concept that 
India was mainly a political and territorial unity. Its inhabitants would become Indians once 
they would feel the individual consciousness of being part of the nation and take part into 
its progress and amelioration. Only such national awareness could make the nation 
capable of consolidating itself within its space, while joining the other nations of the British 
Empire and of the world. The nation imagined by Gokhale then was indissolubly connected 
with humanity. 
  By adopting a political idea of nationhood which was opposed to a narrowly cultural one, 
Gokhale articulated a form of nationalism that celebrated differences vis-à-vis parochial 
identities and challenged the concept of nationhood - quite rooted both in Europe and in 
India by the end of the nineteenth century - according to which a country that did not 
possess blood and cultural bonds could not aspire to be a nation. 
  Gokhale’s idea of the nation was defined, on the one hand, by the principles of the British 
liberal tradition and, on the other, in contraposition to the illiberal British rule in India, which 
violated and insulted those same principles. Gokhale’s conceptualisation of the nation was 
in sum a by-product of liberalism and its ‘other’. In Gokhale’s thought, liberalism was a 
safeguard against the oppressive colonial state, but it was also the catalyst for a radical 
social transformation against the internal evils of Indian society. It advocated freedom for 
each individual, regardless of his or her race, religion, class or caste. It was this liberal 
ideology, which wanted to ensure all-round liberties to the individual, to be attacked time 
and again by the ‘Extremists’, because it jeopardised, more than the colonial rule, the 
 Although Gandhi considered Gokhale his political guru and retained his secular ideas, in terms 571
of education he reflected much more the ideas of Tilak. Gandhi opposed Gokhale's compulsory 
education Bill (Young India, 14 August 1924). Moreover, by advocating the abolition of the salt-tax 
and making this the landmark of his campaign against the government - whereas Gokhale had 
promoted the tax on salt as 8 anna to fund primary education - Gandhi nullified Gokhale's plan to 
use the same tax to fund primary education. Further, Gandhi opposed the implementation of 
compulsory elementary education by the Maharaja of Baroda. By and large, modern education for 
Gandhi, like for Tilak, was alienating for the masses, textbooks were useless, if not harmful, and 
what kept society together were high loyalties such as faith, parents and dharma. Gandhi claimed 
to be defending Indian spiritual tradition and to find an alternative to ‘Western’ modernity (Rao, 
New Perspectives, 171-73). 
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persistence of the master-servant relationships that characterised Indian society. The 
stratagem was to identify Gokhale and the ‘Moderate’ leadership of the Congress with the 
collaborators of the colonial rule, committed to promote colonial modernity to the detriment 
of the traditional Hindu ethos.
 In short, then, the nation envisioned by Gokhale was inclusionary, individual-based, 
forward-looking, based on a common future in which economic and social discrimination 
would be finally overturned. It was predicated on an idea, rather than on external symbols. 
And exactly this was its weakness: being too rational and far-sighted, it did not arouse 
deep and compelling passions. Gokhale’s speeches and appeals were addressed not to 
the masses, but to the educated Indians. Gokhale did not work among the masses, but for 
the masses. His political programme was based on political principles that could hardly be 
captivating for the ‘ignorant’ Indian people until they reached a certain level of education 
and political awareness. Therefore, the Indian masses had to be included gradually in the 
active political life of the nation. Gokhale, thus, did not theorise an oligarchy for India. On 
the contrary, he laid emphasis on the fact that “any progress we make as a people must 
now be on a democratic basis (…). And for this purpose it is not a few towering individuals 
that will suffice, but the average strength of the mass of the people must be raised” . 572
Three were the fundamental factors that could facilitate this scope: the spread of 
education, sine qua non for the creation of a national culture and crucial medium to foster 
national unity and material and moral advancement; the enjoyment of self-government as 
the only hope for Indians to safeguard their rights and interests and discover their common 
purpose as a nation; the continuance of the British connection, so that India could be 
trained in the practice of liberty and free institutions and remain within the space of the 
Empire and under the guidance of British liberal sway.
  Gokhale’s merit was certainly that of familiarising their countrymen with the concept of 
Indian nationality and of providing his successors within the Indian National Congress with 
the powerful and far-reaching ideal of a human, secular, and democratic nationalism. To 
this principle the Congress continued to be inspired even when it was transformed, thanks 
to Gandhi’s action, into a militant political party capable of employing ‘new symbols and 
slogans which appealed to the minds and heart of millions of men and women who had 
hitherto remained practically untouched by politics’ . 573
 Speech at Calcutta, 2 September 1911, Speeches and Writings, Vol. 3, 244.572
 Nanda, Gokhale, 492-93.573
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CONCLUSION
   In the course of this work we have seen how liberalism, especially in its Indian version, 
namely what Indian intellectuals thought functional in the colonial context, played a pivotal 
role in creating a new ethos that, for the first time in the course of Indian history, advocated 
not only the freedom of the individual from social and religious restrictions, but also 
equality between individuals. Liberalism thus constituted the foundation of Gokhale’s 
ideology and the bedrock of his political nationalism, which placed the political individual at 
the centre of the nation. So, Gokhale envisioned the Indian nation as the political entity 
where everybody was entitled to civic and political rights and equal in front of the law. All 
were citizens being inhabitants of the British Empire and according to the British liberal 
tradition.
  Antithetic to Gokhale’s political nationalism was the cultural nationalist ideology which 
was based on the concept that the most important section of the society was the culturally-
defined group. But this cultural nationalism, promoted by Tilak and later on systematised 
by Savarkar, identified itself with the Hindu culture, depicted as the only authentically 
Indian culture of the subcontinent, even though, as seen above, Hinduism as a monolithic 
religion was a by-product of the socio-cultural change brought by colonialism and therefore 
outcome of modernity. However, since Hindu culture was presented as the only social and 
moral binding factor of the nation and described as ancient, pure and characterised by 
permanent traits, the most logical consequence was an attitude of resistance against 
influences coming from other cultures. In a reality as diverse as India, such a vision of the 
nation could not but lead, besides to the obvious rejection of everything British, to the 
exclusion of the Muslim minority, who, in this nationalist discourse, was regarded as one of 
the historical agent that had greatly contributed to the contamination and decline of the 
glorious Hindu past. 
  Of course, both political and cultural nationalism were innovating and modern. Tilak’s 
ideas were by no means more traditional than Gokhale’s ones. As seen above, in fact, 
nationalism is always a modern phenomenon. Indian nationalists, then, embraced and 
blended ideas loosely taken both from the European and Indian history and the respective 
intellectual legacies. The combination was different because the nation they imagined was 
different and therefore they needed strategies that could better serve their purposes.
   Gokhale’s imagined nation was cultural, political, and territorial. But in the Congress 
leader’s ideology, it was the voluntaristic element, that is the individual consciousness of 
being part of a given nationality, the most powerful sentiment that made the nation capable 
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of constituting itself. Belonging to the same culture - and, as seen, Indian culture was, in 
Gokhale’s outlook, very different from what Tilak or Savarkar maintained - was not enough 
to unite the nation. In order to achieve national unity, what was crucial was the political will 
to participate to the well-being of the nation.
  With his emphasis on the individual and his concept of the nation as medium to proceed 
along with the other nations - and not to the detriment of the other nations - on the path of 
human progress, Gokhale is significantly kept in the background nowadays. According to 
Gokhale, and his life provided an example of what he meant, religion had to remain 
relegated into the private sphere and be logically separate from politics, especially in a 
nation with several confessions like India. The individual then had to be decomposed into 
religious man and citizen: this decomposition would be encouraged by political 
emancipation, carried out through education and an increasing association in self-
government. Religious neutrality, thus, was the only way to bring together the different 
communities and include them on a level of equality into the nation. It is quite telling, in this 
respect, that various members of the Muslim League looked up to Gokhale and appealed 
to him to ask for concessions. Mohammad Ali Jinnah said that it was his ambition to 
become the Muslim Gokhale. Also Ambedkar, the eminent leader of the Dalit community, 
highly reputed Gokhale and his socio-political vision and thought that the Congressman 
was entitled to everlasting gratitude for his zeal and sacrifice. 
   The fact that the leaders of the weakest sections of the Indian society valued Gokhale’s 
work explains that his liberal conceptualisation of the nation accommodated the needs of 
the different Indian communities. By advocating a liberal, secular, and egalitarian society, 
free from religious and caste prejudices and an Indian nationality based on citizenship, 
Gokhale suggested that all members of the nation were equal and bore the same rights. 
From this ideological position, not only did Gokhale ask for a greater Indian participation in 
the colonial government, but he also endorsed the creation of a fairer society, which could 
not be realised without the eradication of the master-servant relationship inherent within 
Hindu society.
  All in all, then, Gokhale’s nation was not felt as an exclusionary value, to the detriment of 
the ‘Other’. On the contrary - and in this sense the spirit of Mazzini’s nationalism resonates 
in Gokhale’s thought - the highest duty of the nation rested on the accomplishment of the 
supreme end, namely humanity. In Gokhale’s nationalist ideology, thus, beyond the 
individuality of the nation, we find the universalism of humanity, epitomised by the Empire. 
It was in the welfare of the other nations that each nation had its natural limits. Such a 
vision could only be predicated on the principle of inner and outer liberty. In other words, 
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the freedom of the Indian nation was not only about who controlled society, but also and 
more importantly, about the welfare of all Indians, regardless of their religion, class, or 
caste. And this is, I believe, the greatest lesson that Gokhale bequeathed. 
   Therefore, Gokhale’s idea of the nation remains important in today’s India for two main 
reasons. In the first place, it is a powerful antidote against the narrow-mindedness of 
certain outlooks that consider one’s culture as a watertight container, resistant to the 
influence of the Other’s culture. The danger of such an approach, which requires one to 
hate what is foreign just because it is foreign and denies even the highest achievements of 
different civilisations while admiring its own customs regardless of their effect on the 
freedom of the individual, is self-explanatory. Gokhale, rather than being dazzled by the 
‘West’, appreciated the values and principles of the Enlightenment because he thought 
they could contribute to the amelioration of the Indian society, therefore they were not 
simply a product of the West, but conquests of human reason. 
   In the second place, in a context like the contemporary Indian one, where religion keeps 
on being a ritualised public performance that determines one’s belonging (or non-
belonging) to the nation, the concept of liberty formulated by Gokhale is meaningful 
because it stands for liberty for all citizens, irrespective of their religious or caste identity. 
Gokhale’s freedom, then, is foundation of a secular state that accords the same rights, 
duties, and dignity to the followers of every religion. According to Gokhale, in fact, in a 
country as culturally rich as India, the state had to be secular, neutral, and equidistant from 
every religious confession. This is particularly significant today as a bulwark against the 
ideology of  Hindutva, against the state that identifies itself with the Hinduness of the 
majority and elaborates a discourse that excludes non-Hindus
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